

OPEN-SOURCE PRESS INTELLIGENCE

Iranian Press Monitor

Daily Front-Page Intelligence

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MILITARY COMMAND RESET EDITION

13 daily front pages surveyed: 9 Persian print titles and Iran Daily (English) read from scan, with Kayhan, Vatan-e Emrooz and Sobh-e No from their own channels; Fars News, Nour News and Defa Press monitored for corroboration; Tehran Times was unavailable at the time.

Front pages published the morning of 11 August 2026, reflecting events through late 10 August local.

Defensive open-source press-intelligence. Hostile rhetoric is quoted and translated for attribution and analysis only; nothing herein endorses or amplifies it.



Front page: Seda-ye Iran

Executive Summary

The lead development of the 11 August edition is a personal reassertion of supreme military command. By separate decrees issued in the name of Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei (printed by name on Chaharsoo, over the Leader's portrait as 'Commander-in-Chief' on Seda-ye Iran), six senior commanders and managers of the armed forces were given new responsibilities and 'missions' across the General Staff, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Basij. Khorasan led with 'the commanders' new missions' and a row of six portraits; Qods labelled it a 'redesign of field command'; Jomhuri Eslami tied it directly to the 10 August installation of Mohsen Rezaei at the Supreme National Security Council. Read with that prior change, this is the second stage of a single process: the Leader's office taking direct, personal ownership of the military chain of command. The individual appointees are shown as uncaptioned portraits and named only in unverifiable channel previews, so their identities are withheld here.

The war narrative, notably, has moved off the battlefield. The decisive file is now the Strait of Hormuz, and it is being reported not as combat but as a transit negotiation. Jomhuri Eslami carried the batch's highest-value claim, a 'final understanding between Iran and Oman on the Strait of Hormuz transit map', which if accurate converts last week's 'six conditions' slogan into a bilateral operating arrangement; it is single-sourced on the fronts, with no joint text, map or notice to mariners reproduced, and is logged as an unconfirmed outlet claim. Around it, a striking cross-factional convergence formed: the reformist Etemad framed 'America is looking for a solution to escape the Hormuz impasse', while the hardline Vatan-e Emrooz ran 'flight from Hormuz, Trump wanted to declare the reopening a victory, an outcome that did not materialize'. From opposite motives, both poles now agree that the United States is the demandeur at the strait.

That agreement is amplified by an energy-squeeze register. Sobh-e No assembled the fullest version, European gas prices up 8 percent on Hormuz uncertainty, the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve reported at a multi-decade low, and Trump reduced to demanding that Iran 'compensate our damages'; Khorasan posed 'the riddle of Iran's oil and expensive gasoline in America'; Kayhan rendered a University of Chicago analyst warning the world energy market is heading 'toward an iceberg'. These figures and quotations are outlet claims and second-hand renderings, recorded behind the attribution firewall, but their coordinated deployment is the point: Tehran is selling the reshuffle-and-Hormuz cycle domestically as leverage that is already moving world markets.

Beneath the security story, an explicit 'post-war' frame surfaced from non-triumphal quarters. The economic daily Ta'adol ran 'changing the pattern of trade in the post-war [period]' (pasajang) beside a container ship, and 'housing at the crossroads of inflation and recession' with inflation cited at 266 percent; the English-facing Iran Daily ran an opinion essay asking whether the Islamic Republic is 'shifting from resistance to power-building', explicitly naming a grand-strategy pivot; and Kayhan's day-note, by managing editor Hossein Shariatmadari, was a Safar-season devotional ('If the Messenger of God had not existed, what good is being?') rather than a battlefield boast. From economic, foreign-facing and hardline registers alike, the elite signal is that the kinetic phase is treated as effectively closed and the contest has moved to consolidation, economics and doctrine.

The executive held to the loyalty-and-unity register it adopted on 10 August. The government daily Iran led with President Pezeshkian's call to 'replace discord with understanding' at a meeting of party secretaries-general; the reformist Sazandegi reframed the same meeting as 'rebuilding the state's relationship with the people' over an editorial titled 'the crisis of distrust'; Iran Daily quoted Pezeshkian denying any 'disagreement between officials and the Armed Forces on the Islamabad MoU'. The reformist press worked the domestic dividend, Etemad's lead pressed 'the end of arbitrary [internet] blocking' with the President named as

'guarantor of the survival of the platforms'. Against this, the hardline Chaharsoo devoted its main space to an economic satire of the 'consensus government' theorising 'we cannot', pairing a salute to the Leader's command decrees with an indictment of the elected government's competence on the same page.

