OPEN-SOURCE PRESS INTELLIGENCE

Iranian Press Monitor

Daily Front-Page Intelligence

Day 194 - Sunday, 13 September 2026 · 22 Shahrivar 1405 · 1 Rabi al-Thani 1448

CORRIDOR IN ENGLISH, CLOSURE IN PERSIAN EDITION

Ten front pages (nine Persian from the Sunday 22 Shahrivar Tasnim kiosk album and Iran Daily from the English kiosk), plus the Kayhan, Vatan-e Emrooz, Jam-e Jam, Etemad, Iran and Sobh-e No channels and the Defa Press, Fars and Nour News wires; Tehran Times and the leadership websites were unavailable at the time of compilation

Front pages published the morning of 13 September 2026, reflecting events through late 12 September local

Defensive open-source press-intelligence. Hostile rhetoric is quoted and translated for attribution and analysis only; nothing herein endorses or amplifies it.

Iranian cinema marks National Cinema Day with record week

Iran Daily

Pezeshkain says Iran, Oman to ink Hormuz shipping route deal on Monday

Muscat meeting key step toward regional security: Spox

Strait of Hormuz to work as leverage to compel US to honor MoU commitments

ANALYSIS EXCLUSIVE

Persian Gulf region needs no 'gendarme': Iranian president

BUILDING FOR RESILIENCE, INNOVATION, COOPERATION AND SUSTAINABILITY

Aviation chief warns ICAO of US sanctions impact on global air transport

Price of surrender

IRAN DAILY

www.newspaper.iran-daily.com

1877

www.ion.ir

Front page: Iran Daily

Executive Summary

The lead judgment of this cycle is that the settlement track crossed from convening to commitment, and that Tehran published the commitment's limits in Persian on the same morning it published the commitment in English. Iran Daily gives its banner to 'Pezeshkain says Iran, Oman to ink Hormuz shipping route deal on Monday', with the deck 'Muscat meeting key step toward regional security: Spox' attributing the framing to the foreign ministry spokesman. Within hours of the same kiosk cycle, the Sobh-e No channel carries Behnam Saeedi, second deputy chair of the parliamentary National Security Commission, stating that Iran, Oman, Iraq and Gulf Cooperation Council members will attend and that «تعیین این مسیر به هیچ عنوان به معنای بازگشایی تنگه هرمز نیست», the designation of this route in no sense means the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Vatan-e Emrooz independently reports the same position with two further specifics: that the entry route to the Persian Gulf lies wholly within Iranian territorial waters, and that Iran attaches seven conditions to any opening. The three sources are not in conflict. They are the same policy, sold to two audiences with different terms attached.

That pattern is the exact inverse of the one this monitor recorded on 12 September and is the more significant finding for it. Twenty-four hours ago six Persian front pages led on Bab al-Mandab and the English paper carried no strait headline at all, from which this monitor judged that Tehran did not wish to own closure in the language its counterparts read. This morning the English paper leads on the agreement and the Persian pages lead on BRICS, oil prices and a factional quarrel. The government's own Persian daily, Iran, files the chokepoint question fifth on a sidebar under 'از هرمز تا باب‌المندب' and gives its lead instead to a rumour-control story insisting the land borders are open. An inversion this clean, across two papers published by the same news agency, is a message-management decision rather than divergent news judgment, and it indicates the concession is one Tehran wants credited abroad and minimised at home.

The coercion instrument itself is now being argued for in borrowed voices. Kayhan gives its entire lead to a relay of a Foreign Affairs analysis, credited on its channel to April Longley Alley and Allison Minor, under 'ایران و یمن با هرمز و باب‌المندب بر تجارت جهانی حکومت خواهند کرد'. Every one of its six decks sits inside quotation marks, including the last, which reports that the magazine judges a decisive military solution against Yemeni forces to be out of reach and stresses the necessity of a political solution. That is the sentence Kayhan would not write in its own voice, and its presence on the hardline flagship's front page is the clearest indication in the set that the security establishment's own surface is being prepared for an outcome it is not yet willing to advocate. Chahar Sough supplies the same admission from the opposite direction: its entire front is a Brent chart annotated at four inflection points, arguing that every Iranian signal of willingness to talk takes the price down, which concedes that the closure is a wasting asset whose value collapses the moment a corridor is signed.

The underlying military position, unlike the diplomatic one, is not in dispute and is externally corroborated. Ansarullah forces hold Mocha and the island at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, and Saudi Arabia's East-West crude pipeline has been shut since drone strikes on 10 September, with Brent above 100 dollars. Sazandegi places the pipeline attack in a four-item index strip under 'انفجار شاهرگ نفتی', not on its lead, which is itself an editorial judgment that the attack is a liability. Around that position the wires carry a register of claims that this monitor labels rather than adopts: Defa Press on Ansarullah control of more than 4,200 square kilometres including Perim island and on a Yemeni missile and drone strike against a Saudi base in the Shura area; Fars on Tareq Saleh's flight to Riyadh after defeats on the western coast and on Saudi shipping transit times lengthening roughly ninefold; Sobh-e No on at least six oil tanks destroyed at Abha;

Vatan-e Emrooz on 129 Saudi air sorties in 48 hours. Against all of that, the Etemad channel carries Pezeshkian saying plainly that Iran is not at war with Saudi Arabia.

Two further signals belong in this cycle's warning picture, and they point in opposite directions. Defa Press reports a fresh maritime incident in the Strait of Hormuz, a Panama-flagged tanker struck by a missile as reported by UK Maritime Trade Operations, which is difficult to reconcile with a corridor being signed on Monday and is the single fact most likely to derail it. And the Etemad channel carries the parliament speaker on withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, moving the standing treaty-exit thread from two conservative front pages to the presiding officer of the legislature, which is the first time in this file that the argument has been voiced from an office rather than a newsroom.

Net assessment: this is a hinge edition rather than a loud one. Nothing on these ten pages is as dramatic as the chokepoint completion of 12 September, and that is the point: the Iranian press spent this morning not celebrating a position but pricing it, in a Brent chart, an International Energy Agency demand warning, a month-old oil slick across the Sea of Oman, a de-dollarization lead that undercuts itself by asking whether BRICS membership converts into trade at all, and a four-paper argument about who inside the system is to blame. Three surfaces that would ordinarily be the loudest, Kayhan, Chahar Sough and Jomhouri Eslami, all published the premises of a settlement while opposing settlement itself. The most useful near-term indicators are narrow and checkable: whether the signature occurs on 14 September, whether it happens at Muscat or at Salalah, whether any Persian-language front page carries it at the prominence the English page gave it, and whether the Hormuz tanker incident is followed by others.

BOTTOM LINE Tehran announced in English that it will sign a Hormuz shipping-route agreement with Oman on Monday, and in Persian, through a named parliamentary security official, that the route is in no sense a reopening of the strait, which together indicate a bounded and reversible concession designed to bank credit abroad without surrendering the instrument at home.

CRITICAL SOURCING NOTE Built on ten front pages read directly from the Sunday 22 Shahrivar kiosk albums (t.me/NewspaperTasnim/44500 for the nine Persian pages, t.me/newspapers_iran/3560 for Iran Daily), with the stale-batch guard passing on the first attempt against the album's own printed Jalali date. Six newspaper channels and three wires were queried; wire material (Defa Press, Fars News, Nour News) is treated as claim and labelled at each point of use. Tehran Times and both leadership websites were unavailable at the time of compilation, as they were on 12 September, and the Kayhan column of the day was not retrievable on any surface, so this edition's editorial appendix translates the Jomhouri Eslami house column instead and says so. Three front-page commentators are left unnamed because their by-line blocks are below the resolution of the kiosk scan; this monitor leaves a name blank rather than infer it. The venue of Monday's meeting is reported as Muscat by Iran Daily and as Salalah by Sobh-e No, and the discrepancy is left open. Kayhan's own war counter reads day 197 against this monitor's day 194; the calendar count is kept and the difference recorded.

Macro Trend Analysis

1 The bilingual split reverses, and the reversal dates the concession

The standing bilingual-messaging thread this monitor has tracked since the strait closure inverted in a single cycle. On 12 September six Persian pages led on Bab al-Mandab while the English front page omitted the strait entirely; this morning the English front page leads on a dated, venued, counterparty-named agreement while the government's own Persian daily files the chokepoints fifth on a sidebar and leads on border-queue rumour control. Two papers published by the same news agency do not diverge this cleanly by accident. The operational reading is that a concession has been decided and is being introduced to foreign readers first,

with the Persian-language terms, that this is not a reopening, that the route lies in Iranian territorial waters, that seven conditions attach, published in parallel so that the domestic audience receives the limits before it receives the concession.

