OPEN-SOURCE PRESS INTELLIGENCE

Iranian Press Monitor

Daily Front-Page Intelligence

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THE HARDLINE FLAGSHIPS SPLIT ON SIGNATURE MORNING EDITION

Ten front pages (nine Persian from the Monday 23 Shahrivar Tasnim kiosk album and Iran Daily from the English kiosk), plus the Kayhan, Vatan-e Emrooz, Jam-e Jam, Etemad, Iran and Sobh-e No channels and the Defa Press, Fars and Nour News wires; Tehran Times and the leadership websites were unavailable at the time of compilation

Front pages published the morning of 14 September 2026, reflecting events through late 13 September local

Defensive open-source press-intelligence. Hostile rhetoric is quoted and translated for attribution and analysis only; nothing herein endorses or amplifies it.


کیهان

۲۳۰۰ استاد و پژوهشگر حوزه و دانشگاه در نامه‌ای سرگشاده:
بی‌حجابی، پروژه‌ای ضدامنیتی است

گزارش سی‌ان‌ان از نقش فساد در فروپاشی جبهه مزدوران سعودی در یمن

گزارش خبری تحلیلی کیهان
عمان حافظ منافع آمریکاست
نشست مسقط تله است، مراقب باشید!
تنگه هرمز سلاح راهبردی ایران است، نباید از دست برود

سرمایه‌های مردم قربانی خلأ نظارت در بازار آنلاین طلا

رئیس مرکز توسعه دانشگاه گلمبیا:
استقلال‌طلبی، تنها جرم ایرانی‌هاست
آمریکا به هیچ تفاهمی پایبند نمی‌ماند

حضور عوامل برنامه موفق «محفل ستاره‌ها» در تجمعات شبانه مردم و استقبال پرشور کودکان و نوجوانان

جیران «درماندگی اطلاعاتی» با ولخرجی

تفاهم عمان یا فرصت تنفس به آمریکا!؟

Front page: Kayhan

Executive Summary

The lead judgment of this cycle is that the hardline press fractured, in public and on the record, over the Hormuz settlement it had until now opposed in unison. Kayhan, published under the Supreme Leader's office, gives its entire lead to «عمان حافظ منافع آمریکاست / نشست مسقط تله است، مراقب باشید!», Oman is the guardian of America's interests, the Muscat meeting is a trap, be careful, labelled a Kayhan news-analysis report rather than news. Vatan-e Emrooz, the other hardline flagship, carries the identical event in its masthead kicker as «ایران و عمان ترتیبات دریایی هرمز را نهایی کردند / تمکین اعراب به نظر ایران», Iran and Oman have finalised the Hormuz maritime arrangements, the Arabs submit to Iran's view. One paper calls the meeting an American trap to be stopped; the other banks it as an Arab capitulation to Iran. Two hardline flagships do not read the same morning this differently by accident, and the divergence is the most consequential single fact in this edition.

The government's own limiting formula, meanwhile, is now carried without contest by the outlets closest to the security establishment. Javan, the IRGC-affiliated daily, gives its banner to «عراقچی: توافق عمان تنگه را باز نمی‌کند», Araghchi: the Oman agreement does not open the strait, decked with the condition that reopening requires the American return to its commitments under the Islamabad memorandum. Iran Daily carries the identical sentence in English as «Deal with Oman would not mean reopening of Hormuz: Araghchi». Jomhouri Eslami supplies the procedure without adjectives: «دستور کار اجلاس امروز صلاله عمان / تعیین مسیر دریایی جدید در تنگه هرمز», the agenda of today's Salalah summit in Oman is the designation of a new maritime route in the Strait of Hormuz, with the maps to be shared with the participating states. That is three institutionally distinct surfaces, military, clerical and governmental, printing the same bounded version of the same arrangement, against one that rejects it.

Kayhan's rejection is not a shipping-lane argument and should not be read as one. Hossein Shariatmadari's Yadasht-e Rooz, translated in full at Appendix B, quotes the president's India Today interview and the foreign minister's Al-Araby Al-Jadeed interview back at them, asks why a meeting was necessary at all if the arrangement is not a reopening, and then sets out an Iranian condition list that no office has stated: American departure from the region, reparations, a halt to Israeli attacks on Lebanon and Palestine, the nuclear file excluded from negotiations, and «انتقام و خونخواهی آقای شهید», revenge and blood-vengeance for the martyred gentleman. It calls the attending Gulf states «کشورک‌ها», statelets, and «دولت‌های دست‌نشانده و مزدور», client and mercenary governments, and tells the government it has committed a great error. The editorial is marked part one. This is the succession's legitimacy debt being attached to the maritime file by the paper that claims to speak for the office, on the morning the file closes.

The absence that frames that demand is the one on Seda-ye Iran. The leadership-messaging bulletin, which prints the khamenei.ir affiliation on its own masthead, gave its whole front page to «کیمیای تولید», the alchemy of production, an economic message, and carried no Hormuz condition, no reference to the Salalah meeting and no vengeance framing anywhere. What it does carry on the chokepoints comes entirely in borrowed voices: a Washington Post reading headed «باتلاق ترامپ عمیق‌تر می‌شود», Trump's quagmire deepens, and a captioned satellite before-and-after of the Saudi east-west pipeline pumping station dated 11 September under «اختلال در ۴ درصد عرضه جهانی نفت», disruption of four percent of global oil supply. The leadership surface documents the coercion without owning it, and it did not adopt Kayhan's condition list. That asymmetry is evidence about Kayhan's standing, not about the leadership's position.

Underneath the diplomacy, the war continued and the wires carried a register of claims this monitor labels rather than adopts. Defa Press reports a fully loaded tanker struck by a missile and severely on fire in the Strait of Hormuz, citing UK Maritime Trade Operations, an account closely resembling the incident recorded on 13

September and possibly the same event recirculating. Nour News reports Israeli air strikes around al-Mansouri in southern Lebanon; Fars reports more than 1,100 tonnes of explosives used to destroy tunnels in the Ali al-Taher heights and denies that Iranian personnel were trapped there, while Defa Press reports a limited Israeli repositioning from the same heights. Fars carries Saudi civil-defence alerts for Khamis Mushait, Najran, Jizan and Abha; Etemad's channel carries Saudi strikes on Emirati-backed forces in southern Yemen near Bab al-Mandab; Defa Press reports Yemeni forces activating drone and missile capability against Saudi-aligned positions. Kayhan and Nour News both put Brent at 108 dollars. Vatan-e Emrooz builds its whole front on the proposition that Ansarullah now holds Bab al-Mandab completely and that Saudi Arabia's pipeline bypass, its «پلن B», has burned.

The two most analytically significant items in the edition are not about Hormuz at all. The first is Iran Daily's signed opinion column, «Iran's choice on trilateral defense pact / Join, reject or rewrite the game?», which openly war-games Iranian accession to what it calls the Mecca Pact between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan, and costs that accession in explicit terms: joining «would require changes in tactics, including Iran's support for Yemen», which «could undermine the legitimacy of the strategy of resistance». That a state daily can print the Yemen relationship as a tradeable asset is a movement in the file that no front-page headline announces. The second is Etemad's lead, «کولاک قاسم بصیر», the Qassem Basir blizzard, a ballistic-missile profile on the reformist daily of record, printed directly beneath the president's own words to India Today that «اگر دنبال سلاح هسته‌ای بودیم عضو «ان‌پی‌تی» نمی‌شدیم», if we were seeking a nuclear weapon we would not have joined the NPT. The reformist argument is not for escalation; it is that the conventional deterrent is what makes a bounded settlement survivable.

Net assessment: this is a settlement-morning edition in which the settlement is no longer the question and the reaction to it is. The arrangement was signed with the government's limits attached and with three institutionally distinct surfaces carrying those limits identically, which is message discipline rather than convergence. Against that, one newspaper, the one with the strongest claim to speak for the office, broke ranks and raised the price of any reopening to a list that includes vengeance for an assassinated Leader, and the office's own bulletin did not follow it. Every economic page in the set, reformist and principlist alike, has meanwhile stopped arguing about the war and started itemising its bill: Chahar Sough charts a 25.5 percent collapse in building permits and denies sanctions as the cause in its own deck, Ta'adol reports the dollar and gold retreating and refuses to call it a recovery, and Sazandegi, which a day earlier called the situation a maritime blockade, leads instead on broadcasting regulation. The direction of travel across this edition is toward a settled external position and an unsettled domestic one.

