OPEN-SOURCE PRESS INTELLIGENCE

Iranian Press Monitor

Daily Front-Page Intelligence

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THE HORMUZ-CLOSURE-ON-THE-RECORD EDITION

13 Iranian front pages surveyed: nine Persian print titles read from scan (Javan, Sobh-e No, Kayhan, Nobonyad, Sedaye Iran, Charsou, Ta'adol, Etemad, Jomhouri Eslami) plus Iran Daily in English from scan, and three dailies read from their own channels (Vatan-e Emrooz, Jam-e Jam, Iran); Defa Press, Fars News and Nour News monitored for corroboration; Tehran Times was unavailable at the time

Front pages published the morning of 19 August 2026, reflecting events through late 18 August local

Defensive open-source press-intelligence. Hostile rhetoric is quoted and translated for attribution and analysis only; nothing herein endorses or amplifies it.

Iran Daily

Kamal Garden in Tabriz to become hub for Iran's cultural luminaries

Strait of Hormuz to remain shut until US meets Islamabad MoU conditions: *Qalibaf*

Iran holds ceremony to honor martyred Leader 40 days after his burial

Peyeshkian calls for development plans based on Iran's territorial advantages, limits

Revisiting Iran's 1953 coup d'état after 73 years

Handball coach confident of Iran's Asian Games prospects despite missing overseas players

False-flag operation aimed to turn Iraqi Kurdistan against Iran

Executive Summary

The lead development of the 19 August edition is the hardening of the Strait of Hormuz from ultimatum into declared, conditioned state policy, stated by name and for external audiences. Iran Daily, the government's English-language shop window, fronts Speaker of Parliament and lead negotiator Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf placing on the record that the strait will remain shut until Washington lifts its blockade of Iranian ports, lifts oil sanctions, releases Tehran's frozen assets, and ends military operations. International wire reporting confirms the statement, dated a day after the Islamabad accord's sixty-day deadline lapsed. Where the 18 August edition carried a Reuters-sourced seven-week ultimatum as reformist-fronted system messaging, this cycle the Speaker attaches his own name and a four-point condition set, and the state prints it in English: the closure is now official policy addressed to a foreign readership, not a hardline flourish.

The edition's second axis is the split the closure exposes inside the system. On the same morning that Qalibaf keeps a conditional door open - comply, and the strait reopens - the hardline flagship Kayhan slams it shut. Its front-page Yadasht-e Rooz editorial, authored by Hossein Shariatmadari (channel post #81267), argues that the accord has been violated to the point of being void ('nothing comes of the accord') and that 'today's agenda is breaking the siege' through military and field capability and popular mobilization, not negotiation. The accord dispute this monitor has tracked as a three-way argument thus resolves this cycle into a cleaner binary: conditional-leverage diplomacy (Qalibaf, the government daily) against maximalist rupture (Kayhan, and the principlist Nobonyad, whose front calls 'pride in the memorandum an instance of breaking unity'). The strait is the instrument both camps claim.

Onto the closure the press welds a coordinated 'America in retreat and decline' construction that this cycle is anchored to a real external report. The government daily Iran and the principlist Sobh-e No amplify a Washington Post account that the Pentagon is weighing a reduced Persian Gulf posture after the war; Sobh-e No renders it as 'news of America's withdrawal from the Persian Gulf' beside the fortieth-day commemoration. The original report describes an options study prompted by damage to more than 200 base facilities, not an ordered withdrawal - a distinction the Iranian framing erases. In parallel the reformist Etemad ('the president's failure') and the establishment Jomhouri Eslami ('the collapse of Trump's standing in American public opinion') make the US president's domestic weakness the story, tying it to energy costs, the continued military presence and the coming midterms; Vatan-e Emrooz claims only about 35 percent of US senators back continuing operations. That the adversary-decline line now runs on the reformist tier as well marks it as centrally seeded rather than a hardline monopoly.

The single most consequential thing the edition does not say is the day's sharpest finding. International reporting confirms a genuine UAE-Iran rupture: the Emirates suspended all trade, commercial exchanges and financial transactions with Iran 'until further notice' after accusing Tehran of firing two ballistic missiles toward the UAE on 18 August, one landing in its territorial waters, amid UAE charges that Iran struck its ADNOC vessels in the strait. The Iranian front pages carry none of this. They front instead the enforcement fact that flatters the closure narrative - the government daily reports a detained UAE-flagged tanker rerouted from Jebel Ali to Bandar Abbas - while omitting both the missile allegation and the Emirati trade break. The asymmetry is itself the signal: the press amplifies Iran's own coercion leverage and suppresses the retaliation and the attribution that would complicate it.

Domestically the day belongs to Qalibaf, who surges across the batch on several fronts at once: an appeal for elite unity ('the war is a national matter, not an arena for political rivalries', Javan), a rebuke that 'the street is not the venue for election rallies' (Etemad), open criticism of the state broadcaster IRIB (Sobh-e No), and opposition to the Pezeshkian government's petrol-price increase (Charsou). The Speaker is simultaneously

the face of the Hormuz closure abroad and the arbiter of intra-elite competition at home, and he is the one the current Leader sends to Karbala as his representative. The economic press supplies the counter-current: Charsou's 'the ration coupon's value has been halved' and Ta'adol's 'trade under fire' quantify a subsidy erosion of up to 70 percent and reframe the war as economic warfare, while Parliament hands the agriculture minister a second yellow card over 450 trillion tomans of livestock inputs. Even Ta'adol deflates the bourse rally that Javan celebrates ('the index went up but the market did not').

Two continuity threads persist beneath the external file. The current Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, again issues no message of his own; the leadership appears only through the state-directed fortieth-day (chelom) commemoration of the martyred predecessor, Ali Khamenei, which Iran Daily dates forty days after the burial (reconciling the calendar earlier editions flagged), and through Qalibaf standing in for the Leader at the Karbala rite. The commemoration runs in an avenging register - Sobh-e No's 'O avengers of Khamenei' banner, Kayhan's 'hasten to retribution' cry. And the 28 Mordad anniversary of the US and UK-backed 1953 coup, its seventy-third, is worked across tiers (Nobonyad's 'the empty street', Jomhouri Eslami's 'negligence and discord', Iran Daily's retrospective) into the historical-intervention frame that legitimizes present grievance.