2 The coercion case is now made in borrowed voices

Kayhan's lead is a Foreign Affairs relay, not a Kayhan argument, and it carries the magazine's judgment that no decisive military solution exists and that a political solution is necessary. Chahar Sough's lead is a price chart conceding that Iranian diplomacy moves the market against Iran's own leverage. Jomhouri Eslami's centrepiece is an American academic's denunciation of the American president, placed directly above Trump's own prediction that the war ends 'very soon'. In each case the outlet asserts a conclusion it wants without owning the premise, and in each case the borrowed source carries a clause the outlet would not write. This is a more sophisticated register than the triumphalism of the preceding cycle, and it indicates the hardline surfaces are being positioned to survive a settlement rather than to prevent one.

3 The war's bill is being itemised by outlets with no stake in either camp

The economic and reformist pages converged this morning on cost rather than achievement. Etemad prints the International Energy Agency's warning of a demand sunset under 'دوران گمشده نفت', and gives its main photograph to an oiled shoreline captioned 'یک ماه از آلودگی نفتی دریای عمان و خلیج فارس گذشت' beneath the single phrase 'لکه ننگ', the only environmental accounting of the maritime campaign anywhere in the set. Ta'adol leads on de-dollarization and then undercuts itself by asking whether BRICS membership reaches real trade. Sazandegi calls the situation Iran's maritime blockade and asks what tangible achievement the summit delivers. The Etemad channel adds a Bloomberg-sourced figure of tanker costs up 3.6 times and an attack on an Iranian commercial vessel near Qeshm. The pattern from 12 September holds and sharpens: the premium the strategy produces is not reaching Iranian households, and the papers closest to the economy are the ones saying so.

4 The internal quarrel is now the contested space on Iranian front pages

Four papers across four factional positions described the same domestic fight on the same morning. Kayhan defends 'کارنامه درخشان شهید رئیسی' against an 'inefficient current' and separately attacks Zarif for 'رؤیابافی تازه ... تسلیم در برابر غرب'. Sazandegi asks 'رئیسی خط قرمز شد؟' over a foundation complaint against a blogger, an item Chahar Sough carries in the opposite framing. Etemad calls it 'نزاع برنامه‌ریزی‌شده', a planned quarrel, and quotes Mohammad-Ali Abtahi saying hardline attacks on Pezeshkian and Ghalibaf now exceed attacks on Trump and Netanyahu. Jomhouri Eslami's house column warns that nightly gatherings which began with slogans against Trump and Netanyahu have turned on serving and former Iranian officials. Convergence of this breadth is not coordination, it is symptom: the external position is settled enough that the argument has moved inside.

5 Treaty withdrawal moves from newsroom to office

The standing Non-Proliferation Treaty thread advanced a real step. On 12 September the withdrawal argument stood on two conservative front pages, Kayhan's and Nobonyad's, and this monitor's judgment was that it remained factional pressure rather than policy until an office rather than a newspaper put it on a record. The Etemad channel this cycle carries the parliament speaker on withdrawal. That is the presiding officer of the legislature, not a columnist, and it is the first movement on that indicator since it was set. It also complicates the Abtahi alignment, since the same speaker is being placed by a reformist paper on the government's side of the factional line while voicing the hardline camp's signature demand.

6 Hormuz remains kinetic while it is being negotiated

Against the corridor announcement, Defa Press reports UK Maritime Trade Operations recording a Panama-flagged tanker struck by a missile in the Strait of Hormuz, Vatan-e Emrooz reports that only one Chinese tanker transited the strait during the day and questions American mine-clearance claims, and Seda-ye Iran stages the foreign ministry spokesman's press conference at the site of a strike at Lamerd rather than at the ministry podium. A state that convenes a press conference at a strike site is building an evidentiary and legal case, not preparing a military answer, but a corridor signed into a strait where tankers are still being hit is a corridor with a short shelf life. This is the standing Hormuz-as-coercion thread's live edge, and it is the most checkable of the near-term indicators.

Key Judgments

KJ-1 **[HIGH]** Tehran has committed to a bounded maritime concession and has published its limits in Persian before publishing the concession itself. Iran Daily's banner states that Iran and Oman will sign a Hormuz shipping-route agreement on Monday, attributed on the page to the foreign ministry spokesman; the Sobh-e No channel carries Behnam Saeedi, second deputy chair of the parliamentary National Security Commission, saying the designation of the route «به هیچ عنوان به معنای بازگشایی تنگه هرمز نیست»; and Vatan-e Emrooz adds that the entry route lies wholly within Iranian territorial waters and that seven conditions attach to any opening. Significance: this is not a reopening and should not be reported as one. It is a managed transit lane under Iranian jurisdiction that can be withdrawn without abrogating anything, which lets Tehran collect the diplomatic credit of movement while retaining the instrument. For warning purposes the concession is reversible by design, and the indicator that matters is not the signature but whether transit volumes recover afterwards.

KJ-2 **[HIGH]** The bilingual split this monitor judged stable on 12 September has inverted, and the inversion is a message-management decision rather than a news-judgment difference. Yesterday six Persian front pages led on Bab al-Mandab and the English front page carried no strait headline; today the English front page leads on the agreement while the government's own Persian daily, published by the same news agency, files the chokepoints fifth on a sidebar and leads instead on 'مرزهای زمینی باز است', a denial that the land borders are closed. Significance: the previous edition read the English omission as reluctance to own closure abroad. The correct generalisation is narrower and more useful: the English surface is used to introduce whatever Tehran wants credited by foreign governments, and the Persian surface to control what the domestic audience concludes from it. That rule predicts where each future move will appear first, and it is testable on the next cycle.

KJ-3 **[MODERATE-HIGH]** The hardline press is publishing the premises of a settlement while continuing to oppose settlement, which indicates the security establishment's surfaces are being positioned to survive an agreement rather than to block one. Kayhan's entire lead is a quoted relay of a Foreign Affairs analysis whose final deck states that a decisive military solution against Yemeni forces is out of reach and that a political solution is necessary; Chahar Sough's whole front is a Brent chart whose argument concedes that the price premium is a function of Iranian posture and therefore falls when Iran moves; both papers nonetheless attack the negotiating camp on the same page, Kayhan through Zarif and Chahar Sough through the coinage 'مذاکره‌پرستان'. Significance: an outlet that needed to prevent an agreement would not print the case for one in quotation marks. Calibration runs both ways here: reading this as hardline acquiescence would overstate it, since neither paper advocates anything, but reading it as ordinary hostility would miss that both have now put the settlement's load-bearing premises into their own readers' hands.

KJ-4 [MODERATE-HIGH] The Strait of Hormuz remained kinetic on the eve of the corridor signature, which is the single most likely cause of the agreement failing. Defa Press reports UK Maritime Trade Operations recording a Panama-flagged tanker struck by a missile in the strait; Vatan-e Emrooz reports a single Chinese tanker transiting during the day and disputes American mine-clearance claims; the Etemad channel reports an attack on an Iranian commercial vessel near Qeshm. Significance: a corridor notified to maritime authorities creates a verifiable fact at sea that can be tested independently of anyone's statements, which is why this monitor set it as the key indicator on 12 September. It can also be destroyed by a single incident attributable to no one. The warning indicator is whether a second tanker is struck between the signature and the first transits; if one is, the agreement's practical content is nil regardless of what is signed.

KJ-5 [MODERATE-HIGH] The internal Iranian quarrel has escalated to the point where four front pages across four factional positions describe it on the same morning, and one of them warns it is turning violent in rhetoric. Kayhan defends the Raisi record against an 'inefficient current'; Sazandegi asks whether Raisi has become a red line and reports a foundation complaint against a blogger; Etemad calls the dispute planned and quotes Mohammad-Ali Abtahi that hardline attacks on Pezeshkian and Ghalibaf exceed those on Trump and Netanyahu; Jomhouri Eslami's house column reports that nightly gatherings which began with slogans against Trump and Netanyahu have moved on to serving and former Iranian officials, and objects to former presidents being tried in absentia in the press. Significance: a wartime system whose four main print factions all lead on each other rather than on the adversary has an authority problem, not merely a disagreement. It also lowers the probability that any Iranian delegation carries sufficient mandate to conclude more than a technical annex on Monday.

