One Speech, Two Verdicts: Iran's Press Rallies Behind Pezeshkian at the UN, Turns on His Fox Interview, and Prints a Call to Kill Trump

Iran’s Saturday press has turned UN General Assembly week into a verdict on Israel and a referendum on President Masoud Pezeshkian’s diplomacy. Every front page that covered New York treated the walkout of 77 delegations from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s address as proof that Israel, and Washington with it, has lost the argument. The consensus ends at Pezeshkian’s American interviews. On Fox News he said Iran would set aside its 60 percent enriched uranium within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and he did not dispute a meeting between Iranian officials and U.S. envoys Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff. Reformist papers back him. Hardline titles praise the UN speech, attack the interview, and single out his closest aide. The security line is hardening at the same time, and a Kayhan front-page box went as far as saying that President Donald Trump must be killed. We assess that these mixed signals share one purpose, which is to raise the price of a U.S. refusal while Tehran’s offer is on the table. The risk is that Washington reads the fatwa talk and the Kayhan box as the real position.

Iran Dossier daily intelligence title card for the 26 September 2026 update

The Seven-Day Plan and the Back Channel

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s latest formulation removes the main ambiguity in Iran’s offer. The seven-day period starts when Washington accepts the plan. Iran says the reciprocal steps can be completed in four or five days, the strait can reopen on day six, and the two sides can enter the final-agreement stage on day seven. Araghchi said the U.S. actions Tehran requires are already set out in the existing memorandum framework. The public list varies by speaker. Iranian officials have cited ending the naval blockade and economic pressure, releasing frozen assets, ending hostilities on several fronts, and accepting a safe-shipping arrangement with Oman. The report cautions against assuming that every item is in the operative package. The September 25 update covered the plan’s first public version.

Araghchi also said messages had been exchanged with the Americans both through intermediaries and “without intermediaries,” even as he called engagement with Washington a complete dead end. Pezeshkian, asked on Fox about the meeting with Kushner and Witkoff, did not dispute it and said the talks concern international law and Iran’s rights. Taken together, these statements confirm a direct channel operating alongside the Qatari shuttle. Reuters reports that the two sides are exploring a phased arrangement in which Hormuz reopens, the U.S. economic blockade is lifted, and frozen assets may enter the sequence. The obstacle is who moves first. There is no public evidence that Washington has accepted the plan. One report said Trump rejected it, and no formal U.S. response has been published.

Doha remains the central transmission point. Qatar’s foreign ministry said Pezeshkian and Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman discussed de-escalation and the conditions for dialogue, and the Qatar News Agency reported a joint Qatari-Pakistani effort to protect navigation in Hormuz. Araghchi briefed his Indian, Saudi, Omani, and Turkish counterparts on the Iran-Oman safe-shipping track. Pezeshkian met European Council President Antonio Costa, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, Dutch Prime Minister Rob Jetten, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre.

Pezeshkian in the American Media

Pezeshkian gave Fox News a long interview on September 24 and spoke briefly to NBC and other outlets the same day. On the war, he said Iran did not choose it and will respond with force if attacked again, and that the strait was open before the attack. On the nuclear file, he said Iran will set aside its 60 percent stockpile within international law and the NPT and will honor its treaty obligations. He added that Iran had agreed to dilute the material before the war began. On the deal, he said Iran had reached agreement with Trump, remains willing to advance the signed understanding, and leaves it to Washington to decide whether to end the war. He told NBC that Tehran wants Washington back in the June memorandum before the midterm elections. He also said Iran has no command relationship with the resistance groups, and that he had met Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei for about seven hours roughly a month ago and found him in good health. The report calls this the most forward public position from the presidency since the June memorandum collapsed.

Pezeshkian and Araghchi also briefed Western journalists and think-tank analysts in a Midtown Manhattan hotel on September 24, according to CNN, which attended. Pezeshkian told the room that Iran is not trying to kill Trump. The New York Times defended its UN bureau chief, Farnaz Fassihi, against criticism of her attendance, saying she was one of several reporters present and that talking with Iranian officials is standard reporting practice. Diaspora opposition activists have since circulated the names of six Americans they say attended and are campaigning against them by name. The report confirms Fassihi’s attendance and notes that an activist’s photograph appears to show Trita Parsi. It found no independent confirmation that the others attended. We assess that the session shows the president’s office working the U.S. analyst and media community directly, with a softer message than Tehran’s press carries. It has also opened a second front of criticism from the diaspora opposition, which is likely to widen and to reach congressional offices.

One Speech, Two Verdicts at Home

The system has closed ranks around the UN address itself. Nournews collected praise from the chief of the armed forces general staff, the army commander, and the IRGC spokesman, and Kayhan’s Hossein Shariatmadari credited the speech as well. The institutional dispute concerns sequencing, authorization, and guarantees. Nobody in it argues that diplomacy itself is off limits.

