OPEN-SOURCE PRESS INTELLIGENCE

Iranian Press Monitor

Daily Front-Page Intelligence

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THE MEETING THAT DID NOT HAPPEN EDITION

Ten front pages (nine Persian from the Tuesday 24 Shahrivar Tasnim kiosk album, including the IRGC weekly Sobh-e Sadegh dated the previous day, and Iran Daily from the English kiosk), plus the Kayhan, Vatan-e Emrooz, Jam-e Jam, Etemad, Iran and Sobh-e No channels and the Defa Press, Fars and Nour News wires; Tehran Times and the leadership websites were unavailable at the time of compilation

Front pages published the morning of 15 September 2026, reflecting events through late 14 September local

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Front page: Sobh-e No

Executive Summary

The lead judgment of this cycle is that the Hormuz settlement track has stopped, and that Tehran has no single story about how. Sobh-e No gives its entire front page to the question in its headline, «چرا نشست صلاله لغو شد؟», why was the Salalah meeting cancelled, and answers it in a pulled quote: the region's equations changed, Ansarallah's advances and the resistance front's control of two straits moved the balance to Tehran's favour, the damage to Saudi Arabia's strategic pipeline and Riyadh's export restrictions weakened that country, and America was among the obstacles. Kayhan answers the same question differently on its own front page, in a news-analysis lead headed «دیکته آمریکا به عربستان ثابت کرد نشست عمان تله بود», America's dictate to Saudi Arabia proved the Oman meeting was a trap, arguing that Riyadh requested the postponement to tune the outcome to American benefit and that Oman agreed. Khorasan answers it a third way, printing «فرار ترامپ از صلاله», Trump's flight from Salalah, across a full-page portrait of the American president. Three accounts, one morning, mutually exclusive in their mechanics and identical in their conclusion that no part of the cause lies in Tehran. That pattern is what centrally supplied conclusions look like when the centre has issued a verdict without issuing a narrative.

The most consequential single sentence in the edition is not about Salalah at all, and it is not on a front page as a headline. Inside Kayhan's lead, in the course of accusing Saudi Arabia of manufacturing an excuse, the paper states as settled fact that Riyadh acted «به بهانه حمله یمن به خطوط لوله», on the pretext of the Yemeni attack on the pipelines. No party has publicly claimed the drone strikes that shut Saudi Arabia's east-west Petroline system on 11 and 12 September, a line carrying roughly 5 million barrels a day to Yanbu and now expected to be mostly out of service for weeks; open reporting describes drones launched from Iraq and no claim of responsibility. The daily published under the Supreme Leader's office has placed that attack in Yemen's column in passing, inside a subordinate clause, while arguing about something else. Attributions made incidentally are among the more reliable kinds of open-source evidence, precisely because the speaker is not guarding them.

The second thread is a treaty-exit argument that arrived on three front pages at once. Jam-e Jam, the state broadcaster's daily, leads with «بی خاصیت مثل ان‌پی‌تی», as useless as the NPT, decked with the cancellation of the Atomic Energy Organization chief's attendance at the IAEA General Conference through, in its words, American bullying and Grossi's silence. Sobh-e No runs an IAEA sign beside a red traffic light under «آژانس آمریکایی», the American Agency, and carries an interview arguing that Europe is pushing Iran towards NPT withdrawal. Kayhan places a contributed article on its front page titled «از هسته اتمی تا خروج از NPT», from the nuclear core to exiting the NPT. Jam-e Jam's channel carries a video asking why demands for withdrawal and for weapons development are rising. The underlying event is real and confirmed: Austria withdrew Mohammad Eslami's visa after the Security Council sanctions committee refused a travel-ban exemption over an American objection, with Iran's IAEA ambassador Reza Najafi confirming that the visa had first been granted. What every one of these pages omits is the mechanism, the snapback travel ban, which converts a procedural exclusion into an act of bullying and the Agency into an instrument. That omission is uniform, and uniform omissions are decisions.

The third thread is a counter-narrative campaign of unusual precision. Four titles from four institutional families, Khorasan, Jam-e Jam, Nobonyad and Seda-ye Iran, attacked the same American television production on the same morning: a CBS segment on the rescue of a pilot whose aircraft the Iranian account says was brought down by an indigenous system. Khorasan names the purpose, asking why the piece was a domestically made promotional video produced before the congressional midterm elections. Nobonyad's Mohsen Pourdadfar pairs it directly with the claimed capture of an American submersible in the Strait of

Hormuz. Seda-ye Iran leads its whole front page on it under «اکران شکست روی پرده», the defeat screened on the silver screen. Four newsrooms do not converge on one foreign broadcast this exactly by independent news judgment; the mechanism indicated is centrally guided message discipline. The companion claim travels with it everywhere: Hamshahri, a Tehran municipal daily with no security remit, gives its top half to «موزه غنیمت‌های ایران», the museum of Iran's spoils, quoting the Foreign Ministry spokesman that the American submarine was not impounded but «غنیمت گرفته شده و کاملا حلال است», taken as spoils and entirely licit. The United States military has described that vessel, identified in Iranian state media as an Anduril Dive-LD, as defective and carrying no sensitive or classified equipment. Neither account is adopted here; the coordination is the finding.

Against all of that, the two surfaces with the most at stake said nothing. Iran, the government's own daily, led on President Pezeshkian's pledge that the food-voucher figure will rise, and put its only foreign-policy graphic on Bab al-Mandab; the Strait of Hormuz, Oman and Salalah appear nowhere on its front page, while its own Telegram channel reports shipping through the strait at its lowest level in weeks. Iran Daily, which on 14 September led in English on the government's limiting formula that the Oman agreement does not open the strait, omits Oman entirely and leads instead on Ansarallah striking Saudi bases. The bilingual indicator this monitor has tracked since 12 September has therefore inverted: the English surface, which was where concessions were introduced before being domesticated in Persian, is now where the file has gone silent. Etemad, the reformist daily of record, kept two items in its retrieved window, both of which price the war rather than argue about it, and published no answer of any kind to the treaty-exit argument running on three front pages.

The institutional finding of the edition belongs to a conservative paper and concerns process rather than policy. Nobonyad prints «مجلس، همچنان خارج از گود», parliament, still outside the ring, stating that while decisions on the future of the Strait of Hormuz and on agreements bearing on national security have been placed on the diplomatic apparatus's agenda, the role of the Islamic Consultative Assembly as supervisory and legislative body remains shrouded in ambiguity. The same page asks on what justification Saudi Arabia was admitted to a Hormuz agreement at all, and reports, confirmed independently, that Seyyed Ehsan Khandouzi, economy minister under Raisi, has taken over the economic group inside the Office of the Leader of the Revolution from Ali Aghamohammadi. A settlement file run by the executive and the leadership apparatus with the legislature outside the room is a description a principlist daily has now put in print, and it is harder to dismiss than Kayhan's objections to substance because it is an objection to method.

Net assessment: this is an edition about a diplomatic event that did not take place, and the shape of the reaction to it is more informative than the event. The hardline title that opposed the track claims vindication but did not press its own vengeance frame when it was cheapest to do so, and the leadership-affiliated bulletin declined that frame for a second consecutive cycle. The IRGC's own weekly states the establishment's operating formula in a cover headline, «تسلط بر باب‌المندب، تفاهم در هرمز», command at Bab al-Mandab, understanding at Hormuz, which is an explicit commitment to settle the chokepoint Iran pays for and to keep coercing at the one it does not. The government's surfaces have gone quiet in both languages. And in the space the diplomatic argument has vacated, a treaty-exit argument has arrived with three front pages behind it in a single morning. The direction of travel is from a maritime file that has stalled towards a nuclear file that is being prepared.

BOTTOM LINE The Salalah meeting was cancelled, and the Iranian press published at least three incompatible explanations for it in a single morning while a coordinated argument for leaving the Non-Proliferation Treaty ran across three institutional families on the same pages, which indicates that the

diplomatic track has stopped without an agreed Iranian account of why and that the nuclear file is being prepared as the ground the next phase is fought on.

CRITICAL SOURCING NOTE Ten front pages were read directly with vision from the Tuesday 24 Shahrivar 1405 kiosk albums; the stale-batch guard passed on first run with the album's printed Jalali date matching the target date, and no fallback sources were required. Every masthead was identified from the page rather than from any supplied label. Six newspaper channels and three wires were read as text; wire material is used only for corroboration, official and semi-official claims, and the threat register, never as a front page. Tehran Times and the leadership websites were unavailable at the time of compilation, and no leadership message is reproduced in this edition. Vatan-e Emrooz and Etemad appear from their channels alone, neither title's page having been in the album, and neither is scored on questions that require reading a page. Four claims were checked against open reporting and are carried as confirmed in outline: the Vienna visa refusal and its Security Council mechanism, the Foreign Ministry spokesman's spoils-of-war formulation and the American response to it, the Khandouzi appointment, and the Dublin protest that Sobh-e No attributes to the Irish as a nation rather than to the masked group that burned the flag. Claims recorded and not adopted include the mined supertanker, the captured-aircraft inventory, the downed MQ-1 which appears identically on four surfaces and is therefore one claim rather than four, the Saudi request for outside military help which Kayhan addresses to Israel and Vatan-e Emrooz's channel to the United Kingdom on the same morning, the 2 percent figure for American service personnel's support for the war, and Kayhan's 110 percent oil-revenue banner. This monitor's day number is a fixed calendar count from the war's opening; Iranian outlets count from a different epoch, and Kayhan's own war report this morning is headed the one hundred and ninety-ninth day.

Macro Trend Analysis

1 A cancellation without an agreed cause, and every cause lies abroad

Sobh-e No attributes the collapse of the Salalah meeting to changed regional equations, a weakened Riyadh and American obstruction; Kayhan attributes it to a Saudi request made on American instruction under cover of the pipeline attack; Khorasan attributes it to the American president fleeing the venue. These are not three emphases on one account, they are three different actors causing one event, and they ran on three front pages on one morning. What they share is the absence of any Iranian agency in the outcome, including the negative kind: no page considers that Tehran's own terms contributed, and no page reports the postponement as a loss. A press system that has been told what to conclude but not what happened produces exactly this signature. The operational implication is that the cancellation was not prepared in advance with the press, which in turn suggests it was not Tehran's decision to make.

