Preparing Without Deciding: Washington Rearms as Tehran Widens Its Threats Before Two Elections

The United States and Iran are both preparing for renewed war without committing to one. A U.S. carrier in the Arabian Sea has been rearmed with standoff weapons and bunker-penetrating bombs, and some American personnel have left regional outposts, but no strike order has been made public. Tehran has answered by widening its threats to Israeli cities, the Dimona nuclear site, U.S. warships, Gulf energy infrastructure, and undersea cables. It is also using high oil prices as political leverage against President Trump. The Houthis have turned Saudi airports and pipelines into a second front of Gulf energy risk. Sunday’s Iranian press adds the most detailed public target list yet, naming desalination plants, power stations, ports, and airports across Israel and the Gulf. With Israel voting on October 27 and the United States on November 3, we assess that each side believes added pressure improves its position, and that this belief raises the risk of miscalculation.

Washington Prepares, but Has Not Decided

President Trump’s public remarks on October 24 paired a direct threat of renewed strikes with the prospect of a “big, beautiful agreement.” He questioned whether Iran would honor a settlement, and he defended higher oil prices as an acceptable cost of keeping Tehran from a nuclear weapon. These statements leave the decision open and preserve room to negotiate. His claims about Iran’s nuclear capabilities and casualties are his own assertions.

Military preparation is more visible than the political decision. During a rare press visit to the USS George Washington and an accompanying destroyer, The Wall Street Journal documented a large replenishment of aircraft munitions, standoff weapons, and bunker-penetrating bombs. U.S. officials described contingency plans for escalation and said the ships were preparing for it in the coming days or weeks. Trump told reporters on October 24 that he was thinking about a strike, possibly as early as the next day. However, the reporting did not establish that the president has authorized new strikes, and the carrier is also engaged in blockade and shipping-protection duties.

Separately, U.S. outlets reported that some American personnel were withdrawn from regional outposts after intelligence warnings about possible Iranian plans to attack U.S. citizens and facilities. The underlying intelligence memorandum has not been published. The U.S. Embassy in Beirut also warned personnel and citizens about the city’s southern suburbs. These protective steps should be read separately from the reinforcement of naval strike power. Through the report’s cutoff, no authenticated Pentagon or CENTCOM statement announced a new strike on Iran. Washington’s economic pressure continues through Treasury’s October 21 sanctions on shipping agents, legal intermediaries, and vessels that support Iran’s commodity trade. For the previous day’s picture, see our October 24 daily.

Tehran Widens the Target List

Iran’s dominant message is that a third round of war would be wider in both geography and target type. A montage titled “New Fronts Will Be Opened,” released through the Supreme Leader’s official media, combines missiles, drones, a nuclear-related silhouette, vessels, and Gulf geography in a single warning. It is a deliberate signaling product. It is not an operational order or a verified target list.

Major General Ali Abdollahi, chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, said Tehran would not allow U.S. warships into the Persian Gulf “under any circumstances.” He also disputed Trump’s account of damage to Iran’s nuclear facilities and claimed that Iran can sustain a long confrontation. This statement turns the dispute over individual transits into a claim to exclude U.S. naval forces altogether. Iran’s ability to enforce that claim against the U.S. Navy is doubtful.

Ebrahim Azizi, who chairs the Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, published a warning in Persian, English, and Hebrew that any action against Iran’s security could make Israel uninhabitable in under an hour. The accompanying map marks the Dimona nuclear research center, the Haifa, Ashdod, and Ashkelon refineries, four desalination plants, the Orot Rabin and Eshkol power stations, highway bridges, and the Eilat-Ashkelon oil pipeline. A Defa Press commentary by Mohammad Zarchini listed seven options for a renewed war. The most far-reaching is a ground attack on Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain aimed at seizing territory. Others include strikes on Aramco and Ras Laffan, missile strikes on U.S. and British bases as far away as Diego Garcia, RAF Fairford, and Cyprus, and drone attacks on U.S. embassies in five Arab capitals. The piece is a scenario essay published by the armed forces’ own news agency. It is not a directive. Its value lies in showing how broad the threatened target set has become in media close to the military. Brigadier General Hossein Mohebbi, identified in Iranian reporting as an IRGC spokesman, framed the conflict as an attack on Iran’s identity and civilization, a message aimed mainly at domestic cohesion.

Social media accounts also reported Iranian missile-readiness launches near Yazd, Kerman, and Qazvin on October 24. The locations, numbers, and purposes of these launches have not been confirmed through range notices, telemetry, or official exercise records.