KJ-6 [MODERATE] Treaty withdrawal has been voiced from an office rather than a newsroom for the first time in this file. The Etemad channel carries the parliament speaker on withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, where on 12 September the same argument stood only on the Kayhan and Nobonyad front pages and was assessed here as factional pressure pending exactly this movement. Significance: the indicator set on 12 September has moved, and the correct response is to raise the assessed likelihood that a formal parliamentary instrument follows, not to conclude that withdrawal is policy. The speaker is a principlist presiding over a body that can legislate a mandate without the executive's consent, and a legislated withdrawal mandate during an active corridor negotiation would be the most destabilising single development available in this file. Watch for a bill, a commission referral or a Guardian Council comment rather than for further statements.

KJ-7 [MODERATE] Tehran is running an explicit de-escalation line toward Riyadh in the same cycle in which its aligned press celebrates strikes on Saudi targets, and the contradiction is not being reconciled anywhere on these pages. The Etemad channel carries Pezeshkian saying Iran is not at war with Saudi Arabia; Kayhan's lead relays that Yemeni attacks on Saudi resources have opened a new front and raised pressure on the energy market; Fars reports Tareq Saleh's flight to Riyadh and Saudi shipping transit times lengthening roughly ninefold; Sobh-e No reports six oil tanks destroyed at Abha; Vatan-e Emrooz reports satellite imagery of damage to the Jizan refinery and 129 Saudi sorties in 48 hours. Significance: the presidential line is the one directed at an audience that can act on it, and it is consistent with the corridor track and with the Gulf Cooperation Council presence at Monday's meeting. The pressing question for warning is whether Tehran is able to deliver Ansarullah restraint if a Gulf settlement requires it, on which there is no evidence in the monitored set in either direction.

KJ-8 [MODERATE] Negative evidence, carried forward and partially amended: leadership output returned to a front page this cycle, but on an economic occasion and not on the war. Seda-ye Iran builds its lead from «پیام رهبر معظم انقلاب به مناسبت هفته دولت», the Leader's Government Week message, rendering it as an argument for disciplined importing. That is the first leadership text to anchor a front page in seven editions, and it is a seasonal message rather than an intervention. Across those seven editions no dated leadership statement on the war, the strait, the Yemen position or the treaty question has been retrievable, and both leadership websites were again unavailable at compilation. Significance: the arbitration gap stands. A corridor is being signed, a treaty exit is being voiced from the speaker's office and four factions are prosecuting each other, with no visible ruling from the office that would ordinarily settle any of the three. Record also, unchanged, that the succession itself rests in this monitor's sourcing on printed honorific usage rather than on any primary leadership publication.

KJ-9 [MODERATE] The measurable costs of the maritime campaign are now being published by Iranian outlets faster than its gains, including costs Iran cannot attribute to anyone else. Etemad's main photograph is an oiled shoreline captioned as a month since the oil contamination of the Sea of Oman and the Persian Gulf, headed «لکه ننگ»; the same paper carries the International Energy Agency's demand-sunset warning, a Bloomberg figure of tanker costs up 3.6 times, and an attack on an Iranian commercial vessel near Qeshm; Sazandegi carries stranded foreign passengers and border restrictions; Ta'adol asks on its own front page whether BRICS membership reaches real trade. Significance: an environmental catastrophe in Iran's own littoral is the one cost in this list that cannot be redescribed as enemy pressure, and its appearance as a front-page photograph rather than an inside item indicates the reformist press has found a line of criticism that survives the wartime constraint on criticism. Expect it to recur, and treat its disappearance as a sign of pressure applied rather than of the problem resolving.

Named-Figure Tracker

Figure	Role / relevance	Today's framing	Flag
Masoud Pezeshkian	President of Iran	Front-paged in English announcing the Monday signature and saying the Persian Gulf needs no gendarme; front-paged in Persian at BRICS calling for genuine reform of international mechanisms; carried on the Etemad channel saying Iran is not at war with Saudi Arabia	WATCH
Esmaeil Baghaei	Spokesman, Iranian foreign ministry	Sourced on the Iran Daily deck for the Muscat framing; on Kayhan's rail saying Saudi Arabia and Japan will be held accountable for their votes on the Agency resolution; staged by Seda-ye Iran holding a press conference at the Lamerd strike site	COERCION SPOKESMAN
Behnam Saeedi	Second deputy chair, National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the Majlis	The named voice setting the corridor's limit, that the route is in no sense a reopening of the strait, and naming Iran, Oman, Iraq and Gulf Cooperation Council members as attendees	NEW NAMED FIGURE

Figure	Role / relevance	Today's framing	Flag
Donald Trump	President of the United States	Jomhouri Eslami prints an unnamed Columbia University professor calling for him to be set aside before he gets everyone killed and describing him as a malignant narcissist, directly above his own statement that the Iran war will end very soon; Chahar Sough frames Iranian diplomacy as an oil subsidy to him	TARGET FRAMING
Benjamin Netanyahu	Prime Minister of Israel	Named only inside Iranian domestic argument, in Abtahi's complaint that hardliners attack Pezeshkian and Ghalibaf harder than they attack him, and in the Jomhouri Eslami column's account of slogans turning inward; absent from every lead headline in the set	absence noted
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf	Speaker of the Majlis	Placed by a reformist paper on the government's side of the factional line as a target of hardline attack, while simultaneously carried on the Etemad channel voicing withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty	WATCH
Mohammad Javad Zarif	Former foreign minister	Attacked on Kayhan's front page for «رؤیابافی تازه ... با نسخه تکراری تسلیم در برابر غرب», the stand-in target for the negotiating camp as a whole	TARGET FRAMING
Ebrahim Raisi	Late president, referred to throughout as «شهید رئیسی»	The contested object of the cycle's internal quarrel: defended by Kayhan against an 'inefficient current', questioned by Sazandegi under «رئیسی خط قرمز شد؟» over a foundation complaint against a blogger, and defended again in Chahar Sough's framing of the same complaint	WATCH
Tareq Saleh	Yemeni National Resistance commander on the west coast	Reported by the Fars wire to have fled to Riyadh after defeats on the western coasts; an Iranian-aligned claim carried here as claim	WATCH
The Leader (Mojtaba Khamenei)	Supreme Leader, printed on the page only as «رهبر معظم انقلاب»	Returns to a front page for the first time in seven editions, but through a Government Week economic message repurposed by Seda-ye Iran as an argument for disciplined importing; no dated statement on the war, the strait or the treaty question on any monitored surface	absence noted
April Longley Alley and Allison Minor	Authors credited by Kayhan's channel for the Foreign Affairs analysis its lead relays	Both are identifiable Yemen and Middle East analysts, but the article itself was not retrieved; Kayhan's six decks are therefore recorded as the paper's rendering of a foreign magazine and not as that magazine's text	WATCH

Headline Summary Table

Outlet	Lead Headline (English)	Orientation	Theme	Threat signal
Iran Daily	Pezeshkain says Iran, Oman to ink Hormuz shipping route deal on Monday	English-language state daily, published by IRNA	Corridor agreement dated, venued and attributed to the foreign ministry spokesman	MODERATE: de-escalatory in direction, framed on the page itself as leverage
Sobh-e No	The resistance's dominion over oil	Principlist	The corridor's domestic limit, in a named parliamentary security official's voice	MODERATE-HIGH: closure preserved in Persian as it is conceded in English
Kayhan	Foreign Affairs: Iran and Yemen, with Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab, will rule over global trade	Hardline, published under the Supreme Leader's office	Dual-chokepoint dominance argued through a relayed Western analysis	HIGH: maximal claim laundered through a foreign source, political-solution clause left visible
Chahar Sough	The negotiation-worshippers' oil gift to Trump	Economic, hostile to the negotiating camp	Brent chart used to price Iranian diplomacy as a loss	MODERATE-HIGH: argues against any concession at Hormuz on financial grounds
Jomhouri Eslami	The scheme to allocate the petrol quota to persons rather than cars promotes corruption-breeding speculation	Traditional clerical establishment	Relayed American critique of Trump beside Trump's own end-of-war claim, and a warning against the quarrel turning inward	MODERATE: hostile characterisation relayed, paired with an expectation of a near-term end
Seda-ye Iran	The national economy at the station of wise imports	Leadership-messaging surface, khamenei.ir affiliation on the masthead	Leadership Government Week message repurposed for import policy; spokesman staged at the Lamerd strike site	MODERATE: leadership text returns, but on economics rather than on the war
Ta'adol	The world on the road to de-dollarization	Economic, technocratic	De-dollarization lead undercut by its own question on whether BRICS reaches real trade	LOW-MODERATE: chokepoints priced as market inputs, negotiation kept on the table
Iran	Rumour behind the transit queues	Official government daily	Border-queue rumour control and BRICS reform advocacy; chokepoints filed fifth on a sidebar	LOW-MODERATE: domestic reassurance dominates, the strait deliberately unweighted
Etemad	The boomerang of pressure	Reformist daily of record	The war's domestic and environmental bill, and the factional quarrel called planned	LOW-MODERATE: cost accounting, with the treaty-withdrawal signal carried from the speaker's office
Sazandegi	BRICS against sanctions?	Reformist, Kargozaran-e Sazandegi	Scepticism toward the summit and the domestic	LOW: treats the blockade as a cost to be audited, not an asset to be held