2 The treaty-exit argument moved onto the front pages, and the mechanism was removed from it

In one cycle, «بی خاصیت مثل ان‌پی‌تی» leads the state broadcaster's daily, «آژانس آمریکایی» and an NPT-withdrawal interview run on a principlist front page, and «از هسته اتمی تا خروج از NPT» appears on the front of the Leader's office daily as a contributed article. Three institutional families, one morning, one direction. The occasion is genuine: Austria withdrew Mohammad Eslami's visa for the IAEA General Conference after the Security Council sanctions committee refused a travel-ban exemption over an American objection. The uniform editorial act is the removal of that mechanism. Every page renders a snapback travel ban as American bullying and the Director General's conduct as complicity, which converts a procedural exclusion into evidence that the Agency itself is an instrument and that membership buys nothing. Presenting NPT exit as a reader's contribution and an interviewee's warning rather than as an editorial demand is how a position is

tested before it is owned. This is the thread most likely to produce the next significant escalation, and the resolving indicator is whether any office adopts the argument that a newsroom is currently carrying.

3 The captured-hardware story left the security estate and entered civic culture

The claimed seizure of an American uncrewed submersible was, ten days ago, a military claim contested by an American denial that the vessel was anything but defective. This morning it is the top half of the Tehran municipality's newspaper, curated as «موزه غنیمت‌های ایران», a museum of spoils, with an inventory of claimed drone captures, a Foreign Ministry ruling that the taking was «حلال», licit, and a short explainer for the general reader that reverse engineering means building something better than the original rather than a copy. The IRGC's own weekly ran the same story a day earlier as «جدیدترین شکار نیروی دریایی سپاه», the IRGC Navy's newest catch. What this trend measures is not the truth of the claim but its promotion: a contested military assertion has been converted into settled civic property, at which point it becomes very difficult to retract and starts to function as a public expectation of further such catches.

4 Four newsrooms, one foreign broadcast, one morning

Khorasan, Jam-e Jam, Nobonyad and Seda-ye Iran all attacked the same CBS segment about the rescue of a downed American pilot, in the same terms, on the same day, and one of them, Khorasan, named the United States midterm elections as its purpose. Seda-ye Iran built its entire front page on it. This is the cleanest instance of centrally guided message discipline in several cycles, and it is cleaner than the convergence this monitor recorded on 14 September around the government's Hormuz formula, because a foreign television segment is not an event that four Iranian newsrooms would independently elevate to front-page treatment. The paired claim travels with it in every instance, which tells you what the campaign is for: the American production is offered as the fake, and the captured submersible as the real. Watch for the same pairing appearing in an official statement, which would mark the campaign's graduation from press to policy.

5 The government has gone quiet in both languages, and the bilingual indicator has inverted

Since 12 September this monitor has tracked the English state surface as the place where concessions are introduced abroad before being domesticated in Persian. That cycle completed on 14 September, when Iran Daily and Javan carried the foreign minister's limiting formula identically in both languages. This morning the government's Persian daily leads on food vouchers and does not print the words Hormuz, Oman or Salalah anywhere on its front page, while its own channel reports shipping through the strait at its lowest level in weeks; and Iran Daily omits the file entirely and leads on Ansarullah striking Saudi bases. The substitution is the point: Tehran's governmental surfaces will still claim Bab al-Mandab, where the gains are Ansarallah's and cost Iran nothing, and have stopped discussing Hormuz, where the bill is arriving. The indicator to watch is the reappearance of the Hormuz formula in English, which on the pattern of the last four cycles would precede its return to the Persian pages.

6 A conservative daily has put the exclusion of parliament in print

Nobonyad's «مجلس، همچنان خارج از گود», parliament still outside the ring, states that decision-making on the future of the Strait of Hormuz and on agreements bearing on national security sits with the diplomatic apparatus while the Majlis's supervisory and legislative role remains in ambiguity, and asks on the same page on what justification Saudi Arabia was brought into a Hormuz agreement at all. This is a procedural complaint from inside the principlist camp, and it arrives alongside the confirmed transfer of the economic group inside the Office of the Leader of the Revolution to Seyyed Ehsan Khandouzi, the Raisi government's economy minister, from Ali Aghamohammadi. Together they describe a file being run between the executive and the leadership apparatus. Objections to method outlast objections to substance, and this one is the thread most likely to produce a formal parliamentary demand if and when the Salalah track restarts.

7 The war did not pause for the diplomacy that stopped

The wires and channels carried, in one window: an advanced MQ-1 destroyed over the western Strait of Hormuz, reported identically by Defa Press, Fars, Vatan-e Emrooz's channel and the Iran newspaper's channel and therefore counted here as one claim; a drone attack on two fishing boats twelve nautical miles from Larak Island and thirty miles from Kangan with fishermen missing; a supertanker reported destroyed by naval mines south of the strait; a United Nations Security Council emergency session on Yemeni control of the Bab al-Mandab coastline; Yemeni strikes on Saudi targets with warning sirens at Yanbu, Taif, Jeddah, Abha, Jizan and Ula, airport suspensions and Jizan oil facilities hit; and Saudi Arabia reported requesting outside military intervention, to Israel on Kayhan's account and to the United Kingdom on Vatan-e Emrooz's. Shipping through Hormuz is meanwhile at its lowest level in weeks on the reformist and governmental channels alike. The standing judgment holds without amendment: the corridor that was being negotiated is a corridor in a strait where vessels are still being hit, and the theatre now generating the escalation is the Saudi-Yemeni one rather than the Iranian-American one.

Key Judgments

KJ-1 [HIGH] The Salalah track has stopped, and the Iranian press was given a conclusion without a narrative. Sobh-e No devotes its front page to asking why the meeting was cancelled and answers with changed regional equations, a weakened Riyadh and American obstruction; Kayhan answers with a Saudi postponement request made at American dictation under cover of the pipeline attack; Khorasan answers with «فرار ترامپ از صلاله», Trump's flight from Salalah. Three front pages, one morning, three incompatible causal mechanisms and one shared conclusion that no part of the cause lies in Tehran. On 14 September, by contrast, three institutionally distinct outlets carried the government's limiting formula in a single identical sentence, which is what a prepared line looks like. The significance is that the difference between those two mornings is evidence about who decided: a cancellation Tehran had chosen would have arrived with a line attached, and this one did not.

KJ-2 [HIGH] A coordinated argument for leaving the Non-Proliferation Treaty has moved from commentary to the front pages, and is being carried in borrowed voices rather than owned. «بی خاصیت مثل ان‌پی‌تی», as useless as the NPT, is the state broadcaster daily's banner; «آژانس آمریکایی», the American Agency, with an interview saying Europe is pushing Iran to withdraw, is on a principlist front page; «از هسته‌ای تا خروج از NPT» is a contributed article on the front of the Leader's office daily; the broadcaster's channel asks why withdrawal demands are rising. Every one of them rests on the Vienna visa refusal and every one omits that the refusal followed a Security Council sanctions committee declining a travel-ban exemption over an American objection, which obliged Austria to withdraw a visa it had granted. The significance is twofold: a uniform omission across three institutional families is a decision rather than an editorial coincidence, and positions introduced as a reader's article and an interviewee's warning are positions being tested rather than announced. The indicator that would convert this from press to policy is the adoption of the argument by any office.

KJ-3 [MODERATE-HIGH] Kayhan has attributed the Saudi pipeline attack to Yemen, in passing, while arguing about something else. The clause is «به بهانه حمله یمن به خطوط لوله», on the pretext of the Yemeni attack on the pipelines, and its rhetorical purpose is to accuse Riyadh of manufacturing an excuse rather than to claim the strike. No party has publicly claimed the drone attacks that shut Saudi Arabia's east-west Petroline system on 11 and 12 September; open reporting describes drones launched from Iraq and no claim of responsibility, with the line expected to be out of service for weeks. The evidence for weighting this

is that unguarded attributions made in service of a different argument are less likely to be constructed; the evidence against is that Kayhan routinely asserts as fact what its own camp would like to be true, and that an Iraqi launch point is not a Yemeni one. The significance is that the daily published under the Supreme Leader's office has assigned responsibility for the most economically consequential strike of this phase to Ansarallah without being asked, and that any subsequent Iranian denial of the attribution now has this sentence to answer.

KJ-4 [MODERATE-HIGH] The IRGC has stated its operating formula for the two chokepoints in a cover headline, and it is explicitly asymmetric. Sobh-e Sadegh, the political-cultural weekly of the IRGC's political bureau, headlines «تسلط بر بابالمندب، تفاهم در هرمز», command of Bab al-Mandab and understanding at Hormuz, over a Yemeni dagger, a line of warships and an Israeli flag on the sand, decked as an examination of the resistance axis's upper hand in world trade. The same asymmetry is visible on surfaces answering to different institutions: the government's daily claims Bab al-Mandab on its front page and leaves Hormuz to its channel, and Iran Daily substitutes an Ansarullah lead for the Hormuz file it carried a day earlier. The significance is that the security establishment is committing in print to settling the chokepoint Iran pays for and coercing at the one it does not, which confirms from the IRGC's own bureau the divergence between the security and ideological estates that this monitor inferred on 14 September, and «تفاهم در هرمز» is the specific phrase to watch for in official language.

KJ-5 [MODERATE-HIGH] The four-title attack on a single American broadcast is centrally guided rather than organic, and it exists to carry a contested capability claim. Khorasan, Jam-e Jam, Nobonyad and Seda-ye Iran ran the same attack on a CBS segment about a rescued American pilot on the same morning, Khorasan naming the congressional midterms as its purpose and Seda-ye Iran giving its entire front page to it under «اکران شکست روی پرده». In every instance the segment is paired with the claimed capture of an American uncrewed submersible in the Strait of Hormuz, which Hamshahri simultaneously curates as a museum of spoils and which the United States military has described as a defective vessel carrying no sensitive or classified equipment. Four newsrooms across four institutional families do not independently elevate one foreign television segment to front-page treatment. The significance is that message discipline is being exercised on the information contest rather than on the diplomatic file, on the morning the diplomatic file stopped, and the discipline is sharper here than on anything Hormuz-related in this edition.

KJ-6 [MODERATE] The government has withdrawn from the Hormuz file on both its language surfaces, and the bilingual early indicator has inverted. Iran, the government's daily, leads on the president's food-voucher pledge and prints neither Hormuz nor Oman nor Salalah anywhere on its front page, while placing its only foreign-policy graphic on Bab al-Mandab; its own channel reports shipping through the strait at its lowest level in weeks. Iran Daily, which on 14 September led in English on «the Oman agreement does not open the strait», omits the file and leads on Ansarullah striking Saudi bases. For three cycles the English surface was where concessions were introduced before being domesticated in Persian; it is now where the file has gone silent. The significance is that governmental silence in both languages on a file the government owns, while hardline and principlist titles argue about it in public, indicates a position that has not been settled rather than one being withheld, and the reappearance of the Hormuz formula in English would be the earliest signal that it has been.

