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Water or Mirage? The Leader Weighs an Exit from "Neither War, Nor Peace"

Iran’s Supreme Leader has signaled that he wants the country out of its current state of “neither war, nor peace,” but he has not chosen the way out. On October 27, Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei received Mohsen Rezaei, the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), one day after Rezaei hosted senior security officials from Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan in Tehran. The official readout repeats President Masoud Pezeshkian’s call to end the stalemate, endorses Iranian management of the Strait of Hormuz, and gives public backing to Rezaei’s regional diplomacy. However, it also ties any exit to the conditions that Iranian officials have already set, which are in practice the IRGC’s conditions. We assess that the Leader’s recent audiences highly likely reflect a contest for the lead among the three branches of government, and that the Leader is acting more as a referee than as the author of a single line.

Iran Dossier special report title card in navy and slate blue, headed Water or Mirage?, with a deck on the Leader weighing an exit from neither war, nor peace, dated 27 October 2026

A Third Audience in a Week

Rezaei’s meeting with the Leader is the third audience with a senior official reported in a week. Majlis Speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf met the Leader on October 21, and Judiciary Chief Gholamhossein Mohseni-Ejei followed on October 24. Both men have since described a Leader who is in full health and in command. On the morning of October 27, Qalibaf told the Majlis that the Leader had stressed “maximum unity among officials,” above all among the heads of the three branches.

The timing gives the Rezaei audience added weight. It came one day after Rezaei hosted Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman, Pakistan’s Field Marshal Asim Munir, and Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin at a four-way security meeting in Tehran. That meeting produced only a short statement committing the four governments to further talks, as our October 27 daily described. It also drew an open attack from Kayhan on the morning of the audience.

The Readout Adopts Pezeshkian’s Language, With Conditions Attached

The readout, published by the Leader’s office, picks up a phrase Pezeshkian used three days earlier. Speaking at the launch of Iran’s 1405 census on October 24, the president said that the late Leader Ali Khamenei had ordered an end to the “neither war, nor peace” situation and that Iran must now make its position clear. The Leader’s office now uses the same words. However, it links any exit to the realization of the conditions put forward by the country’s officials. The report notes that this refers to Iran’s seven stated preconditions, which Rezaei restated on October 24 when he said Iran would neither reopen the strait nor return to talks until they are met (see our October 24 update). The stated preconditions therefore remain in place.

The readout makes three further points. First, it endorses “exercising management” over the Strait of Hormuz as a means of protecting national and regional security. Second, it asks the SNSC to use Article 176 of the Constitution, which establishes the council under the president’s chairmanship, to help Pezeshkian and the executive branch resolve the country’s problems more quickly. Third, it records Rezaei’s report that the council is pursuing what Iranian officials call an endogenous regional order, meaning security arrangements built by the region’s own states. That line gives public cover to the four-way track that Kayhan had just dismissed.

The readout also describes the SNSC as the “crossroads of deliberation” for the country’s affairs and calls for a roadmap that sets out each action from start to finish before decisions are made. It credits national resistance with driving the enemy to desperation and calls for active public information to keep the population engaged in the country’s defense.

Three Branches Competing for the Lead

The report judges that the sequence of audiences highly likely points to a power struggle among the three branches of government, with a different actor taking the lead each time. Qalibaf took the lead on the economy and on relations between the government and the Majlis. Mohseni-Ejei took it on internal security and corruption. Pezeshkian claimed the lead on ending the stalemate through his census speech, and Rezaei has now done so on Hormuz and the regional track.

Each readout gives the visitor a mandate and repeats the call for unity. This suggests that the Leader is refereeing among competing centers of power more than steering a single policy line. The repeated emphasis on unity also implies that the divisions are real enough to require public management.