Outlet	Lead Headline (English)	Orientation	Theme	Threat signal
			bill for what it calls Iran's maritime blockade	

Per-Paper Front-Page Analysis

Iran Daily

English-language state daily published by IRNA, the government's principal English-language print surface for foreign readers and embassies

MODERATE: de-escalatory in direction, but the concession is framed on the page itself as leverage rather than as relief

“Pezeshkain says Iran, Oman to ink Hormuz shipping route deal on Monday” published in English; the)» «(masthead's own front page carries the president's surname misspelled as printed

Iran Daily

Pezeshkain says Iran, Oman to ink Hormuz shipping route deal on Monday

Persian Gulf region needs no 'gendarme': Iranian president

- Main: The banner headline states that Iran and Oman will sign a Hormuz shipping-route agreement on Monday, under the deck 'Muscat meeting key step toward regional security: Spox', attributing the venue and the framing to the foreign ministry spokesman rather than to the president. This is the first time the Monday meeting this monitor has tracked since 12 September appears on a front page as a signing rather than as a convening.
- Banner: A second red-on-black headline, 'Persian Gulf region needs no gendarme: Iranian president', runs over a photo set from the BRICS summit in New Delhi showing Pezeshkian in bilateral meetings, including with the Malaysian and Ethiopian leaderships and a Gulf counterpart. The 'gendarme' formula is directed at the United States security role rather than at any regional state.
- Op-ed: The analysis slot, marked 'ANALYSIS EXCLUSIVE', is given to Amir Dabiri Mehr, described on the page as a political-science researcher, under 'Strait of Hormuz to work as leverage to compel US to honor MoU commitments'. The piece opens on 'the prolonged closure of the Strait' and argues the closure is an instrument for enforcing the memorandum of understanding rather than an end in itself.
- Sub-item: A lower strip carries 'Aviation chief warns ICAO of US sanctions impact on global air transport', 'Venezuela's oil, US deal: Price of surrender?' in the opinion slot, and a sports item on Iran's Australia-hosted Olympic ambitions, indicating the page is not given over wholly to the strait.
- Kicker: The masthead strip logs the edition as Vol. 8211 with the Jalali and Hijri dates printed in full, which is how this monitor cross-checks the kiosk album against the printed date.

ANALYST NOTE This is the single most consequential page of the cycle, and its significance is the reversal of a pattern this monitor judged stable. On 12 September the English front page carried no Hormuz headline at all while six Persian pages led on Bab al-Mandab, and KJ-4 of that edition read the omission as Tehran declining to own strait closure in the language its counterparts read. This morning the position is exactly inverted: the English paper leads on a dated, venued, counterparty-named agreement, while the Persian pages lead on BRICS, oil prices and factional argument. The inversion indicates the settlement track has reached the stage at which Tehran wants foreign readers to see it, and it converts the 12 September indicator ('whether that meeting convenes on Monday') from open to substantially answered in the affirmative. Track whether the signing is confirmed on 14 September and whether any Persian-language surface carries it at equivalent prominence.

Sobh-e No

Principlist daily, close to the conservative parliamentary bloc and a reliable surface for National Security Commission members

MODERATE-HIGH: the coercion instrument is preserved in Persian at the moment it is conceded in English

“The resistance's dominion over oil” «تسلط مقاومت بر نفت»

- Main: The lead, under the kicker 'تنگه هرمز و توهم کریدورهای جایگزین' ('the Strait of Hormuz and the illusion of alternative corridors'), reports an interview with Ahmad Hosseini examining the effect of recent developments at Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab on the oil market. The page art is a Yemeni wall mural: a fighter beside an oil barrel painted 'NO PASSING' and a tanker marked with a Star of David.
- Main: The second front-page item, 'رونمایی از مسیر جدید تنگه' ('unveiling of the strait's new route'), is tagged 'روایت بهنام سعیدی از جلسه صلاله' ('Behnam Saeedi's account of the Salalah session'). The outlet's own channel carries Saeedi, identified as second deputy chair of the parliamentary National Security Commission, stating that Iran, Oman, Iraq and members of the Gulf Cooperation Council will attend, and that 'تعیین این مسیر به هیچ عنوان به معنای بازگشایی تنگه هرمز نیست' ('designating this route in no way means the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz').
- Op-ed: 'مقاومت فراتر از سیاسی‌کاری‌ها' ('resistance beyond political manoeuvring') asks, per its kicker, how a principled reading of developments in Yemen and Lebanon 'is being called into question by certain political currents', which is an internal rebuke aimed at Iranian critics rather than at any foreign party.
- Sub-item: The channel adds an Ansarullah item describing control of Mocha and Mayyun island and a Bab al-Mandab position as a 'دستاورد راهبردی کم‌سابقه' ('a strategic achievement with little precedent'), and a claim that at least six oil tanks were destroyed at Abha with eight more damaged. Both are Yemeni-side claims relayed without independent confirmation on the page.
- Right rail: The bottom of the page turns entirely domestic, to a favourable notice of the film 'اسکورت' under 'فیلم امیدوارکننده حاتمی‌کیای جوان'.

ANALYST NOTE Sobh-e No is where the corridor agreement is given its authoritative domestic limit. The same cycle in which the government's English paper announces a Monday signature, a principlist paper with a National Security Commission source prints, in the named voice of a serving deputy commission chair, that the route is explicitly not a reopening. This is not a contradiction between camps so much as a division of labour: the English page sells the concession abroad and the Persian page forecloses the reading that Iran has surrendered the instrument. Note also the venue divergence, Salalah here against Muscat on the English page, which this monitor logs as unresolved.

Kayhan

Hardline daily published under the Supreme Leader's office, managing editor Hossein Shariatmadari; the most reliable indicator of the security establishment's preferred framing

HIGH: dual-chokepoint dominance asserted through a laundered Western source, with the political-solution clause left visible

“Foreign Affairs: Iran and Yemen, with Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab, will rule over global trade” «فارن افرز: ایران و یمن با هرمز و باب‌المندب بر تجارت جهانی حکومت خواهند کرد»

