

OPEN-SOURCE PRESS INTELLIGENCE

Iranian Press Monitor

Daily Front-Page Intelligence

Day 186 - Saturday, 5 September 2026 · 14 Shahrivar 1405 · 23 Rabi al-Awwal 1448

THE MEMORANDUM ON TRIAL EDITION

Ten front pages (nine Persian, one English) from the Saturday 14 Shahrivar batches, plus the Vatan-e Emrooz, Jam-e Jam, Iran, Etemad, Sobh-e No and Kayhan channels and the Defa Press, Fars and Nour News wires; Tehran Times was unavailable at the time

Front pages published the morning of 5 September, reflecting events through late 4 September local; Friday 4 September had no Iranian dailies, so the pages also absorb the Kuhestak funeral of 3 September, the Israeli capture claim at Ali al-TaHER and the release of Hassan Rouhani's 31 August remarks


Defensive open-source press-intelligence. Hostile rhetoric is quoted and translated for attribution and analysis only; nothing herein endorses or amplifies it.

Executive Summary

The lead judgment of the cycle is that the Islamabad memorandum has returned to the Iranian fronts, not as policy but as the object of a factional fight conducted in the open. On 3 September this monitor found the off-ramp withdrawn from the page within a day of Washington declaring the document expired. On the Saturday fronts, the first since the Friday break, it is everywhere. Sazandegi runs a full-page portrait of Hassan Rouhani under 'the war must end honorably' and an editorial by Mohsen Hashemi Rafsanjani on 'the importance of returning to the Islamabad memorandum'. Sobh-e No, the Speaker's paper, leads with 'the polarizers, creditors without an idea', an attack on domestic critics who turned the Ali al-Taher affair into a domestic dispute without offering an alternative to the Islamabad understanding. Iran Daily tells foreign readers that 'a consensus' has re-formed that Washington should return to it and that a deal is Washington's 'third option'. And Javan gives its banner to the new Basij chief, Hossein Taeb, saying 'America has no way but to act on the memorandum'. Against them, Nobonyad calls the Israeli capture claim at Ali al-Taher 'the last arrow into the coffin of the understanding' and interviews an expert on why 'one must not pin hopes on the Islamabad understanding', and Kayhan's satirical column asks where Rouhani's 'what use is a strait without ships' differs from 'the officially declared demands of America and Israel'. The document is contested, which is a different condition from the one recorded two days ago, and the contest is now personal.

The single most consequential item is the change of target. On 3 September five principlist titles attacked Kargozaran secretary-general Hossein Manna'ei. Today the same lane has moved up the hierarchy to the former president. Nobonyad's top box, 'Preparing for a new war', calls Rouhani 'the most unpopular president of recent decades' and says his remarks should be read as 'the preparation of a specific current for imposing a new war on the country', and it ties his path to the government's '14-clause memorandum'. Kayhan's Khabar-e Vizheh is headed 'America's and Rouhani's discomfort at the Strait of Hormuz being closed', its Goft-o Shonud ridicules the 'strait without ships' line, and Shariatmadari's Nokteh, without naming him, answers Rouhani's 31 August question about whether the state broadcaster 'should not become national after 40 days' by quoting the martyred Leader on the enemy's effort to cut the nation from its own media. Rouhani's actual text, verified against the transcript of his 9 Shahrivar meeting with former governors, is more careful than either paper allows: 'stand firm, but standing firm must not be confused with insisting on an endless war', 'whoever is responsible for negotiation, we must all stand behind him', and 'Hormuz must not become the strait of war; it must be the strait of security and at the same time a prosperous strait'. Nobonyad's claim that he demanded a referendum on the war distorts a rhetorical question about whether leaders would accept a different course if the people rejected 'fighting the great powers for another 20 years'. The distortion is itself evidence: the hardline press is treating the honorable-end doctrine as a threat serious enough to misquote.

The Ali al-Taher ridge, whose capture Israel's defense minister declared on 4 September and Hezbollah has not confirmed, has been absorbed into this domestic fight rather than treated as a Lebanon story in its own right. No Persian front leads on it. Sobh-e No uses it to argue that the memorandum limited Israel's advance ('the enemy's advance during the 40-day war was far greater than after the understanding'), Nobonyad uses it to argue the opposite, Sazandegi files it as 'the continuation of the cycle of occupation', and Kayhan's Yadasht-e Rooz by Saadollah Zarei, a 40-year history of Hezbollah translated in full in Appendix B, ends by calling the capture 'a hill whose reality and manner are still unclear' that Israel 'may lose within days'. The flagship's response to the most significant Israeli ground gain in months is therefore reassurance by analogy, not a call for escalation, and Israel and Lebanon remain confined to columns and channel posts for the third edition running. That absence is a finding: the Axis's setback is being managed by not leading on it.



Front page, Sazandegi

Kayhan has changed register. Two days ago its lead was 'track, identify, fire' and its editor proposed cutting the Gulf's undersea cables. Today its lead is 'Trump's ladle has hit the bottom of the pot', built on The Hill's report and Representative Rosa DeLauro's statement that the Pentagon signed a secret agreement to draw on National Institutes of Health funds to cover war costs, and its page-3 day report says 'America is forced to swallow the frog of war and return'. The cable proposal is not repeated on the front, and no official, commander or committee has echoed it in the sources read, which is the negative evidence the last edition asked for. The American-exhaustion narrative is now the cross-factional argument of the day and is built almost entirely from American sources: the NIH story on Kayhan, the New York Times 'dead end' on Jomhuri Eslami and Nour News, the Guardian's account of USS Abraham Lincoln's crew on Jam-e Jam and Sobh-e No (which prints the rust-streaked carrier at its Thai port call as '100,000 tons of diplomacy become floating scrap'), record diesel prices on Etemad Online and Nour News, and Trump's own remark that Democrats 'prefer we lose'. The frame is more durable than battle-damage claims because its facts are checkable; the inference that they add up to exhaustion is the outlets'.

Hormuz messaging has shifted from control claims to escort failure and coalition deterrence. Vatan-e Emrooz's morning post, repeated by Etemad Online, reports that the Qatari LNG carrier Al Ghashamiya abandoned a US-escorted transit and diverted to Fujairah, and that seven million barrels are staged in the Gulf of Oman awaiting passage, both resting on tracking-data claims rather than any Iranian action. The government's own daily and the hardline channels carry the same warning to South Korea that any participation 'constitutes military participation in the aggression', placing the threat to a prospective coalition member in the Foreign Ministry's lane. Javan's lead argues that the Strait 'gets dearer and more important every day' because uncertainty is compounding Washington's costs before the midterms. Two counter-signals sit inside the reformist lane: Rouhani's 'strait of security and prosperity', the most complete counter-doctrine to Hormuz-as-coercion yet printed, and Etemad's online promo 'Hormuz: from the threat of closing the Strait to setting a transit fee', which suggests a toll regime is being floated as the Strait's end state and which is closer to the hardline position than the reformist flagship has been.

Economic grievance has turned inward within the principlist camp and is now aimed at the government by name. Chahar Sough's front carries no war at all: its lead calls the government's gasoline-pricing option 'the gasoline sedition' (فتنه بنزین), the regime's word for the 2009 and 2019 unrest, montages a fuel nozzle over the face of energy-strategy official Esmail Saghab Esfahani, and blames central bank governor Abdolnaser Hemmati's 'blackening' for 33,000 toman's of the dollar's rise. Nobonyad's lead, 'Shooting at the currency market', places a photograph of Pezeshkian and Hemmati whispering above the 221,000-toman figure. Kayhan's top-right item accuses the central bank of censoring the names of 'currency-disrupting banks'. The President's instruction, carried by Jomhuri Eslami and Iran Daily, that consumption control be 'gradual and centered on the people's cooperation' reads as a retreat under this pressure. The economic titles that refused mobilization on 3 September still refuse it: Ta'adol leads on the three sides of the housing crisis and treats Sirik as a reputational contest in a single column, while flagging a new Dubai restriction on Iranian goods that would narrow the re-export route it prescribed two days ago.

The diplomatic lane resurfaced where the last edition predicted it would. Jomhuri Eslami leads on 'regional countries consult to end the war', naming Pakistan, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia and an Egypt-Qatar foreign ministers' call, sourced to 'media sources' and unconfirmed. Two scheduled escalations sit on the channels but on no front: the US-E3 draft resolution to report Iran to the Security Council at next week's IAEA Board, which Iran's Vienna mission pre-frames as 'the complete failure of snapback fantasies', and Trump's repeated threat to strike Pickaxe Mountain 'very soon'. The Leader is absent again: no message from Mojtaba Khamenei accompanies the Kuhestak funeral, the Army's four-base retaliation claim or the memorandum fight, and the only Leader text placed on a front-referenced item is the martyred predecessor's 2022 Nowruz

speech, quoted twice by Shariatmadari in defense of the state broadcaster. On the Etemad channel, reformist activist Hamidreza Jalaeipour's charge that Saeed Jalili's supporters distributed four million red flags at the Leader's funeral to crowd out the national flag shows that the succession-imagery contest noted in prior editions is now being fought openly over the funeral itself.

Net assessment: this is a contestation edition. The mobilization frame of 3 September has given way, on the first fronts after the funeral, to an argument about terms, conducted between newspapers that two days ago printed the same atrocity photographs. The consequential findings are that the memorandum survives as a live question rather than as a corpse; that the hardline campaign has escalated from a party secretary to a former president and is misquoting him to do so; that the Ali al-Taher loss is being absorbed by not leading on it; that Kayhan has shifted from kill-chain to budget-exhaustion register and has let the cable proposal drop; that Hormuz messaging now targets escorts and coalition partners rather than claiming control; and that the government is being attacked on gasoline and the rial in the vocabulary of sedition by its own side of the spectrum. The threads to watch are whether any official adopts Rouhani's 'strait of security and prosperity' or Taeb's memorandum-as-American-obligation, whether the IAEA referral produces a front-page lead next week, whether the four-country consultation is acknowledged by the Foreign Ministry, and whether the Leader speaks before the Board of Governors meets.

BOTTOM LINE Two days after this monitor recorded the memorandum vanishing from the page, the Saturday fronts show it back at the center of an open intra-system fight: Sazandegi leads with Rouhani's 'the war must end honorably', Sobh-e No attacks the 'creditors without an idea' who offer no alternative, Iran Daily tells foreign readers a consensus has re-formed for returning to it, and the Basij chief tells Javan that 'America has no way but to act on the memorandum', while Nobonyad calls the Ali al-Taher loss 'the last arrow into the coffin of the understanding' and Kayhan opens a second front against Rouhani himself. The document is contested rather than dead, the target of the principlist campaign has moved from a party secretary to a former president in 48 hours, and the undersea-cable proposal of 3 September has not been repeated.

CRITICAL SOURCING NOTE Nine Persian fronts and Iran Daily were read from scans; Vatan-e Emrooz, Jam-e Jam and Iran were not in the batch and are represented by their channels only. Tehran Times could not be retrieved and its entry rests on a cached listing from 4 September. The Army spokesman's four-base and 20-objectives claims, the air-defense 'no safe return' claim, the Al Ghashamiya diversion, the Taiz 'on the verge' claim and the Lamerd phosphorus allegation are Iranian claims and are not adopted. Kayhan counts today as the 189th day of the war; this monitor's calendar count is Day 186 and is kept for continuity. Nobonyad's account of Rouhani calling for a vote on the war is a distortion of the verified transcript and is reported as such. The Leader's absence is asserted on the ten scans and nine channels read; khamenei.ir could not be reached.