BOTTOM LINE On the morning Iran signed a Hormuz maritime-route arrangement in Oman, the two hardline flagships printed opposite readings of the same event, with Kayhan demanding it be halted in the Leader's name while the leadership's own bulletin said nothing about it, which indicates that the settlement track has passed the point where the hardline surface can be held together against it.

CRITICAL SOURCING NOTE Ten front-page scans were read directly: nine Persian pages from the NewspaperTasnim kiosk album for Monday 23 Shahrivar 1405 (t.me/NewspaperTasnim/44525) and Iran Daily from the English kiosk album (t.me/newspapers_iran/3561). The stale-batch guard passed on the first attempt with no fallback sourcing, so every page here is from the day's own batch. Six daily channels and three agency wires were read directly; Kayhan's front-page item list, its Yadasht-e Rooz editorial and its companion lead analysis were captured in full (kayhan_online/83894, /83905, /83908, the lead also at kayhan.ir/001PvA) and archived for the translation appendix. Tehran Times and the leadership websites were unavailable at the time of compilation, so the English state daily's own framing is absent from this cycle and Appendix A is a reconstruction from a printed bulletin rather than a primary-source translation. The Iran and Jam-e Jam channels carried no front-page item in the retrieved window. Four bylines were below the legible resolution of the kiosk previews and are reported with that

caveat rather than guessed, including Iran Daily's opinion byline, which renders as Hossein Kazemi at the limit of legibility. Kayhan's front-page citation of a prominent American economist heading Columbia University's development centre is reported as printed; the name is not on the front page and is not supplied here. One correction of record for this edition: the day's venue is reported rather than reconciled, since Kayhan's headline and editorial say Muscat while Kayhan's own body text and Jomhouri Eslami's banner say Salalah, and this monitor has not established which is correct. All Iranian military, battle-damage and territorial-control claims are attributed to the outlet or wire that made them and are not adopted as fact, including the attributed Trump remark about bombing Oman, which is a Kayhan rendering of a claimed Fox News interview and is not to be reproduced as authentic without primary-source confirmation.

Macro Trend Analysis

1 The hardline flagships broke ranks on the same event, in the same cycle

This monitor has tracked the hardline surface as a single bloc on the Hormuz file since the closure began. That bloc failed today. Kayhan's lead calls the Oman meeting «تله», a trap, and its editorial tells the government it has committed a great error; Vatan-e Emrooz's masthead kicker calls the same meeting «تمکین اعراب به نظر ایران», Arab submission to Iran's view. Javan, from inside the IRGC's own media estate, carries the foreign minister's limiting formula as its banner rather than attacking it. Three hardline titles, three incompatible readings, published the same morning. The operational reading is that the security establishment is more comfortable with a bounded arrangement than the ideological establishment is, and that message discipline on this file can no longer be assumed when assessing hardline output.

2 The bilingual split has closed, and its closure dates the concession as accepted

On 12 September the Persian pages led on Bab al-Mandab and the English page omitted the strait entirely; on 13 September the English page led on a dated Monday signature while the government's own Persian daily filed the chokepoints fifth on a sidebar. This morning Iran Daily's banner and Javan's banner carry the identical Araghchi sentence, in English and in Persian, and Jomhouri Eslami prints the agenda in procedural terms. The standing bilingual-messaging thread, this file's most reliable early indicator of a concession being introduced abroad first, has therefore run its full cycle: introduced abroad on the 13th, domesticated at home on the 14th. When a limit is stated identically in both languages by three institutionally distinct outlets, it has been accepted rather than contested.

3 Kayhan attached the succession's legitimacy debt to the maritime file, and the leadership surface did not follow

Shariatmadari's condition list for reopening includes «انتقام و خونخواهی آقای شهید», revenge and blood-vengeance for the martyred gentleman, alongside American withdrawal, reparations, a halt to Israeli attacks on Lebanon and Palestine, and the exclusion of the nuclear file. No office has stated any of this. The same morning, the leadership's own bulletin Seda-ye Iran led on production economics and carried no Hormuz condition and no vengeance framing. That is a measurable gap between the paper that claims the office's voice and the publication that carries its affiliation on its masthead. The indicator to watch is whether any office, rather than this newsroom, adopts the condition list; until one does, the list is a newspaper's bid and should be weighted as such.

4 The Yemen relationship is being priced in public as a tradeable asset

Iran Daily's opinion column argues that joining the Mecca Pact between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan «would require changes in tactics, including Iran's support for Yemen», and that this «could undermine the legitimacy of the strategy of resistance». Etemad's note stack carries «آغاز پایان نفوذ عربستان در یمن؟», the beginning of the end of Saudi influence in Yemen. Vatan-e Emrooz builds its whole front on Ansarullah's Bab

al-Mandab position as the war's decisive card. Three outlets, from three positions, are treating the Yemen relationship as an object of calculation rather than a fixed commitment, and one of them is a state daily printing the trade-off in English. This is new in this file and is the thread most likely to produce the next significant movement.

5 Every economic page has stopped arguing about the war and started billing it

Chahar Sough leads on a 25.5 percent collapse in building-permit issuance under «وقتی تحریم بهانه نیست», when sanctions are not an excuse, names the minister of roads and urban development in its deck, and prints a chamber of commerce member saying what makes the maritime blockade more effective is the laziness of state managers. Ta'adol leads on the dollar and gold retreating and asks whether it is a momentary calm rather than announcing a recovery, while the wires carry Brent at 108 dollars. Sobh-e No's channel reports the stock index jumping 153,000 points. Sazandegi, which on 13 September called the situation Iran's maritime blockade, leads on broadcasting regulation instead. The composite picture is an economy in which the external price of the coercion strategy is rising while the domestic panic premium falls, which is what one would expect if households have begun pricing in a settlement, and in which the papers closest to the economy have converted the war into a competence argument.

6 Hormuz remains kinetic while it is being signed away, and Lebanon is moving too

Defa Press reports a fully loaded tanker struck by a missile and burning in the Strait of Hormuz on the UK Maritime Trade Operations account, an incident closely resembling the one recorded on 13 September and possibly the same event recirculating; this monitor flags the ambiguity rather than counting it twice. In Lebanon, Nour News reports Israeli air strikes around al-Mansouri, Fars reports more than 1,100 tonnes of explosives used against tunnels in the Ali al-Taher heights while denying that Iranian personnel were trapped there, and Defa Press reports a limited Israeli repositioning from the same heights. A denial of trapped personnel that nobody on these pages had alleged is itself a signal. The standing judgment holds: a corridor signed into a strait where tankers are still being hit is a corridor with a short shelf life, and the Lebanese front is the theatre most likely to supply the pretext for its collapse.

Key Judgments

KJ-1 **[HIGH]** The hardline consensus on the Hormuz file has broken, and the break is institutional rather than editorial. Kayhan's lead and editorial demand the Oman arrangement be halted and call the meeting an American trap; Vatan-e Emrooz's masthead kicker reports the same arrangement as finalised and frames the attending Arab states as having submitted to Iran; Javan, IRGC-affiliated, carries the foreign minister's limiting formula as its banner without attacking it. Three hardline titles published three incompatible readings of one event on one morning. The significance is that hardline press output can no longer be treated as a single indicator on this file, and that the security establishment's media estate has separated from the ideological establishment's on the question of whether a bounded settlement is acceptable.

KJ-2 **[HIGH]** The government's limiting formula has been accepted across institutionally distinct surfaces and is now the operative Iranian position. «توافق عمان تنگه را باز نمی‌کند», the Oman agreement does not open the strait, with reopening conditioned on the American return to the Islamabad memorandum, appears identically on Javan's banner in Persian, on Iran Daily's banner in English, and in substance in Jomhouri Eslami's procedural account of the Salalah agenda. Three outlets answering to three different institutions do not converge on one sentence by independent news judgment. The significance is that the arrangement is a route designation and not a reopening, that Tehran has fixed the price of an actual reopening to a prior American performance, and that this is message discipline rather than editorial agreement.

KJ-3 [MODERATE-HIGH] Kayhan's condition list is a bid for influence over the settlement's terms, not a statement of leadership policy. The editorial's demands, American withdrawal from the region, reparations, a halt to Israeli operations in Lebanon and Palestine, exclusion of the nuclear file, and blood-vengeance for the assassinated Leader, have been stated by no office and were absent the same morning from Seda-ye Iran, the bulletin that prints the khamenei.ir affiliation on its masthead and which led instead on production economics. The evidence for the judgment is the asymmetry between the two surfaces; the evidence against it is that Kayhan's managing editor is a leadership appointee and has in the past run ahead of positions later adopted. The significance is that the list should be weighted as a newspaper's bid unless and until an office adopts it, and the appearance of any element of it in an official statement would be a substantive escalation indicator.