Sunday’s papers turned these warnings into a list of named facilities. Kayhan, whose managing editor is appointed by the Supreme Leader, led with a report placing a revised “target bank” within Iran’s reach. In the Gulf it names Abqaiq and Ras Tanura in Saudi Arabia, ADNOC’s Ruwais refinery, Ras Laffan and the North Field in Qatar, and Kuwait’s main refineries. In Israel it names the Leviathan and Tamar gas fields and the Haifa and Ashdod refineries. It also lists desalination plants and power stations on both sides of the Gulf, the Barakah nuclear plant, the ports of Jebel Ali, Haifa, Ashdod, and Hamad, and the main airports of Dubai, Tel Aviv, Doha, Jeddah, and Riyadh. The paper adds subsea cables, data centers, and AI facilities, and claims that interceptor stocks in the region are too thin to absorb mixed waves of missiles and drones. Its interceptor figures are unverified.

Our daily intelligence report judges, with high confidence, that these lists reflect a policy line. They came on the same weekend from the General Staff, the Majlis security committee, and the Leader’s newspaper. The report also judges, with moderate confidence, that Iran would carry out these threats if attacked and could strike first if it concluded that an American or Israeli attack was imminent and unavoidable. Kayhan itself now refers to an “offensive doctrine.” The emphasis on desalination and power plants points at civilian life support, and naming targets in public also raises the domestic cost to the regime of a weak response. We note that public lists remain signaling products and do not establish operational plans or readiness against any single site.

Hormuz, Cables, and the Price of Oil

Iran’s coercive strategy now reaches beyond ships to the physical and digital networks that link the Gulf to world markets. Two Iranian security officials told Reuters that Tehran has prepared contingency plans against undersea communications cables, including efforts to delay repairs after an attack. Because the sources are anonymous, the report does not treat this as an established policy decision, although Iranian media have repeated similar threats in public. Any damage would depend heavily on location and would fall well short of a global communications blackout.

Iranian outlets continue to claim tanker explosions and mine strikes without vessel-level evidence. The latest incident in the UKMTO register remains the October 22 strike on a tanker near Limah, Oman (Advisory 181-26), after which the ship continued its voyage. The more recent Iranian claim that two large tankers hit mines does not appear in that register and should not be counted as a confirmed event. The report also excludes the directives of the body calling itself the Persian Gulf Strait Authority from the confirmed record, since no authenticated statement of its legal powers was obtained in this window. Even without a sustained cut in Gulf exports, the combined threats to shipping, cable repairs, and energy infrastructure can raise freight, insurance, and financing costs.

Brent closed the week near $117 a barrel. Our morning brief recorded a Friday, October 23 settlement of $117.38, up $7.52, or about 6.8 percent, from $109.86 a week earlier. The later daily intelligence report cites Investing.com data showing a settlement of $116.72, with WTI at $103.27. With markets closed for the weekend, these remain the latest prices, and they reopen on Monday, October 26. An IRGC-linked image of a burning tanker under a $117 Brent headline presents the oil shock as a political cost for Trump, and Iranian defense media have highlighted pressure on U.S. equities. Iranian commentary on the U.S. GBU-43/B “mother of all bombs” belongs to the same strategic communications effort. Price escalation and sanctions work in opposite directions on Tehran’s war economy. Higher prices impose costs on importers, while U.S. enforcement limits Iran’s ability to collect its own export revenue. Kayhan’s managing editor, Hossein Shariatmadari, presented the closure of the strait as a seven-month Iranian “sanction” on the West that has done more damage than 47 years of Western sanctions on Iran. He grounds it in the late Ali Khamenei’s advice and in the current Leader’s description of the strait as “a divine gift.” Some of his figures, including a $145 physical oil price, cannot be traced to the sources he names. However, his framing presents any reopening of the strait as surrender, and that narrows the room for Iranian negotiators. Other front pages, from Nobonyad to Farhikhtegan, treat the oil price as Iran’s weapon against Trump, and Fars gave prominence to former President Barack Obama’s campaign remark that Iran now holds a veto over the strait. Our economic press review for October 24 traces how that squeeze is being debated inside Iran.

Yemen Opens a Second Energy Front

Houthi spokesman Yahya Saree announced on October 24 that his forces had carried out seven operations against Saudi targets. He named King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh, an Aramco facility at Yanbu, the Rabigh refinery, East-West Pipeline pumping stations, King Fahd International Airport in Dammam, Najran airport, and the Khamis Mushait air base. He claimed accurate hits and disrupted traffic at Dammam. These are the movement’s own combat claims, and their results remain largely unverified. Saree also claimed attacks on Saudi-linked forces and naval facilities in Aden, and the Houthis issued a fresh warning against use of Riyadh airport. That warning is a threat. It does not close international airspace.