KJ-7 [MODERATE] Negative evidence, and it is the most important finding in the edition after the cancellation itself: the vengeance frame was available, cheap and unused. On 14 September, Hossein Shariatmadari's Kayhan column attached blood-vengeance for the assassinated Leader to any reopening of

the Strait of Hormuz, alongside American withdrawal, reparations, a halt to Israeli operations in Lebanon and Palestine, and exclusion of the nuclear file. On 15 September, with the meeting cancelled and the argument apparently won, the same column spent itself entirely on returning expatriate artists and silent cultural institutions and did not mention Hormuz. In the same cycle, Seda-ye Iran, which prints the khamenei.ir affiliation on its masthead, again carried no Hormuz condition and no vengeance framing, for the second consecutive edition. The benign reading is that a won argument needs no repetition. The alternative is that the frame was a bid that did not land. The significance is that the succession's legitimacy debt has now failed twice to attach to the maritime file on the office's own surfaces, and this monitor continues to weight the condition list as a newspaper's bid until an office adopts any element of it.

KJ-8 [MODERATE] Principlist criticism of the settlement process has shifted from substance to procedure, which makes it more durable. Nobonyad prints that decisions on the future of the Strait of Hormuz and on agreements bearing on national security sit with the diplomatic apparatus while the Majlis's supervisory and legislative role «همچنان در هاله‌ای از ابهام قرار دارد», remains shrouded in ambiguity, and asks on what justification Saudi Arabia was admitted to a Hormuz agreement. The same page carries the confirmed appointment of Seyyed Ehsan Khandouzi, the Raisi government's economy minister, to head the economic group in the Office of the Leader of the Revolution in place of Ali Aghamohammadi. The significance is that a complaint about who decides survives changes in what is decided, in a way that Kayhan's objections to the terms do not, and that a formal parliamentary demand for a role in the Hormuz file is now a plausible next development and would be an indicator that the track is expected to restart.

KJ-9 [MODERATE] The escalation in this cycle is Saudi-Yemeni, not Iranian-American, and it is running ahead of the diplomacy. Iran Daily leads on Ansarullah targeting Saudi military bases in retaliation for air strikes; Fars reports a Security Council emergency session on Yemeni control of the Bab al-Mandab coastline, strikes with warning sirens at Yanbu, Taif, Jeddah, Abha, Jizan and Ula, airport suspensions and Jizan oil facilities hit; Vatan-e Emrooz's channel relays a Yahya Saree statement promising a response to Saudi air strikes on five provinces and counts 54 Saudi sorties in 24 hours; Kayhan's front page reports Riyadh asking Israel for help while Vatan-e Emrooz's channel reports it asking the United Kingdom. The significance is that Saudi Arabia is simultaneously the party Kayhan blames for the Salalah postponement and the party under sustained attack, which means the actor Tehran needs at the table is the actor its allies are hitting, and that the Saudi-Yemeni file is now the likeliest source of the shock that would determine whether the Hormuz track restarts at all.

KJ-10 [LOW-MODERATE] Negative evidence: the reformist surface published no answer to the treaty-exit argument. Etemad's retrieved window carries two items, shipping through the Strait of Hormuz at its lowest level in weeks, and a United States Department of Justice action against Iranian oil-revenue cryptocurrency, and nothing on Salalah, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the IAEA, the NPT or Israel. On 14 September the same title led on a ballistic-missile profile printed beneath the president's own statement that Iran would not have joined the NPT had it sought a weapon, which was an argument that conventional deterrence makes a bounded settlement survivable. No equivalent argument appears anywhere in this edition against three front pages carrying the case for withdrawal. The caveat is material and limits the confidence: no Etemad scan was in the album, so this rests on a channel window rather than on a page, and a channel window is not a front page. The significance is that the absence of a reformist counter-argument on a treaty question is either editorial caution or an absence of permitted ground, and which of the two it is would be worth establishing; recovering the Etemad and Vatan-e Emrooz pages is the first task of the next cycle.

Named-Figure Tracker

Figure	Role / relevance	Today's framing	Flag
Donald Trump	President of the United States	Khorasan runs a full-page portrait under «ترامپ در محاصره ۸ تله», besieged by eight traps, and prints «فرار ترامپ از صلاله», Trump's flight from Salalah; Seda-ye Iran's editorial calls his oil-price claims a perennial lie; Vatan-e Emrooz's channel carries the Supreme Court blocking his postal-voting restrictions	TARGET FRAMING
Mohammad Eslami	Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran	The subject of the Vienna visa refusal on two front pages, named on neither as the object of a Security Council travel ban; Jam-e Jam frames the cancellation as American bullying and Grossi's silence	WATCH
Rafael Grossi	Director General of the IAEA	Named on Jam-e Jam's front page as having stayed silent while Iran's nuclear chief was excluded; the Agency itself rendered by Sobh-e No as «آژانس آمریکایی», the American Agency	TARGET FRAMING
Esmail Baghaei	Spokesman of the Iranian Foreign Ministry	Quoted, unnamed, on Hamshahri's front page that the American submarine was not impounded but taken as spoils of war and is entirely licit; the remarks are his of Monday 14 September and the religious register «حلال» is the paper's addition	COERCION SPOKESMAN
Masoud Pezeshkian	President of the Islamic Republic of Iran	Carried identically on three surfaces on the domestic file, «رقم کالابرگ قطعا افزایش می‌یابد», the food-voucher figure will definitely increase, on Iran's front page, in Jam-e Jam's lead photograph and in Kayhan's right rail, and in English on Iran Daily as a unity appeal against US bullying; absent from every page on Salalah	WATCH
Hossein Shariatmadari	Managing editor of Kayhan, a leadership appointee	Signed «نکته» of the day is a domestic culture-war piece on returning expatriate artists; did not return to the Hormuz condition list or the vengeance framing he published on 14 September	absence noted
Seyyed Ehsan Khandouzi	Economy minister in the Raisi government; now head of the economic group in the Office of the Leader of the Revolution	Reported on Nobonyad's front page and independently confirmed as appointed on 23 Shahrivar 1405, replacing Ali Aghamohammadi	NEW NAMED FIGURE
Mojtaba Khamenei	Supreme Leader	Not named on any front page in this set; the leadership-affiliated bulletin carries an unreadable social card in the masthead	absence noted

Figure	Role / relevance	Today's framing	Flag
		position and no printed message, and no leadership text could be verified in this cycle	
Abbas Araghchi	Foreign Minister of Iran	Reported on Vatan-e Emrooz's channel reaffirming full Iranian support for the Lebanese resistance; absent from every front page in the set, having supplied the government's Hormuz limiting formula a day earlier	absence noted
Mohammed bin Salman	Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia	Pictured on Nobonyad's front page beside the question of on what justification Saudi Arabia was admitted to a Hormuz agreement; Kayhan casts Riyadh as an American lever that requested the Salalah postponement	TARGET FRAMING
Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei	Head of the Judiciary	Pictured on Kayhan's front page ordering a precise audit of the budget and of state companies' violations, alongside a report on signs of infiltration in decision-making centres	WATCH
Yahya Saree	Spokesman of the Yemeni armed forces	Quoted on Vatan-e Emrooz's channel promising a response to Saudi air strikes on five provinces, with 54 Saudi sorties counted in 24 hours; claim not independently confirmed	COERCION SPOKESMAN
Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani	Political scientist and former member of the Majlis national security committee	Quoted on Sobh-e No's front page that Europe's veto game is pushing Iran towards leaving the NPT; the page prints the surname only and the identification is inferential	NEW NAMED FIGURE
Masoud Derakhshan	Professor of economics, Allameh Tabataba'i University	Nobonyad's front-page commentary, printed as «پروفسور درخشان» with no first name, argues that the government spent seven years staging a JCPOA serial and that the Leader of the Revolution warned against optimism from the outset; identification inferential from the surname	WATCH

Headline Summary Table

Outlet	Lead Headline (English)	Orientation	Theme	Threat signal
Sobh-e No	Why was the Salalah meeting cancelled?	Principlist morning daily	The cancellation explained as a regional balance shifted to Tehran, with the Hormuz closure reasserted above the masthead	HIGH
Kayhan	America's dictate to Saudi Arabia proved the Oman meeting was a trap	Hardline, published under the Supreme Leader's office, managing editor Hossein Shariatmadari	Vindication claimed for opposing the track, with the pipeline attack attributed to Yemen in passing	SEVERE

Outlet	Lead Headline (English)	Orientation	Theme	Threat signal
Khorasan	Blood zeal	Conservative Mashhad-based national daily	Salalah as Trump's flight, the American midterms named as the purpose of a US broadcast, and blood donation as a measure of national will	MODERATE-HIGH
Jam-e Jam	As useless as the NPT	State daily of IRIB, the national broadcaster	The treaty declared worthless after the Vienna visa refusal, with the Security Council mechanism omitted	HIGH
Sobh-e Sadegh	Command of Bab al-Mandab, understanding at Hormuz	Political-cultural weekly of the IRGC political bureau, dated 23 Shahrivar	The two-chokepoint doctrine stated explicitly: coerce where it is free, settle where it is costly	HIGH
Hamshahri	The museum of Iran's spoils	Centrist daily of the Tehran municipality	Captured American hardware curated as civic property, with American security guarantees framed as worthless to Gulf states	MODERATE-HIGH
Vatan-e Emrooz	Front page not in the album; read from the channel	Hardline principlist morning daily	The delay priced through the oil market rather than through a plot; Saudi escalation and a reported British request relayed	MODERATE-HIGH
Seda-ye Iran	The defeat screened on the silver screen	Leadership-messaging daily carrying the khamenei.ir affiliation on its masthead	American narrative-making attacked; Hormuz conditions and vengeance framing absent for a second consecutive cycle	MODERATE
Nobonyad	Do not charge incapacity to the imbalance account	Conservative principlist morning daily	Parliament reported excluded from the Hormuz file, and a Leader's-office economic appointment confirmed	MODERATE
Iran Daily	Pezeshkian says unity key to resisting 'US bullying'	English-language state daily published by IRNA	Unity messaging abroad and Bab al-Mandab escalation carried, with the Hormuz file dropped after leading on it a day earlier	MODERATE
Iran	The food-voucher figure will definitely increase	Official daily of the government, published by IRNA	Welfare over diplomacy; Bab al-Mandab claimed on the page while Hormuz is left to the channel	LOW-MODERATE
Etemad	Front page not in the album; read from the channel	Reformist daily of record	The war priced rather than argued, and no reformist answer to the treaty-exit argument	LOW-MODERATE