Net assessment: this is a declared-closure edition in which the Hormuz leverage crosses from messaging into named, conditioned state policy printed for foreign readers, and in which the internal argument over the accord sharpens into a binary between conditional diplomacy and outright rupture. The regime anchors its 'America in retreat' construction to a real Pentagon-review report it overstates, and runs a suppression as deliberate as any amplification: the genuine UAE-Iran break and the missile allegation behind it are kept off the front pages. The threads to watch are whether Qalibaf's four conditions harden into a formal negotiating text or prove rhetorical; whether the UAE rupture and the reported missile exchange escalate; whether the Pentagon posture review is confirmed or is being read into more than it says; and whether the accord split tips toward Kayhan's rupture or the government's conditional line. The current Leader remains present only by proxy and by mourning.

BOTTOM LINE The day the accord's sixty-day clock had run out, Iran converted its Hormuz ultimatum into declared policy: Speaker and lead negotiator Qalibaf stated, on the record and in English, that the strait stays shut until Washington lifts its port blockade, oil sanctions, asset freeze and military operations, while Kayhan foreclosed the diplomatic exit outright, the whole press tier read a Washington Post report of a possible Pentagon Gulf drawdown as proof of American retreat, and a real UAE-Iran rupture that the front pages pointedly did not carry ran underneath it all.

CRITICAL SOURCING NOTE Compiled from nine Persian kiosk scans and the Iran Daily English scan for 28 Mordad 1405, three dailies read from their own Telegram channels (Vatan-e Emrooz, Jam-e Jam, Iran), and the Defa Press, Fars News and Nour News wires for corroboration only; Tehran Times was unavailable. The lead - Qalibaf's four-condition Hormuz-closure statement - was confirmed against international wire reporting dated 18 August. Two amplified secondary claims were independently confirmed and are reported with their original framing: the UAE's suspension of all trade and financial transactions with Iran, which outside reporting ties to a UAE accusation of two Iranian ballistic-missile launches on 18 August (a charge the Iranian front pages omit); and a Washington Post report of a Pentagon study of a reduced Persian Gulf posture after more than 200 base facilities were damaged, described in the original as an options study rather than an ordered withdrawal. All Iranian and allied battle-damage, operational and vote-count claims are the relevant outlets' or agencies' assertions and are held behind the attribution firewall. The succession premise (Ali Khamenei assassinated 28 February 2026; Mojtaba Khamenei as current Supreme Leader) underlies the reading of 'the Leader' references; named figures were checked against the printed pages.

Macro Trend Analysis

1 Hormuz closure crosses from ultimatum to declared, conditioned policy - stated by name and in English

Iran Daily fronts Qalibaf, Speaker and lead negotiator, stating the strait stays shut until Washington lifts its port blockade, lifts oil sanctions, releases frozen assets and ends military operations. Confirmed by international wires and printed for a foreign readership a day after the accord's sixty-day deadline lapsed, this converts the 18 August seven-week ultimatum into named state policy with an explicit condition set. The government daily supplies the enforcement counterpart: a detained UAE-flagged tanker rerouted to Bandar Abbas.

2 The accord split sharpens into a binary: conditional leverage against maximalist rupture

On the same morning Qalibaf keeps a conditional door open, Kayhan's Shariatmadari editorial forecloses it ('nothing comes of the accord; today's agenda is breaking the siege', channel post #81267), and Nobonyad calls 'pride in the memorandum an instance of breaking unity'. The three-way argument the monitor tracked resolves this cycle into conditional-diplomacy (Qalibaf, the government daily) versus outright-rupture (Kayhan, Nobonyad), with the strait as the instrument both claim.

3 'America in retreat and decline', anchored this cycle to a real report it overstates

Iran and Sobh-e No amplify a Washington Post account of a Pentagon study of a reduced Persian Gulf posture as 'America's withdrawal from the Persian Gulf'; the original describes an options study after more than 200 base facilities were damaged, not an ordered withdrawal. Etemad ('the president's failure') and Jomhouri Eslami ('the collapse of Trump's standing') carry the adversary-decline line on the reformist and establishment tiers, with Vatan-e Emrooz's claimed 35-percent Senate support - marking a centrally seeded construction, not editorial convergence.

4 The suppression that is the signal: a real UAE-Iran rupture the front pages omit

Outside reporting confirms the UAE suspended all trade and financial transactions with Iran after accusing Tehran of firing two ballistic missiles toward the Emirates on 18 August. The Iranian front pages carry neither the trade break nor the missile allegation; they front only the seized-tanker diversion that flatters the closure narrative. The asymmetry - amplify one's own leverage, suppress the retaliation and the attribution - is a first-class finding, not an absence.

5 Qalibaf's multi-front surge: closure abroad, arbiter at home, Leader's proxy in Karbala

The Speaker fronts the batch as the face of the Hormuz closure (Iran Daily), the voice of elite unity ('the war is above politics', Javan), the scold of electioneering ('the street is not for rallies', Etemad), a critic of the state broadcaster (Sobh-e No) and an opponent of the petrol-price hike (Charsou) - and the man the current Leader sends to represent him at the fortieth-day rite in Karbala. Qalibaf is simultaneously the day's chief external spokesman and its central domestic actor.

6 Economic-realism dissent hardens as a check on chokepoint triumphalism

Charsou's 'the ration coupon's value has been halved' and its 70-percent purchasing-power figure, Ta'adol's 'trade under fire' recasting the war as economic warfare, the agriculture minister's second parliamentary yellow card over 450 trillion tomans of feed inputs, and Ta'adol's deflation of the bourse rally Javan celebrates keep insisting the binding constraints are domestic and self-inflicted - aimed at a decision-maker readership weighing coercion leverage against fragility.

7 Succession by commemoration, and the 1953 coup as historical-grievance frame

Mojtaba Khamenei issues no message of his own; the leadership appears only through the fortieth-day commemoration of the martyred predecessor (dated forty days after burial by Iran Daily) and the Speaker's Karbala delegation, in an avenging register ('O avengers of Khamenei'; 'hasten to retribution'). In parallel the seventy-third anniversary of the US and UK-backed 1953 coup is worked across tiers (Nobonyad, Jomhouri Eslami, Iran Daily) into the intervention narrative that legitimizes present grievance.

Key Judgments

KJ-1 [HIGH] Iran converted its Hormuz ultimatum into declared, conditioned state policy, stated by name and for external audiences. Iran Daily fronts Speaker and lead negotiator Qalibaf placing on the record that the strait stays shut until Washington lifts its port blockade, lifts oil sanctions, releases frozen assets and ends military operations; international wire reporting confirms the statement, dated a day after the accord's sixty-day deadline lapsed, and the government daily reports a detained UAE-flagged tanker rerouted to Bandar Abbas as the enforcement counterpart. Significance: where the prior edition carried the closure as a reformist-fronted, Reuters-sourced seven-week ultimatum, the Speaker now attaches his own name and a four-point condition set and the state prints it in English, moving the closure from messaging to official policy addressed to a foreign readership. Whether the four conditions harden into a formal negotiating text or prove rhetorical is the single most consequential thread to track.