Net assessment: this is a consolidation edition, not an escalation one. The one hard, cross-corroborated event is the Leader's personal re-issuance of the military command, which completes the picture of a system centralising authority in the Leader's office after the assassination and the war's most intense phase. The war itself has been reframed as won-and-winding-down: the fronts no longer claim battlefield victories but leverage, at Hormuz and in world energy markets, and even the hardline titles let a 'post-war' vocabulary onto the page. Two silences define the cycle as much as its noise: Israel and Lebanon, the flashpoints this brief prioritises, are largely absent from the fronts, and the reshuffle's six appointees go unnamed. The signals to watch are whether the Iran-Oman transit understanding produces any actual joint text or notice to mariners, whether the 'US is the demandeur' consensus is echoed by any American action rather than only Iranian rendering, and whether the 'post-war' framing survives contact with the next incident on the strait or the northern border.

BOTTOM LINE On the morning after moving its security secretary, the Leader personally re-issued the entire senior military command, and the same fronts that saluted the reshuffle shifted the war story off the battlefield and onto the Strait of Hormuz and the economy: the kinetic phase is being wound down into a 'post-war' consolidation in which Hormuz is the leverage and, by Tehran's own account across both factions, the United States is now the party seeking the exit.

CRITICAL SOURCING NOTE Strict attribution governs this edition. The single hard, cross-corroborated fact is the six-post military reshuffle issued personally by the Leader (confirmed across Seda-ye Iran, Chaharsoo, which prints his name in full, Khorasan, Qods, Jomhuri Eslami and Kayhan); the appointees' identities are shown only as uncaptioned portraits and were named solely in unverifiable channel previews, so they are withheld. The 'final Iran-Oman understanding on the Strait of Hormuz transit map' is carried on a single front page (Jomhuri Eslami) with no reproduced joint text, and is recorded as an unconfirmed claim, thematically but not independently supported by Sobh-e No and Etemad. Iranian pressure and battle-damage claims (Vatan-e Emrooz's Aramco and al-Mokha strikes; Fars News's southern-Gulf oil-spill and Gaza casualty figures; Sobh-e No's US petroleum-reserve figure and European gas move; Kayhan's 'Trump food-truck escape' and its second-hand 'energy iceberg' quotation) are logged as outlet claims; second-hand foreign-press citations (WSJ, CNN, a University of Chicago analyst) are flagged as renderings, not verified quotations. Tehran Times was unavailable at the time; khamenei.ir was not retrieved, so Appendix A reconstructs the printed decree framing rather than a verbatim text. The Leader referenced throughout current coverage is Seyyed Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei, printed by name on the fronts.

Macro Trend Analysis

1 The Leader takes personal command

The load-bearing story is a six-post reshuffle of the senior military command, issued by separate decrees in the name of Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei as Supreme Commander-in-Chief and spanning the General Staff, the IRGC and the Basij. Seda-ye Iran reduced its entire front to the caption 'Commander-in-Chief' over the Leader's portrait; Khorasan printed 'the commanders' new missions' with six faces; Qods called it a 'redesign of field command'. Coming the morning after the 10 August SNSC change that installed Mohsen Rezaei, this reads as the second stage of one process, the Leader's office taking direct, personal ownership of the chain of command, and it continues the succession-consolidation thread this monitor has tracked since the assassination.

2 The war moves to the strait

The decisive war file is now Hormuz, and it is reported as a negotiation, not combat. Jomhuri Eslami asserted a 'final Iran-Oman understanding on the transit map' (single-source, no text reproduced); Sobh-e No kept 'the reopening and transit security of the strait' framed as unresolved; and, in the cycle's most notable cross-factional agreement, the reformist Etemad ('America seeks a way out of the Hormuz impasse') and the hardline Vatan-e Emrooz ('flight from Hormuz, Trump wanted a victory he could not get') converged, from opposite motives, on the United States as the party seeking the exit. This sharpens the 10 August 'six conditions' finding: the preconditions bloc's leverage claim is now shared across the aisle, even as the operational arrangement remains unconfirmed.

3 The 'post-war' pivot

An explicit 'post-war' (pasajang) vocabulary surfaced from non-triumphal quarters. Ta'adol ran 'changing the pattern of trade in the post-war [period]' and treated stagflation, not battle, as the front-page problem; Iran Daily's opinion essay asked whether the state is 'shifting from resistance to power-building', naming a grand-strategy pivot for foreign readers; Kayhan's day-note chose Safar devotion over a battlefield boast. The convergence of economic, English-facing and hardline registers on consolidation rather than conquest is an elite signal that the kinetic phase is being treated as effectively closed and the contest relocated to economics and doctrine.