KJ-4 [MODERATE-HIGH] Tehran is now openly calculating the cost of trading its Yemen relationship for a regional security seat. Iran Daily's opinion column examines Iranian accession to the Mecca Pact between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan, states that joining would require changes in tactics including Iranian support for Yemen, and concedes that this could undermine the legitimacy of the strategy of resistance. Etemad's note stack asks whether Saudi influence in Yemen is ending. The significance is that a state daily has printed the trade-off in English rather than in an internal forum, which is how Tehran has historically introduced positions it intends to be heard abroad, and that the Bab al-Mandab position Vatan-e Emrooz calls the war's decisive card is simultaneously being treated by the government's own English surface as negotiable.

KJ-5 [MODERATE] The Iranian domestic market has begun pricing in a settlement, ahead of and independently of any political confirmation. Ta'adol leads on the retreat of the dollar and gold and declines to call it a recovery, asking instead whether it is a momentary calm; Sobh-e No reports the total stock index jumping 153,000 points. Against this, Kayhan and Nour News both report Brent at 108 dollars and Seda-ye Iran documents four percent of global oil supply disrupted by the Saudi east-west pipeline outage. The divergence is the finding: the external price of the coercion strategy is rising while the domestic risk premium falls. The significance is that a domestic market moving before a political announcement is a leading indicator, and a reversal in the rial or the bullion market would be the earliest available warning that the settlement track has stalled.

KJ-6 [MODERATE] Negative evidence: the outlet that supplied the corridor's domestic limit has stopped defending it, and the reformist party paper has left the war file entirely. Sobh-e No, this monitor's single source on 13 September for the parliamentary security commission's statement that the route designation is in no sense a reopening, carried nothing on Hormuz or Oman in the retrieved window on the signature morning and led on a deflationary reading of the China-Russia-Iran alignment. Sazandegi, which on 13 September called the situation Iran's maritime blockade and questioned what the summit delivered, led today on broadcasting regulation and reduced the Oman track to a four-word supportive line in a headline strip. Two withdrawals of this kind on one morning are filed as a finding, not as a gap: the papers that were contesting the limit have accepted it, and the argument on these surfaces has moved to domestic ground.

KJ-7 [MODERATE] The Lebanese front is the most likely near-term source of a shock to the settlement track, and the wires are already positioning for it. Nour News reports Israeli air strikes around al-Mansouri in southern Lebanon; Fars reports more than 1,100 tonnes of explosives used to destroy tunnels in the Ali al-Taher heights and issues a pre-emptive denial that Iranian personnel were trapped there, stating instead that 48 Hezbollah fighters were in two tunnels and eight were killed; Defa Press reports a limited Israeli repositioning from the same heights. Kayhan's condition list names a halt to Israeli attacks on Lebanon as a

precondition for reopening Hormuz. The significance is that a denial issued against an allegation nobody on these pages had made indicates the wire expected the allegation, and that Kayhan has already built the linkage by which a Lebanese escalation would be converted into grounds for repudiating the maritime arrangement.

KJ-8 [LOW-MODERATE] The tanker strike reported in the Strait of Hormuz on this cycle may be the 13 September incident recirculating rather than a new attack, and is treated here as unresolved. Defa Press reports a fully loaded tanker struck by a missile and severely on fire, citing UK Maritime Trade Operations, in terms closely matching the Panama-flagged tanker recorded in the 13 September edition from the same wire and the same source organisation. No Persian front page in today's set carries the incident, which for an event of this significance on a signature morning is itself evidence against it being fresh. The significance is calibration: overstating a repeat as a new strike would inflate the escalation signal on the exact morning an arrangement was signed, while dismissing a genuine second strike would miss the event most capable of voiding that arrangement. Corroboration from a front page or a primary maritime advisory is the resolving indicator.

Named-Figure Tracker

Figure	Role / relevance	Today's framing	Flag
Abbas Araghchi	Foreign Minister of Iran	Carried identically across three institutionally distinct outlets as the author of the limiting formula, that the Oman agreement is not a reopening and that reopening requires the American return to the Islamabad memorandum; named and quoted back at himself in Kayhan's editorial	COERCION SPOKESMAN
Masoud Pezeshkian	President of Iran	Quoted from an India Today interview on the route framework by Kayhan, which uses the quotation against him; carried on Etemad's banner denying any nuclear-weapons intent; addressed as the recipient of Sazandegi's open letter and mocked in Chahar Sough's appointment item	WATCH
Hossein Shariatmadari	Managing editor of Kayhan, appointed by the Supreme Leader's office	Author of the Yadasht-e Rooz demanding the arrangement be halted, calling the Gulf attendees statelets and mercenary governments, and attaching blood-vengeance for the assassinated Leader to the Hormuz conditions; marked part one	NEW NAMED FIGURE
Donald Trump	President of the United States	Carried on Javan's banner saying the United States will in the end exit the Persian Gulf war; relayed by Fars as saying Washington would hold onto Iranian oil as it did Venezuela's; quoted by Kayhan from a claimed Fox News interview threatening to bomb Oman, a	TARGET FRAMING

Figure	Role / relevance	Today's framing	Flag
		rendering not verifiable from primary sources here; named in Seda-ye Iran's borrowed headlines as caught in a deepening quagmire and facing the nightmare of two straits	
Mojtaba Khamenei	Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic	Not named on any front page in this set; referenced only by office as «رهبر معظم انقلاب اسلامی» on Seda-ye Iran's overline. Kayhan's vengeance demand invokes the assassinated predecessor as «آقای شهید» and not the incumbent	absence noted
Farzaneh Sadegh	Minister of Roads and Urban Development	Named directly in Chahar Sough's deck as the author of policies that have produced no result against a 25.5 percent collapse in building-permit issuance	NEW NAMED FIGURE
Ramin Mehmanparast	Former Foreign Ministry spokesman	Interviewed by Etemad under the heading of a costly friendship with America, the framing directed at Gulf states rather than at Tehran	WATCH
Hamidreza Jalaeipour	Reformist sociologist	Interviewed by Etemad on war conditions, supplying the sequenced prescription that the siege must be broken first	WATCH
Seyed Hossein Marashi	Kargozaran-e Sazandegi figure	Bylined on Sazandegi's front-page column defending the developmentalist and entrepreneurial record against corruption allegations	WATCH
The caretaker head of the Defence Ministry	Acting minister, not named on the page	Vatan-e Emrooz's masthead kicker announces military advances in the technology field in this office's voice without printing the office-holder's name, six months into the war	absence noted

Headline Summary Table

Outlet	Lead Headline (English)	Orientation	Theme	Threat signal
Kayhan	Oman is the guardian of America's interests / The Muscat meeting is a trap, be careful!	Hardline, published under the Supreme Leader's office, managing editor Hossein Shariatmadari	The Oman arrangement denounced as an American trap, with an expanded condition list including vengeance for the assassinated Leader	SEVERE: the Leader's flagship demands the Hormuz instrument be withheld and attaches blood-vengeance to any reopening
Vatan-e Emrooz	The new trump card	Hardline principlist morning daily	Bab al-Mandab control presented as the war's decisive card, and the Oman meeting as Arab submission to Iran	HIGH: dual-chokepoint dominance asserted as achieved fact, the arrangement absorbed as tribute