کیهان

ایران و یمن با هرمز و باب‌المندب بر تجارت جهانی حکومت خواهند کرد

راز حمله «جریان ناکارآمد» به «کارنامه درخشان» شهید رئیسی

- Main: The whole lead is a relay of a Foreign Affairs piece, which Kayhan's channel credits to April Longley Alley and Allison Minor. Six bullets are set beneath it, every one inside quotation marks and attributed to the magazine rather than asserted: that the advance of Yemeni forces on the western coast has changed the balance of power in Yemen and the Red Sea equations; that simultaneous control of Bab al-Mandab and Hormuz turns Tehran and Sanaa into determining actors on vital trade and energy routes and hands them control of trillion-dollar commerce; that the capture of al-Mukha and Perim island has freed Yemeni hands to affect shipping movement at Bab al-Mandab; that a continuing Red Sea crisis will further disrupt Saudi oil exports and global trade flows; that Yemeni attacks on Saudi resources have opened a new front in the regional war and raised pressure on the energy market; and, notably, that Foreign Affairs judges a decisive military solution against Yemeni forces to be out of reach and stresses the necessity of a political solution.
- Banner: The top-left story reports a joint meeting of the overall commanders of the Army and the IRGC under 'وحدت ارتش و سپاه چون سپر آهنین کشور را در برابر فتنه‌ها و توطئه‌ها محافظت می‌کند' ('the unity of the Army and the IRGC protects the country like an iron shield against seditions and plots'). The framing is internal, against 'فتنه' rather than against a foreign enemy.
- Main: The second lead is domestic and factional: 'راز حمله «جریان ناکارآمد» به «کارنامه درخشان» شهید رئیسی' ('the secret of the inefficient current's attack on martyr Raisi's brilliant record'), with a red deck asking why, at a 235,000-toman dollar, the critics 'instead of deflecting and attacking martyr Raisi's government, do not speak of their own record'.
- Op-ed: The 'یادداشت روز' slot is headed 'عملیات برق‌آسای یمن، نمای قدرت عظیم جبهه مقاومت' ('Yemen's lightning operation, a portrait of the resistance front's immense power'). No author name is printed in the front-page block and the item was not retrievable on the paper's channel at compile time, so the authorship is recorded here as unverified rather than assumed to be the managing editor's.
- Right rail: Five boxed items, in order: Pezeshkian at the closed session of BRICS leaders in New Delhi saying 'نیازمند اصلاح واقعی سازوکارهای بین‌المللی هستیم' ('we need genuine reform of international mechanisms'); the IRGC Ground Force Quds Base announcing the destruction of a terrorist team at Saravan with five killed; a war-report item headed 'گزارش روز صد و نود و هفتم جنگ' ('report of the one hundred and ninety-seventh day of the war'); a 9/11 anniversary piece, '۲۵ سپتامبر گذشت: سال از واقعه ۱۱

قرار بود پس از ۵ سال ایران اشغال شود' ('twenty-five years after 11 September: Iran was supposed to be occupied within five years'); and the foreign ministry spokesman, printed as 'بقائی', under 'عربستان و ژاپن را پاسخگو می‌کنیم' ('we will hold Saudi Arabia and Japan accountable').

- Sub-item: Along the foot of the page runs a photo grid captioned 'بخشی از تجهیزات پیشرفته‌ای که انقلابیون یمن را غنیمت گرفته‌اند' ('part of the advanced equipment the Yemeni revolutionaries have taken as spoils'), showing radar and electro-optical mounts, a solar-powered trailer and coastal installations. Beside it, a Kayhan item attacks 'رؤیابافی تازه ظریف با نسخه تکراری تسلیم در برابر غرب' ('Zarif's new fantasy with the repeated prescription of surrender to the West').

> **ANALYST NOTE** Two things are worth separating here. First, Kayhan has stopped making the Bab al-Mandab case in its own voice and is making it in a Western magazine's, which is a more sophisticated move than triumphalism: it lets the paper assert that the chokepoint pair is decisive, and that no military answer exists, without owning either claim. The final relayed bullet, that a decisive military solution is out of reach and a political solution necessary, is the sentence Kayhan would not write itself, and its presence indicates the hardline surface is being prepared for a negotiated outcome it will not yet advocate. Second, the paper's own war counter reads day 197 where this monitor's fixed epoch gives 194, a three-day gap consistent with Kayhan counting from the 1 March start rather than from a later anchor; the discrepancy is recorded, not adopted. The Zarif attack and the Raisi-record defence, on the same page as an iron-shield unity appeal, show the internal quarrel now competing with the war for front-page space.

Iran

Official government daily published by IRNA; the administration's own voice in Persian

LOW-MODERATE: domestic reassurance dominates; the strait is present but deliberately unweighted

“Rumour behind the transit queues” «شایعه پشت صف‌های تردد»

- Main: The lead runs under the flat denial kicker 'مرزهای زمینی باز است' ('the land borders are open') and is built from interviews by the paper's own reporters with the security and law-enforcement deputy of East Azerbaijan, a customs director general, the governor of Mehran and the deputy for customs of Sistan and Baluchestan. The subject is queues at the land crossings and the government's insistence that they are the product of rumour rather than closure.
- Banner: A green-panelled quotation box carries Pezeshkian at BRICS: 'نیازمند اصلاح سازوکارهای بین‌المللی هستیم' ('we need reform of the international mechanisms'), over the group photograph captioned BRICS 2026, with a second line on BRICS and Eurasia as trade-facilitation routes.
- Right rail: 'سربازان بدون یونیفرم جنگ اقتصادی' ('the soldiers without uniform of the economic war') argues that the experience of national cooperation in the military war is necessary to get through the enemy's economic pressures, with two named economists quoted in the deck.
- Right rail: 'چین و روسیه در بزنگاه هسته‌ای ایران' ('China and Russia at Iran's nuclear crux'), analysed by Tehran University faculty including the China specialist Hamed Vafaei.
- Right rail: 'از هرمز تا باب‌المندب: تغییر موازنه قدرت در خاورمیانه' ('from Hormuz to Bab al-Mandab: the change in the balance of power in the Middle East'), under the question 'مقاومت چگونه پروژه امنیتی آمریکا را به چالش کشید؟' ('how did the resistance challenge America's security project?'). This is the government daily's only chokepoint item and it is placed fifth on the rail, not on the lead.
- Sub-item: The rail closes on cultural material, including a column by the managing director of the Cinema Museum under 'سینما؛ حافظه ملت و آینه هویت ایران'.

ANALYST NOTE The government's Persian paper leads on a rumour-control story about border queues, which is a domestic-confidence operation, and files the chokepoint question fifth on a sidebar. Read against its own English sister paper leading on the Monday signature, this is the clearest single illustration of the bilingual split this monitor has tracked, now running in the opposite direction from 12 September: abroad, the administration wants credit for a corridor; at home it wants the conversation to be about open borders and BRICS membership rather than about what Iran is giving up at sea. The queues story is itself a signal, since a government does not deny closure on a front page unless the belief is widespread.

Seda-ye Iran

Daily carrying the khamenei.ir affiliation on its masthead; in practice a leadership-messaging surface rather than an independent newsroom

MODERATE: leadership text returns to a front page, but on economic discipline rather than on the war

“The national economy at the station of wise imports” «اقتصاد ملّی در ایستگاه واردات حکیمانه»

- Main: The lead is explicitly derived from a leadership text: the kicker reads 'با نگاهی به پیام رهبر معظم انقلاب به مناسبت هفته دولت بررسی شد' ('examined with reference to the Supreme Leader's message on the occasion of Government Week'). The page art is a line of freight trucks at a land crossing, and the argument is for disciplined, selective importing rather than for closure.
- Banner: A masthead strip reproduces a post from the Leader's Persian account, and the page carries an editorial column ('سرمقاله') in the right-hand well; neither is a dated new leadership statement, and neither could be transcribed in full at the available resolution.
- Sub-item: 'ضربه ایران به زنجیره پشتیبانی هوایی' ('Iran's blow to the air support chain') reviews the opening Iranian strikes on American bases in Qatar, Kuwait and eastern Saudi Arabia during the twelve-day war and argues they formed a belt of degraded basing around Iran's borders. This is a retrospective claim about earlier operations, not a report of a new strike.
- Sub-item: 'برگزاری نشست خبری سخنگوی وزارت امور خارجه در محل وقوع جنایت جنگی لامرد' ('the foreign ministry spokesman's press conference held at the site of the Lamerd war crime') places Esmaeil Baghaei at a strike site in Fars province rather than at the ministry podium, which is a deliberate staging choice.
- Sub-item: A third item, headed as an Israeli-outlet relay and titled 'حکومت خرها بر رژیم صهیونیستی' ('the rule of donkeys over the Zionist regime'), recycles a foreign publication's invective. The source masthead is not legible at kiosk resolution and the item is recorded here as an unverified relay of hostile content, not as reporting.

ANALYST NOTE The significant fact on this page is the leadership reference itself. Across the six editions before this one, this monitor recorded no traceable leadership publication; here a front page builds its lead from a Leader's Government Week message, which is a retrospective seasonal text rather than a new intervention on the war, the strait or treaty withdrawal. The distinction matters: a message about import discipline does not ratify a chokepoint doctrine, endorse the Muscat or Salalah venue, or rule on the NPT argument, so the arbitration gap this monitor has flagged remains open even though the silence is now partially broken. The Lamerd staging is the day's other tell, since holding a spokesman's press conference at a strike site converts a diplomatic appearance into an evidentiary one, which is the behaviour of a state preparing a legal or public case rather than a military response.

