

One Chain, One War: Rezaei's Al-Manar Interview and Iran's Claim on Lebanon and Gaza

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جست و جو در مقالات، اخبار و...
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خداشه بر امنیت هر نقطه از غرب آسیا بر کل منطقه اثر خواهد داشت / خشم مقدس امت اسلام دامن آمریکا و اسرائیل را خواهد گرفت / پاسخ ایران در صورت وقوع جنگی دیگر، بیسابقه خواهد بود
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عاجل | رضایی للمانار: ما هو الجديد الذي تستطيع أمريكا فعله؟ نحن نرجم تحت وطأة الحظر منذ 15 عامًا وفرضوا حصارًا بحريًا منذ أكثر من شهر
• الشرطة النيبالية: العثور على جثامين 270 شخصًا جراء الميضانات التي ضربت شرقي البلاد

22:00 الفدس

یادداشت

- جنگ پیشرفت نیروی برای آینده ایران
- شهید دینسی و حکمرانی صالح
- دور رفتن و جنگ اوزی: تعرفه‌ای تراشید
- آمریکای تراشید و معمای خاکدست جهانی دلار
- ابعاد اقتصادی مکتب: میانجی و همکارهای منطقه
- ای دکتر محمود نندی پور
- آینده روابط ایران و غرب: نگاه از زاویه توافقی هسته‌ای

Executive Summary

In a programmatic-ideological interview with Hezbollah's Al-Manar network, Major General Mohsen Rezaei, Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, laid out his ideological doctrine, emphasizing Iran's view of Lebanon and Hezbollah as central to Iran's security doctrine, the elimination of the Zionist entity, the removal of the American presence from the region, and Iran's terms for the Mecca Pact.

His central claim is that no arena of the resistance axis can be treated on its own: a breach of security anywhere in West Asia affects the whole region, and Hezbollah, Gaza, and Syria remain bound to one another and to Iran itself, so that ending the war in one theater while it continues in another is not, in his framing, a real end to the war at all.

He tied this directly to Iran's own condition for reopening the Strait of Hormuz to the United States: any settlement requires the war to end on every front, and a full American withdrawal from West Asia, which he predicted within a decade. He confirmed a strategic and comprehensive relationship with Hezbollah's leadership while maintaining formal non-interference in Lebanon's internal affairs, and delivered the interview's sharpest line on the next phase of the struggle with the Zionist entity: the seven-kilometer limit that Hezbollah observed under Nasrallah, meant to avoid mass civilian casualties, is over, and any future round will carry no such restraint.

He said Iran intends to see Netanyahu "sent to hell," that a "sacred wrath" is building across the Muslim world that will show no bounds, and accused Netanyahu of fabricating an assassination plot to turn Trump against Tehran. "God willing and by the grace of Almighty God, **we will send Netanyahu to hell, and we will prove that Netanyahu's egregious mistakes have shortened the lifespan of the Zionist regime by several years.** The reason is that **a fierce and sacred wrath is taking shape in the Islamic world. This fierce and sacred wrath will one day emerge and manifest itself on the ground, and the situation will differ from before.**"

On the United States, he set out a deliberate escalation logic across three prior conflicts, promised the next round would bring "stunning blows," and threatened economic countermeasures against American commercial interests in the region if Washington pursues new sanctions. He also described a jointly managed Iran-Oman shipping corridor through Hormuz and set Iran's terms for joining the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement: founding-member status for Iran and Egypt alongside a binding declaration against Israel.

Read as a whole, the interview functions as a public assertion, aimed at Hezbollah's own audience, that Iran's stake in Lebanon is not a matter of policy convenience but a fixed and enduring commitment, backed by an explicit threat of escalation against both the Zionist entity and the United States.

I. Background

Lebanon has already put its objection to Iranian conduct on the international record. A Lebanese letter to the UN Security Council and General Assembly, dated 21 April 2026 and signed by Ambassador Ahmad Arafa, accused the IRGC of operating under diplomatic cover without Lebanese state consent and of launching joint IRGC-Hezbollah offensive operations from Lebanese territory in defiance of Lebanese cabinet decisions taken in early March 2026. Beirut declared Iran's ambassador persona non grata and demanded his departure by 29 March; Tehran's Foreign Ministry confirmed the ambassador would stay. Lebanon's Foreign Ministry later described the document as a response to Iranian letters rather than a formal complaint, a distinction that softened the diplomatic register without withdrawing the underlying allegations.