Macro Trend Analysis

① The memorandum returns to the page as a fight, not a policy

Within 48 hours of this monitor recording the off-ramp's disappearance, the document is on six fronts. For it: Sazandegi's Rouhani lead and Hashemi Rafsanjani editorial, Sobh-e No's attack on critics 'without an idea', Iran Daily's 'consensus' for return, and Javan's Taeb banner ('America has no way but to act on the memorandum'), which uses it as an obligation on Washington rather than as a concession. Against it: Nobonyad's 'coffin' and 'do not pin hopes', and Kayhan's Rouhani items. The 3 September finding that the document survived only as a target is superseded: it is now contested across the spectrum and inside the hardline camp itself.

2 The target moves from Marashi to Rouhani

The five-title campaign against Kargozaran's secretary-general recorded on 3 September has been replaced by a three-title campaign against the former president: Nobonyad's 'preparing a new war', Kayhan's Khabar-e Vizheh, Goft-o Shonud and Nokteh, and Javan's Ardabil Friday-prayer item (still on Marashi). Marashi himself reappears on his own party's front, unrepentant, with 'the Chinese experience and national interests'. The verified transcript shows Nobonyad's 'referendum' charge to be a distortion; the willingness to distort marks the honorable-end doctrine as the thing the hardline lane most needs to discredit.

3 Ali al-Taher absorbed, not led

Israel's declared capture of the ridge overlooking Nabatieh appears on no Persian lead. Sobh-e No and Nobonyad use it as evidence for opposite conclusions about the memorandum; Kayhan's Zarei calls it 'a hill whose reality and manner are still unclear' and predicts its loss 'within days'; Sazandegi files it as 'the cycle of occupation'. Continuing the standing negative-evidence thread on Israel and Lebanon, the Axis's setback is being managed by keeping it off the top of the page, and the flagship's response is historical reassurance rather than a call for escalation.

4 American exhaustion argued from American sources

Kayhan's NIH-Pentagon lead ('the ladle has hit the bottom of the pot'), Jomhuri Eslami's and Nour News's NYT 'dead end', Jam-e Jam's and Sobh-e No's USS Abraham Lincoln crew story and 'floating scrap' photograph, Etemad Online's record diesel price, and Trump's remark that Democrats 'prefer we lose' are assembled into a single cross-factional thesis before the midterms. Kayhan's day report, 'America is forced to swallow the frog of war and return', is the thesis in one line. The facts are checkable; the inference that they sum to exhaustion is the outlets'.

5 Hormuz messaging shifts to escort failure and coalition deterrence

Vatan-e Emrooz and Etemad Online report the Qatari LNG carrier Al Ghashamiya abandoning a US-escorted transit for Fujairah and seven million barrels queued in the Gulf of Oman, both tracking-data claims; the government daily, Vatan-e Emrooz and the Iran channel carry the identical warning that South Korean participation 'constitutes military participation in the aggression'. Javan's lead makes uncertainty itself the lever ('the Strait gets dearer every day'). The counter-doctrine, Rouhani's 'strait of security and prosperity', and Etemad's transit-fee promo are the two reformist positions to track; the second is closer to the hardline end state than the reformist lane has previously gone.

6 Kayhan changes register and drops the cables

The flagship moves from 'track, identify, fire' to budget exhaustion, and neither its front nor its page-2 editorial repeats the undersea-cable proposal of 3 September. No official echo of the proposal was found in the channels or wires. The priority tracking cue of the last edition therefore closes negative for this cycle, without prejudice to its return.

7 Economic grievance weaponized within the principlist camp

Chahar Sough brands the government's gasoline option 'sedition' and montages a fuel nozzle over Saghab Esfahani's face; Nobonyad puts Pezeshkian and Hemmati under 'shooting at the currency market'; Kayhan accuses the central bank of censoring 'disrupting banks'. The President's 'gradual, with the people's cooperation' instruction on Jomhuri Eslami and Iran Daily reads as retreat. Continuing the domestic-cost lane, the strain has moved from being visible on every faction's front to being aimed at the government by name in the vocabulary of 2019.

8 The diplomatic lane resurfaces on the establishment title, and the Leader stays absent

Jomhuri Eslami's 'regional countries consult to end the war' (Pakistan, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia; an Egypt-Qatar call) is the predicted return of the off-ramp through the mediation channel, unconfirmed beyond the paper's 'media sources'. The IAEA referral and Trump's Pickaxe Mountain threat sit only on channels. No Leader message accompanies the funeral, the retaliation claim or the memorandum fight; the only Leader text on a front-referenced item is the martyred predecessor's 2022 speech. Jalaeipour's red-flags charge on the Etemad channel shows the succession-imagery contest now fought over the funeral itself.

Key Judgments

KJ-1 [HIGH] The Islamabad memorandum has returned to the Iranian fronts as a contested question rather than as a corpse, superseding the 3 September finding that it survived only as a target. Evidence: Sazandegi's Rouhani lead and Hashemi Rafsanjani editorial on 'returning to the Islamabad memorandum'; Sobh-e No's lead attacking critics who offer 'no alternative to the Islamabad understanding'; Iran Daily's Dehghani Firouzabadi interview claiming a re-formed 'consensus' for return; Javan's Taeb banner 'America has no way but to act on the memorandum'; against them Nobonyad's 'coffin of the understanding' and 'do not pin hopes', and Kayhan's Rouhani items. Significance: when the Speaker's paper, the reformist party paper, the government's English title and an IRGC-lane daily quoting the Basij chief all print the document in the same morning, the reopening question is live inside the system; overstating this as movement toward a deal would be wrong, since Taeb's usage binds Washington rather than Tehran, but understating it would repeat the error of reading 3 September's silence as closure.

KJ-2 [HIGH] The principlist campaign has escalated from a party secretary-general to a former president in 48 hours, and it is distorting his words to do so. Evidence: Nobonyad's 'Preparing a new war' box calling Rouhani 'the most unpopular president of recent decades' and claiming he demands a popular vote on continuing the war; Kayhan's 'America's and Rouhani's discomfort at the Strait being closed', its Goft-o Shonud on 'a strait without ships', and Shariatmadari's Nokteh answering his IRIB remark; the verified Shafaqna transcript of the 9 Shahrivar meeting, in which the 'vote' is a rhetorical question about 'fighting the great powers for another 20 years' and the operative lines are 'stand firm, but not an endless war' and 'the strait of security and prosperity'. Significance: the willingness to misquote marks the honorable-end doctrine as the position the hardline lane most needs to discredit, and the shift of target upward suggests the Marashi campaign was a rehearsal; Sazandegi's decision to print Marashi again on its own front shows the reformist camp did not fold.

KJ-3 [MODERATE-HIGH] The Ali al-Taher loss is being managed by absorption into the domestic memorandum fight and by not leading on it, and the flagship's response is reassurance rather than escalation. Evidence: no Persian front leads on the ridge; Sobh-e No's and Nobonyad's opposite uses of it; Zarei's Yadasht-e Rooz calling the capture 'still unclear' and predicting Israel 'may lose even that within days'; Sazandegi's 'cycle of occupation' strip; Israel and Lebanon otherwise confined to Kayhan's and Vatan-e Emrooz's channel items on southern Lebanon strikes. Significance: continuing the standing negative-evidence thread, an Axis setback that the Israeli defense minister has declared complete is being kept off the top of the page for the third edition running; an eventual lead on it would mark either a confirmed Hezbollah counter-attack or a decision to convert the loss into a mobilization event.

KJ-4 [MODERATE-HIGH] The American-exhaustion narrative has consolidated across factions and is now built from American rather than Iranian sources, which makes it more durable than battle-damage claims. Evidence: Kayhan's NIH-Pentagon lead and 'swallow the frog' day report; Jomhuri Eslami's and Nour

News's NYT 'dead end'; Jam-e Jam's and Sobh-e No's Guardian-sourced Lincoln crew story and 'floating scrap' photograph; Etemad Online's and Nour News's record diesel price; Nour News's Bernie Sanders item; Trump's 'Democrats prefer we lose' on Vatan-e Emrooz and Sobh-e No. Significance: the facts are checkable and the inference is the outlets'; as with the Driscoll and 'rise up' episodes of prior editions, the frame allows the hardline lane to present pressure as proof of American weakness before the midterms, and it now has the government's English title ('a deal is the third option') and the reformist flagship ('the decline of power', Leylaz) arguing the same premise toward a different conclusion.

KJ-5 [MODERATE-HIGH] Hormuz messaging has shifted from claims of control to escort failure and deterrence of coalition partners, with the threat to South Korea now in the official lane. Evidence: Vatan-e Emrooz's and Etemad Online's Al Ghashamiya diversion and Tanker Trackers' seven million barrels, both tracking-data claims; the identical South Korea warning on the Iran newspaper channel, Vatan-e Emrooz and Press TV; Javan's uncertainty-as-lever lead; Energy Secretary Wright's statement that escorts should be possible by month's end as the implicit foil. Significance: an escort-failure story built on tracking data is harder to falsify than a mine or missile claim, and the official warning to Seoul should be tracked against its deployment decision; inside the reformist lane, Rouhani's 'strait of security and prosperity' is the counter-doctrine and Etemad's 'transit fee' promo is a drift toward the hardline end state that should be watched for repetition.

KJ-6 [MODERATE] Negative-evidence finding: the undersea-cable sabotage proposal of 3 September has not been repeated by Kayhan or echoed by any official, and the flagship has changed register from kill-chain to budget exhaustion. Evidence: Kayhan's front and page 2 today carry the NIH lead, Zarei's Hezbollah editorial and the Rouhani items, with no cable reference; Defa Press, Fars, Nour News, Jam-e Jam and the Army spokesman's briefing contain no cable language. Significance: the priority tracking cue of the last edition closes negative for this cycle; a single non-repetition does not retire the proposal, since the mid-July dual-chokepoint editorial preceded official use by weeks, but it lowers the near-term probability that the proposal was a prepared campaign rather than the editor's own advocacy.

KJ-7 [HIGH] Domestic economic grievance is now being aimed at the government by name from within the principlist camp, in the vocabulary of sedition. Evidence: Chahar Sough's 'halt the gasoline sedition' lead, its Saghab Esfahani montage and its 'Hemmati's blackening made the dollar 33,000 tomans dearer'; Nobonyad's 'shooting at the currency market' over the Pezeshkian-Hemmati photograph; Kayhan's 'censorship of the names of currency-disrupting banks'; Pezeshkian's 'gradual, with the people's cooperation' instruction on Jomhuri Eslami and Iran Daily; the free-market dollar above 220,000 tomans confirmed by Euronews and IranWire. Significance: calling a fuel-price measure 'fetneh' pre-loads the 2019 memory and tells the government that any consumption decision will be treated as a security event by its own side of the spectrum, which narrows the sequencing choice the economic press identified on 3 September; the transmission chain toward political instability still shows no observable link, but the coalition attacking the government on prices now includes hardline titles rather than only technocrats.

KJ-8 [MODERATE] The regional-mediation off-ramp has resurfaced where predicted, on the establishment title, while two scheduled escalations remain confined to the channels. Evidence: Jomhuri Eslami's lead on consultations by Pakistan, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia and an Egypt-Qatar call, sourced to 'media sources'; the Qatari and Omani visits to Tehran in late August on the record; the US-E3 draft IAEA resolution for next week and Iran's 'snapback fantasies' response only on Vatan-e Emrooz's channel; Trump's Pickaxe Mountain threat only on Sobh-e No's channel. Significance: an official acknowledgment of

the four-country consultation by Araghchi or Baghaei would mark the diplomatic lane's return to the page; the absence of the IAEA referral from every front, four days before the Board meets, suggests the press has not yet been told how to frame it and is the item most likely to produce a new lead next week.