Per-Paper Front-Page Analysis

Iran Daily

English-language state daily, published by IRNA

MODERATE

“Pezeshkian says unity key to resisting 'US bullying'”


Iran Daily

Pezeshkian says unity key to resisting ‘US bullying’

Yemen's Ansarullah targets Saudi military bases in retaliation for airstrikes

- Main: The English state surface leads on the president's unity appeal against what it puts in quotation marks as US bullying, the same domestic-cohesion register its Persian sister title carries as a food-voucher pledge. Neither language edition leads on the collapse of the Salalah meeting.
- Main: The page's dominant item is «Yemen's Ansarullah targets Saudi military bases in retaliation for airstrikes», illustrated with a credited satellite photograph of a burned-out energy facility. Corroborated in outline by the wires the same morning: Fars reports a UN Security Council emergency session on Yemeni control of the Bab al-Mandab coastline (t.me/farsna/462147), strikes on Saudi targets with warning sirens at Yanbu, Taif, Jeddah, Abha, Jizan and Ula and airport suspensions (462151 to 462153), and Jizan oil facilities hit (462154).
- Op-ed: A signed opinion column, «Economic diplomacy: a door that remains open», argues from the 2026 BRICS summit that Iran's opportunities in the bloc are economic rather than declaratory and that BRICS membership must move beyond political statements into markets, foreign investment, financing and economic cooperation. This is the English surface arguing for the settlement's economic rationale on the morning the political track stopped.
- Sub-item: «CBI chief sets monetary discipline, FX stability as priorities to curb inflation», the central bank's own framing of the war economy, placed on the front page in English.
- Sub-item: «Geoeconomic competition and new wealth of nations», pegged to the 250th anniversary of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, and «Culture minister calls Minab tragedy document against cruel wars», keeping a civilian-harm item in the English window.
- Absence: Neither the Strait of Hormuz, nor Oman, nor Salalah, nor the Vienna visa refusal appears anywhere on this front page. On 14 September this same title carried the government's Hormuz limiting formula as its banner in English.

> **ANALYST NOTE** The bilingual indicator this monitor has tracked since 12 September has now inverted. For three cycles the English surface was where a concession was introduced before it was domesticated in Persian; this morning it is where the file has gone silent, while the Persian hardline and principlist titles fight in public over who caused the cancellation. A state English daily that led on «the Oman agreement does not open the strait» one day and omits Oman entirely the next is not editing by news value. Read the Ansarullah lead as the substitution: the chokepoint Tehran can still present abroad as a gain, in place of the one where the diplomacy just failed.

Khorasan

Conservative Mashhad-based national daily

MODERATE-HIGH

“Blood zeal” «غیرت خونی»



- Main: The lead is a home-front morale story, not a war story: «ثبت رکورد افزایش ۹۸ درصدی مشارکت مردم در اهدای خون طی ایام جنگ، ترازویی برای سنجش سرمایه اجتماعی و وطن‌دوستی ایرانیان است», a record 98 percent rise in public participation in blood donation during the days of the war is a scale for measuring Iranians' social capital and patriotism. «غیرت» (gheyrat) carries honour, zeal and protective jealousy at once; pairing it with «خونی» reads the donation figure as a measure of willingness to bleed for the nation.
- Main: The page's dominant image is a monochrome portrait of Donald Trump under «ترامپ در محاصره ۸ تله», Trump besieged by eight traps, promising an examination of the American president's miscalculations across «چالش ذخایر استراتژیک، تنگنای فدرال رزرو، بحران سوخت و... چرا زمان به زیان واشنگتن است؟», the strategic-reserve challenge, the Federal Reserve's bind, the fuel crisis and why time works against Washington.
- Kicker: Printed across the Trump photograph, «فرار ترامپ از صلاله», Trump's flight from Salalah, with the teaser «پشت پرده تعویق نشست صلاله در عمان چه بود؟», what lay behind the postponement of the Salalah meeting in Oman. This is the third distinct Iranian account of the same cancellation in one edition, and the only one that puts the American president himself in flight from it.
- Sub-item: «پروپاگاندای هالیوودی», Hollywood propaganda, asking «چرا مستند نجات خلبان آمریکایی یک ویدئوی تبلیغاتی ساخته‌شده داخلی، آن هم پیش از انتخابات میان‌دوره‌ای کنگره بود؟», why the documentary on the rescue of the American pilot was a domestically produced promotional video, and one made before the congressional midterm elections. Khorasan is the only title in the set that names the US midterms as the campaign's purpose.
- Sub-item: «کودکان سنگ صبور ما نیستند», children are not our confidants, a wartime child-welfare column, and «قتل وحشتناک مالک نیسان در قلب بازار», a crime report, keeping ordinary domestic life on a war front page.
- Op-ed: The day's «یادداشت روز», signed Seyyed Mostafa Sadeghi, is «نجابت مردم را غنیمت بشمارید», count the people's forbearance as spoils. It takes the war-booty vocabulary running across the other front pages and turns it back on the government: the asset worth inventorying is public patience, and it is finite.

ANALYST NOTE Khorasan is the clearest evidence in this edition that the Salalah collapse is being narrated rather than reported. Kayhan says Saudi Arabia asked for the delay on America's instruction; Sobh-e No says regional conditions were not ready and America obstructed; Khorasan says Trump fled. Three incompatible causal accounts on one morning, all of them exonerating Tehran, is what centrally encouraged framing looks like when the centre has supplied a conclusion but not a story. The paper's own «یادداشت روز» is the counterweight worth tracking: on the morning three front pages inventory captured American hardware as «غنیمت»,

Khorasan's columnist applies the same word to the public's forbearance and tells the state to treat it as a wasting asset.

Jam-e Jam

State daily published by IRIB, the national broadcaster

HIGH

"As useless as the NPT" «بی خاصیت مثل ان‌پی‌تی»


جام جم

تقدیر مدیران سازمان برنامه و بودجه از رسانه ملی

بی‌خاصیت مثل ان‌پی‌تی

حضور رئیس سازمان انرژی اتمی ایران در نشست آژانس با قلدری آمریکا و سکوت گروسی لغو شد

ضربه مغزی امپراتوری نفتی

مبلغ کالابرگ قطعا افزایش می‌یابد

جشن مهربانی برای مهر

شب‌های حماسه روزهای امید

یک بازنده دوست‌داشتنی

روایت هالیوودی از شکست بزرگ

دروازه تیم ملی در خطر

ترور با هشتگ

سرنوشت عجیب کوله ۷۰ میلیاردی

- Main: The broadcaster's daily leads with a flat verdict on the treaty, decked «حضور رئیس سازمان انرژی اتمی ایران در نشست آژانس با قلدری آمریکا و سکوت گروسی لغو شد», the attendance of the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization at the Agency meeting was cancelled by American bullying and Grossi's silence. The event is real and confirmed in open reporting of 14 September: Austria withdrew Mohammad Eslami's visa for the IAEA General Conference after the UN Security Council sanctions committee refused a travel-ban exemption over a US objection, and Iran's IAEA ambassador Reza Najafi confirmed that the visa had first been approved. The page assigns the outcome to American bullying and to the Director General's silence, and omits the snapback travel-ban mechanism entirely.
- Sub-item: «ضربه مغزی امپراتوری نفتی», concussion of the oil empire, the energy-market column running beside the nuclear lead, tying the two files together on one page.
- Op-ed: «روایت هالیوودی از شکست بزرگ», a Hollywood account of a great defeat, the broadcaster's contribution to the day's cross-title attack on an American network segment about the rescue of a downed US pilot.
- Sub-item: President Masoud Pezeshkian's food-voucher pledge as the domestic lead photograph, «مبلغ کالابرگ قطعا افزایش می‌یابد», the value of the food voucher will definitely increase, over a grocery still-life of eggs, chicken, rice, milk and a card reader. The same pledge appears on Iran's front page and in Kayhan's right rail the same morning.
- Sub-item: «شب‌های حماسه روزهای امید», nights of epic, days of hope, and «ترور با هشتگ؟», assassination by hashtag, the broadcaster's information-operations framing of domestic online criticism.
- Sub-item: «جشن مهربانی برای مهر», a kindness festival for the new school year, and «دروازه تیم ملی در خطر», the national team's goal is in danger, filling the lower page. A left-rail column of official portraits carries further institutional quotations that were not legible at the resolution of the kiosk scan and are not rendered here.

ANALYST NOTE The state broadcaster's newspaper does not make treaty policy, but «بی خاصیت مثل ان‌پی‌تی» as a banner headline is a licensing signal: it tells every editor downstream that arguing the NPT is worthless is now inside the permitted range. Paired the same morning with Sobh-e No's NPT-exit interview, Kayhan's contributed article «از هسته اتمی تا خروج از NPT», and a Jam-e Jam channel video (t.me/jamejamdaily/27741) asking why demands for NPT withdrawal and weapons development are increasing, this is four surfaces across three institutional families moving in one direction in one cycle. That the visa denial rested on a Security Council travel ban rather than on an American whim is absent from every one of them, which is the tell that the item is being used rather than reported.

Hamshahri

Centrist daily owned by the Tehran municipality

MODERATE-HIGH

“The museum of Iran's spoils” «موزه غنیمت‌های ایران»



- Main: The whole top half is given to captured American hardware under the kicker «غنیمت‌های جنگی آمریکایی روی میز مهندسی معکوس», American war spoils on the reverse-engineering table, and the deck «سخنگوی وزارت امور خارجه: زیردریایی آمریکایی توقیف نشده، غنیمت گرفته شده و کاملا حلال است», the Foreign Ministry spokesman: the American submarine was not impounded, it was taken as spoils of war and is entirely licit. The page does not name him; the quotation matches Esmail Baghaei's remarks of Monday 14 September, in which he said it was not confiscated but captured as spoils of war and that such spoils are legitimate. The word «حلال», licit in the religious sense, is the paper's own register on top of the ministry's legal one.
- Sub-item: The first pulled quote inventories the claimed haul: «پهپاد آرکیو ۱۷۰، پهپاد ام‌کیو ۹، پهپاد هرمس ۹۰۰، پهپاد ام‌کیو ۴ و چند پهپاد شناسایی کوچک، بخشی از غنیمت‌های جنگی هستند», an RQ-170, an MQ-9, a Hermes 900, an MQ-4 and several small reconnaissance drones are part of the war spoils. Claim, single-sourced to the page, with no date or location attached to any item.
- Sub-item: «زیردریایی هوشمند بدون سرنشین، آخرین شکار ایرانی‌ها در تنگه هرمز از آمریکاست که باعث وحشت ساکنان کاخ سفید شده است», the unmanned smart submarine is the Iranians' latest catch from America in the Strait of Hormuz and has caused panic among the residents of the White House. Against this, US military statements reported on 8 and 9 September described the seized uncrewed submersible, identified in Iranian state media as a Dive-LD built by Anduril, as defective and carrying no sensitive or classified equipment.
- Sub-item: «مهندسی معکوس لزوما به معنای ساخت یک کپی نیست، بلکه می‌توان با کالبدشکافی سامانه دشمن، سلاحی ارتقایافته‌تر ساخت», reverse engineering does not necessarily mean building a copy; by dissecting the enemy's system one can build a more advanced weapon. This is the analytic purpose of the whole spread: not a trophy claim but a capability claim.
- Sub-item: «چترسوراخ آمریکا», America's punctured umbrella, offering «۸ روایت از کشورهایی که به حمایت امنیتی آمریکا دل بستند و در لحظه بحران تنها ماندند», eight accounts of countries that pinned their hopes on American security support and were left alone at the moment of crisis. Addressed at the Gulf capitals, not at Washington.
- Sub-item: «تحقق ۱۰۳ درصدی پروژه‌ها در جنگ», 103 percent realisation of projects during the war, a municipal-competence claim placed directly beneath the war spread.