4 The Mecca pact, still denied deterrent value

The Saudi-Turkey-Pakistan accord of 7 August continues to be drained of threat, now for foreign as well as domestic audiences. On the English front, Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei recast it as proof that 'the region no longer trusts US security promises'; Vatan-e Emrooz reran the 'oil for security' reading of it as Saudi weakness. The uniformity, and its extension to the diplomat-facing Iran Daily, indicates centrally-congenial message discipline aimed at denying the pact any signaling power, the standing enemy-in-retreat construction carried into a second week.

5 Unity above, delegitimation below

The executive stayed in the loyalty-and-unity register: Iran's 'replace discord with understanding' and Sazandegi's 'rebuilding the state's relationship with the people' both read the Pezeshkian party meeting as repair, while Etemad banked a reformist dividend with 'the end of arbitrary [internet] blocking', the President named as guarantor. The hardline counter came on the same terrain from Chaharsoo, whose main space satirised the 'consensus government' for theorising 'we cannot' even as its banner saluted the Leader's command decrees. The pro-settlement camp remains muted on the war's terms and is fighting instead on domestic legitimacy, trust and civil liberties, a displaced but persistent continuation of the negotiate-now pole.

Key Judgments

KJ-1 [HIGH] The Leader has personally reasserted supreme military command, completing a command-consolidation begun at the security council. Six senior commanders and managers were given new missions by separate decrees issued in the name of Seyyed Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei as Commander-in-Chief, across the General Staff, the IRGC and the Basij (Seda-ye Iran, Chaharsoo, Khorasan, Qods, Jomhuri Eslami, Kayhan), one day after the SNSC change that installed Mohsen Rezaei. Significance: this is the edition's one hard, cross-corroborated event and it is a centralisation, not a policy shift, authority over the armed forces is being visibly gathered into the Leader's office, and the reshuffle should be read as institutional consolidation after the assassination and the war's peak, not as a battlefield move.

KJ-2 [MODERATE] The Hormuz file may be moving from slogan toward a bilateral transit arrangement, but the evidence is single-source. Jomhuri Eslami alone reported a 'final understanding between Iran and Oman on the Strait of Hormuz transit map', with no joint text, map or notice to mariners reproduced; Sobh-e No still frames 'reopening and transit security' as unresolved. Significance: if genuine, this would operationalise the 10 August 'six conditions' into an actual traffic scheme and mark real movement, but it must be treated as an unconfirmed outlet claim until a joint Iran-Oman instrument surfaces; its plausibility is raised, not established, by the parallel Sobh-e No and Etemad framings.

KJ-3 [MODERATE-HIGH] Hardline and reformist fronts now agree, from opposite motives, that the United States is the party seeking the exit at Hormuz. Etemad (reformist) ran 'America is looking for a solution to escape the Hormuz impasse'; Vatan-e Emrooz (hardline) ran 'flight from Hormuz, Trump wanted to declare the reopening a victory, an outcome that did not materialize'; Sobh-e No added 'Trump: compensate our damages' and a multi-decade-low US oil reserve; Jomhuri Eslami asked whether Trump seeks 'escape or a plan'. Significance: the cross-factional convergence on Iran-holds-the-leverage raises confidence that Tehran genuinely reads itself as ascendant on the strait, though the specific claims of US distress are outlet-sourced and the underlying arrangement is unconfirmed, so the confidence attaches to Tehran's self-perception, not to the US posture itself.

KJ-4 [MODERATE-HIGH] The Iranian press is pivoting to an explicit 'post-war' consolidation frame. Ta'adol ran 'changing the pattern of trade in the post-war [period]' and led on stagflation rather than combat; Iran Daily's opinion essay named a shift 'from resistance to power-building'; Kayhan's day-note chose Safar devotion over a battlefield boast. Significance: the appearance of 'post-war' (pasajang) language in economic, English-facing and hardline registers at once is an elite signal that the kinetic phase is being treated as effectively closed, which reframes the war onto economic and doctrinal terrain and is consistent with the reshuffle-as-consolidation and Hormuz-as-negotiation threads.

KJ-5 [MODERATE-HIGH] The Mecca defence pact continues to be uniformly drained of deterrent value, now including the foreign-facing front. Baqaei, on Iran Daily, recast the Saudi-Turkey-Pakistan accord as proof 'the region no longer trusts US security promises'; Vatan-e Emrooz reran it as 'oil for security' born of Saudi weakness. Significance: the convergence, and its deliberate extension to the diplomat-facing English edition, indicates centrally-congenial message discipline aimed at denying the pact any signaling power rather than independent assessment, a continuation of the standing enemy-in-retreat construction into its second week.