Outlet	Lead Headline (English)	Orientation	Theme	Threat signal
Javan	Araghchi: The Oman agreement does not open the strait	Hardline, IRGC-affiliated	The foreign minister's limit carried by the IRGC daily, paired with Trump's exit signal	MODERATE-HIGH: closure maintained as policy and street iconography, the government's framing carried rather than contested
Etemad	The Qassem Basir blizzard	Reformist daily of record	Missile capability showcased beneath the president's denial of nuclear-weapons intent	MODERATE-HIGH: a strike on an American warship presented as demonstrated capability on a reformist front page
Seda-ye Iran	The alchemy of production	Leadership-messaging surface, khamenei.ir affiliation on the masthead	Leadership economic messaging in front, dual-chokepoint pressure relayed only through foreign sources	MODERATE: coercion documented in borrowed voices, no Hormuz condition on the leadership surface
Jomhouri Eslami	Agenda of today's Salalah summit in Oman: designating a new maritime route in the Strait of Hormuz	Traditional clerical establishment daily	The Salalah agenda reported as procedure, and the war's lack of a military solution conceded in-house	LOW-MODERATE: the settlement described administratively, with a no-military-solution judgment in the paper's own voice
Iran Daily	Deal with Oman would not mean reopening of Hormuz: Araghchi	English-language state daily, published by IRNA	The Hormuz limit stated in English, and Iranian accession to the Mecca pact costed in public against support for Yemen	LOW-MODERATE: settlement language matched across languages, the Yemen relationship openly treated as tradeable
Chahar Sough	The construction slump deepened / When sanctions are not an excuse	Economic daily, hostile to the government's management record	Construction collapse charted and the sanctions alibi rejected in the deck	LOW-MODERATE: the blockade's cost billed as a domestic management failure
Ta'adol	The retreat of the dollar and gold	Economic daily, technocratic	Currency and bullion retreat read as a possible settlement premium, with no war framing on the page	LOW: settlement expectations visible in the domestic markets
Sobh-e No	The eastern triangle	Principlist; read from its channel, no scan in the kiosk album	The eastern alignment downgraded from bloc to triangle, and silence on the Hormuz file it limited a day earlier	LOW: the outlet that set the corridor's domestic limit is silent on the morning it is signed
Sazandegi	Protest against SATRA's interventions	Reformist, Kargozaran-e Sazandegi	Broadcasting regulation over the settlement, the Oman track reduced to a supportive headline strip	LOW: no war content above the fold on a signature morning


Per-Paper Front-Page Analysis

Iran Daily

English-language state daily published by the Islamic Republic News Agency

LOW-MODERATE: settlement language in English matching the Persian, and open discussion of trading the Yemen relationship for a regional security seat

“Deal with Oman would not mean reopening of Hormuz: Araghchi”



- Main: The banner carries the foreign minister's limiting formula in English on the morning of the signature, in the same words the Persian pages carry, which closes the bilingual gap this monitor recorded on 13 September in the opposite direction.
- Main: The display lead beneath it is «BRICS condemns attacks on civilian infrastructure, nuclear facilities», decked «Pezeshkian calls for bloc's 'more active role' in defending members' sovereignty», over a summit red-carpet photograph of the Iranian delegation.
- Op-ed: An OPINION EXCLUSIVE column, «Iran's choice on trilateral defense pact / Join, reject or rewrite the game?», bylined to an international-affairs analyst rendered as Hossein Kazemi at the limit of scan legibility. It opens on a circulating report about «the Mecca Pact between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan» inviting Iran to join, and sets out three scenarios.
- Op-ed: The column's second scenario is the analytically significant one, that joining «would require changes in tactics, including Iran's support for Yemen», which «could undermine the legitimacy of the strategy of resistance»; and its third, that refusal would leave Iran «facing a diplomatic deadlock» and could see «its own identity as a country seeking peace and opposing sanctions called into question».
- Sub-item: «Power sector opens way for private electricity imports from neighbors», the practical energy item, filed in the bottom strip.
- Sub-item: An interview marking «55 years of Iran-China relations», and a sports item on Iran beating Jordan to reach the basketball quarterfinals.

ANALYST NOTE The government's English surface now says in English exactly what it says in Persian, which ends, for this cycle, the bilingual split that has been this file's most reliable indicator of a concession being introduced abroad first. The more consequential item is the opinion column: a state daily is publicly war-gaming Iranian accession to a Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani mutual-defence arrangement, and is explicitly costing that accession in terms of abandoning support for Yemen. That an argument of that kind can be printed at all indicates the Yemen relationship is now treated inside Tehran as a bargaining asset rather than a fixed commitment.

Vatan-e Emrooz

Hardline principlist morning daily (روزنامه صبح ایران), aligned with the security establishment

HIGH: dual-chokepoint dominance asserted as achieved fact, with the Oman arrangement absorbed as tribute rather than concession

“The new trump card” «برگ برنده جدید»


وطن امروز

برگ برنده جدید

پلن B سوخت

- Main: The full-page lead sits over a mass Yemeni rally photograph carrying Yemeni, Palestinian and Iranian flags, under the overline «تسلط کامل انصارالله بر باب‌المندب چگونه دست برتر جبهه مقاومت در معادلات میدانی جنگ را تثبیت کرد», how Ansarullah's complete control of Bab al-Mandab consolidated the Resistance Front's upper hand in the battlefield equations of the war. The claim of complete control is the paper's, is not independently established here, and is recorded as an outlet claim.
- Banner: The left-hand masthead kicker reads «ایران و عمان ترتیبات دریایی هرمز را نهایی کردند» over the headline «تمکین اعراب به نظر ایران», the Arabs submit to Iran's view. This is the same Salalah meeting that Kayhan's front page calls a trap, framed here as an Arab capitulation to an Iranian position.
- Kicker: The right-hand masthead kicker carries the caretaker head of the Defence Ministry (سرپرست وزارت دفاع, not named on the front page) announcing «پیشرفت‌های نظامی در حوزه فناوری», military advances in the technology field, with reference to new Iranian defence achievements.
- Right rail: «پلن B سوخت», a pun holding both Plan B burned and fuel Plan B, over «چگونه انصارالله استراتژی امنیت انرژی عربستان برای جایگزین مسیر تنگه هرمز را با شکست روبه‌رو کرد», how Ansarullah defeated Saudi Arabia's energy-security strategy for an alternative to the Hormuz route, with the sub-bullets «آزمون سخت تاب‌آوری برای آمریکا و اروپا», a hard resilience test for America and Europe, and «جغرافیا را با دلار نمی‌توان خرید», geography cannot be bought with dollars.
- Right rail: «کابوس تازه تل‌آویو», Tel Aviv's new nightmare, labelled a Vatan-e Emrooz report on Israeli concern over Ansarullah's advance and its control of Bab al-Mandab.
- Op-ed: A signed «نگاه» column, «این ننگ پاک‌شدنی نیست», this disgrace cannot be washed off, on the quarrel between Ali Karimi and Reza Pahlavi and what the paper calls the hidden fissures it exposed among monarchists. The byline portrait carries a name not legible at the available scan resolution.
- Op-ed: A second signed «یادداشت», «ترامپ، جنگ رمضان و دیوار کوتاه زلنسکی!», Trump, the Ramadan War and Zelensky's low wall, arguing that a politician humiliated in one theatre reaches for the easiest available target in another.

ANALYST NOTE Vatan-e Emrooz and Kayhan, the two hardline flagships, split on the same event for the first time in this file's Hormuz sequence: Vatan-e Emrooz reads the Oman arrangement as Arab submission to Iran and banks it as a win, Kayhan reads it as an American trap and demands it be stopped. That divergence matters more than either headline, because it shows the hardline surface is no longer speaking with one voice on the settlement track. The paper's own centre of gravity has meanwhile moved off Hormuz and onto Bab al-Mandab, where its Plan B feature argues the specific proposition this monitor has been tracking since 12 September, that the Saudi east-west pipeline bypass has failed and the two chokepoints now function as a single instrument.

Seda-ye Iran

Leadership-messaging surface, khamenei.ir affiliation printed on the masthead; issue 469

MODERATE: chokepoint coercion documented through foreign sourcing while the leadership surface itself leads on production

“The alchemy of production” «کیمیای تولید»



- Main: The whole front is built on the Leader's recent economic messaging, under the overline «راه حل واقعی مشکلات اقتصادی کشور با نگاهی به پیام‌های اخیر رهبر معظم انقلاب اسلامی», the real solution to the country's economic problems, in light of the recent messages of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, over a photograph of workers at a gas or refinery installation.
- Banner: The masthead carries a martyr panel for «شهید مهدی سرحدی» with portrait, and a quoted leadership passage in the opposite corner, the standard framing of this publication.
- Sub-item: «باتلاق ترامپ عمیق‌تر می‌شود», Trump's quagmire deepens, credited to a Washington Post reading of Iranian and Ansarullah control of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab. Second-hand rendering of a Western outlet, flagged as such.
- Sub-item: «اختلال در ۴ درصد عرضه جهانی نفت با توقف فعالیت خط لوله انتقال نفت شرق به غرب عربستان», disruption of four percent of global oil supply with the halt of Saudi Arabia's east-west crude pipeline, illustrated with a captioned satellite before-and-after of a pumping station dated 11 September 2026.
- Sub-item: «ترامپ و کابوس دو تنگه راهبردی در غرب آسیا», Trump and the nightmare of two strategic straits in West Asia, the dual-chokepoint argument stated on a leadership-adjacent surface.
- Sub-item: «سرمقاله» runs down the right column as the publication's unsigned lead essay on production as the answer to sanctions pressure.