ANALYST NOTE The significance is the venue, not the content. A Tehran municipal daily with no security remit is running the war-spoils inventory as a civic display, complete with a museum metaphor and a reverse-engineering explainer written for a general reader. That is what a claim looks like once it has been released from

the military information estate into ordinary public culture, and it is how a contested seizure of a reportedly defective drone submarine becomes a settled national possession. Read the adjacent «چترسوراخ آمریکا» spread as the operational point: the audience is Gulf governments weighing American security guarantees, on the morning a Gulf-hosted meeting collapsed.

Iran

Official daily of the government, published by IRNA

LOW-MODERATE

“The food-voucher figure will definitely increase” «رقم کالابرگ قطعا افزایش می‌یابد»



- Main: The government's own daily leads on President Masoud Pezeshkian's pledge to retirees that the food-voucher amount will rise, in a meeting the deck describes as «نشست صمیمی با بازنشستگان», an informal meeting with pensioners. On the morning the Salalah track collapsed, the government paper leads on a welfare transfer.
- Sub-item: The one foreign-policy element on the page is a satellite map graphic of the Bab al-Mandab Strait, Yemen, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, headed «شطرنج مقاومت در دریای سرخ», the chess of resistance in the Red Sea, asking why Ansarallah's advance at Bab al-Mandab matters and carrying a named correspondent byline. The Strait of Hormuz, Oman and Salalah do not appear anywhere on the front page.
- Sub-item: «دکترین نظامی و ایستادگی مردم، دشمن را ناکام کرد», the military doctrine and the people's steadfastness frustrated the enemy, the page's only martial line, filed as a quotation rather than as a headline claim.
- Sub-item: «رشد بخش ساختمان بدون رونق ساخت‌وساز جدید», growth in the construction sector without a new building boom, continuing the economic-page argument this monitor has tracked since 13 September about what the war is costing at home.
- Op-ed: «مرگ تئاتر ماجراجو زنگ خطری برای فرهنگ است», the death of adventurous theatre is an alarm bell for culture, a cultural-policy column given unusual prominence on a war-cycle front page.
- Sub-item: On the paper's own channel, the retrieved window carries the destruction of an advanced MQ-1 drone in the Strait of Hormuz (t.me/IranNewspaper/506783), a drone attack on two fishing boats in Hormozgan waters (506779), and, notably, «حرکت کشتی‌ها در تنگه هرمز به پایین‌ترین سطح طی هفته‌های اخیر رسید», shipping movement in the Strait of Hormuz has fallen to its lowest level in recent weeks (506791). The channel prints the cost of the closure that the front page does not mention.

ANALYST NOTE The government's paper handled the collapse of the government's own diplomatic track by not mentioning it. That is the most disciplined silence in the set and it is a finding, not a gap: Iran had led on the Oman arrangement's limits as recently as 14 September through its English sister title, and it has now withdrawn to welfare policy while the hardline and principlist titles fight over who caused the cancellation. The Red Sea graphic is the tell. Tehran's government surface will still claim Bab al-Mandab, where the gains are Ansarallah's and cost nothing, while going quiet on Hormuz, where the bill is arriving and its own channel is reporting shipping at its lowest level in weeks.

Sobh-e Sadegh

Political-cultural weekly of the IRGC's political bureau

HIGH

"Command of Bab al-Mandab, understanding at Hormuz" «تسلط بر باب‌المندب، تفاهم در هرمز»



- Main: The cover states the two-chokepoint doctrine as a single formula, «تسلط بر باب‌المندب، تفاهم در هرمز», command at Bab al-Mandab and understanding at Hormuz, over a Yemeni jambiya dagger planted point-down on a beach, a line of warships on the horizon and an Israeli flag lying on the sand. The deck: «صبح صادق دست برتر محور مقاومت در کنترل تجارت جهانی را بررسی می‌کند», Sobh-e Sadegh examines the resistance axis's upper hand in controlling world trade.
- Banner: «رونمایی از واقعیت‌های نظامی ایران در میدان», the unveiling of Iran's military realities in the field, reported as said «در نشست مشترک فرماندهان ارتش و سپاه», at a joint meeting of Army and IRGC commanders, over a photograph of two uniformed commanders in conversation.
- Sub-item: «جدیدترین شکار نیروی دریایی سپاه را بشناسید», get to know the IRGC Navy's newest catch, page 4, the in-house version of the captured-submersible story that Hamshahri runs as a museum spread the following morning.
- Sub-item: «قدرت بی‌نیازکننده», the power that makes one self-sufficient, page 8, the self-reliance argument that underwrites the reverse-engineering theme running across this edition.
- Kicker: A boxed strip carries «آمریکایی‌ها هیچ غلطی نکردند», the Americans could not do a damn thing, page 3, filed under the history rubric, alongside «راز ماندگاری», the secret of endurance, and «خرید رأی؟!», vote-buying.
- Absence: The weekly offers no condition for a Hormuz settlement and no vengeance framing. Its formula is explicitly asymmetric and deliberately so: coercion is to be held at Bab al-Mandab, where it is Ansarallah's to exercise, and «تفاهم», understanding, is what Hormuz is for.

ANALYST NOTE This cover, written before the Salalah cancellation and printed into the morning after it, is the most economical statement of the IRGC's own position in the whole set: keep the chokepoint you do not pay for, and settle the one you do. That is the same asymmetry visible on the government daily, which claims Bab al-Mandab on its front page and leaves Hormuz to its Telegram channel. Set against Kayhan, which rejects any understanding at Hormuz at all, the divergence this monitor recorded on 14 September between the security establishment's media estate and the ideological establishment's is confirmed from the IRGC's own political bureau, in a headline rather than an inference. Treat «تفاهم در هرمز» as the formula to watch for in official language.

Kayhan

Hardline daily published under the Supreme Leader's office, managing editor Hossein Shariatmadari

"America's dictate to Saudi Arabia proved the Oman meeting was a trap" «دیکته آمریکا به عربستان ثابت کرد نشست عمان تله بود»

SEVERE


کیهان

گزارش خبری تحلیلی کیهان

دیکته آمریکا به عربستان ثابت کرد نشست عمان تله بود

- Main: The lead is labelled «گزارش خبری تحلیلی کیهان», a Kayhan news-analysis report, and claims vindication for the position the paper printed on 14 September. Its three retrieved paragraphs (t.me/kayhan_online/83996) argue that «تعویق نشست عمان به درخواست عربستان نشان داد که ریاض نقشی فراتر از یک مستمع دارد و به اهرمی برای فشار بر روند ابتکار ایران و عمان تبدیل شده», the postponement of the Oman meeting at Saudi request showed Riyadh has a role beyond that of a listener and has become a lever of pressure on the Iran-Oman initiative; that «ریاض تلاش دارد که خروجی نشست را به سود آمریکا تنظیم کند؛ از این رو به بهانه حمله یمن به خطوط لوله، درخواست تعویق نشست را کرد که با موافقت عمان این تاخیر حاصل شد», Riyadh is trying to tune the meeting's output to America's benefit and so requested the postponement on the pretext of the Yemeni attack on the pipelines, which Oman accepted; and that Saudi participation could turn Iran's gains into «وجه‌المعامله», an object of the bargain.
- Banner: Above the masthead, «تحقق ۱۱۰ درصدی درآمد نفت در بودجه ۱۴۰۵»,» 110 percent realisation of oil revenue in the 1405 budget, a wartime-solvency claim carried without a named source on the front page.
- Kicker: «گزارش خواندنی فارن پالیسی درباره چگونگی زمین‌گیر شدن پنتاگون مقابل ایران», a readable Foreign Policy report on how the Pentagon was pinned down against Iran. A second-hand rendering of a foreign publication; quoting the rendering does not verify it.
- Right rail: «گزارش روز یکصد و نود و نهم جنگ: عربستان زیر ضربات یمن و درخواست کمک رژیم سعودی از اسرائیل», report of day one hundred and ninety-ninth of the war: Saudi Arabia under Yemen's blows and the Saudi regime's request for help from Israel. Note that Vatan-e Emrooz's channel the same morning (t.me/vatanemrooz/25067) reports Riyadh requesting British, not Israeli, military intervention after a US objection. Two hardline surfaces, one claim family, two different addressees, neither corroborated.
- Sub-item: «مقاله وارده: از هسته اتمی تا خروج از NPT», contributed article: from the nuclear core to exiting the NPT, page 7, placing NPT withdrawal on the front page of the Leader's office daily as a reader contribution rather than as the paper's own demand.
- Sub-item: Judiciary chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei pictured with the report that he has ordered «دستور حسابرسی دقیق از بودجه و تخلفات شرکت‌های دولتی», a precise audit of the budget and of state companies' violations, alongside «نشانه‌های نفوذ در مراکز تصمیم‌ساز», signs of infiltration in decision-making centres.
- Op-ed: The day's «نکته» is «جای آن است که خون موج زند در دل لعل!», it is fitting that blood should surge in the heart of the ruby, a Hafez line, signed Hossein Shariatmadari (t.me/kayhan_online/83994). It is a domestic culture-war piece contrasting Israeli filmmakers punished for documenting Gaza

with returning Iranian expatriate figures who face no restriction, and demanding to know why cultural and security institutions stay silent. Notably it is not about Hormuz.