The interview is another matter. Reformist and centrist titles back the president. Sazandegi led on the prospect of a deal before the U.S. elections, Etemad devoted a column of signed notes to the trip, and Shargh printed former President Mohammad Khatami urging Pezeshkian to find the least costly way out of the crisis. Hardline titles took the opposite line. Asr-e Iranian led by accusing the president of giving hope to a hopeless enemy, and its signed house editorial said he had offered the 60 percent stockpile and inspections to a pro-Trump network a day after holding up the late Leader’s photograph at the rostrum. Nobonyad called the trip a diplomacy of weakness and a prelude to a third war.

Shariatmadari reserved his fire for the president’s circle. His Kayhan editorial attacks Executive Vice President Mohammad-Jafar Ghaem-Panah and former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi for attending Saudi Arabia’s national day reception at the embassy in Tehran. He calls the visit an insult to the war dead, invokes the unity of the resistance fronts, and apologizes to the Houthis on Iran’s behalf. He also ridicules the government’s claim that the visit was coordinated with the pillars of the system and demands to know which authority approved it. Ghaem-Panah is Pezeshkian’s closest aide, and Salehi is the face of the old negotiating school. We assess that the hardline camp is policing the negotiating envelope through attacks on the president’s circle while leaving the president himself alone, and that the question about who approved the visit is aimed at the Leader’s office.

Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Qalibaf stayed on the side of defiance. Kayhan quoted him saying Iran’s enemies had lined up against it and learned a lesson. No hardline attack on him by name appears in the sample, and he has not commented on the Fox interview.

The Security Line Hardens

The harder signals arrived in the same news cycle as the offer. Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, said it was time to stop negotiating and for Washington to act, and that Hormuz will not reopen before Iran’s conditions are implemented. Kayhan’s lead called negotiation a deception operation and urged Iran to answer the siege by targeting oil facilities and U.S. companies in the region. Asr-e Ghanoon led on a claim by Hassan Ghashghavi, spokesman of the Majles national security committee, that the new Leader could issue a new fatwa on nuclear weapons in response to changed conditions. Ghashghavi tied the remark to a triple-urgency bill to leave the NPT, and he added that he knew of no change to the existing fatwa. The report reads this as pressure on the talks. It finds no evidence of a policy shift.

Mockery of Trump has escalated into an explicit call for his death. A Kayhan front-page box said that blood vengeance is the nation’s demand and that Trump must be killed, on the same day Pezeshkian was telling reporters in New York the opposite. Farhikhtegan, Asr-e Ghanoon, Asr-e Iranian, and Vatan-e Emrooz added humiliating caricatures, and Kayhan’s satirical column cast Trump as a drunk jackal who sobers up at the sight of a lion. The rhetoric runs in parallel with the president’s search for a deal.

The press also used Netanyahu’s address to claim the diplomatic high ground. Hamshahri ran its entire front page as a comic strip on the walkout, and several papers paired it with Iranian civilian victims of the war in Minab, Lamerd, and Sirik. The Iranian delegation left a framed photograph of Qassem Soleimani on its empty desk during the speech. Hamshahri’s own panel noting that 80 states called for Hormuz to reopen immediately shows the limits of that consensus. We expect Tehran to use the walkout as political cover to present any deal as vindication and to resist terms framed as concessions.

Hormuz, Yemen, and the Saudi Front

A U.S. official told Reuters that about 60 commercial vessels crossed the strait on Wednesday, some 40 of them coordinating with the U.S. military and carrying about 22 million barrels of oil. Reuters could not verify the figure. Kpler counted 14 AIS-visible commodity vessels on Wednesday and nine on Thursday, and put crude exports at 33.7 million barrels for the week from September 20, down from 49.2 million the week before. The counts measure different fleets, and dark transits make both incomplete. Kayhan International called the U.S. figures fabricated. Before February 28, the strait handled about 125 large commercial vessels a day. UKMTO still lists the September 23 strike on a cargo vessel as the latest attack, and a reported launch of two Abu Mahdi anti-ship missiles remains unconfirmed. In practice, control is measured by who sets the cost, risk, and timing of transit, and on that test neither side dominates.

Maj. Gen. Yahya Rahim Safavi’s statement linking Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab as one theater lets Tehran claim Houthi autonomy while treating Houthi operations as part of its maritime leverage. It does not establish an Iranian chain of command. The Houthis claimed 14 Saudi strikes on Yemeni provinces in 24 hours, Saudi Civil Defense issued and quickly lifted an early-warning alert in Jazan without reporting an impact, and Yemen’s government said its forces took high ground overlooking supply routes in the Bab al-Mandab hinterland. France will send troops, radar, and air defenses to protect Yanbu, and Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan discussed their joint defense agreement.

Inside Iran, the Saudi file has turned hot. Asr-e Iranian celebrated Houthi strikes on Riyadh, Kayhan praised Yemeni attacks on Aramco, and Kayhan cited a Wall Street Journal report that Riyadh and Abu Dhabi asked Trump to tighten the blockade. This hostility cuts against Araghchi’s outreach to Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan and constrains any Iran-Saudi track at the UN.