ANALYST NOTE The leadership surface spends its front page on production economics, not on the Salalah meeting, and that placement is itself a finding: the office that Kayhan claims to speak for did not put the Hormuz condition list on its own bulletin. What it does carry on the chokepoints comes entirely in borrowed voices, a Washington Post reading and a satellite image, which keeps the coercion case documented without the leadership owning it. The satellite comparison is the most checkable single piece of evidence in the set, and it dates the east-west pipeline outage this monitor has tracked since 10 September.

Javan

Hardline daily affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

MODERATE-HIGH: closure maintained as policy and displayed as street iconography, but the government's conditional framing is carried rather than contested

"Araghchi: The Oman agreement does not open the strait" «عراقچی: توافق عمان تنگه را باز نمی‌کند»



- Main: The lead is a direct attribution to Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, decked «تنگه هرمز پس از تفاهم ایران و عمان باز نمی‌شود، شرط ایران برای بازگشایی تنگه بازگشت آمریکا به تعهدات خود در تفاهم‌نامه اسلام‌آباد است», the strait does not open after the Iran-Oman understanding, and Iran's condition for reopening is the American return to its commitments under the Islamabad memorandum. This is the government's own limit, printed by an IRGC-affiliated paper on the signature morning.
- Sub-item: Directly beneath, «ترامپ: در نهایت از جنگ خلیج فارس خارج می‌شویم», Trump saying the United States will in the end exit the Persian Gulf war, placed as the counterpart quotation to Araghchi's. The pairing is the page's argument: Iran sets the condition, Washington signals the exit.
- Banner: The centrepiece photograph shows a night rally before a large mural, the visible placard reading «تنگه هرمز بسته می‌ماند», the Strait of Hormuz stays closed, under the display headline «دوصد کردار», two hundred deeds, an inversion of the proverb that two hundred sayings are not worth half a deed.
- Sub-item: «افشاگری‌هایی از درون ماشین جنگی صهیونیست‌ها», revelations from inside the Zionist war machine, illustrated with two portraits and presented as sourced disclosure rather than commentary. The content is not verifiable from the front page and is recorded as an outlet claim.
- Sub-item: «امریکا آتش سوخت را به دامن اروپا هم انداخت», America has thrown the fuel fire into Europe's lap as well, extending the energy-disruption argument from the Gulf to the transatlantic relationship.
- Sub-item: A memorial item on a named martyr's page-one portrait, and a right-rail lead «آینده‌ای مبهم در انتظار...», an ambiguous future awaits, the only hedged formulation on the page.

ANALYST NOTE Javan performs the function Kayhan refuses: it carries the executive's limiting language rather than attacking it, and it does so from inside the IRGC's own media estate. That an IRGC paper prints the foreign minister's condition as its banner while the Leader's office paper calls the same meeting a trap places the two hardline institutions on opposite sides of the same morning, and it suggests the military establishment is more comfortable with a bounded arrangement than the ideological one is. The placard photograph does the reconciling work: the strait stays closed in the picture even as the diplomacy proceeds in the text.

Kayhan

Hardline daily published under the Supreme Leader's office, managing editor Hossein Shariatmadari

SEVERE: the Leader's flagship demands the Hormuz instrument be withheld and attaches blood-vengeance for the assassinated predecessor to the terms of any reopening

"Oman is the guardian of America's interests / The Muscat meeting is a trap, be careful!" «عمان حافظ منافع آمریکاست / نشست مسقط تله است، مراقب باشید!»


کیهان

عمان حافظ منافع آمریکاست
نشست مسقط تله است، مراقب باشید!

- Main: The lead is labelled «گزارش خبری تحلیلی کیهان», a Kayhan news-analysis report, not a news story, and runs under the banner deck «تنگه هرمز سلاح راهبردی ایران است، نباید از دست برود», the Strait of Hormuz is Iran's strategic weapon and must not be lost. The body argues that Hormuz is «کارآمدتر از بمب اتم», more effective than an atomic bomb, and warns that its edge must not be blunted «در تله عمانی‌ها», in the Omanis' trap.
- Main: The same report supplies the meeting's venue and scale, that the maps and details would be presented «در صلاله به وزرای خارجه ۸ کشور منطقه که اغلب پایگاه رسمی آمریکا هستند», in Salalah to the foreign ministers of eight regional states most of which host formal American bases, while the printed headline names Muscat. Kayhan also accuses the government of concealing the detail from the nation and from parliament.
- Sub-item: «رئیس مرکز توسعه دانشگاه کلمبیا: استقلال‌طلبی، تنها جرم ایرانی‌هاست / آمریکا به هیچ تفاهمی پایبند نمی‌ماند», independence-seeking is the Iranians' only crime, America stays committed to no understanding. The speaker is described in the text only as a prominent American economist heading Columbia University's development centre and is not named on the front page; the description matches Jeffrey Sachs but the identification is not printed and is not asserted here.
- Sub-item: «گزارش سی‌ان‌ان از نقش فساد در فروپاشی جبهه مزدوران سعودی در یمن», a CNN report on the role of corruption in the collapse of the Saudi mercenary front in Yemen. This is a second-hand rendering of a Western outlet and is flagged as such; quoting the rendering does not verify it.
- Banner: «استاد و پژوهشگر حوزه و دانشگاه در نامه‌ای سرگشاده: بی‌حجابی، ۲۳۰۰ پروژه‌ای ضدامنیتی است», 2,300 seminary and university academics in an open letter call unveiling an anti-security project, running across the top of the page above the war material.
- Sub-item: «سرمایه‌های مردم قربانی خلأ نظارت در بازار آنلاین طلا», the public's savings sacrificed to the supervision vacuum in the online gold market, the page's one concession to household economics.
- Op-ed: The «یادداشت روز» is «تفاهم عمان یا فرصت تنفس به آمریکا؟!(1)» by Hossein Shariatmadari, marked part one, translated in full at Appendix B.

ANALYST NOTE This is the sharpest public break between Kayhan and the executive recorded in this file. The editorial names the president and the foreign minister, quotes their own interviews back at them, and then sets out an Iranian condition list that goes far beyond anything the government has stated: American withdrawal from the region, reparations, a halt to Israeli attacks on Lebanon and Palestine, the nuclear file excluded from talks, and «انتقام و خونخواهی آقای شهید», revenge and blood-vengeance for the martyred Leader. Kayhan is not arguing about a shipping lane, it is attaching the succession's legitimacy debt to the Hormuz file, and it does so on the

morning the arrangement is signed. Track whether any office, rather than this newsroom, adopts the condition list.

Sazandegi

Reformist daily of the Kargozaran-e Sazandegi party

“Protest against SATRA's interventions” «اعتراض به دخالت‌های ساترا»

LOW: no war content above the fold; the settlement acknowledged only as a one-line endorsement



- Main: The full front is given to a domestic regulatory fight, overlined «طی نامه‌ای سرگشاده به رئیس‌جمهور مطرح شد», raised in an open letter to the president, and decked that the board of the guild association of home-video and online-video companies has written to Pezeshkian expressing alarm at pressure from the state broadcaster and its regulator SATRA on the home-video sector, on the argument that «رقیب، اکنون به داور تبدیل شده است», the competitor has now become the referee.
- Op-ed: «سند فساد کجاست؟», where is the corruption document, by Seyed Hossein Marashi, on what the paper calls the record of developmentalism and entrepreneurship, the Kargozaran camp's standing defence of its own economic lineage.
- Op-ed: The «یادداشت روز», «پزشکیان دنبال چه کسی است؟, who is Pezeshkian looking for, decked «مشکل کشور کمبود نیروی اجرایی نیست، انتخاب‌های اشتباه است», the country's problem is not a shortage of executive manpower but wrong choices. The byline, credited to a member of the party's central council, is at the limit of the available scan's legibility and is not asserted here.
- Banner: The top strip runs seven signed one-line items, among them «تفاهم را فعال کنیم» by Mohsen Hashemi, let us activate the understanding, the page's only reference to the Oman track and a supportive one.
- Sub-item: The page carries no war, Hormuz or Bab al-Mandab item above the fold, which on a signature morning is a placement decision rather than an absence of material.