ANALYST NOTE Two things matter here and they point in opposite directions. First, Kayhan has converted the Salalah postponement into proof of its own 14 September thesis, and in doing so it prints the most specific attributional claim on any page in this set: that Saudi Arabia used «حمله یمن به خطوط لوله», the Yemeni attack on the pipelines, as its pretext. No party has publicly claimed the 11 September strike on Saudi Arabia's east-west pipeline; the Leader's office daily has now casually placed it in Yemen's column. Second, and against the run of the last two editions, Shariatmadari did not use his own column on the file at all: after a 14 September editorial that attached blood-vengeance for the assassinated Leader to any reopening, he spent the day after the track collapsed on domestic cultural grievance. A paper that has won its argument does not need to repeat it, but the retreat from the vengeance frame on the morning it could most cheaply have been pressed is the datum to carry forward.

Sobh-e No

Principlist morning daily, close to the Islamic Revolution Stability Front milieu

HIGH

"Why was the Salalah meeting cancelled?" «چرا نشست صلاله لغو شد؟»



- Main: The whole front is built on the collapse of the Salalah track, and the paper answers its own question in a pulled quote block: «نشست دیپلماتیک صلاله به دلیل تغییرات گسترده در معادلات منطقه لغو شد. پیشروی‌های اخیر انصارالله و کنترل جبهه‌مقاومت بر دو تنگه مهم، موازنه را به نفع تهران تغییر داده است. همزمان، آسیب دیدن خط لوله استراتژیک عربستان و محدودیت شدید صادراتی ریاض، موضع این کشور را تضعیف کرده است. بنابراین در چنین شرایطی منطقه آمادگی برگزاری این نشست را نداشت. آمریکا هم از موانع برگزاری این جلسه بود», the Salalah diplomatic meeting was cancelled because of wide-ranging changes in the region's equations; Ansarallah's recent advances and the resistance front's control of two important straits have shifted the balance in Tehran's favour; at the same time the damage to Saudi Arabia's strategic pipeline and Riyadh's severe export restrictions have weakened that country's position; therefore in such conditions the region was not ready to hold this meeting, and America too was among the obstacles to holding this session.
- Banner: Above the masthead, the paper carries the IRGC's own formula as fact: «سپاه: تنگه هرمز مسدود و تحت کنترل هوشمند ما است», the IRGC: the Strait of Hormuz is closed and under our smart control, decked with the claim that a supertanker named on the page as «الگایا» (rendered Al Gaia on the paper's channel, transliteration unverified), «که قصد عبور از منطقه ممنوعه در جنوب تنگه هرمز را داشت، بر اثر برخورد با مین‌های دریایی منفجر شد», which intended to cross the prohibited zone south of the Strait of Hormuz, exploded after striking naval mines. The channel item (t.me/sobhe_no/115951) adds that the vessel caught fire and that efforts to extinguish it failed. Claim, attributed to the IRGC Navy, not independently confirmed here.
- Sub-item: The page's largest photograph is an IAEA headquarters sign beside a red traffic light under the headline «آژانس آمریکایی», the American Agency, asking «ممانعت از صدور روادید برای رئیس سازمان انرژی اتمی ایران چه پیامدهایی برای آژانس دارد؟», what consequences does the refusal of a visa for the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization hold for the Agency. The page does not print the mechanism: open reporting of 14 September establishes that Mohammad Eslami is subject to a pre-2015 UN Security Council travel ban revived by snapback, that Austria sought an exemption from the sanctions committee, that the United States objected and the request was refused, and that Austria was then obliged to withdraw the visa.
- Sub-item: Beneath it, «بخشایش اردستانی: اروپا با بازی ویدا/وتو، ایران را به خروج از NPT هل می‌دهد», Bakhshayesh Ardestani: Europe, with its veto game, is pushing Iran towards leaving the NPT. The speaker is named on the page by surname; open sources identify Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani, a political scientist and former member of the Majlis national

security committee. This is the NPT-exit argument being carried on a principlist front page rather than in a commentary column.

- Right rail: «ایرلندی‌ها، پرچم آمریکا را به آتش زدند», the Irish burned the American flag, decked with a claim that thousands protested in that country in support of war criminals being held to account, timed to a presidential visit. The underlying event is verifiable: a Dublin march against Donald Trump's Ireland visit on 12 September, organisers claiming about 25,000, during which a masked breakaway group, Anti-Imperialist Action, burned a US flag near Molesworth Street. The page converts one group's act into a national one.
- Sub-item: «بازی سیاسی با چین», political game with China, arguing that «چین به ثبات سیاست خارجی ایران حساس است», China is sensitive to the stability of Iran's foreign policy, a caution against reading Beijing as an unconditional backer.

> **ANALYST NOTE** Sobh-e No is the single most useful page in this edition because it is the only one that states the Salalah cancellation as a question and then answers it in full. Its answer is entirely externalised: the region was not ready, Riyadh was weakened, America obstructed. Tehran appears in the account only as the beneficiary of a shifted balance, never as a party whose own position moved. Set against the same paper's role on 13 September as this monitor's single source for the parliamentary limit that the route designation was in no sense a reopening, the trajectory is clear: the outlet that supplied the domestic ceiling is now supplying the victory narrative for the ceiling having held. Track whether any Iranian surface concedes an Iranian contribution to the postponement; none has yet.

Nobonyad

Conservative principlist morning daily

MODERATE

“Do not charge incapacity to the imbalance account” «ناتوانی را به پای ناترازی ننویسید»



- Main: The lead is an attack on the government's energy management, decked «از تجارب موفق کشور در مدیریت ناترازی برق و بنزین گفت», on the country's successful experience in managing the electricity and petrol imbalance. «ناترازی» (natarazi, imbalance) is the government's own term for the structural energy shortfall; the headline refuses it as an alibi and substitutes «ناتوانی», incapacity.
- Sub-item: The single most consequential item in this edition sits in the lower strip: «خاندوزی رئیس گروه اقتصادی دفتر رهبر انقلاب شد», Khandouzi has become head of the economic group of the Office of the Leader of the Revolution, page 4. Independently confirmed: Seyyed Ehsan Khandouzi, economy minister in the Raisi government and former Tehran member of parliament, was appointed on 23 Shahrivar 1405, replacing Ali Aghamohammadi.
- Sub-item: Beside it, over a portrait of the Saudi crown prince, «با چه توجیهی پای سعودی به توافق برای تنگه هرمز باز شده است؟», on what justification has Saudi Arabia been brought into an agreement over the Strait of Hormuz, page 2. The question is asked of Tehran's own negotiators, not of Riyadh.
- Sub-item: «مجلس، همچنان خارج از گود», parliament, still outside the ring, page 3: «در حالی که تصمیم‌گیری درباره آینده تنگه هرمز و توافق‌های مرتبط با امنیت و منافع ملی کشور در دستور کار دستگاه دیپلماسی قرار گرفته است، نقش مجلس شورای اسلامی به عنوان نهاد ناظر و قانون‌گذار همچنان در هاله‌ای از ابهام قرار دارد», while decision-making on the future of the Strait of Hormuz and on agreements bearing on the country's security and national interests has been placed on the diplomatic apparatus's agenda, the role of the Islamic Consultative Assembly as supervisory and legislative body remains shrouded in ambiguity.
- Op-ed: «هفت سال مردم را پای «سریال برجام» نشاندند», for seven years they sat the people down in front of the JCPOA serial, attributed on the page to «پروفسور درخشان». The surname matches Masoud Derakhshan, professor of economics at Allameh Tabataba'i University, founder of the Imam Sadiq University economics faculty and an economic adviser associated with Saeed Jalili; the page prints no first name and the identification is inferential. The text argues that «امروز مردم فهمیده‌اند اصلاً نمی‌توان به آمریکا اعتماد کرد», today the people have understood that America cannot be trusted at all, and that the Leader of the Revolution said from the outset that he was not optimistic about negotiations «زیرا ایشان آمریکا را بهتر از هرکسی می‌شناسند», because he knows America better than anyone.
- Op-ed: «روایت پیروزی یا نمایش هالیوودی؟», a narrative of victory or a Hollywood show, signed Mohsen Pourdadfar, journalist. Its opening sets the day's cross-title frame precisely: at the very moment the American network CBS was using a Hollywood-style trailer about the rescue of a pilot whose advanced fighter had been hit by an indigenous Iranian system to

manufacture a heroic achievement out of a military defeat, Iran on the other side of the field took an advanced American submersible intact in the Strait of Hormuz, and with the full broadcast of the interview the day before, the seams of the Hollywood account came apart one by one.

ANALYST NOTE Nobonyad supplies the institutional finding of this edition, and it is not the one on its own masthead. A principlist daily is asserting in print that the Majlis has been excluded from decisions on the future of the Strait of Hormuz, and asking on what basis Saudi Arabia was admitted to that file at all. Set beside the confirmed appointment of Khandouzi to run the economic group inside the Leader's office, the picture is of a settlement file being handled by the executive and the leadership apparatus with the legislature outside the room, and of a conservative press that has begun to say so. The complaint is about process, which is why it is harder to dismiss than Kayhan's about substance, and it is the thread most likely to produce a formal parliamentary demand if the Salalah track restarts.

Seda-ye Iran

Leadership-messaging daily, printing the KHAMENEI.IR affiliation on its own masthead

“The defeat screened on the silver screen” «اکران شکست روی پرده»

MODERATE


صدای ایران

اکران شکست روی پرده

- Main: The kicker states the thesis: «آخرین تلاش‌های ترامپ برای دستاوردسازی در جنگ با ایران», Trump's latest attempts to manufacture an achievement in the war with Iran. The headline puns on «اکران», a cinema release, and the page runs two photographs of wreckage being collected by hand and in wheelbarrows, presented as the reality the American production is said to be concealing.
- Sub-item: «حمایت ۲ درصدی نظامیان آمریکایی از جنگ با ایران», 2 percent support among American service personnel for the war with Iran, sourced on the page to a figure at what it names as the Quincy Institute. Single-source, printed without a survey name, sample or date, and not independently verified here; recorded as the page's claim, not as a finding.
- Editorial: The «سرمقاله» is «دروغ همیشگی ترامپ برای خاموش کردن قیمت نفت», Trump's perennial lie about bringing down the price of oil, arguing that oil has gone back above 100 dollars in world markets and that the American diesel price has reached a record 6.1 dollars a gallon. Kayhan's own banner the same morning asks about a 10-dollar diesel shock. Two surfaces inside the same ideological family printed different figures on the same claim in one cycle.
- Sub-item: «شجره طیبه؛ مدرسه‌ای برای همیشه», the good tree, a school for always, a reconstruction feature on a war-damaged school photographed mid-repair before the new academic year.
- Banner: The masthead carries a KHAMENEI.IR social card in place of a printed leadership message. Its text was not legible at the resolution of the kiosk scan and khamenei.ir was unavailable at the time of compilation, so no leadership text is reproduced in this edition.
- Absence: There is no Hormuz condition, no reference to Salalah or Oman, and no vengeance framing anywhere on this front page. That is the second consecutive edition in which the leadership-affiliated bulletin has declined to carry the condition list Kayhan published in the office's name on 14 September.