Hormuz has become an intra-Iranian fault line as much as an Iran-US one. Iranian front-page coverage in early August showed heavy presidential-office presence on the Hormuz file alongside signs of institutional friction over who sets the terms for reopening the strait. Rezaei's arrival at the SNSC, replacing Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr after only five months in the post, places the file under a figure with his own independent standing in the security establishment, a former IRGC commander and Expediency Council secretary rather than a caretaker appointee.

The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, signed 7 August 2026 by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan, has taken shape as a trilateral structure that Iran was not party to and has not yet joined. Tehran's public position has been to welcome the principle of Islamic unity while withholding endorsement, pending clarity on the pact's objectives toward Israel.

II. The Interview by Theme

Lebanon

Tehran has treated Lebanon's war termination as inseparable from its own dealings with Washington rather than a separate Lebanese-American track, and Rezaei stated that position directly:

"There are several conditions in the memorandum with America. **One of the conditions of the memorandum is that America must end the war throughout West Asia, particularly in Lebanon.** The war must end and Israel must withdraw from the territories it has occupied. Lebanon's territories must be liberated. The same applies to Gaza. The war there must end, and Israel's attacks on Damascus in Syria must also end. Why? The reason is that West Asia is like an interconnected chain, and its conditions are linked to one another. When security is disrupted in any area of West Asia, it affects all the other countries as well, and the state of insecurity spreads. As a result, the cost of investment rises, and the economic progress of these countries is now intertwined. **War cannot begin in Lebanon while other countries enjoy economic progress.** Those who attacked Lebanon might also be able to attack Jordan or Saudi Arabia or other countries such as Iran. **Therefore, one of our conditions with America is that the war end on all fronts, and especially in Lebanon.** Of course, we are serious about this matter because the relationship that binds us to the people of Lebanon is a very deep-rooted and historical relationship going back many years, close to two or three hundred years, to the time when the scholars of Jabal Amel came to Iran and played an effective role in developments."



On the timeline for American disengagement from the region, a theme Tehran has returned to consistently since the ceasefire, he said:

"These matters will not last long. The Americans are gradually withdrawing from the West Asia region. That is, within the next ten years **there will be no trace of American bases left.** America will not have a tangible presence in the West Asia region."

On the limits of any renewed Israeli operation against Beirut, he set out what Tehran has treated as a fixed red line:

"The southern suburb of Beirut is our red line. No one has the right to move toward Beirut and the suburb. Therefore, we are monitoring and watching matters with the utmost seriousness. Israel will sooner or later be forced to withdraw from these areas. Why? Because the land of Lebanon resists control and occupation, it cannot be besieged. That is, resistance fighters can be supported and assisted in battle against Israel from three directions: from north to south, from west to east, and from east to west."

He extended the point with a comparison to Gaza that has become a recurring piece of Iranian messaging on Lebanon:

"In other words, the fortress of Lebanon is impregnable to occupiers. I pose this question to analysts around the world: **Gaza was besieged from all four sides, and for more than two years and several months Israel was unable to accomplish anything significant against a territory besieged from all four sides.** So how could it do such a thing in a vaster land like Lebanon, where resistance fighters can move freely from north to south and from west to east and east to west? Therefore, **Israel has no choice but to withdraw, and Israel will be forced to withdraw from southern Lebanon with heavy losses and crushing defeats."**

He closed with a direct address to the Lebanese public:

"As a soldier of Islam, I take pride in the resistance of the people of Lebanon, and I truly bow my head before them. I am aware of the extent of the difficulties you have suffered. Many families have still not been able to rent a home, and many have been displaced and wounded. Those injured by the pagers still suffer. You have achieved a great accomplishment. I am certain that your future, with patience and steadfastness, will be very bright. You are present in the depths of our hearts. We recognize no border or distance with the people of Lebanon. We will certainly work, in cooperation with the Islamic countries and with Iran's help, to compensate for this damage and these destroyed homes, and God willing they will be rebuilt."