KJ-9 [LOW-MODERATE] Negative-evidence finding: the Leader remains absent from the fronts on the day of the funeral and the memorandum fight, and the succession-imagery contest is now being fought over the funeral itself. Evidence: no message from Mojtaba Khamenei on ten scans or nine channels; the only Leader text on a front-referenced item is the martyred predecessor's 1 Farvardin 1401 speech quoted twice by Shariatmadari; Tehran Times still promoting the Government Week message as the latest Leader text; Jalaeipour's charge on the Etemad channel that Jalili's supporters distributed four million red flags at the funeral to crowd out the national flag. Significance: consistent with the pattern of the Leader appearing through intermediaries rather than in his own voice, and with the flagship using the predecessor's authority when it needs a Leader quotation; a Leader statement before the IAEA Board meets would be the first test of whether he speaks on the memorandum question at all. Confidence is low because khamenei.ir could not be reached.

Named-Figure Tracker

Figure	Role / relevance	Today's framing	Flag
Hassan Rouhani	Former president; 31 August remarks to former governors released 3-4 September	Sazandegi: 'the war must end honorably', 'strait of security and prosperity'; Nobonyad: 'preparing a new war', 'most unpopular president'; Kayhan: 'discomfort at the Strait being closed', 'strait without ships' ridiculed	TARGET FRAMING
Hossein Taeb	Head of the Basij Organization since 10 August	Javan banner: 'America has no way but to act on the memorandum'; Iran International adds 'we never asked for a ceasefire or negotiations'	COERCION SPOKESMAN
Donald Trump	US President	Kayhan: 'ladle at the bottom of the pot', NIH raid; Jomhuri Eslami/NYT: 'dead end'; Sobh-e No: Pickaxe Mountain 'very soon'; Vatan-e Emrooz: 'Democrats prefer we lose'	TARGET FRAMING
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf	Speaker of Parliament	Sobh-e No and Vatan-e Emrooz: 'Iran welcomes China's idea' of a regional security architecture; his paper leads against the memorandum's hardline critics	WATCH
Abdolnaser Hemmati	Central Bank governor	Chahar Sough: his 'blackening' raised the dollar 33,000 tomans; Nobonyad: photographed with Pezeshkian under 'shooting at the currency market'; Kayhan: bank-name censorship	TARGET FRAMING
Esmail Saghab Esfahani	Head of the government's strategic	Chahar Sough: leader of 'an extremist reformist band' behind the 'gasoline sedition', fuel-nozzle montage	NEW NAMED FIGURE

Figure	Role / relevance	Today's framing	Flag
	energy management body		
Masoud Pezeshkian	President	Jomhuri Eslami and Iran Daily: gasoline control 'gradual and with the people's cooperation'; Nobonyad: pictured with Hemmati as author of the currency slide	WATCH
Yousef Pezeshkian	President's son and adviser	Nobonyad: his 'enrichment is not our honor' remark read as 'a nuclear pulse to America'	WATCH
Hossein Marashi	Kargozaran secretary-general	Sazandegi: 'the Chinese experience and national interests', first own-front appearance since the 3 September campaign; Javan: Ardabil Friday-prayer criticism continues	WATCH
Saadollah Zarei	Kayhan foreign-affairs columnist	Yadasht-e Rooz: Ali al-Taher capture 'still unclear', Israel 'may lose it within days'	WATCH
Benjamin Netanyahu	Israeli Prime Minister	Sobh-e No: Ali al-Taher as an electoral maneuver; 'fraud, civil war or cancelling the elections?'; Kayhan/Zarei: 'worried about the results of its domestic elections'	TARGET FRAMING
Rosa DeLauro and Chris Van Hollen	US Democratic legislators	Kayhan: DeLauro's NIH statement as proof of budget exhaustion; Van Hollen's investigation call as 'American admission' of the wedding crime	WATCH
Abbas Araghchi	Foreign Minister	Jomhuri Eslami and Jam-e Jam: 'how long must Iran wait to answer the aggressor?' to Jordan; absent from the memorandum fight	absence noted
Mojtaba Khamenei	Supreme Leader	No message on any front or channel on the day of the funeral and the memorandum fight; only the martyred predecessor's 2022 speech is quoted (Kayhan)	absence noted
Mohsen Rezaei	SNSC secretary	No new statement in the batch after the 'new strategy' text of 2 September; Tehran Times still promotes 'Rezaei's strong message'	absence noted

Headline Summary Table

Outlet	Lead Headline (English)	Orientation	Theme	Threat signal
Sazandegi	The War Must End Honorably	Reformist / Kargozaran	Rouhani's honorable-end doctrine; 'strait of security and	MODERATE: de-escalation doctrine

Outlet	Lead Headline (English)	Orientation	Theme	Threat signal
			prosperity'; return to the memorandum	
Nobonyad	Shooting at the Currency Market	Principlist	Rouhani 'preparing a new war'; Ali al-Taher as 'the coffin of the understanding'; rial blamed on the government	MODERATE-HIGH: memorandum declared dead, former president targeted
Sobh-e No	The Polarizers: Creditors Without an Idea	Principlist, Speaker's camp	Memorandum defended against hardline critics; Ghalibaf welcomes China's security idea; carrier as 'floating scrap'	MODERATE-HIGH: intra-system fight, deterrent-credibility imagery
Javan	The Strait Gets Dearer and More Important Every Day!	Hardline, IRGC-affiliated	Uncertainty as lever; Basij chief: 'America has no way but to act on the memorandum'	HIGH: Hormuz cost thesis, memorandum as American obligation
Kayhan	Trump's Ladle Has Hit the Bottom of the Pot: Encroachment on the Budget of Special Patients	Ultra-hardline flagship	US budget exhaustion; Rouhani attacked; Zarei on Hezbollah; cable proposal not repeated	HIGH: exhaustion narrative, domestic targeting
Jomhouri Eslami	Regional Countries Consult to End the War	Traditional / establishment	Mediation off-ramp (Pakistan, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia); Trump at a 'dead end'; gradual gasoline policy	LOW-MODERATE: mediation-first
Chahar Sough	Halt the Gasoline Sedition	Economic, principlist-leaning	Gasoline reform branded 'fetneh'; Hemmati blamed for the dollar; elite 'having a good time'	MODERATE: grievance weaponized against the government
Ta'adol	Three Sides of the Housing Crisis	Economic / business	Housing, bourse risk, Dubai goods restriction; Sirik as reputational contest only	LOW-MODERATE: economic strain lead
Etemad	The Decline of Power	Reformist	Leylaz on the 'drowning superpower'; Army four-base claim; Hormuz transit fee floated; 'dialogue is rationality'	MODERATE: US-decline case for talks

Outlet	Lead Headline (English)	Orientation	Theme	Threat signal
Iran Daily	Armed Forces stand ready for any faceoff with US	Official English-language daily	Readiness for foreign readers; direct-hit analysis; 'deal is the third option'; memorandum 'consensus'	MODERATE: readiness plus deal framing
Vatan-e Emrooz (channel)	Midnight failure of the American escort in the Strait of Hormuz	Hardline principlist	Al Ghashamiya diversion; seven million barrels queued; warning to South Korea; IAEA referral pre-framed	HIGH: escort-failure claim, coalition deterrence
Jam-e Jam (channel)	Army spokesman: the enemy failed in all 20 objectives	State broadcaster daily	Official deterrent claims; Araghchi to Jordan; Lincoln crew; EU gas at 15-year low	MODERATE-HIGH: official claims register
Iran (channel)	Iran warns South Korea: participation in Hormuz equals military involvement	Official government daily	Coalition deterrence in the official lane; US arms sales to host states	MODERATE-HIGH: official warning
Tehran Times (web, cached 4 Sept)	Persian Gulf equilibrium: the fracturing of US hegemony	English-language state daily	Hegemony-fracture essay; Camp Titin reach; Lamerd phosphorus allegation	MODERATE-HIGH: English hardline packaging


Per-Paper Front-Page Analysis

Iran Daily

Official English-language daily of the government (IRNA group), aimed at foreign readers (Saturday, September 5, 2026; Shahrivar 14, 1405; Rabi al-Awwal 23, 1448; 8 pages)

MODERATE: readiness framing; direct-hit analysis for foreign audiences; memorandum return presented as consensus

"Armed Forces stand ready for any faceoff with US"



- Main: 'Armed Forces stand ready for any faceoff with US', page 2, the English rendering of the Army spokesman's briefing that the Persian titles carry as 'new details of the response in Sirik'; the headline chooses readiness over retaliation, consistent with the paper's 'sovereignty' choice on 3 September.
- Second lead: 'Deadly strike on Iranian wedding likely direct hit by US munitions: Analysis', page 2, over a photograph of mourners carrying a coffin marked for 'martyr Amir Mohammad Karimi' at the Sirik funeral of 3 September. The analysis matches the Defa Press item of the same morning (permalink 66839): the US said the target was a communications tower about 135 meters away, while photographic and munition-fragment analysis is said to show a direct hit on the residential building. This is the English-language packaging of the legal-humanitarian campaign identified in KJ-8 of the last edition.
- Interview: 'US has no better option than deal with Iran' with international-relations scholar Jalal Dehghani Firouzabadi (to ILNA), page 3: Tehran treats the Islamabad memorandum as 'the most important document underpinning its engagement with the US'; two views existed in Iran but 'a consensus' has re-formed that the US should return to it, which he calls 'strategic flexibility'; 'the US does not have many options: it either has to escalate tensions and launch an all-out war, or hold on to the status quo, neither war nor peace, along with the continued closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the blockade. The third option is a deal.'
- Kicker: 'Pezeshkian urges gradual approach to gasoline consumption control', page 3, the same instruction Jomhouri Eslami carries and Chahar Sough treats as a retreat.
- Bottom strip: 'Books under watch: story of a war on knowledge' (page 4), 'Iran sweeps New Zealand, makes statement start to Olympic bid' (volleyball, page 6), and 'Mesr village on track to join UN Best Tourism Villages list' (page 7).

ANALYST NOTE For foreign readers the government's paper runs deterrent readiness on top and a scholar's 'deal is the third option' beneath it, which is the two-track posture the Persian fronts abandoned on 3 September and are now fighting over. Dehghani Firouzabadi's claim of a re-formed consensus for returning to the memorandum is contradicted the same morning by Nobonyad and Kayhan, so it should be read as the government's preferred external message rather than as a description of the domestic debate. The direct-hit analysis is the day's strongest element of the international campaign and will be cited abroad; its munition claims are unverified.

Javan

Hardline, IRGC-affiliated daily (political, social and cultural daily; issue of Saturday 14 Shahrivar 1405, year 28, 16 pages)

HIGH: Strait-as-compounding-cost thesis; Basij chief conditions any de-escalation on US compliance with the memorandum

«تنگه هر روز گران تر و مهم تر!» “The Strait Gets Dearer and More Important Every Day!”