Saudi state media provide a separate body of evidence. The coalition reported intercepting a ballistic missile aimed at Riyadh early on October 25 and destroying drones over the Riyadh region. Civil Defense reported falling debris after interceptions over the Makkah and Madinah regions on October 24. These reports confirm a period of heightened missile risk. They do not settle the outcome of each claimed strike on fuel installations. GCC Secretary-General Jasem Albudaiwi condemned the attacks.

The Bab al-Mandab dimension deserves separate attention. Houthi authorities say that non-Saudi shipping may continue through the strait, while accusing Saudi forces of militarizing the Red Sea. By exempting most commercial traffic while leaving Saudi-linked vessels outside that assurance, they have adopted a selective threat posture. Combined with attempts to disrupt Saudi west-coast energy logistics, this extends Gulf energy risk to a second maritime chokepoint.

Lebanon and Iraq Stay Political, for Now

Hezbollah’s main fight remains the Dahr al-Baidar explosives-truck case. Hassan Fadlallah, a member of the party’s parliamentary bloc, acknowledged that the explosives belonged to Hezbollah and said they were intended for operations against Israel. He demanded the return of the material and the detainees and rejected the government’s description of the shipment as a criminal threat. In Hezbollah’s view, prosecuting the group for moving weapons would set a precedent against its military autonomy. Al-Akhbar and Al-Ahed, both aligned with Hezbollah, describe Speaker Nabih Berri’s role in postponing a cabinet referral to the Judicial Council as a temporary truce that leaves the core issues unresolved. A review of Hezbollah-aligned outlets and the bloc’s own portal found no new confirmed Hezbollah military operation during the reporting window. Lebanon remains available as a supporting theater, but there is no evidence of a decision to resume fighting.

In Iraq, a statement attributed to the Islamic Resistance in Iraq condemned restrictions on airports and border crossings with Iran as submission to U.S. orders. The group alleged 171 unauthorized U.S. air movements between September 30 and October 23, a figure that has not been independently verified. Kurdish broadcaster Channel 8, citing an unnamed political source, reported that Washington warned Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi about possible strikes on Iran and that he cautioned armed groups against joining a new confrontation. That account cannot be treated as an official U.S. demarche without documentary confirmation. Reports of foreign oil workers leaving Basra also lack verified movement data.

Asharq Al-Awsat reported on October 24 that Iraqi security officials suspect Israel of covert strikes on two militia weapons depots near Baghdad. The sites reportedly held newly delivered Chinese-made shoulder-fired air-defense systems transferred from Iran, and earlier explosions in October reportedly hit warehouses holding attack and reconnaissance drones. The Popular Mobilization Forces attributed an October 17 blast at one of their facilities in eastern Baghdad, which injured five personnel, to an internal malfunction. Responsibility has not been established. If the reports are substantiated, they would point to an emerging campaign to weaken Iran’s Iraqi partners before a wider war.

Diplomacy, Elections, and the Home Front

The political calendar is unusually compressed. Israel holds its parliamentary election on October 27, two days after the report’s cutoff, and the U.S. midterms follow on November 3. These dates shape incentives and messaging, but they do not provide a reliable timetable for military action. The diplomatic channel remains open in principle through Pakistan, Qatar, and other intermediaries. Iran’s ambassador in Islamabad has suggested that Tehran is willing to resume talks under a Pakistani-brokered framework, while Tehran disputes accounts of specific offers on Hormuz and the blockade. The underlying dispute is about sequencing. Iran wants pressure lifted and shipping access restored first, and Washington wants credible nuclear and security concessions. No settlement had been authenticated by the cutoff.

Sunday’s papers show little room for movement. Kayhan’s editorial dismissed the European offer of October 23 to discuss the nuclear file and Yemen. It set four conditions for any talks: real sanctions relief, a guarantee against another withdrawal, normal banking and oil channels, and compensation for war damage. Its formula is “first obligations, then talks.” The daily intelligence report judges, with high confidence, that an Iranian capitulation or compromise before the U.S. midterms is highly unlikely. Tehran is meanwhile building legal cover against strikes on its nuclear sites. Iran, Russia, China, Pakistan, and eight other states read a joint statement at the UN General Assembly’s First Committee declaring that facilities under IAEA safeguards must never be attacked or threatened. Kayhan International reports that President Pezeshkian will meet Vladimir Putin in Moscow on October 27, on the sidelines of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum. Defa Press argued that Netanyahu, if he cannot form a government, may attack after the vote to force a national unity coalition, and that a hung result would also give Iran an opening. That is an argument by a defense-media outlet, and it is not evidence of Israeli planning. Our Qatar Watch for October 24 examines the strain on Doha’s mediation role.