KJ-2 [HIGH] The accord dispute sharpened this cycle into a binary between conditional leverage and maximalist rupture, visible on one morning. Qalibaf's front keeps a conditional door open (comply, and the strait reopens); Kayhan's Shariatmadari editorial forecloses it ('nothing comes of the accord; today's agenda is breaking the siege', channel post #81267), and Nobonyad calls 'pride in the memorandum an instance of breaking unity'. Significance: the three-way argument the monitor tracked ('almost nothing' / 'must not dead-end' / 'ultimatum') resolves into a cleaner split between the government's conditional-diplomacy line and a principlist rupture camp, with the strait as the shared instrument; the internal resolution of that split, not any external statement, is the concrete stake.

KJ-3 [MODERATE-HIGH] Negative-evidence finding: a genuine UAE-Iran rupture was conspicuously absent from the Iranian front pages. International reporting confirms the UAE suspended all trade and financial transactions with Iran 'until further notice' after accusing Tehran of firing two ballistic missiles toward the Emirates on 18 August, amid UAE charges that Iran struck its ADNOC vessels in the strait; the Iranian press carries neither the missile allegation nor the trade break, fronting only the seized-tanker diversion that flatters the closure narrative. Significance: the suppression is as deliberate as the amplification and is a first-class finding - the press advertises Iran's coercion leverage while withholding the retaliation and the attribution that would complicate it; whether the missile exchange and the trade rupture escalate is a live risk the domestic coverage conceals.

KJ-4 [MODERATE-HIGH] The 'America in retreat and decline' construction now spans all tiers and is anchored to a real report the press overstates. Iran and Sobh-e No amplify a Washington Post account of a Pentagon study of a reduced Persian Gulf posture as 'America's withdrawal from the Persian Gulf'; the original describes an options study after more than 200 base facilities were damaged, not an ordered withdrawal. Etemad ('the president's failure') and Jomhouri Eslami ('the collapse of Trump's standing') run the adversary-decline line on the reformist and establishment tiers, with Vatan-e Emrooz's claimed 35-percent Senate support. Significance: the near-simultaneous appearance across reformist, establishment

and hardline titles marks a centrally seeded line rather than organic convergence; the load-bearing external claim is real but is being read into more than it states.

KJ-5 [MODERATE] Leadership by delegation: the current Supreme Leader again issued no message of his own and was represented at the fortieth-day rite by the Speaker. Across the batch Mojtaba Khamenei appears only through the state-directed chelom commemoration of the martyred predecessor - which Iran Daily dates forty days after the burial, reconciling the calendar earlier editions flagged - and through Qalibaf attending the Karbala commemoration as his representative (Jam-e Jam, Iran channels). Significance: on a coordinated-messaging cycle, the current Leader's continued editorial silence, filled by mourning for the predecessor and by a proxy standing in for him, remains a standing marker in the succession picture and should be logged as negative evidence, not silence.

KJ-6 [MODERATE] Qalibaf emerged as the day's central figure on both the external and domestic files. He is the face of the Hormuz closure abroad (Iran Daily), the voice of elite unity at home ('the war is a national matter, not an arena for political rivalries', Javan), a rebuke to electioneering ('the street is not the venue for election rallies', Etemad), a public critic of the state broadcaster (Sobh-e No) and an opponent of the government's petrol-price hike (Charsou). Significance: the Speaker is consolidating a role as simultaneous chief external spokesman and arbiter of intra-elite competition, positioning against both the Pezeshkian government and IRIB while carrying the Leader's proxy - a concentration of visibility worth tracking in the succession and 2027-cycle context.

KJ-7 [MODERATE] The economic-realism dissent hardened into a quantified check on the chokepoint triumphalism. Charsou fronts 'the ration coupon's value has been halved' with a 70-percent purchasing-power figure and an itemized price table; Ta'adol's 'trade under fire' recasts the war as economic warfare across trade, currency, housing and drug supply and deflates the bourse rally Javan celebrates; Parliament handed the agriculture minister a second yellow card over 450 trillion tomans of livestock inputs. Significance: aimed at a decision-maker readership, this lane keeps insisting the binding constraints are structural and self-inflicted, an implicit rebuttal to the front-page coercion-confidence; the intra-establishment petrol-price fight (Qalibaf against the government) gives it a concrete budgetary edge.

Named-Figure Tracker

Figure	Role / relevance	Today's framing	Flag
Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf	Speaker of Parliament; lead negotiator on the Islamabad accord	Face of the declared Hormuz closure abroad, arbiter of elite competition at home, and the Leader's representative at the Karbala fortieth-day rite	COERCION SPOKESMAN
Kazem Gharibabadi	Deputy foreign minister	Frames Trump's Hormuz expectations as an 'illusion' Iran will not dispel (Javan)	WATCH
Hossein Shariatmadari	Kayhan managing editor	Authors the day's flagged editorial foreclosing diplomacy: 'break the siege'	WATCH
Masoud Pezeshkian	President	Target of Qalibaf's and the economic press's opposition on petrol pricing; calls for planning around Iran's 'territorial advantages'	WATCH

Figure	Role / relevance	Today's framing	Flag
Donald Trump	US president	Cast as failing and isolated across all tiers (energy costs, military presence, midterms, Senate dissent); his Hormuz claim mocked	TARGET FRAMING
Mojtaba Khamenei	Supreme Leader	Issues no message of his own; present only through the predecessor's commemoration and by proxy (Qalibaf) at Karbala	absence noted