Hezbollah-Iran Relations

Asked directly to characterize the Iran-Hezbollah relationship, Rezaei used the formula Tehran has relied on throughout the post-Nasrallah period, non-interference paired with strategic partnership:

"We have always pursued a policy of non-interference in Lebanon's internal affairs. On this basis, **our relationship with Hezbollah's leadership has been and remains a strategic and comprehensive relationship.** However, we do not go into the details of Hezbollah's military structure. **Of course, we previously provided certain military training or made certain capabilities available to Hezbollah's fronts, but we do not discuss the details of decisions Hezbollah makes.** The reason is that **Hezbollah has grown large and wise**, and its members are capable of independent military decision-making. **The second and third generations of Hezbollah have entered the field, and we are entirely confident that there are competent and capable figures.** Thank God, today it is young military forces who hold the reins of power within Hezbollah."

Pressed on whether Hezbollah's younger, less experienced commanders can fill the void left by its slain leadership, he drew directly on his own career, a comparison consistent with how Tehran has framed generational continuity since Nasrallah's death:

"**The Islamic Revolution of Iran has proven that the youth of every nation are its saving angels.** As you mentioned, I was twenty-seven when I became commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Hajj Qasem Soleimani was about twenty-one. I chose him at that time to command a battalion in Kerman. The same was true of Hossein Kharrazi, Ahmad Kazemi, and Ahmad Motevaselian (Motevaselian was abducted in Lebanon in 1982 by the Christian Phalangist militia and highly likely murdered). They were all between twenty-one and twenty-three years old. I found all of them at that time and appointed them as battalion commanders. They were able to accomplish great things and performed admirably. The founders of the Guard Corps today were the youth of yesterday. Therefore, we should never be afraid to entrust tasks to the youth. I am full of great hope and I have faith in the ability of Lebanon's youth to achieve great accomplishments."

Strait of Hormuz

On the purpose of the recent visits by Pakistani and Omani officials, Rezaei confirmed they came to relay Iran's terms rather than to negotiate on Washington's behalf, consistent with Tehran's insistence that it, not intermediaries, sets the sequence:

"These gentlemen (Asim Munir and Badr al-Busaidi) came to see what Iran's conditions are for opening the Strait of Hormuz. They asked us to state the conditions so they could convey them to the Americans. **We are preparing a list of conditions to inform them. The first stage currently concerns the Strait of Hormuz and the requirement that America declare an end to the war in all areas of West Asia, particularly Lebanon.**"

He was explicit that Iran, not the United States, would dictate the order of steps:

"The matter of the Strait of Hormuz is linked to ending the wars across the region, particularly in Lebanon and Gaza. This is our policy in the new diplomacy. That is, we do not follow the Americans or walk alongside them. Rather, America must follow us and walk behind us. We have announced our conditions. If they accept them, the strait will open. They must accept and implement these conditions."

Asked about the mechanics of any reopening, he described a corridor arrangement worked out with Oman:

"We have agreed to open a temporary corridor for ships to enter and exit through the middle of the Strait of Hormuz. Part of it lies in our waters and another part in Oman's waters. We jointly manage this process of entry and exit. This has been specified, and the location of this corridor is entirely clear."

He closed the point by naming the underlying obstacle:

"Everything depends on America's implementation of the conditions. They must agree to our conditions and implement them so that trust is built, because there is a deep gap of mistrust between us and America."

The War with the United States

Rezaei framed Iran's conduct across the last three rounds of conflict as a deliberate, calibrated escalation rather than improvisation, a narrative consistent with Tehran's post-ceasefire framing of the war:

"From the outset, we tried to control the scope of the war. For example, in the twelve-day war in which Israel attacked us, we initially carried out no attack whatsoever on American bases. We did not attack American bases in the Persian Gulf states, but we did do so in the forty-day war. Likewise, in the seventeen-day Muharram war that began, for the first time we heavily bombarded American bases in Jordan, to the point that the American Central Command (CENTCOM) in the region was forced to retreat from Qatar to Jordan and from Jordan to Israel."

He explained the logic behind the pacing, echoing Tehran's standing effort to place responsibility for the war on Washington:

"The philosophy behind it is that we want to prove to the world that everything that has happened in the region is due to Trump's folly. If we had suddenly expanded the scope of the war from the beginning, world opinion would have condemned us. But today world public opinion is on our side, as is public opinion among our own people."