- Main: The lead is an economic-strategic argument, not a battle report: 'why is the price of oil still climbing and why is Washington so worried about it?' Javan's answer is the 'uncertainty' (عدم قطعیت) about the future of Hormuz, and it invites the reader to read the tanker-transit statistics and the market as proof that the Strait is 'a strategic puzzle for America'. Internal subheads on the jump: 'the Strait's dimensions gets bigger every day', 'the future of oil', 'the effect of the Strait on the American election'. The frame is that time is working for Tehran because the price of the closure is compounding for Washington.
- Banner (illustration): A full-column stylized portrait of Hojjatoleslam Hossein Taeb, head of the Basij Organization, montaged over an aerial view of the Strait with tankers, carrying the quote 'America has no way but to act on the memorandum' («امریکا راهی جز عمل به تفاهم نامه ندارد»). The caption text: America 'started the war and our children and women were martyred', 'we did not begin this war, they did', and 'America must act on the conditions in the memorandum' (page 2). Taeb was named Basij chief by the Leader on 10 August; his same remarks were carried by Iran International on 4 September with the additional line 'we never asked for a ceasefire or negotiations'.
- Right rail (op-ed): 'Development and Package: threat to the country's independence and security' (توسعه و بسته؛ تهدید استقلال و امنیت کشور), a column on the Western 'package' approach to Iran's development, and 'Why do you sicken the nation's hope with a blatant lie?' (چرا با دروغ شاخدار امید), presented as the Ardabil Friday prayer leader's criticism of Hossein Marashi, continuing the principlist campaign against the Kargozaran secretary-general recorded on 3 September.
- Right rail (culture): 'Islamic civilization gains new life with artificial intelligence' and a piece on the heroes of the 'cypress, white, red' (سرو، سفید، سرخ) narrative being 'ordinary people', plus a review calling the 'Shah-gol' production 'a casino for distorting Qajar history'; a consumer item on 'pickpocketing in administrative restaurants' rounds out the page.
- Sub-item (body of lead): the text argues that Washington's own uncertainty has become a price signal: every day the Strait is contested it becomes 'more expensive' for the United States, the Gulf producers and Europe, and that this is why the American administration is 'worried' before its midterm elections, a direct continuation of the falsification-of-American-control frame from Javan's 3 September edition.

ANALYST NOTE Javan pairs an economic-leverage lead with the Basij chief's memorandum line, which is the first time since the memorandum was declared 'expired' by Washington that an IRGC-lane title has put a senior security figure behind 'America must act on the memorandum' on page one. Read with Nobonyad's simultaneous 'do not pin hopes on the Islamabad understanding', this shows the hardline camp itself divided between using the memorandum as a stick (Taeb: it binds America, not us) and burying it (Nobonyad, Kayhan). Track whether Taeb's formula, memorandum-as-American-obligation, is repeated by the SNSC or the Majlis; if so, the document is being revived as a coercive rather than a diplomatic instrument.

MODERATE-HIGH: memorandum defended against domestic hardliners; carrier-decline imagery aimed at US deterrent credibility; Ali al-Taher framed as electoral bait

«دوقطبی سازان طلبکاران بی ایده» "The Polarizers: Creditors Without an Idea"



- Main: An unusual lead that turns on domestic critics rather than on Washington. The kicker reads: 'some political currents turned the Ali al-Taher affair into a domestic political dispute without offering an alternative to the Islamabad understanding'. The pull quote: 'the Hezbollah-Israeli front has deep roots and is not summed up in a bilateral understanding; nevertheless the complex Lebanon affair, which entered a new phase after 7 October, is reduced by some to the Islamabad understanding, heedless of the fact that the enemy's advance during the 40-day war was far greater than after the understanding, and when an understanding is in practice on the ground how can it be expected to solve the crisis? The critics who offered no alternative idea are now busy making claims (طلبکاری) instead of answering the question of siege and war'. Two supporting columns: 'The Zionist enemy wants to drag Iran's foot into this war' by Seyyed Hadi Seyyed Afghahi, and 'The Ali al-Taher matter is electoral' by Ahmad Dastmalchian, both reading the Israeli capture claim as bait and as Netanyahu's pre-election maneuver.
- Banner (top): 'Iran welcomes China's idea' (استقبال ایران از ایده چین): Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf writes that China's emphasis on strengthening shared security 'reflects what Iran has emphasized for years' and that 'the countries of the region must write their own future with their own hands'. The same text ran on the Vatan-e Emrooz channel on 4 September (permalink 24134) and on Sobh-e No's own channel (115679), where Ghalibaf's office title is given as Iran's special representative for China.
- Right rail: 'The game of a lost war' (بازی جنگ باخته): after Iran's success with logo animations, the White House website unveiled a classic video game to promote Trump's policies; 'Fraud, civil war or cancelling the elections?' (تقلب، جنگ داخلی یا لغو انتخابات؟), presented as Netanyahu's scenarios for escaping 'definitive defeat' in the November Knesset election; and 'From BRICS to Delhi's Jama Masjid: Iran's narrative in the heart of India', an account of judiciary chief Mohseni-Ejeh's visit to India.
- Sub-item (bottom, photo): 'The decline of a hegemony as told by an image' (افول یک هژمونی به روایت تصویر), a large photograph of the USS Abraham Lincoln docked at Laem Chabang, Thailand, with rust streaks on the hull: 'when 100,000 tons of diplomacy becomes floating scrap'. The text cites Henry Kissinger's phrase for the carrier and social-media users who called it 'scrap that barely survived the Persian Gulf'. The port call is confirmed by USNI News and CNN (first full port visit after roughly 286 days at sea); the 'scrap' characterization is the paper's.
- Channel (text): Sobh-e No's channel carried the Army spokesman's 'the right solution for America is to pay the costs and leave the region' (115673),

Trump's remark that the US may 'hit Pickaxe Mountain' (کوه کلنگ) 'very soon' (115680), and a two-part Ali al-Taher analysis on the morning of 5 September (115685-115686) arguing that the pre-ceasefire Israeli advance of about eight kilometers is the relevant comparison and that the critics offer 'only demolition, no reconstruction'.

ANALYST NOTE Sobh-e No is defending the memorandum by attacking its hardline critics, which places the Speaker's paper on the same side as Sazandegi's Rouhani lead and against Nobonyad and Kayhan on the same morning. The Ali al-Taher loss is being absorbed into the domestic memorandum fight rather than treated as a Lebanon story in its own right: for Sobh-e No the ridge proves the document limited Israel's advance, for Nobonyad it proves the document is a coffin. The Ghalibaf endorsement of China's 'shared security' idea gives the pivot-East thread an institutional owner beyond the newspapers; watch whether Beijing's Gulf security proposal is named in official Iranian diplomacy this week.

Kayhan

Ultra-hardline flagship, published under the Supreme Leader's office; managing editor Hossein Shariatmadari (year 85, issue of Saturday 14 Shahrivar 1405, 8 pages plus 4 digital)

HIGH: US-exhaustion narrative; Rouhani and IRIB critics targeted; Taiz offensive celebrated; cable-sabotage proposal not repeated on the front

«کفگیر "Trump's Ladle Has Hit the Bottom of the Pot: Encroachment on the Budget of Special Patients" ترامپ به ته دیگ خورد؛ دست‌اندازی به بودجه بیماران خاص»



- Main: Built on The Hill's report that the Pentagon signed an interagency agreement giving it access to National Institutes of Health funds. Kayhan's kicker: 'The Hill's exposure of America's war-budget deficit'. Three decks: the war against Iran has put Trump in a 'dead-end situation' in which 'continuing the war without a big achievement is unthinkable for him'; the Trump government is transferring part of the health budget to the Pentagon 'without permission' because of the shortfall; and Democratic Representative Rosa DeLauro is quoted saying the agreement was made secretly and that diverting money from AIDS, influenza and tuberculosis programs to the war is unacceptable. The underlying report is real (DeLauro's statement of 3-4 September and a pending 95 billion dollar supplemental); the 'special patients' framing and the 'ladle at the bottom of the pot' idiom are Kayhan's.
- Second lead: 'American officials and media admit America's crime in the attack on the wedding ceremony' (اعتراف مقامات و رسانه‌های آمریکایی به): Senator Chris Van Hollen's call for a full investigation, a New York Times item on munition remains, and analysts' statements that the residential building took a direct hit. Beside it, the photo package 'Funeral of the martyrs of the wedding attack held with the enthusiastic presence of the people and officials' (برگزاری تشییع پیکر شهدای) (حمله به مراسم عروسی), Tasnim and IRNA images from Kuhestak on 3 September.
- Right rail: 'Report of the 189th day of the war: America is forced to swallow the frog of war and return' (آمریکا مجبور است قورباغه جنگ را قورت بدهد و) (برگردد), page 3; note that Kayhan's own day-count (189) runs three days ahead of this monitor's calendar count (Day 186). Also 'Mohseni-Ejei's consultations with foreign counterparts and participation in Delhi's Friday prayer', the 'martyrdom of a Paveh border-regiment officer in a clash with a counter-revolutionary grouplet', and the anniversary of Ayatollah Ali Qoddusi.
- Kicker (left): 'Yemen on the verge of controlling Taiz; the Al Saud have reached for the mediators' (یمن در آستانه تسلط بر تعز؛ آل سعود دست به دامن) (میانجی‌ها شد), page 8, with a strike photo. The Houthis offensive west of Taiz on 3-4 September is confirmed by Al Jazeera and Arab News as the largest since the 2022 truce; 'on the verge of controlling Taiz' and Saudi appeals to mediators are Kayhan's claims and not corroborated. Top left: 'From the US ambassador to the UN: Zionist savagery in Gaza and the West Bank has everyone screaming'. Top right: 'In a questionable move: censorship of the

names of the currency-disrupting banks in the Central Bank's announcement' (سانسور اسامی بانک‌های اخلاک‌گرا ارزی در اطلاعیه بانک مرکزی), the flagship's second consecutive front-page economic grievance after the electricity-bill item of 3 September.

- Op-ed (Yadasht-e Rooz): 'Hezbollah's steadfastness and the uproar of a distraught regime' (ایستادگی حزب‌الله و جنجال رژیم پریشان) by Saadollah Zarei, page 2: a 40-year history of Hezbollah ending with the argument that Israel, having failed to destroy the movement in five months of daily bombardment 'despite two apparent ceasefires arising from the bilateral Islamabad understanding and the trilateral Washington talks', is 'maneuvering on the capture of a hill whose reality and manner are still unclear', and 'may lose even that within days'. Nokteh column (Shariatmadari): 'To which mill does this water flow?!' (این آب به کدام آسیاب؟), a defense of state broadcaster IRIB against 'wholesale attacks' by 'some individuals, parties and political currents', quoting the martyred Leader's 1 Farvardin 1401 speech on the enemy separating the nation from its own media. Khabar-e Vizheh: 'America's and Rouhani's discomfort at the Strait of Hormuz being closed' (ناراحتی آمریکا و روحانی از بسته بودن تنگه), and the Goft-o Shonud column 'What's the difference?!' which asks where Rouhani's 'what use is a Strait without ships' differs from 'the officially declared demands of America and Israel'.
- Sub-item: 'Tehran Friday prayer leader: no one has the right to say a word that smells of weakness' (هیچ‌کس حق ندارد سخنی بگوید که بوی ضعف بدهد), page 3, from Ayatollah Seyyed Ahmad Khatami's first sermon of 13 Shahrivar at the Imam Khomeini Mosalla, confirmed by Asr-e Iran and Entekhab.

ANALYST NOTE Kayhan has moved its lead from the kill-chain register of 3 September ('track, identify, fire') to the American-exhaustion register: the Pentagon-NIH story and the 'swallow the frog' day report are one argument, that Washington is running out of money and options before the midterms. The more consequential material is on page 2. Zarei's Yadasht-e Rooz treats the Ali al-Taher loss as unproven and reversible, which is the flagship pre-empting a morale problem in the Axis, while Shariatmadari's Nokteh and the Goft-o Shonud open a second front against Rouhani and against critics of IRIB, marking Rouhani's 'honorable end' speech as the day's principal domestic target. The undersea-cable proposal of 3 September is not repeated on the front today, which is the negative evidence the last edition asked for. Continuing thread: the flagship's economic grievances (banks today, electricity bills on 3 September) are now a two-day pattern.