Headline Summary Table

Outlet	Lead Headline (English)	Orientation	Theme	Threat signal
Iran Daily	Strait of Hormuz to remain shut until US meets Islamabad MoU conditions: Qalibaf	Official English-language daily	The Speaker's on-the-record, four-condition Hormuz closure, printed for external audiences	HIGH
Kayhan	Nothing comes of the accord; today's agenda is breaking the siege	Ultra-hardline flagship (Shariatmadari)	Diplomacy foreclosed; break-the-siege maximalism; twin-chokepoint economic war	HIGH
Sedaye Iran	Trump, Hormuz and the goldfish	Pro-leadership conservative	Mockery of Trump's Hormuz claim; the 'breaking point' mural	MODERATE-HIGH
Javan	Time to solve the problems	Hardline / IRGC-affiliated	Qalibaf's elite-unity appeal; Gharibabadi on Trump's Hormuz 'illusion'; backs petrol reform	MODERATE
Iran	A detained UAE-flagged tanker is diverted to Bandar Abbas	Official government daily (channel)	Concrete Hormuz enforcement; amplifies the Pentagon Gulf-drawdown report	MODERATE-HIGH
Sobh-e No	I am faithful to the covenant until the dawn of the appearance	Principlist	Fortieth-day revenge liturgy; 'America's withdrawal from the Persian Gulf'; Qalibaf vs IRIB	MODERATE-HIGH
Vatan-e Emrooz	War after war	Hardline / principlist (channel)	Second chokepoint via Bab-el-Mandeb (Ansarallah); US Senate dissent as fracture	MODERATE-HIGH
Jomhouri Eslami	The collapse of Trump's standing in American public opinion	Traditional / establishment	Adversary decline plus statecraft (Iraq, Afghanistan, migration, AI, coup anniversary)	MODERATE
Etemad	The president's failure	Reformist	Trump constrained ahead of the midterms; Qalibaf 'street not for rallies'; intelligence-merger proposal	LOW-MODERATE
Jam-e Jam	What lies behind the alleged backing shortfall of online gold-and-silver platforms?	State broadcaster / IRIB (channel)	Domestic economy leads; Qalibaf to represent the Leader at Karbala	MODERATE

Outlet	Lead Headline (English)	Orientation	Theme	Threat signal
Nobonyad	The agriculture minister's second yellow card: the unknown fate of 450 trillion tomans in feed inputs	Conservative / principlist	Accord-skeptic ('MoU pride breaks unity'); accountability; ration-coupon erosion	LOW
Charsou	The ration coupon's value has been halved	Economic / business	Subsidy erosion quantified; Qalibaf vs the government on petrol pricing	LOW
Ta'adol	Trade under fire	Economic / business	War as economic warfare; deflates the bourse rally; housing and drug-supply strain	LOW

Per-Paper Front-Page Analysis

Iran Daily

Official government-linked English-language daily (print scan)

“Strait of Hormuz to remain shut until US meets Islamabad MoU conditions: Qalibaf”

HIGH: official Hormuz-closure conditions stated for external audiences

Iran Daily

Strait of Hormuz to remain shut until US meets Islamabad MoU conditions: Qalibaf

Iran holds ceremony to honor martyred Leader 40 days after his burial

False-flag operation aimed to turn Iraqi Kurdistan against Iran

- Main: 'Strait of Hormuz to remain shut until US meets Islamabad MoU conditions: Qalibaf' - the English shop-window daily fronts Parliament Speaker and lead negotiator Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf placing on the record that the strait stays closed until Washington lifts its blockade of Iranian ports, lifts oil sanctions, releases Tehran's frozen assets, and ends military operations; the statement is independently carried by international wires (Reuters, syndicated) and dated a day after the accord's sixty-day deadline lapsed.
- Banner photo: 'Iran holds ceremony to honor martyred Leader 40 days after his burial' - the fortieth-day (chelom) commemoration of the martyred Leader, the caption counting forty days from the burial rather than from the 28 February death, which reconciles the calendar the earlier editions flagged as not fitting a late-February martyrdom.
- Sub-item: 'Pezeshkian calls for development plans based on Iran's territorial advantages, limits' - the president reframing economic planning around geography, an implicit nod to the chokepoint-leverage doctrine the front pages run.
- Interview: 'Revisiting Iran's 1953 coup d'etat after 73 years' - the paper marks the 28 Mordad anniversary of the US and UK-backed 1953 coup, welding present grievance to the historical-intervention frame.
- Feature: 'False-flag operation aimed to turn Iraqi Kurdistan against Iran' - an exclusive interview alleging hostile actors staged attacks from Iraqi Kurdistan (Erbil, the Kurdistan Region) with outside sponsorship to provoke Iran; carried as the outlet's attributed claim, not verified.

> **ANALYST NOTE** As the state's English-language shop window for external audiences, Iran Daily's choice to lead on Qalibaf's four Hormuz-closure conditions signals the closure is now official state messaging for foreign readers, not a hardline flourish; that the same edition foregrounds the fortieth-day commemoration and the 1953 coup anniversary shows the government fusing coercive strait leverage to a legitimacy narrative of historical victimhood. Track whether Qalibaf's four conditions harden into a formal negotiating text.

Javan

Hardline daily, IRGC-affiliated

MODERATE: unity messaging with Hormuz signaling

“Time to solve the problems” «نوبت حل مسائل»

- Main: نوبت حل مسائل ('time to solve the problems'), over Speaker Qalibaf's remark قالیباف: امر ملی جنگ، صحنه رقابت‌های سیاسی نیست، باید مسائل را حل کنیم ('Qalibaf: the war is a national matter, not an arena for political rivalries; we must solve the problems') - an appeal for elite unity carried on the IRGC-linked front.
- Sub-item: غرب‌آبادی: توهم ترامپ درباره تنگه هرمز را برطرف نمی‌کنیم - deputy foreign minister Kazem Gharibabadi framing Trump's expectations on the Strait of Hormuz as an 'illusion' Iran will not dispel.
- Op-ed: اصلاحات بنزینی به نفع کشور و ملت خواهد شد ('petrol reform will benefit the country and the nation') - unusually, Javan backs the fuel-price adjustment that Qalibaf and the economic papers oppose.
- Sub-item: شاخص بورس در آستانه فتح قله ۳ میلیون واحد ('the bourse index on the verge of conquering the three-million-point peak') - a rare upbeat economic note.
- Kicker: عادی شدن قانون‌شکنی در خیابان‌های پایتخت ('the normalization of law-breaking in the capital's streets') - a public-order grievance.
- Photo caption: «عید ما انتظار» در چهلمین روز خاکسپاری امام شهید - the fortieth-day-of-burial commemoration of the martyred Imam.

> **ANALYST NOTE** Javan amplifies Qalibaf's unity appeal (the war is above politics) while, atypically, endorsing the petrol-price reform the Speaker publicly opposes: a small but real crack showing the fuel-pricing fight runs across, not between, the hardline and pragmatist camps. Gharibabadi's 'we will not dispel Trump's Hormuz illusion' folds the diplomatic desk into the coercion frame.