KJ-6 [MODERATE] The executive remains in the unity register while the reformist press banks domestic dividends and the hardline lane presses economic delegitimation. Iran ('replace discord with understanding') and Sazandegi ('rebuilding the state-people relationship', editorial 'the crisis of distrust') read the Pezeshkian party meeting as repair; Etemad pressed 'the end of arbitrary internet filtering' with the President as guarantor; Pezeshkian denied any government-military rift on the Islamabad MoU. Against this, Chaharsoo saluted the Leader's decrees above and satirised the 'consensus government' for 'we cannot' below. Significance: the pro-settlement camp is still muted on the war's terms and is fighting on legitimacy, trust and civil liberties instead, while the hardline counter concedes the Leader's command decisions but attacks the elected government's competence, the system's central fracture displaced but intact.

KJ-7 [MODERATE] Negative finding: Israel and Lebanon are largely absent from the fronts, the reshuffle's appointees are unnamed, and the loudest claims are uncorroborated. No front-page lead this cycle centred on Israel or Lebanon, the two flashpoints this brief prioritises, the war content ran through Hormuz, the United States and the Saudi-Yemen theatre instead; the six military appointees appear only as uncaptioned portraits; and Vatan-e Emrooz's Aramco and al-Mokha strikes, Fars News's oil-spill and Gaza figures, Sobh-e No's US-reserve figure and Kayhan's food-truck item are all outlet claims, with Tehran Times unavailable and khamenei.ir not retrieved. Significance: the quieting of the Israel and Lebanon fronts is itself a signal that the theatre has shifted to the strait and the economy, and the edition's certainty about American distress again runs ahead of its documentation.

Named-Figure Tracker

Figure	Role / relevance	Today's framing	Flag
Seyyed Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei	The Leader / Supreme Commander-in-Chief (successor to the assassinated Ali Khamenei)	Personally re-issues the senior military command by separate decrees; portrayed on Seda-ye Iran under the single caption 'Commander-in-Chief'; named in full on Chaharsoo.	WATCH
Mohsen Rezaei	The Leader's representative to, and secretary of, the Supreme National Security Council (installed 10 August)	Linked by Jomhuri Eslami to today's military reshuffle, tying the SNSC change and the command decrees into one consolidation.	WATCH
Masoud Pezeshkian	President of Iran	Calls to 'replace discord with understanding' and to rebuild the state-people relationship; denies any government-Armed Forces rift on the Islamabad MoU; named by Etemad as guarantor of online platforms.	WATCH
Esmail Baqaei	Foreign Ministry spokesman	On the English front, recasts the Saudi-Turkey-Pakistan pact as proof the region 'no longer trusts US security promises'.	COERCION SPOKESMAN
Donald Trump	US President	Framed across the batch as the party seeking a way out of the war and the Hormuz impasse, mocked by Kayhan ('escape by food truck') and reduced by Sobh-e No to demanding compensation.	TARGET FRAMING
Hossein Shariatmadari	Kayhan managing editor	Authors the day's flagged 'Yadasht-e Rooz', a Safar-season devotional ('If the Messenger of God had not	WATCH

Figure	Role / relevance	Today's framing	Flag
		existed, what good is being?') rather than a war polemic.	
Ahmad Motamedi	Former Communications (ICT) minister	Etemad's interviewee arguing that 'arbitrary' internet filtering is ending; the reformist civil-liberties case.	NEW NAMED FIGURE
The six military appointees	Newly assigned senior commanders/managers (General Staff, IRGC, Basij)	Shown only as uncaptioned portraits; named solely in unverifiable channel previews; identities withheld pending confirmation.	absence noted
Benjamin Netanyahu / Israel; Lebanon	Standing priority flashpoints	Largely absent from the fronts this cycle; no Israel- or Lebanon-led headline surfaced, a notable quieting of both fronts.	absence noted

Headline Summary Table

Outlet	Lead Headline (English)	Orientation	Theme	Threat signal
Seda-ye Iran	Commander-in-Chief	Hardline, keyed to the Leader's office	The Leader as personal head of the armed forces	MODERATE-HIGH: leader-cult command consolidation
Khorasan	The commanders' new missions	Conservative, Mashhad	Six-post military reshuffle, documented plainly	MODERATE: reshuffle plus energy-leverage sidebar
Chaharsoo	Appointment of six high-ranking military commanders	Principlist / hardline	Reshuffle above, economic assault on the 'consensus government' below	LOW-MODERATE: executive delegitimation
Kayhan	Six commanders appointed; 'Trump's escape by food truck'	Ultra-hardline flagship (channel)	Reshuffle, Safar legitimacy editorial, mocking US-vulnerability claims	MODERATE-HIGH: mocking US-vulnerability messaging
Qods	The Iran of Imam Reza: blood-avenger and self-sacrificing	Conservative (Astan Quds Razavi)	'Redesign of field command' in a devotional revenge register	MODERATE-HIGH: revenge (khunkhah) framing
Jomhuri Eslami	Final Iran-Oman understanding on the Strait of Hormuz transit scheme	Traditional / establishment	Reported bilateral Hormuz transit arrangement (single-source)	HIGH: Hormuz operationalization claim (unconfirmed)
Vatan-e Emrooz	Flight from Hormuz: Trump wanted a victory he could not get	Hardline / principlist (channel)	Hormuz as US defeat; Mecca pact as Saudi weakness; Yemeni-strike leverage	MODERATE-HIGH: US-defeat framing plus strike claims