ANALYST NOTE Sazandegi is the negative-evidence page of this edition. On the morning an international maritime arrangement is signed in Oman, the reformist party paper leads on broadcasting regulation and files the settlement as a four-word supportive line in a headline strip. Read against its 13 September front, which called the situation Iran's maritime blockade and asked what the summit delivered, the retreat to domestic regulatory politics indicates the Kargozaran camp judges that it has nothing further to gain from contesting the war file and is returning to the ground where it competes. That is a signal about the domestic argument's direction, not about the war's.

Chahar Sough

Economic daily (چارسوق), business and market focus

"The **LOW-MODERATE: the blockade's costs itemised as a domestic management failure rather than an external siege** *construction slump deepened / When sanctions are not an excuse"* «رکود ساخت‌وساز عمیق‌تر شد / وقتی تحریم بهانه نیست»



- Main: The lead is a bar chart of building-permit issuance by quarter, decked «سقوط ۲۵.۵ درصدی صدور پروانه‌های ساختمانی», a 25.5 percent collapse in building-permit issuance, and «چرا سیاست‌های فرزانه صادق نتیجه نداده است؟», why have Farzaneh Sadegh's policies produced no result, naming the minister of roads and urban development directly in the deck.
- Main: The paper's framing device is the headline's second clause, that sanctions are not the explanation, which places the blame on domestic policy on a morning when every other front page is arguing about foreign pressure.
- Sub-item: «زیان‌دهی ایران خودرو با وجود افزایش ۲.۵ برابری قیمت خودروها», Iran Khodro loss-making despite a 2.5-fold rise in car prices, with a supporting table of production and price figures.
- Sub-item: «سیدجواد حسینی، عضو اتاق بازرگانی در گفت‌وگو با چارسوق: آنچه محاصره دریایی را مؤثرتر می‌کند تنبلی مدیران دولتی است», what makes the maritime blockade more effective is the laziness of state managers. The interviewee is identified on the page as a chamber of commerce member; the paper, not this monitor, calls the situation a maritime blockade.
- Sub-item: «جان‌نثار دولت پزشکیان معرفی شد», a mocking item on a government appointment, illustrated with a portrait in traditional dress.

ANALYST NOTE Chahar Sough performs the same manoeuvre it performed on 13 September, when its whole front was a Brent chart pricing Iranian diplomacy as a loss, but it has moved the target. Today the chart measures Iranian construction, and the deck denies sanctions as the cause. An economic paper that refuses the sanctions alibi in its headline and then prints a businessman calling state management the real force multiplier of the blockade is making a political argument in accounting language, and it is the clearest sign in the set that the war's domestic bill is being converted into a competence indictment.

Ta'adol

Economic daily, technocratic, close to the chambers of commerce

LOW: settlement expectations visible in the currency and bullion markets, with no war framing on the page

“The retreat of the dollar and gold” «عقب‌نشینی «دلار» و «طلا»»


تعادل

عبور از «زمستان سخت» با تکیه بر «تابستان داغ»

آرامش مقطعی یا آغاز بازگشت ثبات؟

عقب‌نشینی «دلار» و «طلا»

بابت دوران صلح جواب نمی‌دهد

- Main: The lead is decked as a question rather than a claim, «آرامش مقطعی یا آغاز بازگشت ثبات؟», a momentary calm or the beginning of a return to stability, the first front page in this file to report the currency and bullion markets falling back since the maritime campaign began.
- Main: The centre photograph is the podium of the tenth Amin al-Zarb entrepreneurship festival, under the headline «نسخه دوران صلح جواب نمی‌دهد», the peacetime prescription does not work, a private-sector demand for wartime economic instruments rather than a war position.
- Kicker: «گزارش «تعادل» از تاب‌آوری شبکه برق / عبور از «زمستان سخت» با تکیه بر «تابستان داغ»»», Ta'adol's report on the resilience of the power grid, getting through a hard winter by relying on a hot summer.
- Kicker: «بارش‌های شدید به معنای احیای منابع آب‌های زیرزمینی کشور نیست / ال‌نینو می‌آید اما مشکل ایران نمی‌رود», heavy rains do not mean the country's groundwater is replenished, El Nino is coming but Iran's problem is not leaving.
- Sub-item: «ثبت رکورد جدید در بورس», a new record on the stock exchange, and «جابه‌جایی انبار نفت شهران ریسک قدیمی تهران!», relocating the Shahran fuel depot, Tehran's old risk, a civil-defence item with obvious wartime resonance that the paper files as urban planning.
- Op-ed: The right-column signed note is «آدرس غلط ندهید», do not give a false address, the page's implicit answer to every front page blaming the outside world.

ANALYST NOTE Ta'adol supplies the single most checkable market fact in the edition, that the dollar and gold retreated, and it refuses to call it a recovery. Read against the wires reporting Brent at 108 dollars, the picture is a war economy in which the external price of the coercion strategy is rising while the domestic panic premium is falling, which is what one would expect if Iranian households have begun pricing in a settlement. The Shahran depot item, filed as planning rather than defence, is the kind of displacement that tends to precede an explicit civil-defence debate.

Etemad

Reformist daily of record

MODERATE-HIGH: a strike on an American warship presented as demonstrated capability on a reformist front page, paired with an explicit nuclear-weapon denial

“The Qassem Basir blizzard” «کولاک قاسم بصیر»


اعتماد
دوشنبه ۱۰ آذر ۱۴۰۴
ایستاده‌ایم و حرفمان همان است
داستان موشکی که ناو امریکایی را هدف گرفت
کولاک قاسم بصیر
دوستی پرهزینه با امریکا
اول شکست محاصره
فرصت به موقع
به شرط بازگشت
کاسبان خیابان انقلاب

- Main: The lead is a weapons profile, overlined «داستان موشکی که ناو امریکایی را هدف گرفت», the story of the missile that targeted an American warship, and decked «سلاحی که پس از استفاده ایران از قابلیت‌های اپتیکی علیه ناوهای امریکایی در هرمز، بار دیگر توجه‌ها را به نسل تازه موشک‌های بالستیک ایران جلب کرده است», a weapon that after Iran's use of optical capabilities against American warships in Hormuz has again drawn attention to the new generation of Iranian ballistic missiles. The strike claim is Etemad's rendering and is recorded as a claim, not as established fact.
- Banner: The top strip carries the president's own words, «ایستاده‌ایم و حرفمان همان است», we are standing and our word is unchanged, over «مشروح گفت‌وگوی رئیس‌جمهور با شبکه خبری ایندیا تودی هند» and the operative line «اگر دنبال سلاح هسته‌ای بودیم عضو «ان‌پی‌تی» نمی‌شدیم», if we were seeking a nuclear weapon we would not have joined the NPT.
- Sub-item: «"اعتماد" در گفت‌وگو با رامین مهمان‌پرست بررسی می‌کند / دوستی پرهزینه با امریکا», Etemad examines, in conversation with Ramin Mehmanparast, the costly friendship with America. Mehmanparast is a former Foreign Ministry spokesman; the framing is directed at Gulf states rather than at Tehran.
- Sub-item: «تحلیل شرایط جنگی در گفت‌وگو با حمیدرضا جلایی‌پور», an analysis of war conditions with the reformist sociologist Hamidreza Jalaeipour, carrying the sequenced prescription «اول شکست محاصره», first break the siege, followed by «فرصت به موقع» and «به شرط بازگشت», a timely opportunity, conditional on a return.
- Sub-item: «تغییر موازنه قدرت به نفع مقاومت», a shift in the balance of power in favour of the Resistance, printed by a reformist paper without quotation marks, which is itself notable.
- Right rail: The «یادداشت‌ها» column stack runs seven signed notes, among them «مهار نفوذ در گلوگاه‌ها», containing infiltration at the chokepoints, «جدل‌های داخلی یعنی دست کم گرفتن خطرها», internal quarrels mean underestimating the dangers, «ایران در کانون بازی چهارگانه», Iran at the centre of a four-way game, and «آغاز پایان نفوذ عربستان در یمن؟», the beginning of the end of Saudi influence in Yemen. The bylines are below the legible resolution of the available scan.
- Main: The page photograph is a street scene captioned «روایتی از بازگشت دستفروشان پایتخت / کاسبان خیابان انقلاب», an account of the return of the capital's street vendors, the trade of Enghelab Street, the only domestic-livelihood photograph in the set.