Sobh-e No

Principlist daily

MODERATE-HIGH: revenge liturgy plus 'US retreat' amplification

“I am faithful to the covenant until the dawn of the [Mahdi's] appearance” «انا علی العهد تا صبح ظهور»

- Main (devotional banner): انا علی العهد تا صبح ظهور ('I am faithful to the covenant until the dawn of the appearance'), with خون او، تضمین است ('his blood is a guarantee') - the fortieth-day mourning liturgy for the martyred Leader rendered as an oath of continuity.
- Banner: ۴۰ روز از تشییع آقای شهیدمان گذشته است ('forty days have passed since the funeral of our martyr'); the crowd photo carries a یا ثارات الخامنه‌ای ('O avengers of Khamenei') revenge banner.
- Sub-item: همزمان با چهلمین روز ... خبر خروج آمریکا از خلیج فارس به گوش می‌رسد ('concurrent with the fortieth day, news of America's withdrawal from the Persian Gulf is heard') - the paper welds the commemoration to a claimed US retreat.
- Sub-item: انتقاد قالیباف از صدا و سیما ('Qalibaf's criticism of the state broadcaster IRIB'), extended by رسانه ملت یا رسانه یک محفل؟ ('media of the nation or media of a clique?').
- Sub-item: برتری میدانی انصارالله ('Ansarallah's field superiority') and پشت پرده خلع سلاح ('behind the scenes of disarmament') - the Yemen and disarmament threads.
- Right rail: چرا اطلاعات‌های کاغذی سعودی بی‌نتیجه است ('why Saudi paper-intelligence is fruitless').

ANALYST NOTE Sobh-e No fuses the martyred-Leader commemoration with the 'America withdrawing from the Persian Gulf' narrative - a line the Washington Post's report of a Pentagon review of Gulf force posture gives the papers real material to amplify - while pressing Qalibaf's open feud with the state broadcaster. The 'Ya Tharat al-Khamenei' revenge liturgy sustains the succession-by-commemoration thread this monitor tracks; the current Leader again appears only through mourning for the predecessor.

Kayhan

Ultra-hardline flagship daily, close to the Supreme Leader's office and the IRGC; managing editor Hossein Shariatmadari

HIGH: diplomacy rejected, 'break the siege' escalation

"Nothing comes of the accord; today's agenda is breaking the siege" «کاری از تفاهم ساخته نیست، دستور کار امروز شکستن محاصره است»

کیهان

کاری از تفاهم ساخته نیست
دستور کار امروز شکستن محاصره است

- Main: کاری از تفاهم ساخته نیست، دستور کار امروز شکستن محاصره است ('nothing comes of the accord; today's agenda is breaking the siege'), under the imperative preamble با پشتوانه میدان و خیابان اقدام کنید ('act with the backing of the battlefield and the street'); the flagship forecloses the diplomatic track on the same morning Qalibaf keeps a conditional door open.
- Op-ed (Yadasht-e Rooz): the day's flagged Shariatmadari editorial, confirmed on the outlet channel (kayhan_online, post #81267), argues that violations of the accord render it meaningless and that priority belongs to breaking the siege (محاصره) through military capability, not negotiation.
- Sub-item: نفت عربستان پشت حصارهای هرمز و باب‌المندب، اقتصاد آل‌سعود کوچک شد ('Saudi oil trapped behind the walls of Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb; the Al Saud economy has shrunk') - the standing twin-chokepoint economic-war thread.
- Banner: بزرگ‌ترین رسوایی تاریخ سیاست خارجی آمریکا در جنگ با ایران رقم خورد ('the biggest scandal in the history of American foreign policy has occurred in the war with Iran') - an adversary-in-disarray construction.
- Kicker: پیام‌های نهفته در احکام فرماندهان نظامی ('hidden messages in the appointments of military commanders') - command-and-succession signaling read into recent military decrees.
- Right rail: کارت زرد مجلس به وزیر کشاورزی درباره نهاده‌های دامی ('Parliament's yellow card to the agriculture minister over livestock feed inputs') - the shared domestic-accountability story.
- Photo caption: ندای «حی علی‌القصاص» در مراسم چهلمین روز تشییع و تدفین امام شهید ('the cry hasten to retribution / qisas resonated at the fortieth-day funeral ceremony of the martyred Imam') - the revenge liturgy attached to the commemoration.

> **ANALYST NOTE** Kayhan's flat rejection of the accord ('nothing comes of it') and pivot to 'breaking the siege' set the hardline flagship squarely against Qalibaf's conditional framing on the same morning: where the Speaker keeps a door open (comply, and the strait reopens), Shariatmadari's paper forecloses it and elevates the qisas revenge register. The twin-chokepoint economic-war line continues the standing Hormuz plus Bab-el-Mandeb thread. This is centrally-messaged escalation rhetoric; its battle-damage and 'scandal' claims are held behind the attribution firewall.

Nobonyad

Conservative / principlist daily

LOW: accord-skepticism and economic governance

“The agriculture minister takes a second parliamentary card: the unknown fate of 450 trillion tomans in feed inputs” «وزیر جهاد کشاورزی دومین کارت را از مجلس گرفت: سرنوشت نامعلوم ۴۵ همت نهاده»

- Main: وزیر جهاد کشاورزی دومین کارت را از مجلس گرفت / سرنوشت نامعلوم ۴۵ همت نهاده ('the agriculture-jihad minister receives his second [yellow] card from parliament; the unknown fate of 45 hemat [450 trillion tomans] of [livestock] inputs') - a hard accountability lead against the Pezeshkian cabinet.
- Banner: کودتای ۲۸ مرداد نتیجه خیابان خالی بود ('the 28 Mordad coup was the result of the empty street'), a historian's reading of the 1953 coup keyed to mobilization.
- Sub-item: افتخار به تفاهم‌نامه مصداق وحدت‌شکنی ('pride in the memorandum is an instance of breaking unity') - the paper's continuing accord-skeptic line, one day after its 'Day sixty: almost nothing' verdict.
- Op-ed: مسئول اجرایی نباید جای فرمانده جنگ بنشیند ('an executive official must not sit in the war commander's seat').
- Sub-item: قدرت خرید کالابرگ ۷۰ درصد آب رفت ('the ration coupon's purchasing power has shrunk 70 percent'); and دادستانی علیه ابتذال ('the prosecutor against vulgarity').
- Sidebar: نطق برخلاف اتحاد مقدس ('a speech against the sacred union'), pictured with Qalibaf.

ANALYST NOTE Nobonyad sustains its accord-skeptic register ('pride in the MoU breaks unity') while hammering the agriculture ministry and the eroding ration coupon - a hardline-economic critique aimed squarely at the Pezeshkian government. Read with yesterday's 'Day sixty: almost nothing', the title is building a principlist case that the Islamabad track is both worthless abroad and a distraction from domestic failure.