MODERATE-HIGH: memorandum declared dead; Rouhani accused of preparing a 'new war'; currency slide blamed on the government

«شلیک به بازار ارز» "Shooting at the Currency Market"



- Main: 'Nobonyad reports from behind the scenes of the dollar's jump to the 221,000-toman channel' over a large photograph of President Pezeshkian and Central Bank governor Abdolnaser Hemmati whispering in a conference hall, page 4. The composition makes the government, not the war, the author of the currency slide. The free-market rate crossed 220,000 tomans on 2 September (Euronews, IranWire).
- Banner (top): 'Preparing for a new war' (در تدارک جنگ جدید), a boxed attack on Hassan Rouhani beside his photograph: his 'recent remarks should be assessed above all as the preparation of a specific current for imposing a new war on the country'; 'the most unpopular president of recent decades', with 'a black record from the JCPOA to the gasoline riots of 1398', is said to be demanding a referral to the people's vote on continuing the war. The box ties Rouhani's path to the government's '14-clause memorandum', which it says 'both stripped Iran of its pressure tools against Trump and imposed doubled pressure on the resistance front and the front lines', page 2.
- Sub-item: 'Nobonyad's conversation with a West Asia expert: one must not pin hopes on the Islamabad understanding' (نباید به تفاهم اسلام‌آباد دل بست), page 6; and 'The last arrow of Ali al-Taher into the coffin of the understanding' (تیر آخر علی‌الطاهر به تابوت تفاهم): 'the Zionist regime army's claim of controlling the strategic Ali al-Taher hill in southern Lebanon is not just a battlefield news item; this event is a firm slap to the narratives that in recent months presented the Islamabad understanding as the factor for stopping the war and Israel's retreat', page 5. A signed column by Mohsen Pourdardgar, 'Ali al-Taher: a small point with big consequences', adds that the capture claim 'has not yet been proven'.
- Sub-item: 'The president's son's position against enrichment: a nuclear pulse to America?' (پالس هسته‌ای به آمریکا؟), page 3, on Yousef Pezeshkian's remarks (reported 1 September) that 'enrichment is not a religious principle, it is not our honor, and our survival does not depend on it'; Nobonyad reads the remark as a signal to Washington.
- Right rail: 'The judiciary's commendable act in the sentence against the Dey-month coup-plotter' (اقدام قابل تقدیر قوه قضائیه در حکم محکومیت): a defendant the paper does not name in the headline, accused of media and propaganda activity against national security 'in favor of hostile groups', sentenced to 12 years, 6 months and one day and confiscation of all property in favor of the state, page 3. The sentence could not be verified against a court statement at compile time.

ANALYST NOTE Nobonyad is the clearest expression of the anti-memorandum position on the day: the Islamabad document is 'a coffin', Ali al-Taher is the final nail, Rouhani is preparing 'a new war', and the currency collapse is the government's doing. Its 'referendum' reading of Rouhani is a distortion worth logging: the

transcript (Shafaqna, 9 Shahrivar meeting) has Rouhani asking whether leaders would accept a different course if the people rejected 'fighting the great powers for another 20 years', not calling for a vote on the war. Continuing the 3 September Marashi campaign, the principlist target list has widened from a party secretary-general to a former president in 48 hours. The paper also picks up the president's son's enrichment remark as a 'pulse' to Washington, which, alongside Kayhan readers' letters against domestic enrichment skeptics, suggests the nuclear-cost debate opened on 1 September is being policed rather than closed.

MODERATE: de-escalation doctrine; Hormuz reframed as security-and-prosperity strait; memorandum return advocated

«جنگ باید عزتمندانه پایان یابد» "The War Must End Honorably"



- Main: A full-page portrait of former president Hassan Rouhani under the kicker 'Hassan Rouhani, in a meeting with governors, deputy governors and district governors, on getting the country through a hard turn'. Six pull quotes: 'both the Sepah defends the country and negotiation does'; 'some think that supporting diplomacy means not supporting the armed forces, are these in contradiction?'; 'whoever is responsible for negotiation, it makes no difference, we must all stand behind him'; 'revenge must be in the manner of the Imams'; 'we must stand firm, but standing firm must not be confused with insisting on an endless war'; and 'Hormuz must not become the strait of war; it must be the strait of security and at the same time a prosperous strait'. The meeting took place on 9 Shahrivar (31 August) with officials of Rouhani's two governments; the full transcript was released on 12-13 Shahrivar (Shafaqna, Didar News). The transcript also contains the lines Kayhan seizes on: 'what use is a strait without ships?' and 'apparently some people dislike a pact and dislike negotiation'.
- Op-ed (editorial, سرمقاله): 'Trump's felt-beating trap' (تله نمدمالی ترامپ) by Mohsen Hashemi Rafsanjani, member of the Kargozaran central council, 'on the importance of returning to the Islamabad memorandum and preventing America's pretext-seeking and abuse'. The argument, also carried on the Sazandegi media group's site, is that Washington is trying to wear Iran down (the felt-beating image) by assuming power and gasoline cuts, triple-digit inflation and a 300,000-toman dollar, and that returning to the memorandum denies it that trap.
- Right rail (column): 'Chinese experience and national interests' (تجربه چینی و منافع ملی): Kargozaran secretary-general Hossein Marashi, with photograph, argues that if Iran really intends to look East it should take the Chinese experience seriously rather than the Russian model, and that 'the era of the war lobby must end and priorities placed on economic development'. This is Marashi's first front-page appearance in his own party paper since the five-title principlist campaign against him on 3 September.
- Top strip: 'Continuation of the cycle of occupation: Israel's claims about the Ali al-Taher heights' (تداوم چرخه اشغال), page 3; 'The narrative of crime and fall: a report on the American attack on Kuhestak', page 3; and 'Mental guidance!' (هدایت ذهنی), page 6.
- Sub-item (bottom column): a signed column beside the portrait notes that on 9 Shahrivar Rouhani told the governors that the decisive majority wants the war ended honorably 'so that the country can be rebuilt, damages repaired and investors can invest', and that the enemy 'may not bow and may not come to the table', in which case 'we must stand firm'.

ANALYST NOTE Sazandegi has made Rouhani the face of the honorable-exit position on the morning three principlist titles attack him, which converts the memorandum argument into a personal contest between the former president and the hardline press. The choice matters because Rouhani's formula ('stand firm, but not an endless war'; 'the strait of security and prosperity') is the most complete counter-doctrine to the Hormuz-as-coercion thread that any Iranian figure has offered in print since the closure, and because it is anchored in a 20-year referendum question that Nobonyad has already recast as 'preparing a new war'. Marashi's re-emergence on his own front, unrepentant, indicates the Kargozaran camp did not fold under the 3 September campaign. Track whether Pezeshkian or Araghchi borrow the 'strait of security and prosperity' phrase; if they do, the reformist lane has supplied the government's exit language.

Chahar Sough

Economic daily, principlist-leaning ('the economy in the people's hands'; year 2, Saturday 14 Shahrivar 1405)

MODERATE: domestic economic grievance weaponized against the government; gasoline reform branded sedition

«ایست به فتنه بنزین» "Halt the Gasoline Sedition"



- Main: A photomontage of a fuel nozzle pouring gasoline over the face of Esmail Saghab Esfahani, head of the government's strategic energy management body, above the yellow-block headline. Decks: 'Chahar Sough's report on the 40 flagrant flaws of the Saghab gasoline plan and its friends'; 'the dangerous plan of an extremist reformist band led by Saghab Esfahani to make gasoline expensive has been set aside for now'. The paper labels the plan 'sedition' (فتنه), the regime's word for the 2009 and 2019 unrest, and lists 'inflationary consequences of the Saghab plan': direct and indirect transport-cost increases, chain effects on inflation, more pressure on household purchasing power, the risk of an informal quota market, intensified social discontent, and 'the probability of the economic problem turning into social protest'. Saghab Esfahani has publicly described a 14 million liter daily shortfall and three options including market pricing beyond quotas; Speaker Ghalibaf opposed a price rise on 17 August.
- Sub-item: 'The gasoline problem has a solution: let us not make it bigger with shocks and constant rule changes' (مسئله بنزین راه حل دارد), an interview with Ali Khezrian, Tehran's representative in the Majlis, which aligns the paper with the parliamentary opposition to the government's fourth-quota plan.
- Sub-item: 'Hemmati's blackening made the dollar 33,000 tomans more expensive' (سیاه‌نمایی همتی دلار را ۳۳ هزار تومان گران کرد), with a bar chart of the free-market rate rising from about 188,000 to 221,000 tomans. The paper's own site dates the 'incorrect statements' of the Central Bank governor to the morning of 29 Mordad (20 August) and counts the rise from that day; the causal claim is the paper's.
- Sub-item (photos): 'Having a good time with the 220,000-toman dollar' (خوش‌گذرانی با دلار ۲۲۰ هزار تومانی), two photographs of women at a fashion show or boutique opening and taking selfies, presented as evidence of an elite enjoying the currency slide while households absorb it.
- Kicker: page-one blurbs on gasoline consumption management refer to the President's instruction, reported on the government daily and Iran Daily the same morning, that consumption control be 'gradual and centered on the people's cooperation', which Chahar Sough treats as the plan's defeat.

ANALYST NOTE Chahar Sough is running the principlist economic-populist line at full volume: the government's gasoline reform is 'sedition', its central banker is talking the rial down, and its social base is partying on the dollar. The significance is the vocabulary. Calling a fuel-price plan 'fetneh' pre-loads the 2019 gasoline-riot memory and signals that hardline outlets will treat any consumption measure as a security event, which narrows the government's room on the single decision that the economic press on 3 September called harder than a deal with Washington. Pezeshkian's 'gradual' instruction, carried by Jomhouri Eslami and Iran Daily the same

morning, reads as a retreat under exactly this pressure. Continuity: the domestic-cost lane flagged in prior editions has now produced a front page in which the war does not appear at all.



Photomontage on the Chahar Sough front: a fuel nozzle pours gasoline across the face of Esmail Saghab Esfahani, the government's energy-strategy official, above the headline 'Halt the gasoline sedition'. Not a drawn cartoon; the image is a composite built from a portrait photograph.

“Regional Countries

LOW-MODERATE: mediation-first framing; American dead-end read; retaliation not led

Consult to End the War” «رایزنی کشورهای منطقه برای پایان دادن به جنگ»



- Main: Three decks: 'media sources announced that leaders of countries of the region, especially Pakistan, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, have begun new consultations aimed at stopping the America-Iran war'; 'these countries are consulting among themselves and with other security actors in the region'; and 'the foreign ministers of Egypt and Qatar, in a phone call, stressed the necessity of an immediate stop to the war and the return of diplomacy'. Beside it, in the right column, 'New York Times: Trump has reached a dead end in the Iran war' (ترامپ در جنگ ایران به بن‌بست رسیده). The Qatari and Omani visits to Tehran in late August are on the record; the 'new consultations' item is single-source on the paper's 'media sources'.
- Photo (center): 'Funeral of the martyrs of America's criminal attack on a wedding ceremony in Sirik county', a wide shot of the Kuhestak procession with a flag-draped coffin, page 3. Left column: 'Araghchi to his Jordanian counterpart: how long must Iran wait to respond to the aggressor?', 'Zionist media and America's encouragement toward a ground war with Iran', and 'A US representative: Congress must not keep closing its eyes to the war crimes of Trump and Hegseth'.
- Right rail (top): 'Opening of the 64-bed Shohada-ye Malekshahi hospital' with photograph, page 2; 'The President at the energy-management coordination meeting: gasoline consumption-management policies will be implemented gradually and centered on the people's cooperation' سیاست‌های مدیریت مصرف بنزین تدریجی و با محوریت همراهی مردم اجرا), page 2; 'The oil minister's report on two years in the fourteenth government: the ministry's focus on increasing production'; and 'Teachers' hourly pay will be doubled' (education minister).
- Op-ed: a signed column, 'Trump: war relying on the law of the jungle' (ترامپ: جنگ با تکیه بر قانون جنگل), opening 'in the name of God' and arguing that Washington and the Zionist regime have replaced international law with force in Gaza, Lebanon and Iran; and the standing box 'Five solutions for society's calm: the necessity of managing dissatisfaction and strengthening hope' (پنج راهکار برای آرامش جامعه), the paper's fourth consecutive front-page piece on domestic morale.
- Sub-item: the daily Beheshti quotation at the foot of the page: 'In our view the judicial apparatus must be able to work correctly but also fast; fast and decisive, and we hope to reach this desired quality', and a science item warning readers not to entrust diagnosis and medication to artificial intelligence.