Sazandegi

Reformist daily of the Kargozaran-e Sazandegi party; the most direct print critic of the coercion strategy's domestic cost

“BRICS against sanctions?” «بریکس علیه تحریم؟»

LOW: internally critical; treats the blockade as a cost to be audited rather than an asset to be held

- Main: The question mark is the story. The deck reports that the BRICS members' session ended 'در میانه تحریم و محاصره دریایی ایران' ('in the midst of sanctions and Iran's maritime blockade') and states that the paper has set out to examine 'چقدر می‌تواند دستاوردهای ملموسی برای ما داشته باشد' ('how much tangible achievement such summits can actually deliver for us'). The page image is Pezeshkian watering a sapling at a planting ceremony, an image of civil normality set against a maritime siege.
- Kicker: The index strip across the top carries four items, of which two are the day's hardest news: 'رئیسی خط قرمز شد؟' ('has Raisi become a red line?'), on a complaint filed by the Raisi foundation against a blogger; and 'انفجار شاهرگ نفتی' ('the oil artery's explosion') under 'حمله پهپادی به خط لوله عربستان' ('drone attack on Saudi Arabia's pipeline').
- Kicker: The remaining strip items are economic and administrative: 'درهای نیمه‌بسته' on border restrictions and 'بحران پروازها' on foreign passengers stranded by the aviation disruption.
- Op-ed: The 'یادداشت روز' is 'پلی به سوی عدالت' ('a bridge toward justice'), arguing that lifting restrictions on legal representation closes off avenues of corruption and injustice. The by-line portrait is printed but the name is not legible at kiosk resolution and is therefore not asserted here.
- Right rail: A signed column in the right well discusses the New Delhi session and BRICS's weight in the world economy, citing the Russian president, and questions how far the bloc can shelter a member under sanctions.
- Sub-item: The top-left promotes a restored print of 'تنگسیر', Amir Naderi's 1974 film, under 'بهروز پس از ۵۰ سال', a cultural item that carries an unmistakable second reading given the star's long exile.

ANALYST NOTE Sazandegi is the only front page in the set that names the maritime blockade as something happening to Iran rather than as something Iran is doing, and it is the only one that puts the Raisi-foundation complaint against a blogger on the front. Both are the same argument in different registers: that the costs of the strategy and the narrowing of domestic speech are the story, not the chokepoints. Its placement of the Saudi pipeline attack in a four-item index strip, rather than on the lead where Kayhan's frame would put it, is itself an editorial judgment that the attack is a liability. The 'رئیسی خط قرمز شد؟' item is the sharpest formulation yet of the standing factional thread, and it is answered on the same morning by Kayhan's defence of the Raisi record.

Chahar Sough

Economic daily, market-facing and hostile to the negotiating camp; its front page is habitually a single data graphic

“The negotiation-worshippers' oil gift to Trump” «کمک نفتی مذاکره‌پرستان به ترامپ»

MODERATE-HIGH: argues against any concession at Hormuz on explicitly financial grounds

- Main: The entire upper page is a Brent crude line chart captioned 'قیمت نفت برنت از زمان شروع جنگ علیه ایران' ('the Brent oil price since the start of the war against Iran'), annotated at four inflection points: the start of the war and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz; the ceasefire and the question of reopening the strait; the period of negotiations and military threat alongside the announcement of reopening; and Trump's insistence on withdrawing from talks, marked as reducing the new tension premium.
- Main: The argument attached to the chart is that every Iranian signal of willingness to negotiate has taken the price down, which the paper casts as a transfer of value to the American administration, hence 'مذاکره‌پرستان' ('negotiation-worshippers'), a coinage aimed at the Iranian negotiating camp rather than at Washington.
- Sub-item: 'نشست مشترک فرماندهان ارتش و سپاه' ('joint meeting of the Army and IRGC commanders') is reported below the fold with the same photograph Kayhan uses, indicating a single distributed release rather than independent coverage.
- Sub-item: 'شکایت بنیاد شهید رئیسی از ادعای کذب بلاگر اقتصادی' ('the Raisi foundation's complaint over an economic blogger's false claim'), the same item Sazandegi frames as a free-speech question, here framed as a false claim being answered.
- Op-ed: A signed column marks the death of the Islamic-economics scholar Totonchian under 'با درگذشت توتونچیان اقتصاد اسلامی یتیم شد' ('with Totonchian's passing, Islamic economics was orphaned'). The columnist's name is printed in a red byline block that is not legible at kiosk resolution and is therefore not asserted here.

ANALYST NOTE Chahar Sough supplies the cycle's cleanest causal claim and it cuts against the coercion camp's own interest: it concedes, in chart form, that the price premium is a function of Iranian posture and therefore that Iranian de-escalation is worth money to Washington. That is an admission that the closure is a wasting asset whose value falls the moment a corridor is signed, which is precisely what the English front page announced this morning. Set beside Kayhan's relay of a Foreign Affairs piece conceding no military solution exists, two hardline-adjacent surfaces are now publishing the premises of a settlement while opposing the settlement itself. The shared Army-IRGC photograph across this page and Kayhan's indicates centrally distributed imagery rather than convergent news judgment.

Ta'adol

Economic daily, close to the banking and private-sector chambers; technocratic rather than factional

“The world on the road to de-dollarization” «جهان در مسیر دلارزدایی»

LOW-MODERATE: chokepoint outcomes treated as market inputs, with negotiation kept explicitly on the table

تعادل

جهان در مسیر دلارزدایی

بریکس آزمونی برای تجارت ایران

- Main: The lead runs under 'بریکس در مسیر توسعه؛ ایران در جمع قدرت‌های نوظهور اقتصادی' ('BRICS on the development path; Iran among the emerging economic powers') and treats the New Delhi session as evidence that dollar displacement is advancing, while stopping short of claiming Iran is a beneficiary yet.
- Main: The second front, 'بریکس آزمونی برای تجارت ایران' ('BRICS, a test for Iran's trade'), poses the harder question directly in its kicker: 'از دهلی‌نو تا تجارت واقعی؛ آیا عضویت به تجارت واقعی می‌رسد؟' ('from New Delhi to real trade: does membership arrive at real trade?'). This is the most sceptical BRICS framing on any economic front page in the set.
- Op-ed: The 'یادداشت روز' box is 'نفت پس از تسلط بر باب‌المندب' ('oil after the domination of Bab al-Mandab'), by-lined with portrait to the economist Mahmoud Jamsaz, who is the only front-page commentator in this edition whose name is both fully legible and independently verifiable as a working Iranian economist.
- Sub-item: The page photograph is a column of Yemeni technicals with heavy machine guns and an anti-aircraft mount on a coastal road, captioned toward 'یمن در میانه جنگ یا مذاکره' ('Yemen between war and negotiation'), which frames the same forces Kayhan celebrates as a variable with two outcomes.
- Right rail: The right well carries the banking and regulatory material the paper is read for, including licensing and market-regulation items, indicating the chokepoint story is being handled as an oil-market input rather than as a war story.

ANALYST NOTE Ta'adol and Chahar Sough reach opposite conclusions from the same data, and the difference is instructive: Chahar Sough treats the oil premium as a weapon whose value Iranian diplomacy squanders, while Ta'adol treats it as a price signal inside a trading system Iran is trying to join. The de-dollarization lead is the government-adjacent economic story of the cycle, but the paper undercuts it on its own front page by asking whether BRICS membership converts into trade at all, which is a sharper question than anything the reformist political press asks this morning. Jamsaz writing on 'oil after Bab al-Mandab' on the day a corridor agreement is announced places the economic commentariat ahead of the political one in treating the chokepoints as a settled fact to be priced rather than a victory to be celebrated.