ANALYST NOTE The reformist daily of record leading on a ballistic missile is the single most anomalous placement in this edition, and it should be read alongside its own banner, in which the president denies a weapons programme in an interview with an Indian broadcaster. Etemad is not arguing for escalation; it is

> demonstrating that the deterrent works so that the negotiating position underneath it can hold, which is the reformist camp's standing case for a bounded settlement. The four-way-game note and the Saudi-influence note together indicate that this newsroom now reads Yemen, not Hormuz, as the file where the regional balance is actually moving.

Jomhouri Eslami

Traditional clerical establishment daily, founded within the Islamic Republic Party lineage

LOW-MODERATE: the settlement described administratively, with a no-military-solution judgment stated in the paper's own voice

“Agenda of today's Salalah summit in Oman: designating a new maritime route in the Strait of Hormuz”

«دستور کار اجلاس امروز صلاله عمان / تعیین مسیر دریایی جدید در تنگه هرمز»


جمهوری اسلامی

دستور کار اجلاس امروز صلاله عمان
تعیین مسیر دریایی جدید در تنگه هرمز

- Main: Alone among the Persian front pages, Jomhouri Eslami names the venue in its banner as Salalah rather than Muscat, and describes the agenda in procedural rather than adversarial terms. Its decks attribute to Araghchi that the details of the agreement with Oman and the maps of the new route will be placed at the disposal of the participating states.
- Sub-item: The decks add that the session will take up further regional questions beyond the route itself, and that the participating states are attending so that their non-objection is made visible to the international community rather than as parties to the bilateral understanding.
- Main: The centre photograph shows an awards ceremony captioned «تقدیر از فعالان اقتصادی و کارآفرینان برتر در دوران جنگ و پساجنگ», honouring leading economic actors and entrepreneurs of the war and post-war period, the only front page in the set to name a post-war period in its own caption.
- Sub-item: «سازمان بهینه‌سازی انرژی در اجرای مأموریت قانونی خود مستقر نشده است», the energy optimisation organisation has not established itself in executing its legal mandate, a direct administrative criticism filed above the fold.
- Op-ed: «تروریست‌های مدافع دموکراسی!», the terrorists who defend democracy, a signed right-column polemic; and a second house column «ماجراهایی که وحدت ملی را نشانه می‌گیرند», the affairs that take aim at national unity, continuing the paper's 13 September warning that the domestic quarrel is turning on Iranian officials.
- Sub-item: «جنگ منطقه راه حل نظامی ندارد», the region's war has no military solution, printed in the left rail as the paper's own formulation rather than as a relayed foreign judgment.
- Banner: The foot of the page carries a framed quotation of the martyred Ayatollah Beheshti on detachment from the world, and the sports strip reports the Iranian volleyball team finishing runner-up in Asia.

ANALYST NOTE Jomhouri Eslami is the procedural outlier and is therefore the most useful page in the set for establishing what is actually happening: it prints a venue, an agenda and a document-sharing arrangement without either celebrating or denouncing them. Its willingness to write that the regional war has no military solution in its own voice, where Kayhan on 13 September could only relay that judgment through a foreign magazine, marks the clerical establishment daily as the first outlet in this file to own the sentence. Its parallel warning about national unity carries the standing inward-quarrel thread forward for a second consecutive cycle.

Sobh-e No

Principlist daily; read this cycle from its own channel, no front-page scan in the kiosk album

“The eastern triangle” LOW: the outlet that set the corridor's domestic limit is silent on it the morning it is signed

«مثلث شرق»

- Main: The lead is an argument that China, Russia and Iran should be read as an interlocking diplomatic alignment rather than as a military alliance, which is a notably deflationary formulation from a principlist paper and a retreat from the bloc language the same title used earlier in this file.
- Sub-item: «جهش ۱۵۳ هزار واحدی شاخص کل بورس», a 153,000-point jump in the total stock index to 7,431,000 points, corroborating Ta'adol's reading of a domestic market pricing in calm.
- Sub-item: «بیرون کشیدن پیکر ۱۷ شهید», the recovery of 17 bodies by civil defence teams in Gaza, the paper's only external-conflict item in the retrieved window.
- Sub-item: Two law-enforcement items, a seizure of 100 bladed weapons in Tehran and 390 kilograms of methamphetamine in Alborz province, and a film review, which together indicate a domestic news cycle.
- Sub-item: The channel carries no Hormuz or Oman item in the retrieved window, which for the outlet that on 13 September supplied this monitor with the corridor's domestic limit in a named official's voice is a notable silence.

> **ANALYST NOTE** Sobh-e No was the single source on 13 September for the parliamentary security commission's statement that the route designation is in no sense a reopening. Twenty-four hours later, on the signature morning, the same channel carries nothing on the file at all and leads instead on a deflationary reading of the eastern alignment. The absence is filed here as a finding rather than as a gap: the paper that set the domestic limit is not defending it, which is consistent with the limit having been accepted rather than contested.

Appendix A: The leadership's economic message as carried on the front page of Seda-ye Iran (partial, reconstructed from the scan)

Seda-ye Iran, issue 469, Monday 23 Shahrivar 1405 / 14 September 2026, front page (khamenei.ir affiliation printed on the masthead), scans/fa-02.jpg

Verification note, stated first because it governs everything below. The leadership websites, khamenei.ir in both its Persian and English editions, could not be reached from this monitor's collection environment during the compilation window, as has been the case for several consecutive cycles. What follows is therefore reconstructed from the printed page of the leadership-messaging bulletin Seda-ye Iran rather than from the primary text, and it is presented as a partial rendering of a front-page treatment of the message, not as a full or authoritative translation of the message itself. No sentence below is offered as a verbatim quotation of the Leader.

The bulletin's whole front page is given to the economy. Its overline reads: «راه حل واقعی مشکلات اقتصادی کشور با نگاهی به پیام‌های اخیر رهبر معظم انقلاب اسلامی», the real solution to the country's economic problems, in light of the recent messages of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution. The display headline over a photograph of workers at a gas processing installation is a single phrase: «کیمیای تولید», the alchemy of production.

The framing the page builds from that phrase is the familiar resistance-economy proposition in its production-first form: that the country's economic difficulty is not in the first instance a function of external pressure or of the exchange rate, but of domestic productive capacity, and that the instrument which converts pressure into capability is production itself. The page's unsigned lead essay, headed «سرمقاله», develops this as the answer to the sanctions question rather than as one policy among several.

Two features of the page carry analytic weight beyond the message's content. The first is that the printed reference throughout is to «رهبر معظم انقلاب اسلامی», the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, in the standing office formulation, with no personal name printed on the front page. This monitor reads the printed name on each page rather than inferring; the front page of this edition prints the office, not the name. The second is the martyr panel in the masthead corner for «شهید مهدی سرحدی», martyr Mehdi Sarhadi, with portrait, the publication's standard framing device.

Analyst flag. The significant fact about this appendix is what the page does not contain. On the morning that an Iranian delegation was to sign a maritime-route arrangement in Oman, and on the morning that Kayhan devoted its editorial and its lead to demanding that arrangement be stopped in the Leader's name, the leadership's own front-page bulletin carried no Hormuz condition, no reference to the Salalah meeting, and no succession or vengeance framing. Kayhan's condition list, including its demand for «انتقام و خونخواهی آقای شهید», revenge and blood-vengeance for the martyred Leader, appears on Kayhan's page and not on the leadership surface. Treat that asymmetry as evidence about Kayhan's standing, not about the leadership's position, and re-check it when the leadership websites next become reachable.

Appendix B: Full translation of the day's flagged editorial, Kayhan's Yadasht-e Rooz by Hossein Shariatmadari

Kayhan, «تفاهم عمان یا فرصت تنفس به آمریکا؟!(1)», by حسین شریعتمداری, Monday 23 Shahrivar 1405 / 14 September 2026; retrieved in full from the paper's channel at t.me/kayhan_online/83905 and archived to raw/kayhan-83905.txt

Title as printed: «تفاهم عمان یا فرصت تنفس به آمریکا؟!(1)», The Oman understanding, or a breathing space for America?! (1). Author as printed: #حسین_شریعتمداری, Hossein Shariatmadari, Kayhan's managing editor, appointed by the Supreme Leader's office. The numeral (1) indicates the paper intends a continuation.