Sedaye Iran

Pro-leadership conservative daily (masthead carries a KHAMENEI.IR strap)

“Trump, Hormuz and the goldfish” «ترامپ، هرمز و ماهی قرمز»

MODERATE-HIGH: Hormuz-as-leverage mockery of Trump

صدای ایران

ترامپ، هرمز و ماهی قرمز

- Main: ترامپ، هرمز و ماهی قرمز ('Trump, Hormuz and the goldfish') - a mocking wordplay casting the US president's claim over the Strait of Hormuz as self-deluding; the strap reports Trump 'claiming ownership of the jugular of the Hormuz pass' even as reopening it eludes him.
- Banner image: the Valiasr Square mural repainted as 'At The Breaking Point' (به شکستنی) - a hand tearing a face - deployed as the visual grammar of the coercion-confidence frame.
- Sub-item: ضد ایران به نظم آمریکایی در قرن آسیا؟ ('anti-Iran within the American order in the Asian century?') - situating the confrontation in a great-power framing.
- Photo caption: the fortieth-day commemoration of the martyred figure held at the Imam Khomeini mausoleum in Tehran, with the martyr Zakeri-far pictured at the masthead.

> **ANALYST NOTE** A pro-leadership title (KHAMENEI.IR-branded) reducing Trump's Hormuz claim to delusion, and dressing it in the 'breaking point' mural, keeps the coercion-confidence line running on the leadership tier without new facts; the value is the framing, not reporting. It reinforces the standing thread in which the strait is theatre for demonstrating leverage over Washington.

Valiasr Square super-mural reworked as 'At The Breaking Point': a hand tearing a stretched face, no text beyond the English strap

Charsou

Economic / business daily (nabz-e eqtesad)

LOW: cost-of-living and fuel-price politics

“The ration coupon's value has been halved” «ارزش کالابرگ نصف شد»

- Main: ارزش کالابرگ نصف شد ('the value of the ration coupon [kalabarg] has been halved'), with the strap اعتراض مجلس به عدم افزایش مبلغ کالابرگ؛ ادعای دولت: افزایش کالابرگ به معنی تورم می‌شود! ('parliament protests the non-increase of the coupon; the government's claim: raising the coupon means inflation!').
- Data table: an itemized comparison of coupon-basket prices (cooking oil, eggs, sugar, pasta, cheese, red meat, legumes) before and after, quantifying the real erosion of the subsidy.
- Sub-item: مخالفت قالیباف با تصمیم دولت پزشکیان برای گران کردن بنزین ('Qalibaf's opposition to the Pezeshkian government's decision to raise petrol prices'), pictured with the Speaker.
- Sub-item: قدرت خرید کالابرگ ۷۰ درصد آب رفت ('the coupon's purchasing power has shrunk 70 percent').

ANALYST NOTE The economic daily quantifies household erosion (the coupon halved, purchasing power down 70 percent) and surfaces the Qalibaf-versus-government petrol fight as a concrete pricing dispute, giving the intra-establishment split the front pages carry politically a hard budgetary edge. For a decision-maker readership this lane keeps insisting the binding constraints are domestic and self-inflicted.

Ta'adol

Economic / business daily

LOW: economic-warfare framing

“Trade under fire” «تجارت زیر آتش»

- Main: تجارت زیر آتش ('trade under fire'), with the strap اقتصاد در چند جبهه می‌جنگد: از محاصره ... تا صف مرزی ('the economy is fighting on several fronts: from the siege to the border queue') - the war reframed as an economic-warfare problem.
- Sub-head: کالابرگ در برابر تورم ('the ration coupon versus inflation') - the shared subsidy-erosion story, told as a macro trade-off.
- Sub-item: چرخش بزرگ سیاست مسکن، بازار اجاره در دو راهی، تورم و تنظیم‌گری ('a major shift in housing policy; the rental market at a crossroads; inflation and regulation').
- Sub-item: شاخص بالا رفت اما بازار، نه ('the index went up but the market did not') - a caution against reading the bourse rally as recovery, cutting against Javan's upbeat 'three-million-point' note.
- Kicker: ۱۷ سال بلاتکلیفی، یک تصمیم پر ریسک ('seventeen years of limbo, one risky decision') and چرا واردات دارو در ایران بی‌ثبات است؟ ('why is drug importation in Iran unstable?').

ANALYST NOTE Ta'adol frames the war and siege as economic warfare fought across trade, currency, housing and pharmaceutical supply, and explicitly deflates the bourse rally the hardline titles cite as strength. This keeps the standing structural-cost counter-narrative alive against front-page triumphalism, aimed at a reader who must weigh coercion leverage against domestic fragility.

Etemad

Reformist daily

LOW-MODERATE: adversary-weakness framing and domestic politics

“The president's failure” «ناکامی پرزیدنت»

- Main: «اعتماد» گزارش می‌دهد: ناکامی پرزیدنت ('Etemad reports: the president's failure') - the reformist front turns the day's frame onto the US president, arguing that rising energy costs, the continued military presence and public-opinion anxiety are narrowing Trump's room ahead of the midterm elections.
- Sub-item: رئیس مجلس در نطق پیش از دستور: خیابان، محل میتینگ‌های انتخاباتی نیست ('the Speaker in a pre-agenda address: the street is not the venue for election rallies') - Qalibaf policing intra-elite competition.
- Sub-item: پیشنهاد تجمیع نهادهای اطلاعاتی ('a proposal to consolidate the intelligence agencies'), attributed to a specialist member of parliament citing the need to merge security bodies.
- Interview: آزمون تاب‌آوری ایران و امریکا ('the resilience test of Iran and America'), in conversation with analyst Rahman Ghahremanpour.
- Op-ed/feature: «پشت پرده زندگی خفاش شب» ('behind the scenes of the life of the Night Bat') - a crime-history feature, and a report headed حمله ... جاده تنگی قشم on an attack near a strait road (details thin, carried as the outlet's account pending confirmation).

ANALYST NOTE The reformist Etemad mirrors the establishment Jomhouri Eslami by making Trump's domestic weakness the story, evidence that the 'adversary-in-decline' construction now spans the reformist tier and is not a hardline monopoly. Qalibaf's 'the street is not for rallies', carried across several titles, reads as the Speaker asserting himself as arbiter of elite competition; the intelligence-merger proposal is a quiet institutional signal worth logging.