Outlet	Lead Headline (English)	Orientation	Theme	Threat signal
Sobh-e No	The US energy squeeze around a Hormuz still not fully reopened	Principlist (channel)	Energy-leverage messaging: European gas up, US reserves low, Trump demanding compensation	MODERATE: energy-leverage messaging
Etemad	The end of arbitrary blocking	Reformist	'America seeks the Hormuz off-ramp'; end internet filtering, President as guarantor	MODERATE: US-as-demandeur framing; domestic-liberties push
Iran Daily	Baqaei: Saudi-Turkey-Pakistan pact shows region no longer trusts US security promises	State English-language	Mecca pact drained of meaning; 'resistance to power-building' pivot	MODERATE-HIGH: doctrinal pivot signaled to foreign audiences
Ta'adol	Housing at the crossroads of inflation and recession	Economic / business	'Post-war' trade reorientation; stagflation with inflation cited at 266 percent	LOW-MODERATE: post-war economy, stagflation strain
Iran	Let us replace discord with understanding	Official government daily	Executive unity outreach to parties; reshuffle logged plainly	LOW-MODERATE: unity messaging, executive on the defensive
Sazandegi	Rebuilding the state's relationship with the people	Reformist (Kargozaran)	Same meeting read as trust repair; editorial 'the crisis of distrust'	LOW: domestic legitimacy and trust framing

Per-Paper Front-Page Analysis

Iran Daily

State English-language daily (aimed at foreign readers and diplomats)

"Baqaei: Saudi-Turkey-Pakistan pact shows region no longer trusts US security promises" **MODERATE-HIGH: doctrinal 'power-building' pivot signaled to foreign audiences**



- Main: 'Baqaei: Saudi-Turkey-Pakistan pact shows region no longer trust US security promises': Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baqaei is quoted casting the 7 August 'Mecca' defence accord not as an anti-Iran realignment but as proof that even US partners have lost faith in American security guarantees, the English-front management of the pact for foreign audiences.
- Sub-lead: 'Pezeshkian: No disagreement between officials, Armed Forces on Islamabad MoU': the President is quoted denying any rift between the government and the military over the Pakistan-brokered (Islamabad) understanding, the unity message pitched abroad and matching the domestic 'replace discord with understanding' line.
- Opinion: 'Is the Islamic Republic shifting from resistance to power-building?' (standfirst: 'Iran's new grand strategy and its implications for Persian Gulf security'): a signed essay arguing a doctrinal pivot from 'resistance' to 'power-building', the English-front articulation of the batch-wide post-war reorientation.
- Sidebar: 'AQR unveils special programs for Islamic month of Safar' (Astan Quds Razavi), tying the English edition to the same Safar devotional season as Qods and Khorasan.
- Sidebar: 'Revival of Sassanid corridor to transform Kermanshah tourism' and a domestic weightlifting item (Davoudi, Yousefi), soft-power and normalcy notes.

ANALYST NOTE Iran Daily is the deliberate foreign-facing counterpoint to the Persian triumphalism: it drains the Mecca pact of anti-Iran meaning through Baqaei ('the region no longer trusts US promises'), projects government-military unity on the Islamabad MoU through Pezeshkian, and, most notably, runs an opinion essay naming a 'resistance to power-building' grand-strategy shift. That last item is the clearest English-language statement of the 'post-war' pivot that Ta'adol frames economically, an elite signal that Tehran wants foreign readers to see a state moving from war-footing to consolidation.

