Who Ordered the Ship Attacks: The IRGC Claims Higher Approval as Tehran Sidelines Araghchi

The dispute over who authorized the July attacks on three ships, which undid the Islamabad memorandum, is now the sharpest open fault line in Tehran. The IRGC spokesman says the strikes were approved by unnamed higher officials, reformists say President Pezeshkian was not told, and the Leader’s office has said nothing. We assess with high confidence that the hardline camp around the IRGC command holds the initiative. It controls Iran’s most important lever, the Strait of Hormuz, and it claims cover from above. Speaker Qalibaf is defending the negotiating track in the IRGC’s own language, and Foreign Minister Araghchi has been moved off the U.S. file. At sea, the army commander says the strait will stay closed, and at least ten ships have been attacked near it since Sunday. The axis marked Yahya Sinwar’s second anniversary through its media while Iran’s senior leaders stayed silent. Washington is tightening financial pressure and has pledged no new strikes before the November 3 midterms, so the period of greatest risk begins after that date.

The Ship-Attack Dispute Becomes a Contest for Authority

The argument over the memorandum moved into public view on Khabar TV’s live program Be Vaght-e Iran. Former Tehran mayor Gholamhossein Karbaschi said that the strikes on three ships in Hormuz after the memorandum was signed had violated it and handed Washington the pretext it wanted. He then asked whether the president could really be unaware of who had hit the ships. Veteran reformist Behzad Nabavi had earlier relayed an account in which Pezeshkian complained to the armed forces commanders, who denied responsibility and said no order had been given.

IRGC spokesman Brig. Gen. Hossein Mohebbi answered on October 15. He said the attacks on “violating” ships were “neither arbitrary nor carried out without coordination with higher officials.” He described them as a decisive response to the third U.S. breach of its commitments, two during the talks and one after signature. He did not say who the officials were. The wording protects the commanders and points above the president, while leaving Pezeshkian exposed. Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi has said Iran suspended its memorandum commitments because of U.S. breaches, and Euronews Persian framed the episode as a choice between the president’s ignorance and an IRGC claim of authorization from the top.

Kayhan’s managing editor, Hossein Shariatmadari, who is appointed by the Leader’s office, used his October 15 commentary to attack former foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif over his reference to the 1828 Treaty of Turkmenchay. He also rejected Hossein Marashi’s call for a tactical retreat, dismissed Hassan Rouhani’s referendum proposal, and accused such figures of acting as American envoys. The reformist camp is not united either. Activist Mohammad Reza Jalaeipour rejected Karbaschi’s argument, saying that Trump needs no excuse to walk away from a deal and that restraint could cost Iran its missiles and its leverage in Hormuz.

The decisive actors in this contest are the IRGC command and the Leader’s office. The IRGC claims cover from higher officials, and the Leader has not contradicted it. Until he does, Pezeshkian and Araghchi carry the political cost of a policy they do not control. We assess with high confidence that the authorization dispute is the most serious open division in Tehran. Neither side has named the authority involved, and the dispute could stay unresolved for some time.

Qalibaf Straddles Both Camps

Speaker and lead negotiator Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf released a video message on the night of October 14 in which he said Iran is fighting and negotiating at the same time. In his account, Iran must fight with full strength when necessary and then turn battlefield gains into a political record of the enemy’s defeat. The purpose of fighting, he said, is to leave the enemy with no option except to accept Iran’s demands or concede defeat. He called the Islamabad memorandum a document of America’s defeat, said the United States must change its behavior and be punished for breaking its word, and explained that he insisted on a two-stage text because he did not trust Washington. He rejected both endless war and endless talks.

The speech defends the negotiating track in the IRGC’s vocabulary of punishment. It shields Qalibaf from the charge of weakness that Kayhan and the Paydari camp have leveled at negotiators, and it keeps him available as the channel to Washington. In late August, Iran International described a conciliatory current around Qalibaf and a confrontational current around Mohsen Rezaei, IRGC commander Ahmad Vahidi, and Basij chief Hossein Taeb. This week’s exchanges fit that picture with one revision. Qalibaf now speaks the confrontational camp’s language in order to stay in the game. We assess with moderate confidence that he is the most likely bridge if Washington offers a new formula after November 3. Our October 15 update covered the U.S. proposal he confirmed earlier in the week.

The president is emphasizing endurance and money. At a Nurse Day event, Pezeshkian said bombs and missiles cannot force a nation to surrender and warned that internal division is the real danger. He added that, if funds allow, he would sooner pay public-sector salaries than import gasoline. First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref said Iran will stop gasoline imports this year and redirect the savings to subsidies and e-vouchers. Pezeshkian travels to Yerevan today for the summit of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, where Tehran plans to document environmental damage from U.S. and Israeli strikes.