1. Today, at the Muscat session, the understanding between Iran and Oman is to be finalised in the presence of the foreign ministers of the Persian Gulf littoral states. It has been announced that 'this understanding is solely between Iran and Oman, and the other countries will be present at the session only so that they are apprised of the details of the route and the transit arrangements, so that their non-opposition is also made implicitly clear to the international community.' Yesterday Dr Pezeshkian, in an interview with India's India Today news network, said: 'We held talks with the country of Oman in this regard. We reached an understanding on what is in fact a defined route framework. On Monday the foreign ministers of the very Arab countries we were supposed to be quarrelling with are to meet in Oman so as to reach an understanding with one another on the Hormuz route and to announce this situation to that international organisation which is dedicated to the sea. Within the framework of those international laws the route will be open, on condition that America abandons its assault and its dishonourable aggressions.'

Up to this point the discussion concerns the designation of a maritime route through the Strait of Hormuz. But it must be said: this route, which in the international law of the sea is referred to as a 'traffic separation scheme, TSS', already existed. That system is designed to organise the movement of vessels in congested waterways such as straits, canals and high-traffic routes so as to reduce the risk of collision. Therefore, and to all appearances, the subject of today's Muscat session cannot be an understanding about this route through the Strait of Hormuz.

And yet Mr Araghchi, our country's honourable minister of foreign affairs, in an interview with Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, presented the designation of a 'new maritime route' as the subject of today's Iran-Oman negotiation, and said: 'The agenda of Monday's session in Oman is the examination of a new maritime route in the Strait of Hormuz, and the details of the agreement with Oman and the maps relating to this route will be placed at the disposal of the participating countries.' Unfortunately our country's honourable officials have left unanswered, in their statements, the question of what the new route's characteristics are such that a plan and an agreement about it were necessary, if the route agreed upon is not the already-existing 'traffic separation scheme, TSS', and if, as Mr Araghchi puts it, what is intended is the designation of a 'new maritime route'.

2. Mr Araghchi and certain others among our country's honourable officials have emphasised regarding the aforementioned agreement between Iran and Oman that 'the agreement with the Sultanate of Oman does not mean the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz', and have emphasised that 'for the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, Iran regards America's return to its commitments in the Islamabad memorandum as the condition'. The gentlemen have not explained that, if the agreement referred to does not carry the sense and meaning of reopening the Strait of Hormuz, and if they regard the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz as conditional on 'America's return to its commitments in the Islamabad memorandum', then, first, what necessity was there for today's Iran-Oman session with the presence and supervision of the Persian Gulf littoral states?! And second, why have we taken no lesson from America's dozens of breaches of its undertakings?! The expectation, and it is also the intelligent course, is that so long as America has not acted upon its commitments in practice rather than in word and speech, we should halt every negotiation and decision concerning the Strait of Hormuz and

defer it to after America's performance of its commitments. And that we should stand firm on this undertaking too: that America's departure from the region, the payment of reparations, the halting of the Zionist regime's attacks on Lebanon and Palestine, our country's nuclear programme being outside the subject of negotiations, and revenge and blood-vengeance for the martyred gentleman and our other honoured martyrs, and so forth, are among Iran's conditions for the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.

3. The presence of the Persian Gulf littoral states at today's Muscat session is, likewise, an insult to the Iranian nation and to all the forces of the Resistance. These statelets, in the Twelve-Day and Ramadan wars, in the massacre of the oppressed people of Lebanon and Gaza and the West Bank and Yemen, have been part of the enemy's general staff and have been complicit in the savage crimes of America and the Zionist regime. How can these client and mercenary governments be referred to as 'neutral observers' or 'observers of the scene'?! With apologies to our country's honourable officials, it must be said that in this respect you have committed a great error! The Emirates and Saudi Arabia and Qatar and Kuwait and the rest are the guardians of the interests of America and the Zionist regime, and so long as they have not paid the price of their complicity in the crimes of America and Israel and have not been punished, they must have not the slightest interference or presence in the decision-making of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Consider this report! Trump, in an interview with Fox News, has said: 'If Oman stands in our way in relation to Iran, we will bomb it'! This is the treatment accorded to Oman, which has had and continues to have friendly relations with Iran. Compare the remaining Arab states of the Persian Gulf littoral from this angle.

Analyst flag and verification notes. Three items in this text require handling. First, the attributed Trump quotation about bombing Oman is reproduced here because it is what the editorial prints; it is a Kayhan rendering of a claimed Fox News remark, was not verifiable from any primary source available to this monitor during the compilation window, and is not to be reproduced as authentic without primary-source confirmation. Second, the two interview quotations, Pezeshkian to India Today and Araghchi to Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, are likewise Kayhan's renderings; the Pezeshkian quotation is corroborated in substance by Etemad's front-page treatment of the same India Today interview, and the Araghchi limiting formula is independently carried by Javan's banner and by Iran Daily in English, so the substance of both is well supported even where the exact wording is not. Third, «آقای شهید», rendered here as 'the martyred gentleman', is the editorial's formulation for the assassinated predecessor and is the vehicle by which the succession's legitimacy debt is attached to the Hormuz file; the reader should note that the honorific, and the vengeance demand built on it, appear on Kayhan's page and not on the leadership's own bulletin the same morning. Source line: Kayhan, Yadasht-e Rooz, 23 Shahrivar 1405, channel item kayhan_online/83905; the paper's companion lead analysis is item kayhan_online/83908 at kayhan.ir/001PvA.

Appendix C: Methodology and sourcing notes

iran-press-digest v2 collection run, 14 September 2026

Collection. Ten front-page scans were retrieved: nine Persian pages from the NewspaperTasnim kiosk album for Monday 23 Shahrivar 1405, posted at t.me/NewspaperTasnim/44525 with the caption «صفحه نخست روزنامه‌های دوشنبه ۲۳ شهریور ۱۴۰۵», and Iran Daily from the English kiosk album at t.me/newspapers_iran/3561. The stale-batch guard compared the album's own printed Jalali date to the target date and passed on the first attempt with no fallback sourcing required, so every page in this edition is from the day's own batch.

Text channels. Six daily channels and three agency wires were read directly: kayhan_online, vatanemrooz, jamejamdaily, etemadonline, IranNewspaper and sobhe_no as dailies; defapress_ir, farsna and Nournews_ir as agencies. Agency material is used for corroboration and for the threat register only, never as a front page, and is labelled as claims throughout. Kayhan's front-page item list, its Yadasht-e Rooz editorial and its companion lead analysis were captured in full and archived to raw/ for the translation appendix.

Unavailable sources. Tehran Times and the leadership websites, khamenei.ir in both editions, could not be reached from this monitor's collection environment during the compilation window. This is the same limitation recorded in recent editions and it is stated here rather than papered over: the English-language state daily's own framing is absent from this cycle, and Appendix A is a reconstruction from a printed bulletin rather than a primary-source translation. The Iran and Jam-e Jam channels carried no front-page item in the retrieved window, so those two titles are represented in this edition only by the scans where available and are otherwise absent.

Scan legibility. The kiosk album's images are low-resolution previews. Display headlines, decks and named bylines set at body size were magnified for reading, but four items could not be resolved and are handled accordingly: the byline on Vatan-e Emrooz's «نگاه» column, the bylines on Etemad's seven-item «یادداشت‌ها» stack, the byline on Sazandegi's «یادداشت روز», and the byline on Iran Daily's opinion column, which renders as Hossein Kazemi at the limit of legibility and is reported with that caveat. No name is asserted anywhere in this edition that was not legible on the page or corroborated from the outlet's own channel.

Identification and attribution. Named figures were checked against the printed page before being asserted. Kayhan's front-page quotation of a 'prominent American economist and head of Columbia University's development centre' is reported as printed; the description corresponds to a well-known figure but the name is not on the front page and is therefore not supplied here. The venue discrepancy on the day's central event is reported rather than reconciled: Kayhan's headline and editorial say Muscat, Kayhan's own body text and Jomhouri Eslami's banner say Salalah, and this monitor has not established which is correct. Every Iranian military, battle-damage and control claim in this edition is attributed to the outlet or wire that made it and is not adopted as fact, including Vatan-e Emrooz's assertion of complete Ansarullah control of Bab al-Mandab, Etemad's account of a missile strike on an American warship, and the wire reports of a tanker struck in the Strait of Hormuz, which closely resembles the incident recorded in the 13 September edition and may be the same event recirculating.

Day count. Day 195 is calculated on the monitor's fixed calendar epoch, Day 118 on 29 June 2026. The hand-authored reference reports drifted several days low against this count; the calendar count is authoritative here and is not reconciled to them.

Open-source material only. All translations from Persian/Arabic originals. Iranian claims are labelled as claims. Prepared for analysis and early warning; hostile content is documented for defensive assessment only, not endorsed.