On what comes next, he was deliberately vague on detail but explicit on intent:

"I do not want to go into details now, but our attacks will be different, and we will deliver stunning blows to the Americans. We have prepared ourselves for a new stage. Whatever happened or happens, it originates from America. In any event in the region and beyond it, America will be the primary culprit, and we are merely defending ourselves."

On sanctions and the naval blockade, he dismissed new economic pressure as manageable, a position Tehran has held consistently since the blockade began:

"What new thing can America do? We have been under sanctions for more than fifteen years. We are under severe sanctions. They have imposed a naval blockade on us for more than a month. What else can they do? Let us see who inflicts the greatest economic damage. Without doubt, they will be the biggest losers."

He gave a specific account of how Iran worked around the blockade:

"During the ceasefire, we broke the sanctions and exported nearly seventy or eighty million barrels of oil, and we pumped it into the markets. So we are selling the same amount of oil per day that we sold before, because we had stored oil in tankers, and as soon as sanctions were lifted, dozens of ships passed through the sanctioned zone. In addition, we found another route. Although the amount of oil we transport through it is small, we are gradually increasing that amount."

On China and Turkey, he reiterated Tehran's confidence that neither will join an American economic campaign:

"China has announced that it will not cooperate with America in an economic war. We have special relations with our friends in Turkey. During the eight-year war imposed by Saddam against Iran, Turkey was our trade route. I doubt very much that Turkey will exert economic pressure on Iran."

Israel

On Israel, Rezaei spoke in his own words, quoted here in full:

"God willing and by the grace of Almighty God, we will send Netanyahu to hell, and we will prove that Netanyahu's egregious mistakes have shortened the lifespan of the Zionist regime by several years. The reason is that a fierce and sacred wrath is taking shape in the Islamic world. This fierce and sacred wrath will one day emerge and manifest itself on the ground, and the situation will differ from before."

"Israel and America exploited two characteristics of the resistance front. The first is **political decency**. What was it that made our dear brother and great hero (Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah) define the seven-kilometer equation in Lebanon? **Why did he not attack Haifa and Tel Aviv?** While he was capable of striking Haifa and Tel Aviv with dozens of missiles. He was capable of striking the settlers of northern Palestine with dozens of missiles. But he did not want to kill a large number of people, **even Jews**. **So he set the seven-kilometer limit, so that the settlers of northern Palestine would migrate and pressure Israel.**"

"But will it be the same in the next war? Will there be a limit and seven kilometers in future battles? No, that era has ended. The wrath taking shape in the Islamic world will recognize no bounds, and the Zionists will be pursued to the very last of them. Even if they enter their shelters, they will be dragged out. Therefore, America and Israel exploited the political decency of the resistance front and engaged in deception."

"But will the future be like this? **I tell you that new Sinwars and new Sayyid Hassan Nasrallahs will in the future raise a fierce wrath without any limit and will pursue all the Zionists.** The calamity Netanyahu has brought upon Israel, no Israeli ruler has brought such a calamity upon it, **and no one has committed such a disastrous mistake.** He imagines that by killing women and children the confrontation will end, but the battle and confrontation will only intensify."

Asked about Netanyahu's claim that Iran intends to assassinate American and Israeli officials and their relatives, Rezaei said:

"Netanyahu managed to deceive Trump. If we had decided to act in Turkey, nothing would have stopped us. But these are lies fabricated by Netanyahu, which frightened Trump. He came to Turkey aboard that large American aircraft. Netanyahu told him that the Iranians were trying to assassinate him. **They put him on a food delivery truck and took him out disguised as a worker, and Trump believed it, while we had no intention of going there at all."**

The Mecca Pact and Syria

On Syria, Rezaei rejected the idea that Damascus was acting against Hezbollah at Israel's behest, placing the blame instead on Israel for violating its own understanding with the new government in Damascus:

"The Syrian government faces many difficulties. The Zionist regime has trampled on all the agreements America made with Mr. al-Jolani. What is it that makes Israel attack Damascus, its outskirts, and Syria's airports? Since Mr. al-Jolani extended a hand of friendship toward Trump, Israel has advanced several kilometers toward Damascus. Therefore, an equation that would result in Syria's entry against Lebanon is not a practical equation."