The IRGC Commander Who Was Not Received

IRGC commander Maj. Gen. Ahmad Vahidi is absent from this sequence. No audience between Vahidi and the Leader has been reported, and his only public statement this week was a condolence message. Yet the readout endorses the IRGC’s terms for ending the war and its regime of control over Hormuz. The report assesses that Vahidi is probably shaping the outcome behind the scenes. In practice, the Rezaei audience gives the SNSC a visible role while leaving the substance of Iran’s position where the IRGC has set it.

Leverage That Is Wearing Down Its Own Base

Iran appears to be looking for a way out of the position it has created. Its control of the Hormuz chokepoint has imposed costs on everyone, but it has not restored Iran’s own oil income. Iranian crude is not reaching buyers in volume, while Gulf producers continue to export under U.S. naval escort and through overland routes. CENTCOM puts Gulf partners’ exports since the summer at more than 1.5 billion barrels. As a result, the leverage Tehran built at sea is wearing down the economy it was meant to protect.

The report reads the Leader’s instruction to end “neither war, nor peace” as a sign that he wants a decision one way or the other. The direction remains open. Hossein Shariatmadari, the Leader’s own representative at Kayhan, dismissed the Tehran meeting that morning as a mirage, and the readout still ties any exit to the IRGC’s conditions. If the regional track does not deliver sanctions relief or a Hormuz arrangement that Tehran can present as a win, the alternative for which the hardline camp is preparing the public is a new round of war. Our Iranian Press Monitor for October 27 follows how the Tehran papers received the meeting.

Key Points

  1. The Leader wants an exit from the current stalemate but has not chosen its direction (moderate confidence). The readout adopts the language of ending “neither war, nor peace” while keeping Iran’s stated preconditions intact.
  2. The run of audiences reflects a contest among the three branches of government (high confidence; the report’s “highly likely”). Each visitor received a mandate in a separate field, and each readout repeated the call for unity.
  3. The readout gives public cover to Rezaei’s regional track (high confidence). It records the council’s pursuit of an endogenous regional order on the same day Kayhan attacked the four-way meeting.
  4. Vahidi is probably shaping the outcome without appearing in public (moderate confidence). The readout endorses the IRGC’s terms on the war and on Hormuz, although no audience for the IRGC commander has been reported.
  5. Iran’s Hormuz leverage is eroding its own economic base (moderate confidence). Iranian crude is not reaching buyers in volume, while Gulf partners continue to export.
  6. If the regional track fails, the hardline camp’s alternative is a new round of war (low to moderate confidence). The coming weeks should show whether the Leader backs Rezaei’s track or Kayhan’s line.

What to Watch

  • An audience for Vahidi or a public IRGC statement on the regional track, which would show whether the IRGC endorses or constrains Rezaei’s diplomacy.
  • Kayhan’s next editorials. Continued attacks on the SNSC after the readout would signal that the hardline camp does not read it as a ruling against them; silence would suggest the opposite.
  • Use of Article 176. Any new SNSC decision framed as support for the president and the executive would show whether the council is taking on a coordinating role in economic as well as security policy.
  • Follow-up to the four-way meeting. A second session, a working group, or any Saudi move on Houthi attacks would indicate whether the regional track can produce something Tehran can present as a win.
  • Changes to the seven conditions. Any softening or reordering of Iran’s stated preconditions, or a new formula for Hormuz passage, would be the clearest sign that the Leader has chosen an exit.
  • Hardline messaging on renewed war. An increase in calls to prepare the public for another round would suggest that the regional track is losing ground.

This post summarizes a special report prepared by Iran Dossier analysts on October 27, 2026 (5 Aban 1405). The report draws on the Leader’s office readout of the Rezaei audience published on rahbar.ir, which it translates in full, and on reporting by Tasnim and Hamshahri Online covering the Qalibaf and Mohseni-Ejei audiences and Pezeshkian’s census speech. Statements about the Leader’s health and instructions come from officials who met him and have not been independently verified. Confidence levels reflect the report’s own estimative language; judgments about Vahidi’s role and the Leader’s intentions are analytic inferences from the sequence and wording of official readouts.

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