ANALYST NOTE The leadership surface again documents the war through American weakness rather than through Iranian demands, and again it does not adopt Kayhan's terms. On the morning the diplomatic track it never endorsed fell over, it led on a media-criticism story about a CBS segment and an oil-price column, and said nothing about the strait. Read against 14 September, when the same bulletin led on production economics while Kayhan attached blood-vengeance for the assassinated Leader to any reopening, the standing judgment holds and strengthens: Kayhan's condition list is a newspaper's bid, and the office's own publication has now passed on it twice. The indicator to watch is unchanged, and is the appearance of any element of that list in an office statement rather than in a newsroom.

Etemad

Reformist daily of record

LOW-MODERATE

“Front page not retrieved; channel items only”

- Sub-item: The only Hormuz item in the retrieved window (533680) reports that maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz «به پایین‌ترین سطح طی هفته‌های اخیر رسید», has reached its lowest level in recent weeks, on existing military tensions, citing Reuters and Al Jazeera on vessel and tanker movements. The same finding appears on the government newspaper's channel (t.me/IranNewspaper/506791).
- Sub-item: On the United States (533682), US Department of Justice allegations of an attempt to seize 61 million dollars in Iranian oil-revenue cryptocurrency, with claims of 1.5 billion dollars laundered through networks in China and elsewhere. The reformist surface is the one carrying the enforcement side of the sanctions file.
- Absence: Nothing in the retrieved window on Salalah or Oman, on Saudi Arabia, on Yemen, on the IAEA or the NPT, or on Israel. On 14 September this title led its front page on a ballistic-missile profile printed beneath the president's denial of nuclear-weapons intent.
- Absence: No reformist voice anywhere in this edition argues against the NPT-exit drumbeat that Jam-e Jam, Sobh-e No and Kayhan carried on their front pages this morning.

> **ANALYST NOTE** The reformist daily of record went quiet on every contested file in the cycle and kept two items, both of which price the war rather than argue about it: shipping at its lowest level in weeks, and an American seizure action against Iranian oil revenue. The second absence is the more significant one. A treaty-exit argument ran across three front pages from three institutional families this morning and the reformist surface published no answer to it, which is a different posture from the 14 September edition, where Etemad's response to the settlement was to showcase the conventional deterrent that would make a bounded settlement survivable. Whether that silence is editorial caution or an absence of permitted ground is the question the next cycle should resolve.

Vatan-e Emrooz

Hardline principlist morning daily

MODERATE-HIGH

“Front page not retrieved; channel items only”

- Sub-item: On the Strait of Hormuz (25060), a CBS report relayed that oil prices are approaching four-month highs amid the delayed Iran-Oman negotiations over the strait. This is the one hardline surface in the set that links the postponement directly to the oil price rather than to a plot.
- Sub-item: On Yemen (25062), a statement attributed to Yahya Saree that Saudi air strikes on five Yemeni provinces will receive a response, with 54 sorties by Saudi F-15 and Typhoon aircraft in 24 hours against Taiz, Lahj, Marib, Hajjah and al-Jawf. Attributed claim; the sortie count is not independently confirmed here.
- Sub-item: On Saudi Arabia (25067), Riyadh is reported to be requesting British military intervention in Yemen after an American objection to Saudi operations. Kayhan's front page the same morning reports the Saudi request for help as having been made to Israel. Two hardline surfaces, one morning, two different addressees; neither corroborated.
- Sub-item: On Lebanon (25065), Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi is reported reaffirming Iran's full support for the Lebanese resistance against Israeli aggression, the only senior Iranian statement on Lebanon in the retrieved window.
- Sub-item: On the war (25066), the destruction of an advanced MQ-1 drone over the western Strait of Hormuz, the same claim carried by Defa Press (67500), Fars (462157) and the Iran newspaper channel (506783).
- Sub-item: On the United States (25070), the Supreme Court blocking the Trump administration's postal-voting restrictions for the midterm elections, part of the same American-domestic-weakness register Khorasan runs as its eight traps.

> **ANALYST NOTE** The absence of a Vatan-e Emrooz scan from the kiosk album matters for calibration rather than for coverage. On 14 September this title was the hardline flagship that banked the Oman arrangement as «تمکین اعراب», Arab submission, against Kayhan's rejection of it, and it is therefore the single most useful test of whether the hardline split survived the cancellation. Its channel window is consistent with the softer reading, relaying an American network's oil-price explanation of the delay rather than a plot, but a channel window is not a front page and this monitor does not score the split on it. Recovering the Vatan-e Emrooz page is the highest-value gap to close in the next cycle.

Appendix A - The leadership surface on 24 Shahrivar 1405, and what it did not carry

Seda-ye Iran, Tuesday 24 Shahrivar 1405 / 15 September 2026, front page (scans/fa-09.jpg). khamenei.ir and its English mirror were unavailable at the time of compilation

Verification note first, because it governs everything below. This monitor's standing practice is to open with a full translation of the Leader's lead message of the day. No such message could be verified for this cycle. Both khamenei.ir and its English mirror were unavailable at the time of compilation, and the leadership channel window returned no retrievable text. Seda-ye Iran, the daily that prints the KHAMENEI.IR affiliation on its own masthead, carries a leadership social card in the masthead position in place of a printed message, and that card's text was not legible at the resolution of the kiosk scan. No leadership text is reproduced here, and none should be inferred. What follows is the leadership-messaging surface's own front page, which is a different and lesser thing, and it is offered as such.

The page leads with «اکران شکست روی پرده», the defeat screened on the silver screen, under the kicker «آخرین تلاش‌های ترامپ برای دستاوردسازی در جنگ با ایران», Trump's latest attempts to manufacture an achievement in the war with Iran. The argument is that an American network production about the rescue of a downed pilot is a domestic political artefact rather than a record of an event. Two photographs run beneath the headline: wreckage being gathered by hand and loaded into wheelbarrows, and a large pale airframe section resting on stony ground. The page offers no location, no date and no unit for either photograph, and this monitor does not adopt them as evidence of any particular engagement.

The front page's editorial, «دروغ همیشگی ترامپ برای خاموش کردن قیمت نفت», Trump's perennial lie about bringing down the price of oil, argues that the renewed rise of oil on world markets has again falsified the American president's claim to be able to suppress it, and that the American diesel price has reached a record of 6.1 dollars a gallon. Read as evidence rather than as argument, this is the leadership surface measuring the war by the pressure it places on the American consumer. It is worth recording that Kayhan's own banner the same morning poses the question as a 10-dollar diesel shock. Two publications inside the same ideological family printed materially different figures for the same claim on the same day, and neither sourced it on the page.

The third item is «حمایت ۲ درصدی نظامیان آمریکایی از جنگ با ایران», 2 percent support among American service personnel for the war with Iran, attributed on the page to a figure at what it names as the Quincy Institute. No survey name, sample, fieldwork date or publication is given. This monitor records the claim and does not adopt it. A figure of this kind, printed without provenance on a leadership-affiliated surface, is an instrument rather than a finding, and it is the sort of claim that should not be reproduced as authentic without primary-source confirmation.

The fourth item is the one that is not there. The page carries no condition for a Hormuz settlement, no reference to Salalah or Oman, no mention of the cancelled meeting, and no vengeance framing of any kind. On 14 September, Kayhan published in the Leader's office's name a condition list for any reopening of the strait that included American withdrawal from the region, reparations, a halt to Israeli operations in Lebanon and Palestine, exclusion of the nuclear file from negotiations, and «انتقام و خونخواهی آقای شهید», revenge and blood-vengeance for the martyred gentleman. The leadership-affiliated bulletin did not carry that list on 14 September and has not carried it on 15 September either, on the morning when the collapse of the diplomatic track made it cheapest to press. Two consecutive editions of declining to adopt it is now the record. The analyst flag is unchanged and its resolving indicator is unchanged with it: the appearance of any element of

that list in a statement from an office, rather than from a newsroom, would be a substantive escalation and should be treated as one.

Analyst flag: partial appendix, by disclosure rather than by omission. The absence of a verifiable leadership message in this cycle is recorded as a gap in this monitor's coverage and not as a judgment about the leadership's activity, about which this edition offers no evidence either way.

Appendix B - Kayhan's news-analysis lead: «دیکته آمریکا به عربستان ثابت کرد نشست عمان تله بود»

Kayhan, Tuesday 24 Shahrivar 1405 / 3 Rabi al-Thani 1448 / 15 September 2026, front page; full text of the retrieved passage from the paper's channel, t.me/kayhan_online/83996. Labelled on the page as «گزارش خبری تحلیلی کیهان», a Kayhan news-analysis report, and published unsigned

Headline as printed: «دیکته آمریکا به عربستان ثابت کرد نشست عمان تله بود». America's dictate to Saudi Arabia proved the Oman meeting was a trap.

«تعویق نشست عمان به درخواست عربستان نشان داد که ریاض نقشی فراتر از یک مستمع دارد و به اهرمی برای فشار بر روند ابتکار ایران و عمان تبدیل شده که در کمین خروجی نشست، موضع گرفته است.» The postponement of the Oman meeting at Saudi Arabia's request showed that Riyadh holds a role beyond that of a listener, and has become a lever of pressure on the course of the Iranian and Omani initiative, having taken up a position in ambush of the meeting's outcome.

«ریاض تلاش دارد که خروجی نشست را به سود آمریکا تنظیم کند؛ از این رو به بهانه حمله یمن به خطوط لوله، درخواست تعویق نشست را کرد که با موافقت عمان این تاخیر حاصل شد.» Riyadh is attempting to tune the meeting's outcome to America's benefit; on that basis, using the pretext of the Yemeni attack on the pipelines, it requested the postponement of the meeting, and with Oman's agreement this delay was obtained.

«حضور ریاض در این نشست، نه صرفا در جایگاه یک کشور مستقل، بلکه در قامت بازیگری همسو با منافع آمریکا، می‌تواند دستاوردهای ایران را به «وجه‌المعامله» تبدیل کند.» Riyadh's presence at this meeting, not simply in the position of an independent country but in the stature of an actor aligned with America's interests, is capable of turning Iran's gains into an object of the bargain.