Lebanon, the Southeast, and the Economy

Hezbollah MP Hassan Fadlallah said the movement is ready for a political resolution but not for surrender. Prime Minister Salam, speaking in New York after meeting Pezeshkian, said the state alone negotiates for Lebanon, called for a timetable to implement the framework agreement, and warned of a vacuum after a UNIFIL withdrawal. The indicator is whether Hezbollah MPs move from principles to concrete terms on a defense strategy.

In Sistan and Baluchestan, the IRGC confirmed the death of Brig. Gen. Hossein Zarifi, commander of the Shahid Sajjad operational base in Saravan. Seda-ye Iran dedicated its issue to Maj. Ahmad Zeraati, the base’s intelligence chief, killed in the same operation. Official statements have not named the armed group. An IRGC Intelligence Organization statement again argued that success is measured by the freedom of action denied to the enemy, and its claims of forced U.S. evacuations remain unconfirmed.

The economic press is putting numbers on the cost of war. The UAE and Oman have barred Iranian airlines, and Kayhan International reported that Iraq’s prime minister ordered a halt to Iranian flights to Najaf. The central bank governor credits the judiciary with forcing the return of $10 billion in export proceeds, and Sazandegi reports that lawmakers are investigating canceled oil contracts with China and the handover of 80 million barrels to four intermediaries. Chaharsough calculates that the 11-item staple basket for a three-person household more than doubled, to 12.25 million tomans (about $52), against a fixed e-coupon of 3 million tomans. Brent settled Friday at $104.32 a barrel and WTI at $92.41. The same day’s Economic Press Review examines these pressures in detail. We assess that economic pressure is the strongest domestic argument for Pezeshkian’s timetable and will sharpen the fight over who pays for continued resistance.

Key Points

The Iranian press is unanimous that Netanyahu’s UN appearance exposed Israel’s isolation. Tehran is using the walkout to claim the diplomatic high ground before any settlement talks. (High confidence.)
Pezeshkian widened Iran’s public offer in U.S. media. He offered to set aside the 60 percent stockpile within the NPT, did not dispute the Kushner-Witkoff meeting, and wants a deal before the midterms. (High confidence.)
The hard right is separating the president from his diplomacy. It praises the UN speech and attacks the Fox interview and his entourage, with Ghaem-Panah and Salehi named. (High confidence.)
The security establishment is tightening the sequence. Rezaei says Hormuz stays closed until Washington acts, and Araghchi’s clock starts only after U.S. acceptance. Tehran will not trade Hormuz leverage for promises. (High confidence.)
Nuclear-weapons signaling has entered the mainstream press. The report reads the fatwa talk as pressure on the talks and sees no evidence of a policy shift. (High to moderate confidence.)
The president’s outreach to U.S. analysts has become a target for the diaspora opposition. Fassihi’s attendance is confirmed, and most other named attendees are not. (Moderate confidence.)
Mockery of Trump has escalated to an explicit call to kill him, in parallel with the president’s deal-seeking. (High confidence.)
Hormuz traffic is partly back, and the numbers are disputed. The U.S. and Kpler counts measure different things. (Moderate confidence.)
Saudi Arabia is the new focus of hardline anger, which constrains any Iran-Saudi track. (Moderate confidence.)

What to Watch

A formal U.S. response to the seven-day plan, and whether Washington accepts an implementation sequence before full Hormuz normalization.
Any official Iranian account of the Kushner-Witkoff meeting and who authorized it.
Whether Kayhan or allied figures extend their attack from Ghaem-Panah and Salehi to Araghchi or the president, and any signal from the Leader’s office on the Saudi embassy episode.
Qalibaf’s first public comment on the Fox interview or the 60 percent offer.
Progress of the NPT exit bill and any further senior talk of a new nuclear fatwa.
Official reaction in Tehran or Washington to Kayhan’s call to kill Trump.
New UKMTO or JMIC warnings, and whether U.S.-reported and Kpler-visible Hormuz traffic converge.
Physical damage at Yanbu or on the East-West Pipeline, and the first French deployments.
Iranian retaliation against the UAE and Oman over airline bans, and further third-country flight suspensions.
Identification of the armed group behind the Saravan fighting.

This post summarizes our daily intelligence report on the U.S.-Israel-Iran war, the Strait of Hormuz, the Axis of Resistance, and the Iranian press for September 26, 2026 (4 Mehr 1405). The report draws on 19 Iranian publications, official statements, and international reporting from Reuters, CNN, the New York Times, Kpler, and UKMTO. The U.S. official’s Hormuz transit figures, the Houthi and IRGC Intelligence battlefield claims, the Abu Mahdi launch report, and the Yemeni government’s territorial gains are carried at the report’s own confidence levels. The attendance list circulated by diaspora activists is carried only where independently confirmed. Headlines and statements from Iranian sources are paraphrased from the report’s translations, and toman amounts are converted approximately at a free-market rate of about 234,500 to the dollar. The same day’s Iranian Press Monitor offers a separate reading of the front pages, and the Qatar Watch for September 25 covers Doha’s role. The previous edition in this series is the September 25 update.