On the hardline side, Vahidi has repeated that no outside power has any right to a presence in Hormuz or the Persian Gulf, and he has called for maximum use of domestic capacity to raise combat power. Mohammad Mokhber, adviser to the Leader, visited the family of a nurse killed in the war and praised the patience of martyrs’ families. Supreme National Security Council secretary Mohsen Rezaei has called the latest U.S. response inadequate.

Araghchi Is Moved Off the American File

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has not disappeared, but his role has narrowed since he returned from the UN General Assembly in late September. On October 6, a member of parliament filed an impeachment motion accusing him of meeting U.S. officials without the Leader’s permission, and Didban Iran published the names of 35 signatories. On October 7, Araghchi spent three hours answering questions in the Majlis. He said his team had followed the instructions of the competent authorities and floated a seven-day plan to reopen Hormuz if Washington accepted Iran’s conditions, a plan that Trump rejected.

Since then, the U.S. channel has run through Qalibaf as negotiator and Rezaei at the Supreme National Security Council, while the IRGC runs Hormuz. Araghchi has worked the telephone with Lebanon’s President Joseph Aoun and Iraq’s Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein, and on October 15 he sent a message to the deputy foreign minister of the Houthi government in Sanaa condemning the blockade of Yemen. Iran sent only a deputy foreign minister to the CICA summit in Baku. Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei, not the minister, now fronts the ministry’s public messaging.

Araghchi reappears at the OIC Council of Foreign Ministers in Baghdad on October 17 and 18, his first visit since Iraq completed its new cabinet. We assess with moderate confidence that his low profile reflects the impeachment threat and the IRGC-led turn at sea, and that he retains the regional and multilateral portfolio. Baghdad will show whether he still speaks for Iran on Hormuz and the memorandum or only on Islamic solidarity and Yemen. A move by the Majlis presidium to schedule the impeachment vote would be the clearest sign of a decision to remove him.

The Military Line Hardens at Sea

Army commander Maj. Gen. Amir Hatami told a ceremony at Imam Ali Officers’ University on the evening of October 15 that Hormuz was closed when the war began, remains closed, and will stay closed until the enemy respects the rights of the Iranian nation. He said the IRGC Navy manages the western part of the strait and the regular Navy the eastern part and the Gulf of Oman. According to Hatami, the armed forces decided a few days ago on decisive action against violating ships, many have since hit mines or been struck, and traffic is now very limited. He also set out a deterrent equation: if Iran’s infrastructure is threatened, the infrastructure of the United States, Israel, and anyone who cooperates with them will suffer damage several times greater.

Defa Press’s weekly defense roundup lists IRGC communiqués 18 and 19, on a strike on the LPG carrier NV Sunshine and a mined crude supertanker that exploded and burned. It also lists further mined tankers, a 2,500 TEU container ship sunk south of the strait, and a drone strike on a dhow off Sirik. IRGC Navy commander Ali Azmaei warned that ships switching off their transponders would face severe action. A former senior officer of the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters threatened a complete closure of Bab al-Mandab if the United States enters the Yemen war.

The independent record confirms a sharp rise in attacks, although it does not confirm every Iranian claim. Maritime security firm Marisks confirmed that three merchant ships were struck on Tuesday, all with tracking switched off, and counts at least ten vessels attacked near the strait since Sunday, the highest number since the war began. CENTCOM says an IRGC projectile hit the Singapore-flagged container ship GFS PRIDE, which later sank. It also reported destroying an Iran-affiliated dhow in the Gulf of Oman, and the carrier USS George H.W. Bush has returned to the Arabian Sea. Reuters reported that Washington is weighing an easing of sanctions on shadow-fleet tankers to bring freight costs down.

We assess with high confidence that Iran’s armed forces are raising the cost of Gulf trade. Iran does not need to stop every ship to claim control. It needs to make transit dangerous enough that insurers and owners stay away, and the sinking of GFS PRIDE and the mine strikes give that claim real weight this week. Even so, non-Iranian Gulf exports continue at high volumes.

Washington Pairs Financial Pressure With a Pause on Strikes

On October 15, the Treasury Department announced a new package under Operation Economic Outcast. It targets Iraq’s International Development Bank for Investment and Finance, which it accuses of giving Iran access to dollars, the offshore Jazireh International Bank Company and Chabahar International Bank Overseas Company, a Dubai-based oil intermediary, and exchange houses with links to the UAE, Hong Kong, and Turkey. A FinCEN alert asks banks to watch for the diversion of religious charity funds through khums payments, hawala, and cash couriers. The State Department also sanctioned Cuba’s BICSA bank for servicing Iran’s Karafarin Bank. Our Economic Press Review for October 16 examines how these measures land in Iran’s markets.