«فرمانده کل

MODERATE-HIGH: leader-cult consolidation of personal command authority

قوا»



- Banner: A full-page portrait of the Leader, Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei, under the single phrase 'Commander-in-Chief' (فرمانده کل قوا, farmandeh-e koll-e qova): the front makes the Leader's role as head of the armed forces the entire visual argument of the day, the framing device for the six-commander military reshuffle carried across the batch.
- Main: A dense lead text beside the portrait presents the day's military-command decrees as the Leader personally exercising supreme command, reinforcing the office rather than the outgoing secretariat (continuing the 10 August SNSC-reshuffle thread that moved Zolqadr aside for Rezaei).
- Sub-item: 'The price of Trump's adventurism against Iran' (تاوان ماجراجویی): an enemy-cost register aligning with the batch-wide 'Trump wants out of the war' thread.
- Sub-item: A notice on six senior military commands (شش ... عالی‌رتبه), the reshuffle rendered from the Leader's-office vantage.
- Right rail: An item on America (هیمنه/زهرداری آمریکا) in the standing 'American decline' construction.

ANALYST NOTE Seda-ye Iran, the front most tightly keyed to the Leader's office, converts the six-commander reshuffle into a leader-cult tableau: the single caption 'Commander-in-Chief' over Mojtaba's portrait locates command authority in the person of the Leader, not in the reshuffled officers or the SNSC secretariat. Read with 10 August, it confirms the standing finding that the hard line is owned above the secretariat, and it advances the succession-consolidation thread this monitor has tracked, personal supreme command now asserted visually.

"Let us replace discord with understanding"

LOW-MODERATE: unity messaging, executive on the defensive

«تفاهم را جایگزین اختلاف کنیم»



- Main: 'Let us replace discord with understanding' (تفاهم را جایگزین اختلاف کنیم): a call by President Pezeshkian, at a meeting with the secretaries-general of parties and political groups, for those groups to play a larger role in solving the country's problems (subhead: دعوت رئیس‌جمهوری از احزاب و (گروه‌های سیاسی ... برای نقش‌آفرینی بیشتر در حل مسائل کشور); the executive's national-unity and outreach message, over a photo of the assembled meeting.
- Right rail: 'Appointment of six high-ranking commanders in the armed forces' (انتصاب شش فرمانده عالی‌رتبه در نیروهای مسلح): the government daily records the Leader's military-command decrees as an institutional fact, without the triumphal styling of the hardline fronts.
- Sub-item: 'Yesterday, today and tomorrow of Iran' (دیروز، امروز و فردای ایران): a continuity-and-endurance framing of the executive's stewardship.
- Sub-item: 'Artists on the path of return' (هنرمندان در مسیر بازگشت): a cultural-reconciliation note aligned with the outreach lead.
- Sub-item: A domestic query on the Imam Reza shrine and on 'the fate of ...' revenues, plus a Persian Gulf sidebar (هساگ‌های ... خلیج فارس).

ANALYST NOTE The government daily answers the surrender-and-war-guilt campaign not by defending the negotiating track on the merits but by reframing the moment as a call to unity: Pezeshkian invites the parties in, and the six-commander reshuffle is logged as orderly administration. This continues the 10 August pattern in which the executive speaks in the loyalty-and-unity register ('do not become Netanyahu's plaything' then; 'replace discord with understanding' now), a defensive posture that concedes the framing initiative to its critics while keeping the executive inside the tent.

"The Iran of Imam Reza: blood-**MODERATE-HIGH: revenge (khunkhah) register plus 'redesign of field command'**
avenger and self-sacrificing" «ایران امام رضا؛ خونخواه و جانفدا»



- Main: 'The Iran of Imam Reza: blood-avenger and self-sacrificing' (خونخواه/khunkhah, revenge-seeking; جانفدا/janfeda, ready to sacrifice life), over a photo of pilgrims walking the road to Mashhad: the shrine daily fuses the pilgrimage season with the war's revenge register, casting national endurance in devotional terms.
- Banner (left column): 'Redesign of field command' (بازطراحی فرماندهی میدان): the paper's own label for the six-commander military reshuffle, read not as personnel churn but as a deliberate restructuring of battlefield command.
- Sub-item: A boxed notice that the Leader of the Revolution, in separate decrees, appointed senior commanders in the General Staff of the Armed Forces, the IRGC and the Basij and defined new duties for the country's military forces (رہبر انقلاب در احکامی جداگانه ... شرح وظایف جدیدی برای). (نیروی نظامی کشور تعیین کردند).
- Op-ed: 'The war enters the battle of time' (جنگ وارد نبرد زمان می‌شود): an endurance-and-attrition argument that the contest is now about who outlasts whom.
- Sub-item: The custodian of Astan Quds Razavi on releasing prisoners held for unintentional offences as an Ahl al-Bayt act of relief.
- Op-ed: A meditation on the final moments of the Prophet's life ('Join me to the highest companion', مرا به رفیق اعلیٰ ملحق گردان, tied to the Safar mourning season).
- Banner (bottom): 'On foot to Mashhad: the story of the devotees of the Imam of kindnesses' (پیاپی تا مشهد): the pilgrimage as the front's emotional spine.