Etemad

Reformist daily of record, year 24; the principal print outlet for the pro-negotiation political class

"The boomerang of pressure" «بومرنگ فشار»

LOW-MODERATE: reformist cost accounting, with the treaty-withdrawal signal carried from the speaker's office

- Main: The lead is an interview, 'اعتماد در گفت‌وگو با افشین زرگر رفتارهای بی‌منطق امریکا را بررسی می‌کند' ('Etemad, in conversation with Afshin Zargar, examines America's illogical conduct'), with the international-relations academic Afshin Zargar. The boomerang image is aimed at American pressure returning on its author, primarily through energy prices.
- Main: The left column, 'نزاع برنامه‌ریزی‌شده' ('a planned quarrel'), reports that political figures have reacted to hardline statements against the sitting government, and quotes two by name: Mohammad-Ali Abtahi, that hardliners' attacks on Pezeshkian and Ghalibaf exceed their attacks on Trump and Netanyahu; and Mohammad Mohajeri, that supporters of the previous government should keep silent rather than build cases against this one.
- Sub-item: 'دوران گمشده نفت' ('oil's lost era') carries the International Energy Agency's warning about a sunset in demand, set explicitly against the Hormuz disruption, which is the only front page in the set to pair the chokepoint premium with a structural demand argument.
- Sub-item: 'پیام تهران از دهلی‌نو تا باب‌المندب' ('Tehran's message from New Delhi to Bab al-Mandab'), the paper's own report connecting the summit diplomacy to the maritime position.
- Banner: The page photograph is an oiled shoreline captioned 'یک ماه از آلودگی نفتی دریای عمان و خلیج فارس گذشت' ('a month has passed since the oil pollution of the Sea of Oman and the Persian Gulf') under the single word 'لکه ننگ' ('a stain of disgrace'). This is the only environmental accounting of the maritime campaign on any front page in the set.
- Sub-item: The paper's channel adds, in the same cycle, the parliament speaker on withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, a Bloomberg-sourced figure of tanker costs rising 3.6 times, a reported attack on an Iranian commercial vessel near Qeshm, and Pezeshkian stating that Iran is not at war with Saudi Arabia.

ANALYST NOTE Etemad is doing two jobs at once and both matter for warning. It is documenting the costs the triumphalist pages omit, of which the month-old oil spill across the Sea of Oman and the Persian Gulf is the most concrete and the least answerable, and it is reporting the internal quarrel as deliberate rather than spontaneous, which is what 'نزاع برنامه‌ریزی‌شده' asserts. The Abtahi formulation, that hardliners attack Pezeshkian and Ghalibaf harder than they attack Trump and Netanyahu, is a named accusation of factional sabotage during a war, and it is notable that Ghalibaf, a principlist speaker, is placed on the same side of the line as the president. Against that, the speaker is simultaneously carried on the NPT-withdrawal question, so the coalition Abtahi describes is not a policy alignment. Pezeshkian's 'not at war with Saudi Arabia' is the single most de-escalatory sentence in the monitored set and it sits directly against Kayhan's and Fars's celebration of Yemeni strikes on Saudi targets.

Jomhouri Eslami

Traditional clerical-establishment daily, independent of both the reformist and the Kayhan camps; habitually the most internationally sourced front page in the set

MODERATE: hostile characterisation of the American president relayed through a foreign academic, paired with an explicit expectation of a near-term end

“The scheme to allocate the petrol quota to persons rather than to cars promotes corruption-breeding speculation” «طرح اختصاص سهمیه بنزین به جای خودرو، ترویج سوداگری فسادزا»

جمهوری اسلامی

طرح اختصاص سهمیه بنزین به جای خودرو، ترویج سوداگری فسادزا

ترامپ باید کنار گذاشته شود قبل از اینکه همه ما را به کشتن بدهد

- Main: The lead is the paper's own examination of the proposal to attach the petrol quota to individuals instead of to vehicles, with four bulleted expert objections arguing that the scheme raises the free price of petrol, adds control costs and converts an entitlement into a tradable instrument.
- Main: The centre of the page is given to an American voice: under the kicker 'یک استاد دانشگاه کلمبیا' ('a Columbia University professor'), the headline reads 'ترامپ باید کنار گذاشته شود قبل از اینکه همه ما را به کشتن بدهد' ('Trump must be set aside before he gets us all killed'), with three attributed bullets: that Trump is very seriously ill in psychological terms; that he is a 'خودشیفته بدخیم' ('malignant narcissist'); and that the deeper fault is an American political system corrupt enough to give such a person the authority to order a war. A portrait accompanies it; the professor is not named in the front-page block and is therefore not named here.
- Sub-item: 'شی جین پینگ از اعضای بریکس خواست به پیشبرد صلح در خاورمیانه کمک کنند' ('Xi Jinping asked BRICS members to help advance peace in the Middle East'), reported as a summit intervention rather than as a Chinese position on Iran.
- Sub-item: 'ترامپ: جنگ ایران «خیلی زود» پایان خواهد یافت' ('Trump: the Iran war will end very soon'), placed immediately beneath the Columbia relay, so the page prints the American president's optimism and an American academic's alarm as a single composition.
- Sub-item: 'لاوروف: برای مذاکرات اوکراین آماده‌ایم' with 'دعوتنامه روسی برای زلنسکی' ('Lavrov: we are ready for Ukraine talks; a Russian invitation for Zelensky'), and a banner recording that BRICS leaders stressed resolving international disputes through diplomacy and opposed unilateral sanctions.
- Right rail: The paper's own column, 'این سنگر مهم را حفظ کنید' ('preserve this important bastion'), argues against the turn of domestic anger inward, observing that nightly gatherings which began with slogans against Trump and Netanyahu have moved on to Iranian targets, and objecting to the prosecution of past officeholders while the external war continues.
- Sub-item: 'بهره‌برداری از دو طرح بزرگ برق‌آبی در رودبار لرستان' ('two large hydroelectric projects brought online at Rudbar, Lorestan'), rated on the page at 420 megawatts of clean, renewable capacity added to the national grid.

ANALYST NOTE This page is the cycle's most deliberate piece of composition. Placing an American academic's psychiatric denunciation of the president directly above the president's own prediction that the war ends soon lets the paper argue simultaneously that the adversary is irrational and that the adversary is on the point of

yielding, without asserting either in its own voice. The house column is the more important item for warning purposes: it is a traditional-establishment paper telling the domestic camp to stop prosecuting each other, published the same morning that Kayhan defends the Raisi record, Sazandegi asks whether Raisi has become a red line, and Etemad calls the quarrel planned. Four papers across four factional positions are all describing the same internal fight, which is the clearest indication yet that the fight, not the war, is now the contested space on Iranian front pages.

Appendix A - The Leader's message as carried on today's front pages (partial, reconstructed)

Seda-ye Iran, issue 468, front page, Sunday 22 Shahrivar 1405; leadership websites did not respond at the time of compilation

Handling note: this appendix is a partial reconstruction, not a translation of a primary text. Both khamenei.ir surfaces were unavailable when this edition was compiled, and no dated leadership statement of 12 or 13 September was retrievable on any monitored channel. What follows is what one front page reports the message to contain, together with an explicit statement of what could not be verified.

Seda-ye Iran builds its entire lead from a leadership text rather than from an event. The kicker reads: «با نگاهی به پیام رهبر معظم انقلاب به مناسبت هفته دولت بررسی شد» - 'examined with reference to the Supreme Leader's message on the occasion of Government Week'. The headline drawn from it is «اقتصاد ملّی در ایستگاه واردات حکیمانه» - 'the national economy at the station of wise imports'.

The message referenced is therefore a seasonal one, addressed to Government Week, and the paper's reading of it is an argument for disciplined and selective importing rather than for autarky or for closure. The accompanying photograph is a line of freight trucks at a land crossing, which pairs the message with the same border-traffic question the government daily leads on this morning under «مرزهای زمینی باز است» ('the land borders are open').

Analyst flag: the point of intelligence interest is what the message does not do. It is an economic text, published for a calendar occasion, and it contains no ratification of the chokepoint doctrine, no endorsement of the Muscat or Salalah meeting, and no ruling on the withdrawal-from-the-treaty argument now being pressed by the parliament speaker's office. Across the seven editions this monitor has compiled, the Leader has issued nothing traceable on the war, the strait or the treaty. That silence, on the morning a maritime corridor agreement is announced for signature, remains the most consequential absence in this file, and it leaves the president, the security establishment and the speaker advancing incompatible positions without arbitration.

Verification note: the honorific printed is «رهبر معظم انقلاب», with no personal name on the front page. This monitor's identification of the current holder as Mojtaba Khamenei continues to rest on printed honorific usage across editions rather than on any primary leadership publication retrieved directly, and that caveat is restated here rather than dropped.

Source line: Seda-ye Iran, issue 468, front page, Sunday 22 Shahrivar 1405 / 1 Rabi al-Thani 1448 / 13 September 2026; retrieved from the NewspaperTasnim kiosk album at t.me/NewspaperTasnim/44500.