On the military side, President Trump ruled out the use of nuclear weapons, said Iran’s navy, air force, and army are largely destroyed, and told Fox News he does not know who Washington is negotiating with. That remark feeds Tehran’s internal argument over who holds authority. Trump has pledged no new strikes before the November 3 midterms. CNN reported that the White House and the Pentagon hold plans to use the GBU-43 MOAB against Iranian sites if ordered, and the White House declined to comment. In Israel, Prime Minister Netanyahu said a strike on Iran before the country’s October 27 election would not be in Israel’s interest.

We assess with moderate confidence that both sides believe time favors them. Tehran reads the U.S. pause as space to raise costs, and Washington reads tightening finance as a slow squeeze. The period of greatest risk opens after November 3, when the U.S. pledge expires and Israel’s election is over.

Sinwar’s Anniversary and Tehran’s Silence

Hamas, the Qassam Brigades, and the Popular Resistance Committees marked the second anniversary of Yahya Sinwar’s death with statements presenting it as the start of a phase that is still unfolding. Iranian state outlets amplified that message in Arabic and Persian. Al-Vefagh, IRNA’s Arabic-language daily, gave its entire Thursday front page to Sinwar, and Defa Press, Mehr, IQNA, and IRIB News carried tributes. The Israeli army chose the anniversary morning to publish documents it attributes to Sinwar, which it says show planning to film the October 7 attack and to draw Hezbollah and West Bank factions into a wider war. The documents have not been independently authenticated.

Iran’s senior leaders said nothing. By midday in Tehran, no anniversary message had appeared from Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, Qalibaf, Araghchi, Vahidi, or the Foreign Ministry spokesman. In October 2024, the Leader’s office issued a personal message on Sinwar’s killing. We assess with moderate confidence that Tehran is leaving the commemoration to its media and the Palestinian factions while its leaders are absorbed by the memorandum dispute and the war at sea. A late message remains possible, and its absence would be worth noting, because Mojtaba Khamenei has made few public statements since taking office.

The anniversary coverage also carries the eliminationist vocabulary common in axis media, including pledges to fight until Israel is gone. The Foreign Ministry answered criticism from British Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband with a Nazi comparison. These themes continue the pattern described in our special report on antisemitic propaganda in Iranian state media. No new report on the situation of Iran’s Jewish community appeared in the outlets reviewed.

Yemen, Lebanon, and Iraq

On October 15, Houthi missiles and drones struck the Maashiq presidential compound in Aden, seat of Yemen’s internationally recognized government. The health minister reported five people killed and 16 wounded, and the cabinet said ministries would keep working from Aden. Marib’s media office reported nine ballistic missiles and seven other projectiles fired at the city. Houthi spokesman Yahya Saree said the targets were Saudi command sites and depots and denied attacking Medina. The Saudi-led coalition says the Houthis have attacked Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport 20 times since October 1. Riyadh accuses Iran of arming and training the Houthis, France has begun deploying assets to protect Saudi oil facilities, and the EU-Gulf summit planned for October 24 has been postponed. Former U.S. envoy Tim Lenderking warns that the Houthis are acting with growing independence from Tehran.

In Lebanon, a Hezbollah member of parliament acknowledged that 780 kilograms of explosives seized on October 5 belonged to the group and asked for their return. Secretary of State Marco Rubio urged President Aoun to keep the explosives and hold those responsible to account. Lebanon’s central bank revoked the local license of Iran’s Bank Saderat. Unnamed Lebanese military sources told Emirati media that Iran has instructed Hezbollah to raise its readiness for an imminent regional war, but no Hezbollah statement confirms this.

In Iraq, parliament completed the new cabinet on October 15. The appointments include Asaib Ahl al-Haq’s Laith al-Khazali as a deputy prime minister and figures linked to Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada and Kataib Imam Ali at the ministries of tourism and the digital economy. The vote came on the same day that Treasury designated an Iraqi bank for giving Iran access to dollars.