ANALYST NOTE Jomhuri Eslami is the only Persian front that leads on an off-ramp, and it does so through the regional-mediation channel (Pakistan, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia) rather than through the memorandum, which matches the 3 September prediction that the off-ramp, if it returned, would come first through the Oman lane or through this paper. Its pairing of 'regional consultations' with the NYT 'dead end' read is the establishment version of Rouhani's argument: the war should end because the other side is stuck, not because Iran is. The gradual gasoline line and the hospital opening are the paper's continuing insistence on governance continuity. Track whether the Egypt-Qatar call and the four-country consultation are named by Araghchi or Baghaei in the coming days; an official acknowledgment would mark the diplomatic lane's return to the page.

"Three Sides of

LOW-MODERATE: economic strain lead; Dubai trade restriction; war only as reputational contest

the Housing Crisis: Household Pocket, Bank Incapacity, Unsuitable Land" «۳ ضلع بحران مسکن؛ جیب خانوار، ناتوانی بانک و زمین نامناسب»



- Main: 'Housing cannot be cured with the 1390s prescription': the lead argues that the three constraints of collapsed household purchasing power, banks unable to lend and poorly located land make the old mass-construction model unworkable, continuing the 3 September finding that housing sits at 'the ceiling of purchasing power'.
- Right rail (column): 'Sirik: the symbol of America's defeat in international public opinion' (سیریک؛ نماد شکست آمریکا در افکار عمومی بین‌المللی) by Hassan Hanizadeh, the Arab-affairs analyst, page 2: the only war item on the front, and it is framed as a reputational rather than a military event, consistent with KJ-8 of the 3 September edition on the strike as an international legal campaign.
- Sub-item: 'Ta'adol's report on the emergence of a new energy imbalance: Europe's heavy price for a hasty transition to clean energy' (بهای سنگین اروپا) (برای گذار شتابزده به انرژی پاک), page 4, which sits beside the Jam-e Jam channel's item on EU gas storage at 65.6 percent, a 15-year seasonal low (Financial Times); and 'Bitcoin's temporary jump above 82,000 dollars' as the crypto market passes 1.62 trillion dollars.
- Sub-item (photo): 'The shadow of risk and parallel markets over the bourse' (سایه ریسک و بازارهای موازی روی بورس), Ta'adol's weekly review of Tehran Stock Exchange trading after the 20-session rally ended on renewed fighting in the south, with a companion column 'Political risk against the bourse's currency engine'.
- Left rail: Farshad Momeni's analysis 'why fighting rent-seeking without structural reform goes nowhere'; 'Dubai's restriction on the entry of goods' (محدودیت دبی برای ورود کالا), a trade-route item reporting new limits on Iranian consignments through the Emirates that would tighten the re-export channel the economic press has been counting on; and 'the danger of a selective approach to corruption'.

ANALYST NOTE Ta'adol again declines mobilization: no retaliation, no memorandum, one war column framed as a reputational contest. The new datum is the Dubai restriction item, which if it holds would close part of the informal re-export route that Ta'adol itself prescribed on 3 September as an adaptation path, and it should be read together with the US sanctions designation of a Turkey-based entity reported on the Sobh-e No channel. The paper's silence on the currency slide that leads Nobonyad and Chahar Sough is itself a choice: the economic press is treating the rial as a symptom of structural imbalance, not of the central banker's words.



- Main: 'A pathology of America's behavior in conversation with Saeed Leylaz', the reformist economist and analyst. Three decks: 'a superpower whose hegemonic foundations are sinking is like a drowning man who clutches at any plank to keep his head above water'; 'military attacks on wedding ceremonies, the Minab school and non-military gatherings signal the sinking of America's strategic outlook and the anger arising from defeat'; and 'sultan-like designs, instead of building trust, prepare the ground for hypocrisy and the elimination of elites', a line that reads as much as a domestic warning as a foreign one. Leylaz has argued elsewhere that Iran must use the Hormuz lever now or 'go after nuclear weapons tomorrow'.
- Right rail (top): 'The Army spokesman explained: new details of Iran's response to America's crime in Sirik' (جزئیات جدید از پاسخ ایران به جنایت (آمریکا در سیریک), page 2. The IRNA and Borna versions of the briefing have the spokesman saying the Army struck four US bases in three countries and that the enemy failed in all 20 objectives of its attack on Iran; the Jam-e Jam channel carried the '20 objectives' line on 4 September. Base counts remain Iranian claims.
- Left column: 'Etemad in conversation with Gholamreza Karimi: the mirage of the American coalition' (سراب ائتلاف آمریکایی), on the limits of the maritime and sanctions coalition Washington is assembling, which echoes the Kayhan and Fars channel items on Euronews denying that the EU formally joined US sanctions; 'Etemad reports: the return-and-enough proposal' («پیشنهاد «بازگشت بس»»), a report the paper flags on page 9; and the online promo 'Hormuz: from the threat of closing the Strait to setting a transit fee' (هرمز؛ از تهدید به بستن تنگه تا تعیین هزینه عبور), which signals that a toll regime is being discussed as the Strait's end state.
- Yaddasht-ha (notes column): 'Trump's psychological gamble to provoke public opinion' by Mohammad-Mahdi Javadi-Hesar; 'The necessities of crisis management in the age of regional turmoil' by Ebrahim Motaghi; 'Dialogue with the enemy is a sign of rationality and wisdom' (گفت‌وگو با دشمن نشانه عقلانیت و خردورزی است) by Majid Farahani; and cultural columns on tourism policy and on artists returning to the homeland.
- Channel (text): Etemad Online posted, on the morning of 5 September, reformist activist Hamidreza Jalaeipour's charge that Jalili supporters distributed four million red flags at the Leader's funeral to crowd out the national flag, together with his call for 'active diplomacy and gradual fuel solutions' (531785); a video from the strike site in Sirik (531782); and the Qatari LNG carrier's abandonment of its US-escorted Hormuz transit (531790).

that the moment to negotiate is now, because Washington is weaker than it looks, not because Iran is. The Hormuz transit-fee promo is the item to track: if the reformist flagship is floating a toll as the Strait's settled end state, it marks a shift from 'open it for terms' toward 'monetize it', which is closer to the hardline position than the reformist lane has been. The Jalaeipour red-flags charge on the channel shows the succession-imagery fight (Jalili's camp versus the reformists) is being fought on the Leader's funeral itself.

Iran (channel)

Official government daily; read from its Telegram channel (front page not in the scan batch)

"Iran warns South Korea:

MODERATE-HIGH: official warning to South Korea; host-nation confidence targeted

participation against Iran in Hormuz equals military involvement in the war" «هشدار ایران به کره جنوبی: «مشارکت علیه ایران در هرمز، مشارکت نظامی در جنگ است»

- Main (channel, 4 September, permalink 504569): the government paper carries the warning to Seoul in the same words as the hardline channels, which places the threat to a prospective coalition partner in the official lane rather than only the IRGC lane.
- Sub-item (permalinks 504568, 504570): the State Department's approval of Bell 412 helicopters to Iraq (150 million dollars) and roughly 6 billion dollars in arms sales to Saudi Arabia, Oman and Iraq, the same package Defa Press itemized (66821), read as Washington arming the host states Iran has been striking.
- Sub-item (permalinks 504571, 504572, 504574): an Israeli attack on the south Lebanon village of Mifdoun; 'an American wounded in the war against Iran: we thought Kuwait was safe', a testimony item aimed at US host-nation confidence; and the Foreign Ministry's 'why should Americans sacrifice their youth for Israel's war?', the government's version of the American-exhaustion frame.
- Sub-item: the remainder of the feed (504575-504587) is administrative: school investment, weather, fuel prices and traffic; no memorandum or Pezeshkian statement beyond the gradual-gasoline instruction carried by Jomhouri Eslami and Iran Daily.

ANALYST NOTE The government channel's night feed is indistinguishable in selection from the hardline channels, which is consistent with the message discipline observed on 3 September; the difference is on the printed page, where the government's own English title runs a scholar's 'deal is the third option'. The South Korea warning appearing here means it carries the Foreign Ministry's imprimatur, not only the IRGC's, and should be tracked against Seoul's deployment decision.

Jam-e Jam (channel)

State broadcaster (IRIB) daily; read from its Telegram channel (front-page post 26570 at 03:45 on 5 September; image not in the scan batch)

“Army **MODERATE-HIGH: official 'all 20 objectives failed' claim; air-defense kill claim; Araghchi's warning to Jordan**

spokesman: the enemy failed in all 20 objectives of its attack on Iran” ۲۰ دشمن در تمام
هدف حمله به ایران ناکام ماند»

- Main (channel, 4 September, permalink 26562): the Army spokesman's claim that the adversary's 20 objectives, 'including disarming the nuclear capability and destabilizing the nation', went unrealized; the same briefing is the source of Etemad's 'new details' item and Iran Daily's readiness lead.
- Sub-item (permalink 26558): Foreign Minister Araghchi's reply to Jordanian remarks, 'how long must Iran wait to answer the aggressor?', questioning Amman's position on Iranian responses through Arab airspace; carried on the Jomhuri Eslami front the next morning.
- Sub-item (permalink 26565): Air Defense commander Brigadier General Elahami quoted that 'enemy technology guaranteed no safe return', a claim of downed or damaged aircraft that no other source in the batch corroborates.
- Sub-item (permalinks 26567, 26569): The Guardian's report that USS Abraham Lincoln sailors were barred from media interviews and described poor conditions aboard, the same material Sobh-e No turns into its 'floating scrap' image; and the Financial Times on EU gas storage at 65.6 percent, a 15-year low for the season.
- Sub-item (permalinks 26561, 26575, 26577): Hormozgan's governor on five wedding-strike victims still hospitalized, four in intensive care; the UN on 33,000 Palestinians displaced from Jenin, Tulkarm and Nur Shams; and the welfare ministry's subsidy recharge for the first group of households on 6 September, the state paper's one domestic-relief item.

ANALYST NOTE The broadcaster's paper supplies the official layer that the Persian fronts build on: the Army's '20 objectives' and the air-defense 'no safe return' claim are threat-register statements without independent corroboration and should be logged as claims. Its selection of the Lincoln crew story and the EU gas figure shows the state line converging with Sobh-e No and Ta'adol on American and European exhaustion as the strategic argument of the day.

Tehran Times (web)

English-language state daily; the website was unavailable at compile time and only a cached home-page listing dated 4 September could be read

"Persian Gulf

MODERATE-HIGH: hegemony-fracture essay; phosphorus allegation; Camp Titin reach argument

equilibrium: the fracturing of US hegemony"

- Main (home page as cached on 4 September): 'Persian Gulf equilibrium: the fracturing of US hegemony', an essay casting Iran as a Jerry who 'does not flee' but 'exhausts its adversary and systematically neutralizes American capabilities', the site's most-viewed item.
- Sub-item: 'Camp Titin: Iran's strike on a US Marine facility signals a wider strategic challenge' by Hossein Amiri, continuing the 3 September thread on the Gulf of Aqaba strike; 'How Iran disabled the largest US naval base in West Asia'; and 'IRGC: two oil tankers disabled after hitting sea mines', the Wednesday claim.
- Sub-item: the standing lead 'They came for a wedding dance, Trump gave them the dance of death' with a deputy health minister's claim of 'evidence pointing to phosphorus bombing in Lamerd', a new and unverified allegation.
- Sub-item (editorial menu): 'Leader Sets Key National Priorities' (the Government Week message that SNSC secretary Mohsen Rezaei described as 'clear and beyond interpretation'), 'Rezaei's Strong Message', 'Trump's Iran Strategy: Growing Strategic Quagmire' and 'Pezeshkian Calls for Stronger SCO Cooperation'.
- Coverage note: the 5 September edition could not be retrieved; the items above reflect the site as of 4 September and are used for continuity only.