Jomhouri Eslami

Traditional / establishment daily

MODERATE: adversary-decline plus governance

“The collapse of Trump's standing in American public opinion” «سقوط جایگاه ترامپ در افکار عمومی آمریکا»

جمهوری اسلامی

سقوط جایگاه ترامپ در افکار عمومی آمریکا

- Main: سقوط جایگاه ترامپ در افکار عمومی آمریکا ('the collapse of Trump's standing in American public opinion') - the establishment front runs the adversary-decline line through US polling, mirroring the reformist Etemad.
- Banner: کودتای ۲۸ مرداد نتیجه غفلت و تفرقه بود ('the 28 Mordad coup was the result of negligence and discord') - the 1953 coup anniversary read as a warning against internal division.
- Sub-item: ۵۲ زخمی در حمله با نارنجک به یک مدرسه شیعه در غرب کابل ('52 injured in a grenade attack on a Shia school in western Kabul') - a sectarian-violence report from Afghanistan.
- Sub-item: تأکید تهران بر همکاری ... رابطه ایران و عراق, and وزارت خارجه ما با طالبان و مردم افغانستان - Iran-Iraq cooperation and engagement with the Taliban and the Afghan people.
- Sub-item: رئیس سازمان ملی مهاجرت: ۲ میلیون اتباع غیرمجاز در ایران حضور دارند ('two million undocumented foreign nationals are present in Iran'), and ایران باید در جمع ۱۰ کشور برتر هوش مصنوعی قرار گیرد ('Iran must rank among the top ten AI states') with AI schooling for ten million students.
- Sub-item: کارت زرد نمایندگان مجلس به وزیر جهاد کشاورزی ('Parliament's yellow card to the agriculture minister'); and پرونده ۳۵۱ شهید: جنگ تحمیلی سوم در دست تکمیل است ('the 351-martyrs dossier: the third imposed war is being documented').
- Op-ed: a column on شهید مظلوم آیت‌الله بهشتی (the martyred Ayatollah Beheshti), invoking historical martyrdom.

> **ANALYST NOTE** The establishment paper pairs the Trump-decline frame with a heavy governance and regional-diplomacy load (Iraq, Afghanistan, migration, AI, coup-anniversary caution), signaling the establishment's preference for managed statecraft over Kayhan's break-the-siege maximalism. Its '351 martyrs / third imposed war' dossier institutionalizes the current conflict as a successor to the 1980s war, a legitimation move to track.

Iran

Official government daily (front page read from the outlet's own channel; no kiosk scan)

MODERATE-HIGH: concrete Hormuz enforcement plus US-drawdown amplification

“A detained UAE-flagged tanker in the Hormuz corridor is diverted to Bandar Abbas” «نفتکش اماراتی متوقف‌شده در کریدور شمالی تنگه هرمز به سمت بندرعباس تغییر مسیر داد»

- Front page (channel IranNewspaper): the government daily supplies the day's concrete Hormuz-enforcement fact - a UAE-flagged tanker previously detained in the strait's northern corridor has altered course toward Bandar Abbas instead of its original destination of Jebel Ali (post #500681); read from the channel, not a kiosk scan.
- Sub-item: the Pentagon is evaluating a reduction of its Persian Gulf military presence after the war (post #500685) - the government paper amplifying the Washington Post report as vindication of the 'US in retreat' frame.
- Sub-item: Qalibaf calls Iran-Iraq relations fundamental and announces he will attend the fortieth-day commemoration of the martyred Leader in Karbala as the Supreme Leader's representative (post #500686).
- Sub-item: US officials say Trump has asked aides to arrange a meeting with North Korea's Kim Jong-un by autumn (post #500671).

> **ANALYST NOTE** As the government's daily, Iran pairs the enforcement reality under the closure policy - a detained UAE tanker rerouted to an Iranian port - with the Washington Post's Pentagon-review report, presenting Tehran's coercion as working and Washington as withdrawing. The tanker diversion is the concrete counterpart to Qalibaf's declared closure; the Pentagon 'review' is, per the original reporting, an options study prompted by base damage, not an ordered withdrawal, and is held to that standard here.

Jam-e Jam

State broadcaster (IRIB) daily (front page read from the outlet's own channel; no kiosk scan)

MODERATE: leadership-by-delegation signal

“What lies behind the alleged backing shortfall of the online gold-and-silver platforms?” «ماجرای کسری پشتوانه پلتفرم‌های آنلاین فروش طلا و نقره چیست؟»

- Front page (channel jamejamdaily, post #25236): ماجرای کسری پشتوانه پلتفرم‌های آنلاین فروش طلا و نقره چیست؟ - a domestic-economic lead in which the Central Bank denies claims of a physical-backing shortfall at online precious-metals platforms.
- Sub-item: Qalibaf calls Iran-Iraq ties 'historical and inseparable bonds' (post #25249) and departs for Baghdad for strategic talks (post #25251).
- Sub-item: Qalibaf will represent the Supreme Leader at the fortieth-day commemoration in Karbala (post #25253).
- Sub-item: a crude anti-Trump item (post #25238) circulated on the channel; the weather bulletin notes the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz and Sea of Oman remaining choppy through Friday.

> **ANALYST NOTE** That the state broadcaster's own paper leads on a domestic gold-platform story rather than the war is itself a signal: IRIB is not fronting the strait maximalism this cycle. The decisive item is Qalibaf representing the Supreme Leader at the Karbala fortieth-day rite - the clearest evidence yet that the current Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, again delegates public commemoration to the Speaker rather than appearing himself, extending the succession-by-delegation pattern.

Vatan-e Emrooz

Hardline / principlist daily (front page read from the outlet's own channel; no kiosk scan)

“War after war” «جنگ پس از جنگ»

MODERATE-HIGH: second-chokepoint plus US-dissent amplification

- Front page: the 28 Mordad 1405 edition was posted to the outlet channel (vatanemrooz, post #22449); the analysis below is read from that channel, not from a kiosk scan.
- Main theme: جنگ پس از جنگ ('war after war', post #22437) argues the task now is converting military capability into political leverage through control of critical waterways - a direct restatement of the chokepoint doctrine.
- Sub-item: «آزادسازی المخا» (post #22433) reports Yemeni forces striking Saudi-aligned mercenaries near Bab-el-Mandeb with ballistic strikes toward the strait and against vessels in the Red Sea - the second-chokepoint thread via Ansarallah.
- Sub-item: «سناتورهای ترامپ از جنگ می‌گریزند» (post #22439) claims only about 35 percent of US senators support continuing operations, framing Congressional dissent as adversary fracture.
- Sub-item: Yemen's deputy information minister cited affirming a 'unity of fronts' with Iran.

> **ANALYST NOTE** The hardline Vatan-e Emrooz sustains the second-chokepoint (Bab-el-Mandeb) thread through Yemen and amplifies US Senate dissent as evidence of a fracturing adversary. Its front-page absence from the kiosk this cycle mirrors the pattern the monitor has tracked; its claims are agency and adversary-press material, held behind the firewall pending primary confirmation.