On the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, **he set out conditions consistent with Tehran's public reluctance to endorse a pact it was not party to founding:**

"We welcome any unity within the Islamic world, but this unity must be comprehensive. If two or three countries draft something, sign it, and ask others to join them, will they approve it? Such a thing is not possible. We have not agreed so far because we wanted to know the objectives. We expected that from the first day these three countries would issue a declaration against Israel and demand the withdrawal of the Zionist regime from Gaza, southern Lebanon, and southern Syria. Iran and Egypt cannot merely be spectators and merely join as consenting parties. They must be among the founders."

III. Assessment

Beirut's April letter accused the IRGC of running joint offensive operations from Lebanese soil, against the explicit orders of Lebanon's cabinet. It also accused Iran of keeping an ambassador in place after Beirut declared him persona non grata. Rezaei's formula, non-interference paired with a strategic relationship with Hezbollah, does not answer that record. It defies it outright.

The real point is simpler: Rezaei does not treat Lebanon and Iran as separate. Hezbollah is Iran's arm inside Lebanon. Naim Qassem is not really Hezbollah's independent leader. He is Iran's man in Beirut. Hezbollah's own letters to Mojtaba Khamenei make this explicit: they renew the pledge of allegiance and state that the party follows Khamenei's leadership. Qassem has personally thanked Tehran's negotiators for keeping Lebanon inside the ceasefire deal with Washington.

That is why Rezaei's praise for Hezbollah's "second and third generation" of commanders is not a pep talk. It is a statement of intent. Iran still expects that generation, under Qassem, to finish what Nasrallah started. This time without the seven-kilometer limit.



That is also why Iran opposes Hezbollah's disarmament. A disarmed Hezbollah cannot finish the job. The standoff between Beirut's peace process and Hezbollah's refusal to disarm is not really a Lebanese standoff. It is an Iranian one. Iran controls the pace through its own memorandum with Washington. As long as the war has not ended on Iran's terms, everywhere, disarmament stays off the table.

So the interview is not really addressed to Beirut. It is addressed to Hezbollah. The message: Iran still owns this file, and the mission is not over.

The Hormuz linkage is the more consequential move. By making an American declaration ending the war in Lebanon and Gaza a stated condition for reopening the strait, Rezaei ties Tehran's most valuable point of leverage against Washington to Hezbollah's fate rather than treating Hormuz as a narrower bilateral file. Hormuz has already emerged as a site of internal Iranian friction over who controls the terms of reopening. Rezaei's arrival at the SNSC, and his choice to stake out the Hormuz-Lebanon linkage personally and publicly on Hezbollah's own network, reads as an attempt to settle that internal question in his own favor as much as a message to Washington.

The Mecca Pact section fits the same pattern. Iran has watched a Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani defense structure take shape without it, and Rezaei's conditions for joining, founding-member status for Iran and Egypt plus a binding anti-Israel declaration, are conditions the pact's current signatories have so far avoided. Demanding them publicly, on Al-Manar, both makes the case to a Hezbollah-aligned audience that Iran is not being left behind and puts pressure on Ankara and Riyadh to either meet Iranian terms or be blamed for excluding it.

The removal of Nasrallah's seven-kilometer restraint doctrine is the sharpest line in the interview and the one most clearly aimed at Hezbollah's own base rather than at Washington or Jerusalem. It functions as deterrence signaling

toward Israel ahead of any next round, and as reassurance to hardline audiences in Iran and Hezbollah who viewed the old restraint doctrine as a missed opportunity that it will not recur. Paired with the generational framing, Rezaei's own rise at 27 echoed in Soleimani, Kharrazi, Kazemi, and Motevaselian, the message to Hezbollah's constituency is that decapitation of Nasrallah, Safieddine, and Soleimani has not broken continuity of command or resolve.

Taken together, the interview functions less as new policy than as public reinforcement of a position Iran has held since Beirut filed its complaint: that Hezbollah's Lebanon file will not be settled by Beirut, Washington, and Israel without Tehran, and that Iran is prepared to use its own leverage, Hormuz above all, to keep it that way. It also serves Rezaei personally, establishing him within three weeks of taking the SNSC post as a more publicly assertive security chief than his predecessor, on precisely the two files, Hormuz and Lebanon, where friction was already building.