The Economy Contracts Without Collapsing

Iran’s economy continues to shrink under pressure. The free-market dollar stood near 267,900 tomans on Friday morning, against an official remittance rate of about 180,557 tomans, a premium of roughly 48 percent. September inflation was 73.6 percent. The Statistical Center put first-quarter GDP at minus 10.1 percent including oil, and the IMF forecasts a 7.6 percent contraction for 2026. The Trade Promotion Organization reports that first-half foreign trade fell about 34 percent by weight. Registration for the expanded e-voucher program, which requires self-declaration from about 18.3 million household heads, closes today after technical problems forced an extension. Tracked Iranian seaborne crude exports remain near zero, while other Gulf producers have recovered more than 81 percent of prewar flows. Brent traded near $105 a barrel and WTI near $97 on Friday morning.

Key Points

1. The ship-attack authorization dispute is the sharpest open fault line in Tehran. The IRGC spokesman says higher officials approved the July attacks, reformist accounts say Pezeshkian was not told, neither side names the authority, and the Leader’s office is silent. (High confidence.)

2. The hardline camp around the IRGC command holds the initiative. It controls Hormuz and claims cover from above, and Pezeshkian’s camp can protest but cannot reverse its decisions. (Moderate confidence.)

3. Qalibaf is straddling both camps. He defends the memorandum as a record of America’s defeat and demands U.S. punishment, which protects him from hardline attack while he keeps the negotiating track open. (Moderate confidence.)

4. Araghchi has been pushed to the margins of the U.S. file but keeps the regional portfolio. The impeachment motion is pending, a deputy went to the CICA summit in Baku, and he will attend the OIC meeting in Baghdad on October 17 and 18. (Moderate confidence.)

5. The armed forces are raising the cost of Gulf trade and say Hormuz stays closed. Hatami’s speech, IRGC communiqués 18 and 19, the mine strikes, and the sinking of GFS PRIDE support this, and Marisks counts at least ten attacks near the strait since Sunday. (High confidence.)

6. Washington pairs financial pressure with a declared pause on strikes until November 3. The Treasury and FinCEN actions of October 15, Trump’s midterm pledge, reported MOAB planning, and a carrier back in the Arabian Sea all point in this direction. (Moderate confidence.)

7. Iran’s senior leadership left the Sinwar anniversary to the media and the movements. No message from the Leader, Qalibaf, Araghchi, or the IRGC command had appeared by midday, in contrast with 2024, although a late message remains possible. (Moderate confidence.)

What to Watch

• Any statement from the Leader’s office on who authorized the July ship attacks, or a further IRGC statement naming the higher officials.
• A personal message on the Sinwar anniversary from Mojtaba Khamenei, Qalibaf, or Vahidi, or its continued absence.
• The Majlis presidium’s handling of the Araghchi impeachment motion, and Araghchi’s message at the OIC meeting in Baghdad.
• The Majlis confidence vote on the defense minister nominee, scheduled for Sunday, October 18.
• Qalibaf’s next move, whether a fresh statement on the U.S. response or a renewed clash with Kayhan and the Paydari camp.
• Further IRGC communiqués on mined or struck ships, and CENTCOM attribution of new incidents.
• Any U.S. decision on easing sanctions on shadow-fleet tankers, and Treasury follow-up on Iraqi and offshore banks.
• Houthi strikes on Riyadh, Aden, and Marib, and any move toward Bab al-Mandab.
• Pezeshkian’s meetings on the sidelines in Yerevan and any comment on the memorandum dispute while abroad.
• The free-market dollar when markets reopen on Saturday, and the outcome of the e-voucher registration deadline.

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This post summarizes our daily intelligence report on the U.S.-Israel-Iran war, the Strait of Hormuz, the Axis of Resistance, and the Iranian media for October 16, 2026, with an information cutoff of 12:15 Tehran time. Iran’s daily newspapers do not print on Fridays, so Iranian material comes mainly from news agencies and official channels, including IRNA, Defa Press, Mehr, Tasnim, IQNA, IRIB News, Fararu, Didban Iran, Entekhab, Nour News, Mardom Salari, Saed News, and Al-Vefagh’s Thursday edition, together with IranWire, Radio Farda, Euronews Persian, Iran International, Gooya News, and NIAC’s summaries. Palestinian statements come from Hamas via Tawassoul and from Safa. Maritime coverage draws on Marisks via CBS News, CENTCOM, and UKMTO. U.S. coverage draws on the Treasury Department, Fox News, CBS News, and CNN. Yemen, Lebanon, and Iraq coverage draws on Saba, Al-Sahwa, the Saudi Press Agency, the Critical Threats Project, Al-Ahed, Bloomberg, and the Iraqi parliament. Economic data come from Iran’s Statistical Center, the Trade Promotion Organization, the IMF, Trading Economics, and market-rate trackers. Party claims are labeled as such, and confidence levels follow the source assessment. See also the Iranian Press Monitor for October 15 and the Qatar Watch for October 15.