Appendix A - The leadership's public presence for the day: the fortieth-day commemoration and the Speaker's Karbala delegation

Iran Daily (print, 19 Aug 2026); Jam-e Jam channel posts #25249, #25251, #25253; Iran newspaper channel post #500686; Sobh-e No, Kayhan, Sedaye Iran, Etemad and Jomhouri Eslami front pages

No fresh message from the current Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, was published across the batch. As in recent editions, the leadership appears not through a first-person statement but through the state-directed fortieth-day (chelom) commemoration of the martyred Leader, Ali Khamenei, assassinated on 28 February 2026. Iran Daily's English caption dates the rite forty days after the burial, which reconciles the calendar earlier editions had flagged as inconsistent with a late-February death: the forty-day count runs from the burial, not from the killing.

The single most concrete leadership signal is delegation. The state broadcaster's paper and the government daily both report that Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf will represent the Supreme Leader at the fortieth-day commemoration in Karbala, and that he departed for Baghdad for strategic talks on Iran-Iraq relations. The current Leader thus marks the predecessor's chelom through a proxy rather than in person.

The commemoration is carried in an explicitly avenging register. Sobh-e No fronts the devotional oath انا علی العهد تا صبح ظهور ('I am faithful to the covenant until the dawn of the appearance') beside a یا ثارات الخامنه‌ای ('O avengers of Khamenei') banner; Kayhan reports the cry حی علی‌القصاص ('hasten to retribution / qisas') at the Tehran ceremony. The vocabulary of revenge (خونخواهی) and retribution (قصاص) is the outlets' framing of the rite and is documented as such.

Analyst flag: the current Leader's continued editorial silence, filled by commemoration of the predecessor and by the Speaker acting as his representative, remains a marker in the succession picture and should be logged as a standing negative-evidence thread. A separate Kayhan channel item circulating a Supreme Leader 'Persian Gulf' quotation is not treated here as a fresh statement: Persian Gulf National Day falls in spring, and the line reads as re-circulated predecessor material, not a new message from Mojtaba Khamenei.

Appendix B - The day's flagged editorial: Kayhan, 'Nothing comes of the accord; today's agenda is breaking the siege'

Kayhan, Yadasht-e Rooz, 28 Mordad 1405 / 19 Aug 2026; author verified as Hossein Shariatmadari (kayhan_online post #81267; front-page scan fa-03)

Author verification: the piece runs under Kayhan's standing Yadasht-e Rooz (Note of the Day) slot, authored by managing editor Hossein Shariatmadari. It was posted to the outlet channel as post #81267 and matches the front-page banner on the scan. A full verbatim Persian text was not published to the channel at compile time, so the following renders the editorial's thesis and load-bearing points faithfully rather than paragraph by paragraph.

Thesis: the Islamabad memorandum has been violated to the point of being void, and continuing to spend political capital on 'understanding' (تفاهم) with Washington is a dead end. 'Nothing comes of the accord.'

Prescription: the priority ('today's agenda') is 'breaking the siege' (شکستن محاصره), to be achieved through military and field capability and popular mobilization - 'act with the backing of the battlefield and the street' (با پشتوانه میدان و خیابان اقدام کنید) - not through negotiation. The strait leverage and the twin-chokepoint squeeze on Saudi oil (نفت عربستان پشت حصارهای هرمز و باب‌المندب) are offered as proof that coercion works where diplomacy has failed.

Analyst flag: appearing on the same morning that Speaker Qalibaf placed conditional-reopening terms on the record (comply, and the strait reopens), Shariatmadari's editorial is the maximalist counter-pole: it forecloses the diplomatic exit and fuses the strait leverage to the revenge liturgy of the commemoration. It is centrally-aligned escalation advocacy; its battle-damage and 'scandal' assertions are held behind the attribution firewall and are not to be reproduced as verified. Hostile content documented for defensive assessment only.

Appendix C - Methodology and Sourcing Notes

iran-press-digest v2 pipeline

Scans: nine Persian front-page scans from the NewspaperTasnim kiosk album for 28 Mordad 1405 (t.me/NewspaperTasnim/44064), identified by masthead as Javan, Sobh-e No, Kayhan, Nobonyad, Sedaye Iran, Charsou, Ta'adol, Etemad and Jomhouri Eslami; plus one English scan, Iran Daily (Vol. 8191, 19 Aug 2026), from the Newspapers_Iran album. The kiosk album's own printed Jalali date matched the target day, so the stale-batch guard did not trip and no fallback sources were needed.

Text sources: three additional dailies were read from their own Telegram channels because no kiosk scan was available - Vatan-e Emrooz (#22449), Jam-e Jam (#25236) and Iran (IranNewspaper). Three wire agencies (Defa Press, Fars News, Nour News) were monitored for corroboration and threat-signaling only, their content labeled as claims per the attribution firewall and folded into the trends and threat register, not the per-paper front-page sections. Tehran Times was unavailable at the time of compilation.

Cross-verification: the edition's lead - Qalibaf's statement that the Strait of Hormuz remains closed until the US lifts its port blockade, lifts oil sanctions, releases frozen assets and ends military operations - was confirmed against international wire reporting (Reuters, syndicated) dated 18 August, a day after the accord's sixty-day deadline lapsed. Two secondary claims amplified by the Iranian press were independently confirmed and are reported with their original framing: the UAE's suspension of all trade and financial transactions with Iran, which international reporting ties to a UAE accusation that Iran fired two ballistic missiles toward the Emirates on 18 August (a charge the Iranian front pages do not carry); and a Washington Post report that the Pentagon is weighing a reduced Persian Gulf posture after more than 200 base facilities were damaged, described in the original as an options study, not an ordered withdrawal.

Single-source and attribution flags: Iranian and allied battle-damage and operational claims (the Bab-el-Mandeb / Al-Mokha strike, 'Ansarallah field superiority', the seized-tanker diversion, US-senator vote counts) are the relevant outlets' or agencies' assertions and are not adopted as fact. The succession premise - Ali Khamenei assassinated 28 February 2026, Mojtaba Khamenei as current Supreme Leader - underlies the reading of 'the Leader' references and the commemoration coverage. Named figures (Qalibaf, Gharibabadi, Pezeshkian, Shariatmadari, Ghahremanpour, Beheshti) were checked against the printed pages. Translations are editorial; loaded regime vocabulary is glossed inline and retained in the original script where it carries the framing.

House note: this product documents and analyses hostile foreign-press rhetoric for defensive assessment only; nothing herein endorses, amplifies or operationalizes it.

Open-source material only. All translations from Persian/Arabic originals. Iranian claims are labelled as claims. Prepared for analysis and early warning; hostile content is documented for defensive assessment only, not endorsed.