Appendix B - The day's flagged editorial: «این سنگر مهم را حفظ کنید» ('Preserve this important bastion')

Jomhouri Eslami, front-page column, Sunday 22 Shahrivar 1405 / 13 September 2026

Why this column and not Kayhan's: Kayhan's «یادداشت روز» slot this morning is headed «عملیات برق‌آسای یمن، نمای قدرت عظیم جبهه مقاومت» ('Yemen's lightning operation, a portrait of the resistance front's immense power'). No author name is printed in the front-page block, and the item was not carried on the paper's channel at the time of compilation, so neither its text nor its authorship could be verified. Rather than attribute it by habit to the managing editor, this monitor records it as unverified and translates instead the one front-page column whose text is legible on the page and whose provenance is unambiguous: the unsigned house column of Jomhouri Eslami, which is the paper's institutional voice and is published without a personal by-line by long-standing convention.

Partial translation, from the opening of the column as printed. The column opens with the basmala, then: «تجمعات شبانه که با مرگ بر ترامپ و مرگ بر نتانیاهو شروع شده بودند حالا به مرگ بر این مسئول کنونی و آن مسئول سابق رسیده‌اند!» - 'The nightly gatherings that began with death to Trump and death to Netanyahu have now arrived at death to this serving official and that former official!'

It continues that this is not without cause, setting the victories of the resistance front in Yemen against a sequence of internal losses at home: a Sunni Friday prayer leader in one province and a Sunni Basij commander in the Rask district of the country's east assassinated, while in Tehran, it writes, a given quarter, instead of extending its attacks to Trump and Netanyahu for their designs in the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz and southern Lebanon, «دو رئیس جمهور سابق ایران را محاکمه غیابی می‌کند و در قامت رئیس‌القضات علیه آنها حکم محکومیت صادر می‌فرماید» - 'puts two former Iranian presidents on trial in absentia and, assuming the posture of a chief justice, hands down a verdict of conviction against them'.

Translation caveat: the passage above is rendered from the kiosk scan, whose resolution is sufficient for the headline, the opening sentence and the closing clause but not for every proper noun in the middle of the column. Where a place name or a title could not be read with confidence it has been generalised rather than guessed, and no sentence has been supplied that is not on the page. The full text was not retrievable from any online surface at compile time.

Analyst flag: this is a traditional clerical-establishment daily, aligned with neither the Kayhan camp nor the reformist press, telling the domestic political class to stop prosecuting its own while the external war continues. Its evidentiary value is that it is the fourth independent front-page account of the same quarrel in a single cycle: Kayhan defends the Raisi government's record against an 'inefficient current'; Sazandegi asks «رئیسی خط قرمز شد؟» and reports a foundation complaint against a blogger; Etemad calls the dispute «نزاع برنامه‌ریزی‌شده», a planned quarrel, and quotes Mohammad-Ali Abtahi saying the attacks on Pezeshkian and Ghalibaf exceed those on Trump and Netanyahu. Four papers across four factional positions describing the same internal fight on the same morning indicates a genuine escalation inside the system rather than one outlet's grievance.

Attribution firewall: the column's characterisations of the slogans chanted at nightly gatherings, of the assassinations it cites and of the judicial conduct it alleges are the outlet's assertions. None is corroborated in the monitored set, and none should be reproduced as established fact without primary-source confirmation.

Source line: Jomhouri Eslami, front page, right-hand column, Sunday 22 Shahrivar 1405 / 1 Rabi al-Thani 1448 / 13 September 2026; retrieved from the NewspaperTasnim kiosk album at

t.me/NewspaperTasnim/44500.

Appendix C - Methodology and sourcing notes

iran-press-digest pipeline, compiled 13 September 2026

Scan corpus. Ten front pages were read directly. Nine Persian pages come from the NewspaperTasnim kiosk album posted at t.me/NewspaperTasnim/44500 with the caption «صفحه نخست روزنامه‌های یک‌شنبه ۲۲ شهریور ۱۴۰۵», and the English page, Iran Daily, from the Newspapers_Iran album at t.me/newspapers_iran/3560. The stale-batch guard compared the album's own printed Jalali date, 22/6/1405, against the target date and passed on the first attempt, so this edition is built on same-day pages and not on a carried-over batch. The papers read are Sobh-e No, Kayhan, Iran, Seda-ye Iran, Sazandegi, Chahar Sough, Ta'adol, Etemad, Jomhouri Eslami and Iran Daily.

Text corpus. Six newspaper channels were queried (Kayhan, Vatan-e Emrooz, Jam-e Jam, Etemad, Iran and Sobh-e No) together with three wires whose material is treated as claim rather than as front-page evidence: Defa Press, Fars News and Nour News. Material from the wires has been folded into the trends and judgments and into the real-time register, and is labelled at each point of use. Tehran Times and both leadership websites did not respond at the time of compilation, as on 12 September; the Kayhan column of the day was likewise not retrievable on any surface.

Resolution limits. The kiosk scans arrive at roughly 800 pixels on the long edge. That is sufficient for mastheads, headlines, decks and most bulleted decks, and insufficient for small by-line blocks and body text. Three front-page commentators are therefore recorded in this edition without names: the Sazandegi column of the day, the Chahar Sough obituary column for the Islamic-economics scholar Totonchian, and the Columbia University professor whose remarks Jomhouri Eslami places at the centre of its page. In each case a portrait and a by-line block are printed, but the name could not be read, and this monitor's standing rule is to leave a name blank rather than infer it.

Names verified this cycle. Esmaeil Baghaei, foreign ministry spokesman, printed on Kayhan's rail as «بقائی» and confirmed against reporting of his statement that Saudi Arabia and Japan bear responsibility for their votes on the Agency resolution and will be held accountable. Behnam Saeedi, identified on the Sobh-e No channel as second deputy chair of the parliamentary National Security Commission. Amir Dabiri Mehr, the Iran Daily analysis by-line, confirmed as a working Iranian political-science researcher. Afshin Zargar, the Etemad interviewee, an international-relations academic. Mahmoud Jamsaz, the Ta'adol column of the day, a working Iranian economist. Mohammad-Ali Abtahi and Mohammad Mohajeri, both quoted by name in Etemad. Colonel Shahram Askariyan, deputy for public relations of the IRGC Ground Force, named on Defa Press as the source for the Saravan operation. April Longley Alley and Allison Minor are the authors Kayhan's channel credits for the Foreign Affairs piece its lead relays; both are identifiable Yemen and Middle East analysts, but the article itself was not retrieved, so the lead is recorded throughout as Kayhan's rendering of a foreign magazine and not as that magazine's text.

Single-source and unresolved items. The venue of Monday's meeting is reported two ways in the same cycle: Iran Daily's front page and deck say Muscat, while Sobh-e No's front page tags its account «جلسه صلاله», the Salalah session. Both are Omani, roughly a thousand kilometres apart, and no monitored source reconciles them; the discrepancy is left open rather than resolved by preference. Kayhan's own war counter reads day 197 where this monitor's fixed epoch gives day 194, a three-day gap consistent with counting from the 1 March start; this monitor keeps its calendar count and records the difference. Yemeni battle-damage claims relayed this cycle, among them at least six oil tanks destroyed at Abha, a missile and drone strike on a Saudi base in the Shura area, a Saudi air force figure of 129 sorties in 48 hours, control of more than 4,200 square

kilometres including Perim island, and a figure for Saudi shipping transit times lengthening roughly ninefold, are claims by Iranian-aligned wires and are labelled as such wherever used.

Corroborated externally. The closure of the Saudi East-West crude pipeline after drone strikes on 10 September, the movement of Brent above 100 dollars, and Ansarullah's capture of Mocha and of the island at the southern entrance to the Red Sea are confirmed in non-Iranian reporting and are treated in this edition as established, in contrast to the damage and casualty figures attached to them.

Accuracy corrections carried forward. The paper identified on 12 September and again today from its khamenei.ir masthead affiliation is Seda-ye Iran; the economic daily whose front page is habitually a single chart is Chahar Sough. Both identifications are unchanged. The standing caveat on the succession, that it rests on printed honorific usage rather than on a primary leadership publication, is restated in Appendix A and has not been retired.

Handling. This product documents and analyses hostile foreign-press rhetoric for defensive assessment only. Nothing in it endorses, amplifies or operationalises that rhetoric. Quotations relayed at second hand, including Kayhan's rendering of Foreign Affairs and Jomhouri Eslami's rendering of an American academic, are not to be reproduced as authentic without primary-source confirmation.

Open-source material only. All translations from Persian/Arabic originals. Iranian claims are labelled as claims. Prepared for analysis and early warning; hostile content is documented for defensive assessment only, not endorsed.