ANALYST NOTE Tehran Times remains the English packaging of the hardline register: hegemony fracturing, Camp Titin as strategic reach, the wedding strike as war crime, and now a phosphorus allegation for Lamerd that would, if pressed, become a second legal-campaign file. The Leader's Government Week message is the most recent Leader text the state English press promotes, which confirms that no fresh Leader statement accompanied the Kuhestak strike or the retaliation.

Vatan-e Emrooz (channel)

Hardline principlist daily; read from its Telegram channel (front-page image posted at 18:35 on 4 September, permalink 24139, not in the scan batch)

"Midnight failure of the

HIGH: escort-failure claim; explicit threat to South Korea; IAEA referral pre-framed

American escort in the Strait of Hormuz" «شکست نیمه‌شبى اسکورت آمریکا در تنگه هرمز»

- Main (channel, 04:15, permalink 24140): 'the LNG carrier Al Ghashamiya, moving in the southern corridor under American protection, abandoned its transit of the Strait of Hormuz' and, instead of returning to Ras Laffan, 'has headed for the port of Fujairah in the Emirates'; the post cites Kpler tracking data from late Mordad showing the vessel and four other LNG carriers leaving Ras Laffan eastward. The Etemad Online channel carried the same item at 05:34. The vessel's diversion is a claim from Iranian channels citing tracking data; no operator statement was available at compile time.
- Sub-item (04:42, permalink 24142): 'Iran's warning to South Korea': an Iranian official is quoted that 'any South Korean participation against Iran in Hormuz constitutes military participation in the aggression', following Press TV's 4 September report that Seoul is weighing a deployment under US pressure; the Iran newspaper channel carried the same warning (504569).
- Sub-item (05:01, permalink 24144): 'Tanker Trackers' claim: more than 7 million barrels' of oil staged in the Gulf of Oman awaiting Hormuz transit under CENTCOM protection, presented as evidence that the escort regime is a queue, not a corridor.
- Kicker (16:40-17:55 on 4 September, permalinks 24131-24137): Reuters on the US and E3 pressing the IAEA Board to report Iran to the Security Council next week; Iran's Vienna mission calling it 'the complete failure of snapback fantasies'; Trump's claim that Democrats 'prefer we lose the war against Iran'; Ghalibaf welcoming China's regional security architecture; Pezeshkian on enemies using 'war, siege and sanctions' to divide; and an Israeli analyst on the Mecca accord's signatories pursuing separate goals.
- Op-ed (Kiosk column, 05:32, permalink 24150): 'Evading the crime' (شانه خالى کردن از جنايت), on the Trump administration's attempts to escape responsibility for the Kuhestak wedding bombing, following Vice President Vance's 3 September line that 'we're investigating it because obviously we care'.

ANALYST NOTE Vatan-e Emrooz's morning feed is the day's clearest Hormuz-control messaging: an escorted Qatari LNG carrier turning back, seven million barrels queued, and a new threat aimed at a prospective coalition member (South Korea). The escort-failure story is the hardline answer to Energy Secretary Wright's statement that the Navy should be able to escort tankers by the end of the month, and it is built on tracking data rather than on an Iranian action, which makes it more durable than a battle-damage claim. The IAEA referral item, carried without a front-page lead anywhere in the batch, is the week's scheduled escalation and is being pre-framed as 'snapback fantasy'.

Appendix A: The Leader on the day's fronts (absence noted; the printed Leader text is the martyred predecessor's)

Kayhan, Nokteh column 'To which mill does this water flow?!' by Hossein Shariatmadari, page 2, 14 Shahrivar 1405; Kayhan Online permalinks 82963 and 82964

Analyst flag: no message, speech or directive from the sitting Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, appears on any of the ten scanned fronts of 14 Shahrivar, on the six outlet channels or on the three agency wires read for this edition. This is the third consecutive edition in which the Leader is absent from the page on a day of major operational or political consequence (the Kuhestak funeral, the Army's multi-base retaliation claim, and the open factional fight over the memorandum). The most recent Leader texts promoted by the state press remain the Government Week message (which SNSC secretary Mohsen Rezaei called 'clear and beyond interpretation') and the Unity Week message read on 30 August; neither is reprinted today. The only Leader text printed on a front-page-referenced item today is a quotation of the martyred predecessor, Ali Khamenei, from his Nowruz address of 1 Farvardin 1401 (21 March 2022), reproduced twice by Shariatmadari to defend the state broadcaster. It is translated in full below because it is the text the flagship chose to place under the Leader's authority on this day.

Original (as printed by Kayhan): «در جنگ ترکیبی، دشمن از رسانه استفاده می‌کند، از عامل فرهنگی استفاده می‌کند، از عامل امنیتی استفاده می‌کند، از نفوذ استفاده می‌کند، از عامل اقتصادی استفاده می‌کند؛ از همه این عوامل استفاده می‌کند برای اینکه ملت را در محاصره قرار بدهد، برای اینکه ملت را دچار یأس کند، ملت را از نیروی خودش غافل کند. سعی می‌کنند ملت را از راه‌های اطلاع‌رسانی جدا کنند. خب، ما وسایل اطلاع‌رسانی به مردم را داریم؛ اینها را بدین می‌کنند: به رادیوتلوویزیون گوش ندهید، خبرهایش خلاف واقع است؛ به گزارش مسئولین توجه نکنید، گزارششان خلاف واقع است؛ به حرف‌های رهبری گوش نکنید، حرف‌های رهبری تکراری است؛ تکراری است؟ سال‌ها است که جبهه دشمن با صدای بلند اعلام می‌کند که می‌خواهیم جمهوری اسلامی را به زانو در بیاوریم، رهبری در مقابل می‌گوید «غلط می‌کنید»؛ این تکرار نیست؛ این استقامت است.» (اول فروردین ۱۴۰۱)

Translation: 'In the combined war, the enemy uses the media, uses the cultural factor, uses the security factor, uses infiltration, uses the economic factor; it uses all of these factors in order to place the nation under siege, in order to drive the nation to despair, to make the nation unaware of its own strength. They try to cut the nation off from its channels of information. Well, we have our means of informing the people; they make people suspicious of these: do not listen to radio and television, its news is contrary to fact; pay no attention to the officials' reports, their reports are contrary to fact; do not listen to the Leadership's words, the Leadership's words are repetitive. Repetitive? For years the enemy front has announced at the top of its voice that we want to bring the Islamic Republic to its knees, and the Leadership answers, "you are mistaken" (غلط می‌کنید), a rebuke closer to "how dare you"; this is not repetition; this is steadfastness.' (1 Farvardin 1401)

Shariatmadari's framing around the quotation: the editor introduces the passage as 'the expert and intelligent statements of the martyred gentleman' (آقای شهید) and asks 'some individuals and a number of parties and political currents' now attacking 'the totality of the national broadcaster' how their attacks differ from 'the extensive and successive attacks of the system's known enemies on IRIB and the missile attack of America and the Zionist regime on the national media's building', noting that four missiles were fired at the IRIB building. He closes: 'the enemy strikes IRIB so that the people go to the enemy's media for news and analysis ... have they thought at all to which mill they are pouring this water?'

Verification note: the quotation is attributed by Kayhan to the address of 1 Farvardin 1401 and its wording matches the published text of that speech. The honorific 'the martyred gentleman' and the reference to the assassinated Leader as 'our martyr' (شهیدمان) are as printed. The column is a response to Hassan Rouhani's

31 August remarks asking whether IRIB 'should not become national after 12 days, after 40 days', which the Etemad channel and Shafaqna carried on 3-4 September; Kayhan does not name Rouhani in the Nokteh but does so in its Goft-o Shonud and Khabar-e Vizheh items on the same page. Source line: Kayhan, page 2, 14 Shahrivar 1405; Kayhan Online, 82963 and 82964, posted 04:15-04:17 on 5 September 2026.

Appendix B: Flagged editorial, Kayhan Yadasht-e Rooz, 'Hezbollah's Steadfastness and the Uproar of a Distraught Regime' (ایستادگی حزب الله و (جنجال رژیم پریشان by Saadollah Zarei

Kayhan, page 2, Saturday 14 Shahrivar 1405 (5 September 2026); kayhan.ir item 337341; raw Persian text saved in raw/kayhan-yadasht-e-rooz-2026-09-05.txt

Author verification: the piece is signed سعدالله زارعی (Saadollah Zarei) on kayhan.ir. Zarei is Kayhan's principal foreign-affairs columnist and a regular Yadasht-e Rooz author on the Axis of Resistance; the front page carries the title without a byline. The day's Nokteh column ('To which mill does this water flow?!') is by managing editor Hossein Shariatmadari and is treated in Appendix A. Full translation follows; honorifics and loaded regime vocabulary ('usurping', 'criminal', 'martyred', 'the Jewish army', 'takfiri terrorists', 'the Jolani government') are rendered as printed and are the author's.

Lebanese Hezbollah declared its existence in 1364 (1985), at a time when the Israeli regime had seized territory as far as Beirut and not long after it had, through the Camp David accord in the winter of 1357 (1979), broken the resistance of the last and most powerful Arab state standing against it and doubled the area it occupied or controlled. In those days the government of Bashir and Amin Gemayel was formally Israel's puppet in Lebanon. Lebanon had been in civil war for about ten years before Hezbollah's founding and the war continued for fifteen years after it. From 1355 (1976), two years after the civil war began, Israel used Lebanese mercenaries to create the 'South Lebanon Army' under Major Saad Haddad, with a strength of about 5,000, which for about 25 years, until 1379 (2000), operated as the Israeli army's front-line force.

Before Hezbollah's founding the Shia were in the position of 'the weakest Lebanese community' and had no political standing in the state, including the army. Internally, despite the great efforts of Imam Musa Sadr, Sheikh Mahdi Shamseddine and Allameh Fadlallah, they lacked the necessary structure and cohesion compared with the Christians, the Sunnis and the Druze. Economically and financially, as the martyr Dr. Chamran says, they were in a wretched state.

Hezbollah came into being in those conditions, when not a glimmer of success lay before it, and over fifteen years of striving effort, surmounting many difficulties and offering hundreds of martyrs and thousands of wounded, it managed to pass through the set of problems we have listed and, within about fifteen years, to expel the usurping and criminal Israeli army completely from Lebanon, to shatter and dissolve the mercenary and treacherous army of the south under Colonel Antoine Lahad, to fill the organizational vacuum of the Shia, to end Lebanon's 25-year civil war, to remove the affliction of a government in Beirut dependent on the criminal Israeli regime, to secure and consolidate an effective Shia presence in the political structure, and to raise Lebanon, between 1379/2000 and 1402/2023, that is for 23 years, to the status of a deterrent power.

After its great victory over the Israeli regime in the summer war of 1385 (2006), known in Iran as the 33-day war and called by the Lebanese the July War, Hezbollah attained a position beyond Lebanon. Its remarkable victory over an army equipped and comprehensively supported by America gave Hezbollah a unique standing in the Islamic world, in the Arab world and even beyond, in Latin America, and made it, after Iran, the most powerful, most intelligent and largest unit of the resistance. On that basis, in every regional development eyes turned to Hezbollah. On that basis it became well known that Hezbollah played a fundamental role in bringing the usurping American army in Iraq to its knees between 1383 and 1390 (2004-2011) and in eliminating the takfiri terrorists in that country between 1394 and 1397 (2015-2018), though the size of that effect has not been published anywhere and Hezbollah itself has published nothing on these two matters. The same discussions exist about the formation of Ansarallah and Hezbollah's role in helping Yemen during its eight-

year war with a coalition of nineteen countries centered on the Saudis, and Hezbollah has said nothing about that either.