Iranian commentary is also trying to raise the political cost for Gulf governments that facilitate U.S. military activity. Hardline editor Hossein Shariatmadari was quoted as claiming that Bahrain could eventually be reclaimed by Iran. This is a provocative claim by an individual commentator, and Iran has made no corresponding change in its formal recognition of Bahraini sovereignty. It is also an old one. In 2007 he called Bahrain Iran’s “14th province,” which forced Iran’s foreign minister to travel to Manama to reaffirm Bahraini sovereignty. This time, however, it appears beside the Defa Press essay on seizing Gulf territory, which tells Gulf hosts of U.S. forces that their territory, as well as their bases, is at risk.

At home, the leadership is pairing military defiance with messages about governance and public trust. The Supreme Leader’s media reported a meeting between Mojtaba Khamenei and judiciary chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei on corruption enforcement, court efficiency, technological modernization, and restitution for wartime damage. President Masoud Pezeshkian told a budget and planning forum that the government needs accurate data and transparent allocation to correct unequal access to public services. As with the Leader’s meeting with Speaker Qalibaf on October 21, the office released only text and no photograph, and the papers ran file portraits. Pezeshkian also used the launch of the national census to say that Iran must leave its condition of “neither war nor peace” so that the government can plan. The IRGC-affiliated Javan answered on its front page that the exit does not come through negotiation. These messages acknowledge the strain that inflation and wartime constraints place on state institutions, even as security officials stress endurance. The economic papers report that importers of essential goods are owed about €4 billion and warn that supply chains could break within one to two months. Truck queues at the Bazargan crossing on the Turkish border periodically reach 3,000 to 4,000 vehicles, and the open-market dollar trades near 267,100 tomans. Central Bank governor Hemmati claims that reserves can fund imports through the end of Trump’s term, but neither that claim nor reported production gains shows that Iran can collect its oil revenue and pay its importers. We assess that these domestic costs both limit Iran’s staying power and push the regime to raise pressure abroad in search of a settlement. For Sunday’s Iranian papers, see our Iranian Press Monitor for October 25.

Iranian-aligned accounts also circulated “Parasite,” a Lego-style video posted on October 24 by Explosive Media, an anonymous Iranian collective. It uses dehumanizing imagery, the Star of David, and conspiracy motifs about Jewish control of political finance and war policy. These are recognizable antisemitic tropes. The video is an influence tactic aimed at discrediting U.S. and Israeli leaders, and it offers no evidence of operational plans or of a measurable shift in foreign public opinion. However, it marks a shift from attacking Trump and Netanyahu to attacking Jews as a group, in English and in the vocabulary of U.S. conspiracy subcultures. IRGC spokesman Mohebbi separately spoke of a “psychological and cognitive war of the Jews” against Muslims, and Vatan-e Emrooz printed an open sexual slur against Trump over his ties to Israel.

Key Points

1. Washington is building readiness for renewed strikes without a public decision to carry them out. The carrier rearmament and personnel withdrawals are documented, but no strike order or authenticated CENTCOM announcement has appeared. (High confidence.)

2. Tehran has widened its declared target set to include Israeli population centers, Dimona, U.S. warships, Gulf energy assets, and undersea cables. The montage, Azizi’s map, and the Defa Press essay are signaling products and do not amount to strike orders. (High confidence in the messaging; low confidence in any specific operational plan.)

3. Iran’s claim that two more tankers struck mines remains unverified. The latest confirmed UKMTO incident is the October 22 strike near Limah. (Low confidence in the claim as stated.)

4. Iran is using the oil price as political leverage against Trump, while U.S. sanctions continue to restrict its export revenue. Brent’s 6.8 percent weekly rise to $117.38 is the verified reference point. (High confidence.)

5. The Houthi campaign against Saudi airports and energy sites has made Yemen a direct contributor to Gulf energy insecurity. Saudi interception reports confirm heightened missile activity but not every claimed hit. (Moderate confidence.)

6. Hezbollah and the Iraqi factions are resisting politically, with no confirmed decision to open new military fronts. Reports of suspected Israeli strikes on militia air-defense deliveries near Baghdad, if substantiated, would mark a preemptive campaign in Iraq. (Moderate confidence on the political posture; low confidence on the strikes.)