ANALYST NOTE Qods supplies the day's most explicit gloss on the reshuffle, 'redesign of field command', which reframes the six-commander decrees as intentional war restructuring rather than routine rotation, and pairs it with 'the war enters the battle of time', an attrition thesis. The devotional envelope (Imam Reza, the Mashhad pilgrimage, the Prophet's passing) is not decoration: it sacralises endurance and revenge (khunkhah) as the register in which the shrine establishment wants the war's costs absorbed, a continuity of the standing religious-legitimation thread.

"The commanders' new missions"

MODERATE: reshuffle documented plainly; energy-leverage sidebar

«ماموریت‌های جدید فرماندهان»



- Main: 'The commanders' new missions' (ماموریت‌های جدید فرماندهان), under a row of six commander portraits: the subhead states that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (فرمانده معظم کل قوا), by issuing separate decrees, conveyed the responsibilities and missions of six commanders and senior managers of the armed forces. Khorasan renders the reshuffle as the day's lead in plain administrative terms, six named appointments to General Staff, IRGC and Basij posts.
- Sub-item: 'The riddle of Iran's oil and expensive gasoline in America' (معمای نفت ایران و بنزین گران در آمریکا): an energy-leverage angle tying Iranian oil to rising US pump prices, part of the batch-wide 'America squeezed on energy' thread.
- Sub-item: 'Free fall of Iran's football stars' (سقوط آزاد ستاره‌های فوتبال ایران): a sports-and-morale item.
- Sub-item: 'Here is paradise' (این‌جا بهشت است) plus 'national arrangements to ease the pilgrimage': the Mashhad shrine and the pilgrimage season foregrounded, as on Qods.
- Op-ed: 'The shrine, an infinite relation' (حرم، نسبت بی‌نهایت): the day-note in the devotional register.

ANALYST NOTE Khorasan is the cleanest documentary record of the lead event: it prints the reshuffle as six decrees from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief covering the General Staff, IRGC and Basij, without triumphal spin, and pairs it with an energy-leverage sidebar (Iranian oil versus US pump prices) that recurs across the batch. Its restraint is the tell that the reshuffle is being treated as a genuine institutional event; the individual appointees, however, are shown as portraits without legible captions, so their identities are not independently confirmable from the scan.

Sazandegi

Reformist, aligned with the Kargozaran-e Sazandegi party

«بازسازی رابطه حاکمیت با مردم»

LOW: domestic legitimacy and trust framing

رابطه حاکمیت با مردم»



- Main: 'Rebuilding the state's relationship with the people' (بازسازی رابطه): Sazandegi's read of the same Pezeshkian meeting that Iran leads with, but pitched as repair of a broken state-society bond, not merely party outreach; the subhead frames the President as calling, before the secretaries-general of parties and political activists, for that rebuilding.
- Op-ed: 'The crisis of distrust' (بحران بی اعتمادی): the front's editorial spine, naming public distrust of the state as the central problem the outreach must address.
- Photo bank: A gallery of party and political figures assembled at the meeting, plus a photo of President Pezeshkian seated at the session, underscoring the breadth of the invited political spectrum.
- Sub-item: Party-politics notes ('you did not keep the covenant', پیمان نیستید) that keep the reformist grievance in view even as the outreach is welcomed.

ANALYST NOTE Where the government daily calls the meeting 'unity', Sazandegi reframes it as overdue repair of a 'crisis of distrust', the reformist tell that the outreach is being received as necessary but insufficient. This keeps alive the negotiate-now/rebuild-legitimacy pole of the system's fracture that this monitor has tracked: with the pro-settlement camp muted since 9 August, the reformist press now presses its case less on the war's terms than on domestic legitimacy and trust, a displaced but persistent line.

«انتصاب شش فرمانده عالی‌رتبه نظامی» "Appointment of six high-ranking military commanders"



- Banner: 'Appointment of six high-ranking military commanders' (انتصاب شش): the subhead prints the Leader's name in full, 'His Excellency Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, by issuing separate decrees conveyed the responsibilities and missions of six commanders and senior managers of the armed forces' (حضرت آیت‌الله سیدمجتبی حسینی خامنه‌ای، فرمانده معظم) ... مسئولیت‌ها و ماموریت‌های شش تن از فرماندهان و مدیران عالی‌رتبه کل قوا ... (نیروهای مسلح را ابلاغ کردند): a direct printed confirmation of the succession identity used across this monitor.
- Main: 'The struggle to theorise "we cannot"' (تقلای یوسف برای تثویز کردن «نمی‌توانیم»), over a staged photo of a man at a blackboard: a hardline satire mocking the Pezeshkian 'consensus government' (دولت وفاق) for defeatism, the blackboard reading 'the alphabet of the consensus government: we can't + it won't work' (الفبای دولت وفاق: نمی‌توانیم + نمی‌شود) with mock lessons on inflation control, sanctions and hard-currency revenue.
- Op-ed: 'A response to Yusuf's distortions' (پاسخ به تحریف‌های یوسف): a rebuttal panel attacking a government defender's economic claims.
- Data box: A comparative table of macro indicators (money-supply growth, exchange rate, point-to-point inflation) set against successive administrations, used to argue the current government's economic failure.