But in the recent world war against the then government of Syria, a war that itself ended in the aggressors' defeat while the Syrian government collapsed for other reasons, Hezbollah's role between 1392 and 1398 (2013-2019) is evident and prominent. Hezbollah was certainly a major pillar of the victory in Syria and of the liberation of its areas occupied by takfiri terrorists. This is a role about which much documentation exists and about which Hezbollah's own leaders and commanders have spoken.

The Syrian war was a critical juncture for Hezbollah and the choice to enter it was the hardest decision of its life; in the end Hezbollah's martyred leader, a few months after the war began, in early 1391 (2012), entered the Syrian war on the argument that he could not ignore the future dangers to Lebanon's security from a victory of the takfiris tied to America and its regional agents in Syria. Hezbollah's entry into combat with gunmen who, in addition to America, Europe and Israel, were openly and comprehensively supported by the governments of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates and Turkey, and in the Morsi period by the Egyptian government, was entirely different from Hezbollah's clashes with the Israeli regime on Lebanese soil, and so the intense propaganda of the Arab governments against Hezbollah set in, with accusations such as the killing of Sunnis, and of turning from a resistance force into an expansionist one, from a national force into a proxy, from a force with spiritual motives into a force with material ones, and put great pressure on Hezbollah. Hezbollah's entry into the six- or seven-year Syrian war, which required bringing a relatively large force into the fray, had other side effects for it, because it enabled its enemies to identify its forces and commanders, and its practice in a war in the alleys and streets of a country doubled the Israeli army's worry about it. But Hezbollah, aware of these side effects, judged the defeat of the protected terrorists in Syria to be an important danger for Lebanon's security and saw itself compelled to enter. Experience has confirmed this, and now the whole long eastern border of Lebanon is exposed to threat and from time to time leads to armed clashes between the Jolani government and the Lebanese army.

After the relative consolidation of the Assad government in Syria and at Bashar al-Assad's request, Hezbollah ended its presence in Syria in 1398 (2019) and returned to Lebanon.

When in mid-Mehr 1402 (October 2023) the Israeli regime's war against the Palestinian resistance in Gaza began, Hezbollah came to Gaza's aid without hesitation by attacking the northern areas of occupied Palestine and was engaged with the Israeli army for about fifteen months without pause, at a time when less than five years had passed since its combat forces left Syria, which does not count as much time to rebuild a force that had been engaged for about seven years in the Syrian war. With Hezbollah's entry into the defense of Gaza against Israel, it was expected that Lebanon's domestic front would line up behind Hezbollah, since here an Arab-Islamic land was directly under the heavy and merciless attacks of the Jewish army. But Lebanon's domestic front in its two Christian and Sunni spheres, which had undergone changes to the detriment of Hezbollah and Hamas during the Syrian war, and the condemnation of the Al-Aqsa Flood operation by the Arab governments, prevented a Lebanese-Arab convergence in favor of the Lebanese resistance in the war with the regime, and Hezbollah spent about fifteen months of war in sheer isolation, an oppression that grew with every Israeli advance in Gaza.

Meanwhile two military clashes occurred in 1403 (2024) between the Israeli regime and Iran and Hezbollah entered in a limited way on Iran's side, until these clashes led to the heavy 12-day war of Khordad and Tir 1404 (June 2025) of the Israeli regime against Iran and ultimately to the heavy Ramadan war between America, Israel and nine other governments and the Islamic Republic, at the start of which the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Imam Seyyed Ali Khamenei, was martyred. These two wars, and especially the second, caused Lebanese Hezbollah, together with the resistance in Iraq and Yemen, to enter a new war

with the Israeli regime in unity with the resistance front. Given the interconnection of the American, Zionist and partly Arab front in the Ramadan war against Iran, Hezbollah's defense of the Islamic Republic automatically exposed it to the fiercer enmity of that front, including the domestic front of Hezbollah's opponents and the Arab governments of the southern Persian Gulf, and their defeat by Iran widened the scope of their enmity toward Hezbollah and, after the defeat, made them more determined to destroy it.

Hezbollah has spent the period from 19 Farvardin to mid-Shahrivar (8 April to early September), a five-month period, in this atmosphere, and despite two apparent ceasefires arising from the bilateral Islamabad understanding and the trilateral Washington negotiations, it has been under the usurping army's daily bombardment.

The Israeli army, with the strategy of completely eliminating Hezbollah, resumed intense war against Hezbollah from mid-Farvardin and has been supported in it by various kinds of front-wide backing. So far the Israeli army, despite its technological superiority and its air and intelligence support, has not reached its declared objective, and in this atmosphere it is forced to maneuver on the destruction of a village or the capture of a hill, while the Israeli government, because of its military defeats, is worried about the results of its domestic elections. In an atmosphere in which Iran's military strikes on America's main bases in the region, from the Emirates to Jordan, have forced the Trump government to endure heavy blows and many casualties, and while the American army has for five months been engaged in wresting Iran's control of the Strait of Hormuz in order to dominate the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman and has achieved not the smallest gain in it, the Israeli army maneuvers on the capture of a hill in Lebanon whose reality and manner are still unclear, whereas if it has gained anything in this five-month contest, it may lose even that within the next few days! With the account we have written of forty years of Hezbollah's repeated victories and forty years of its enemies' helplessness before it, Hezbollah is not a scroll that can be rolled up by war or even by a combination of wars.

Analyst flag: the editorial's operative claims are (1) that the Ali al-Taher capture is unproven ('reality and manner still unclear') and reversible 'within days'; (2) that the Islamabad memorandum and the 'trilateral Washington negotiations' produced only 'apparent ceasefires' for Lebanon; and (3) that Iranian strikes have inflicted 'heavy blows and many casualties' on US forces. Claim 1 is contradicted by the Israeli defense minister's 4 September statement and by France 24 and Asharq Al-Awsat reporting of the ridge's capture, though Hezbollah has not confirmed the loss; claim 3 is an Iranian claim without independent casualty confirmation. The piece is significant as the flagship's chosen response to the ridge's fall: reassurance by historical analogy rather than a call for escalation, and no mention of the undersea-cable proposal the same page carried two days earlier. Source line: Kayhan, Yadasht-e Rooz, page 2, 14 Shahrivar 1405, item 337341.

Appendix C: Methodology and Sourcing Notes

Iran Press Intelligence Monitor pipeline, edition of 5 September 2026 (Day 186)

Sources and coverage. Ten front-page scans were gathered from the NewspaperTasnim album of Saturday 14 Shahrivar 1405 (posted 22:54 on 4 September, permalink 44332; nine Persian titles) and the Newspapers_Iran album of the same date (permalink 3554; Iran Daily). The stale-batch guard matched the album's printed Jalali date to the edition date on the first attempt. The Persian titles read from scans are Javan, Sobh-e No, Kayhan, Nobonyad, Sazandegi, Chahar Sough, Jomhuri Eslami, Ta'adol and Etemad. Vatan-e Emrooz, Jam-e Jam and Iran were not in the scan batch and were read from their Telegram channels (permalinks cited in each entry); their entries are channel readings, not front-page analyses. Kayhan's editorial, satirical and special-news items were read from kayhan.ir (items 337340 and 337341). Defa Press, Fars News and Nour News were read as agency wires for corroboration and threat-register context, not as front pages. Tehran Times was unavailable at compile time; a cached home-page listing dated 4 September was used for continuity only, and its 5 September edition is not represented.

Day count. This edition is Day 186 by the monitor's fixed calendar count (Day 118 on 29 June 2026). Kayhan's own front page today carries 'the report of the 189th day of the war', and at least one open-source tracker uses the same count; the monitor keeps its own epoch for consistency across editions and notes the three-day divergence rather than adopting the paper's figure. Jalali and Hijri dates (14 Shahrivar 1405; 23 Rabi al-Awwal 1448) are taken from the mastheads.

Identification and verification. Every named figure was checked against the printed text and, where the page was ambiguous, against a second source: Hossein Taeb (Basij chief since 10 August; his memorandum remarks also carried by Iran International on 4 September), Saadollah Zarei (byline on kayhan.ir), Mohsen Hashemi Rafsanjani (Sazandegi editorial, confirmed on the Sazandegi media group's site), Esmail Saghab Esfahani (head of the government's strategic energy management body, named on the Chahar Sough page and in Fararu and SNN reports on the gasoline options), Ayatollah Seyyed Ahmad Khatami (Tehran Friday prayer leader on 13 Shahrivar, per Asr-e Iran and Entekhab), Jalal Dehghani Firouzabadi (name tag on the Iran Daily interview), and Yousef Pezeshkian (the 'president's son' of Nobonyad's item, whose enrichment remarks were reported on 1 September). Hassan Rouhani's remarks were verified against the Shafaqna transcript of his 9 Shahrivar (31 August) meeting; Nobonyad's characterization of those remarks as a demand for a vote on continuing the war is a distortion of a rhetorical question and is flagged in the paper's entry. The Iran Daily photograph caption naming the coffin's occupant was read from the scan and is reported as printed.

Claims logged as claims. The Army spokesman's 'four US bases in three countries' and 'all 20 objectives failed', the air-defense commander's 'no safe return', Kayhan's 'Yemen on the verge of controlling Taiz' and 'Al Saud reached for mediators', the Qatari LNG carrier Al Ghashamiya's abandonment of an escorted transit (Iranian channels citing tracking data; no operator statement found), Tanker Trackers' seven million barrels staged in the Gulf of Oman, the deputy health minister's phosphorus allegation for Lamerd, the direct-hit munition analysis for Kuhestak, and Chahar Sough's attribution of a 33,000-toman rise to the central bank governor's statements are all attributed to their outlets and not adopted as fact. The Pentagon-NIH funding story, the US-E3 draft IAEA resolution, Trump's Pickaxe Mountain remark, the Houthi offensive west of Taiz, the USS Abraham Lincoln's Thailand port call and the free-market dollar above 220,000 toman are corroborated by non-Iranian sources.

Single-source flags. The Nobonyad sentence against the unnamed 'Dey-month coup plotter' (12 years, 6 months and one day plus confiscation) could not be matched to a judiciary statement. Jomhuri Eslami's 'new

consultations' among Pakistan, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia rest on the paper's 'media sources'; the Egypt-Qatar foreign ministers' call is not independently confirmed here. Etemad's 'return-and-enough proposal' item is flagged from the front-page blurb only. The Leader's absence from the fronts is asserted on the basis of the ten scans and nine channels read; a Leader statement carried only on khamenei.ir, which could not be reached at compile time, would not have been captured.

Translation caveats. Persian headlines are retained in the original script beside editorial English renderings. 'Fetneh' (sedition) in Chahar Sough's lead, 'talabkar' (creditor or claimant) in Sobh-e No's lead, 'ezzatzmandaneh' (honorable, with dignity) in Sazandegi's lead and 'siyah-namayi' (painting black) in Chahar Sough's Hemmati item carry political register that the English glosses only approximate. The idiom in Kayhan's lead, 'the ladle has hit the bottom of the pot', means the resources are exhausted. Unverified attributed quotations, including all second-hand renderings of American officials and media, are not to be reproduced as authentic without primary-source confirmation.

Handling. This product documents and analyzes hostile foreign-press rhetoric for defensive assessment only; nothing herein endorses, amplifies or operationalizes it. Prepared for analysis and early warning.

Open-source material only. All translations from Persian/Arabic originals. Iranian claims are labelled as claims. Prepared for analysis and early warning; hostile content is documented for defensive assessment only, not endorsed.