7. The risk of miscalculation is elevated because each side appears to read the other’s restraint as room for more pressure. The Israeli and U.S. elections compress political incentives without setting a military timetable. (Moderate confidence.)

8. Iran has published its most detailed target list yet, covering energy, water, power, ports, airports, and data cables in Israel, the Gulf, and beyond. The lists come from the General Staff, the Majlis security committee, and the Leader’s newspaper, which makes them a policy line. (High confidence.)

9. Iran would act on these threats if attacked and may strike first if it judges an attack imminent and unavoidable. This rests on Kayhan’s “offensive doctrine,” the Defa Press scenarios, and the unverified readiness launches. (Moderate confidence.)

10. An Iranian capitulation or compromise before the U.S. midterms is highly unlikely. Kayhan’s four preconditions, Javan’s reply to Pezeshkian, and Shariatmadari’s treatment of the closure as a winning counter-sanction all point the same way. (High confidence.)

11. Antisemitic content is moving from domestic editorials into English-language products aimed at Americans. (Moderate to high confidence.)

12. The cost of Iran’s strategy is falling on households and importers, and the government has no durable fix. (High confidence.)

What to Watch

• Deployment of additional U.S. strike assets, specific embassy or military evacuation orders, or an authenticated CENTCOM statement, any of which would signal a shift from contingency planning toward execution.
• Verified Iranian missile activity, range notices, or exercise records that confirm or refute the reported readiness launches near Yazd, Kerman, and Qazvin.
• Named vessels and IMO numbers for the claimed mine strikes, matching UKMTO entries, insurer advisories, and independent port throughput data.
• Any restriction on cable repair vessels or a verified outage on Gulf seabed cables.
• Each Houthi target claim compared against Saudi interception notices and operator data, especially at Dammam, Yanbu, and Rabigh.
• Militia orders in Iraq, Baghdad’s response to them, and any official finding on responsibility for the Baghdad depot explosions.
• Statements by Naim Qassem, Hezbollah’s parliamentary bloc, and its political bureau, read separately from aligned editorial commentary.
• Movement on the Pakistani-brokered framework, and Iranian and U.S. messaging around Israel’s October 27 election.
• Any action against facilities on the Kayhan or Azizi lists, especially desalination plants, subsea cables, and the Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline.
• The Pezeshkian-Putin meeting in Moscow on October 27 and any Russian offer on Hormuz or the nuclear file.
• A photograph or video of Mojtaba Khamenei, or further text-only releases after meetings with heads of branches.
• Payment of the €4 billion in importer arrears, queue lengths at Bazargan, and the open-market dollar.
• Brent and WTI when markets reopen on Monday, October 26.

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This post summarizes our daily war brief on the U.S.-Israel-Iran war, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Axis of Resistance for October 25, 2026, covering the 24 hours to 05:29 UTC that day. Iranian material draws on Defa Press, the Supreme Leader’s official media, and official social media accounts. Arabic material draws on Al-Manar, Al-Ahed, Al-Akhbar, Al-Mayadeen, Al-Masirah, Asharq Al-Awsat, a statement by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, and the Saudi Press Agency. U.S. and maritime material draws on Treasury and OFAC, UKMTO, The Wall Street Journal, Reuters, Anadolu, Channel 8, election authorities, and market settlement data, with additional reference to the Critical Threats Iran Update for October 24. It was updated later the same day with our combined daily intelligence report and Iranian press monitor for October 25, which reviews Sunday’s Tehran papers, including Kayhan, Farhikhtegan, Eskenas, Shargh, Vatan-e Emrooz, Sobh-e No, Nobonyad, Javan, Jam-e Jam, Etemad, Sazandegi, Jomhuri Eslami, Donya-e Eqtesad, Charsoo, Taadol, Khorasan, Tehran Times, and Kayhan International, along with Fars, AP, Anadolu, Kurdistan24, Investing.com, and Explosive Media’s own posts. The two reports give slightly different Brent settlement prices for October 23. The Iranian tanker and missile-launch claims, the Houthi strike claims, the Iraqi militia figures, the Channel 8 report, and the suspected Israeli strikes in Iraq are unverified. Kayhan’s interceptor figures and Shariatmadari’s oil and polling figures are also unverified. The brief does not assign confidence levels to individual judgments, so those in Key Points 1 through 7 are our own reading of its evidence. Key Points 8 through 12 carry the combined report’s own confidence levels.