Analyst flag, first point. The operative word is «وجه‌المعامله», which is not a term of abuse but a term of trade: the thing handed over in a transaction. Kayhan's objection to the Salalah meeting was never that it would fail; it was that it would succeed, and that succeeding would convert the closure of the Strait of Hormuz from a permanent instrument into a spent one. The postponement is therefore not reported here as a setback but as a rescue, and the paper is claiming the credit for having named the danger first. That is an argument about the price of any future settlement, and it will be made again the moment the track restarts.

Analyst flag, second point, and it is the more consequential of the two. In the course of assigning blame to Riyadh, this text states as established fact that there was a «حمله یمن به خطوط لوله», a Yemeni attack on the pipelines. No party has publicly claimed responsibility for the drone strikes that shut Saudi Arabia's east-west pipeline, the roughly 1,200 kilometre Petroline system carrying some 5 million barrels a day to Yanbu, on 11 and 12 September; open reporting describes drones launched from Iraq and no claim of responsibility, with the line expected to be mostly out of service for weeks. The daily published under the Supreme Leader's office has now placed that attack in Yemen's column in passing, inside a sentence whose purpose is to accuse Saudi Arabia of using it as an excuse. Attributions made incidentally, in service of a different argument, are among the more reliable kinds of open-source evidence, because the speaker is not guarding them. This monitor does not adopt the attribution, and records it as the single most significant unguarded claim on any Iranian front page in this cycle.

Source line: Kayhan, front-page news-analysis report, unsigned, issue of Tuesday 24 Shahrivar 1405 / 3 Rabi al-Thani 1448 / 15 September 2026; text retrieved from the paper's own channel at t.me/kayhan_online/83996.

Appendix C - The day's signed editorials, and where Kayhan's managing editor spent his column

Kayhan «نکته» by Hossein Shariatmadari (t.me/kayhan_online/83994); Khorasan «یادداشت روز» by Seyyed Mostafa Sadeghi; Nobonyad commentary by Mohsen Pourdadfar. Authors as printed and verified against the pages and the channel

Kayhan, «نکته», signed Hossein Shariatmadari: «جای آن است که خون موج زند در دل لعل!», it is fitting that blood should surge in the heart of the ruby, a line from Hafez. The piece is a domestic culture-war argument. It contrasts the treatment of Israeli filmmakers who it says have been punished for documenting atrocities in Gaza with Iranian expatriate figures who it says have been hostile to the Islamic Republic from abroad and face no restriction on return, and it asks how cultural and security institutions can stay silent before «این همه زشتی، پلشتی، وطن‌فروشی و اهانت», all this ugliness, squalor, selling of the homeland and insult. Only the opening section was retrievable at compile time and the full text is not reproduced here.

Analyst flag on the Shariatmadari column, which is a finding about placement rather than about content. On 14 September this column attached the succession's legitimacy debt to the maritime file, demanding blood-vengeance for the assassinated Leader as a condition of any reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. On 15 September, with the Salalah meeting cancelled and the argument apparently won, the same column did not return to the subject at all and spent itself on returning artists and silent cultural institutions. A newspaper that has won an argument has no need to repeat it, and that is the benign reading. The alternative reading is that the vengeance frame was a bid that did not land, and that its author has moved off it on precisely the morning it was cheapest to press. This monitor does not choose between the two readings on one cycle of evidence; it records that the frame was available and was not used, and files that as the same negative-evidence thread as the leadership bulletin's second consecutive silence.

Khorasan, «یادداشت روز», signed Seyyed Mostafa Sadeghi: «نجابت مردم را غنیمت بشمارید», count the people's forbearance as spoils. Printed on a morning when three separate front pages inventoried captured American hardware under the word «غنیمت», war booty, the column applies the same word to the public's patience and tells the state to treat it as an asset that can be spent. The rhetorical move is small and the political content is not: a conservative provincial daily has taken the edition's triumphal vocabulary and pointed it inward.

Nobonyad, signed Mohsen Pourdadfar, journalist: «روایت پیروزی یا نمایش هالیوودی؟», a narrative of victory or a Hollywood show. Opening as printed, in translation: precisely at the moment when the American network CBS, with a Hollywood-style trailer about the rescue of a pilot whose advanced fighter had been struck by an indigenous Iranian system, was trying to build a heroic achievement out of a military defeat, Iran on the other side of the field took an advanced American submersible intact in the Strait of Hormuz and made a catch of it; and with the full broadcast of the interview the previous day, the Hollywood seams of that account came apart one by one. The full text is on the paper's page 6 and was not retrievable.

Analyst flag on the Hollywood frame. Four titles from four institutional families, Khorasan, Jam-e Jam, Nobonyad and Seda-ye Iran, carried the same attack on the same American broadcast on the same morning, and one of them, Khorasan, named its purpose as the United States congressional midterm elections. Four independent newsrooms do not converge this precisely on a foreign television segment by independent editorial judgment. The mechanism indicated is centrally guided message discipline rather than organic convergence. What the convergence is for is the second question: the counter-narrative pairs the American production with the claimed capture of the uncrewed submersible in every one of the four instances, and the United States military has stated that the seized vessel, identified in Iranian state media as an Anduril-built

Dive-LD, was defective and carried no sensitive or classified equipment. Neither account is adopted here. Both are recorded as claims, and the coordination is recorded as the finding.

Source line: Kayhan issue of 24 Shahrivar 1405, «نکته» via t.me/kayhan_online/83994; Khorasan issue of 24 Shahrivar 1405, «یادداشت روز», page 1; Nobonyad year 1 no. 1465, 24 Shahrivar 1405, page 1 with the full text at page 6.

Appendix D - Methodology and sourcing notes

iran-press-digest v2 pipeline, compiled 15 September 2026

Scans. Ten front pages were read directly with vision: nine Persian pages from the NewspaperTasnim kiosk album for Tuesday 24 Shahrivar 1405 (t.me/NewspaperTasnim/44551, posted 02:14 UTC) and Iran Daily from the English kiosk album (t.me/newspapers_iran/3562, posted 04:31 UTC). The stale-batch guard passed on first run: the album's own printed Jalali date, 24 Shahrivar 1405, matches the target date, and no fallback sources were needed. Every masthead was identified from the page itself rather than from any label supplied with the image. One of the nine Persian pages, Sobh-e Sadegh, is a weekly dated Monday 23 Shahrivar and is treated as such throughout.

Text sources. The Kayhan, Vatan-e Emrooz, Jam-e Jam, Etemad, Iran and Sobh-e No newspaper channels were read, together with the Defa Press, Fars News and Nour News wires. Wire material is used for corroboration, for official and semi-official claims and for the threat register only, and is never treated as a front page. Tehran Times was unavailable at the time of compilation, as were khamenei.ir and its English mirror.

Coverage gaps, stated as gaps. Vatan-e Emrooz and Etemad appear in this edition from their channels alone; neither title's own front page was in the kiosk album, and neither is scored on the questions that would require reading the page. This matters most for Vatan-e Emrooz, which on 14 September was the hardline flagship that read the Oman arrangement as an Arab capitulation against Kayhan's rejection of it, and which is therefore the decisive test of whether the hardline split survived the cancellation. Recovering that page is the highest-value gap to close in the next cycle.

Verification performed. Four claims carried on these pages were checked against open reporting and are carried here as confirmed in outline: the refusal of entry to Mohammad Eslami for the IAEA General Conference, where the mechanism is a pre-2015 Security Council travel ban revived by snapback, an Austrian request for an exemption, a United States objection at the sanctions committee and Austria's consequent withdrawal of a visa it had already granted, with Iran's IAEA ambassador Reza Najafi confirming the sequence; the Foreign Ministry spokesman's spoils-of-war formulation on the seized uncrewed submersible, which matches Esmail Baghaei's remarks of Monday 14 September, and which the United States military answered by describing the vessel as defective and carrying no sensitive or classified equipment; the appointment of Seyyed Ehsan Khandouzi, economy minister in the Raisi government, as head of the economic group in the Office of the Leader of the Revolution on 23 Shahrivar 1405, replacing Ali Aghamohammadi; and the Dublin protest against the American president's visit to Ireland on 12 September, at which organisers claimed some 25,000 participants and a masked breakaway group named Anti-Imperialist Action burned a United States flag, which Sobh-e No's front page renders as «ایرلندی‌ها», the Irish, doing so.

Claims recorded and not adopted. The supertanker named on Sobh-e No's banner as «الگایا», rendered Al Gaia on the paper's own channel, reported destroyed by naval mines in the prohibited zone south of the Strait of Hormuz; the transliteration is uncertain and no independent maritime confirmation was obtained. The inventory of captured aircraft on Hamshahri's front page, an RQ-170, an MQ-9, a Hermes 900, an MQ-4 and several small reconnaissance drones, printed without dates or locations. The destruction of an advanced MQ-1 over the western Strait of Hormuz, which appears identically across four Iranian surfaces in one morning and is therefore one claim rather than four. Saudi Arabia's reported request for outside military help against Yemen, which Kayhan's front page addresses to Israel and Vatan-e Emrooz's channel addresses to the United Kingdom on the same morning. The 2 percent figure for American service personnel's support for the

war on Seda-ye Iran's front page, printed with no survey, sample or date. Kayhan's 110 percent oil-revenue realisation banner. None of these is corroborated here.

Day count. This monitor's day number is a fixed calendar count from the war's opening, and Day 196 is 15 September 2026. Kayhan's own front page this morning heads its war report «روز یکصد و نود و نهم», the one hundred and ninety-ninth day, and the IRGC aerospace commander's remarks carried on the Nour News wire refer to a two hundredth night. Iranian outlets count from a different starting point and are not reconciled to this monitor's counter; where a discrepancy appears it is a difference of epoch, not an error in either.

Translation and attribution. Translations are editorial. Original-script headlines are retained beside the English throughout, because the register of the Persian is analytic evidence and not decoration. Every claim on these pages is attributed to the outlet or the speaker that made it and none is adopted as fact; Iranian military and battle-damage claims are labelled as claims wherever they appear; second-hand renderings of foreign publications, of which this edition carries several, remain flagged, and quoting a rendering does not verify what it renders. Unverified attributed quotations in this edition are not to be reproduced as authentic without primary-source confirmation. This product documents and analyses hostile foreign-press rhetoric for defensive assessment only, and nothing in it endorses, amplifies or operationalises that rhetoric.

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