ANALYST NOTE Chaharsoo does two things at once: it prints the cleanest confirmation of the Leader's identity (Seyyed Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei by name, as Supreme Commander-in-Chief) beneath the reshuffle banner, and it turns its main space into an economic assault on the executive's 'we can't' messaging. The juxtaposition is the hardline formula of the cycle, salute the Leader's command decisions above, indict the elected government's competence below, a division of the succession-consolidation and executive-delegitimation threads onto a single page.

A staged photograph of a bearded 'teacher' at a blackboard on which the 'alphabet of the consensus government' is chalked as 'we can't + it won't work', with numbered mock lessons ridiculing the government's claims on inflation, sanctions and currency revenue.

"Final Iran-Oman

understanding on the Strait of Hormuz transit scheme" تفاهم نهایی ایران و عمان بر سر نقشه تردد تنگه هرمز

هرمز»



- Main: 'Final understanding between Iran and Oman on the Strait of Hormuz transit map' (تفاهم نهایی ایران و عمان بر سر نقشه تردد تنگه هرمز): the single most operationally consequential headline in the batch, asserting that Tehran and Muscat have settled a transit scheme for the strait. If accurate, it moves the Hormuz file from the 10 August 'six conditions' slogan toward an actual bilateral traffic arrangement; it is, however, a single front-page source and no joint text, map or notice to mariners is reproduced.
- Right rail: 'Trump seeking a way to escape the war, or a plan?' (ترامپ به دنبال راه فرار از جنگ یا برنامه است): keeps the US-wants-out thread live while withholding judgement on whether it is genuine exit or maneuver.
- Sub-item: 'Appointment of six high-ranking commanders in the General Staff, IRGC and Basij' alongside a note on Mohsen Rezaei as the Leader's representative to the Supreme National Security Council: the paper links today's military reshuffle to the 10 August SNSC change.
- Sub-item: 'The enemy's calculations are built on artificial-intelligence data and on elements they never executed' (محاسبات دشمن بر پایه داده‌های هوش مصنوعی ... بنا شده): an argument that adversary planning rests on unrealised assumptions.
- Banner (top): 'Reserve of 513 million cubic metres of water in Tehran's five dams' and 'guaranteed wheat purchases pass 7 million tonnes': the war-economy and resource-stress register.
- Op-ed: 'From crisis management to getting through a hard summer' (ان مدیریت بحران تا عبور از تابستان سخت): water, power and cost-of-living strain framed as the season's real test.
- Sub-item: 'Palestinian flag raised at the Locarno festival' with a '60,000 Gaza martyrs' cross-reference.

ANALYST NOTE Jomhouri Eslami carries the batch's highest-value claim, a 'final' Iran-Oman transit understanding for Hormuz, which would convert last week's preconditions rhetoric into a bilateral operating arrangement and partly answer the standing 'announced but not sealed' question. It is single-sourced on the front pages and unaccompanied by any reproduced text, so it must be logged as an outlet claim pending a joint Iran-Oman instrument; its plausibility is raised, not confirmed, by Sobh-e No's parallel 'Hormuz reopening and transit security' framing and Etemad's 'America seeks a way out of the Hormuz impasse'. The paper's establishment restraint (pairing the claim with 'Trump: escape or plan?' rather than a victory lap) makes it a more reliable weathervane than the triumphal fronts.

«پایان انسداد سلیقه‌ای» "The end of arbitrary blocking"



- Main: 'The end of arbitrary blocking' (پایان انسداد سلیقه‌ای): in an Etemad interview with Ahmad Motamedi, a former Communications minister, the paper argues internet filtering imposed on discretionary (سلیقه‌ای) grounds is ending, with the subhead 'the President is the guarantor of the survival of the [online] platforms' (رئیس‌جمهور ضامن بقای سکوها‌ی اینترنتی): a reformist push to bind Pezeshkian to lifting filtering.
- Top strip: 'America is looking for a solution to escape the Hormuz impasse' (آمریکا برای خروج از بن‌بست هرمز به دنبال راه‌حل است): Etemad casts the US as the party seeking an off-ramp on the strait, the mirror image of the hardline 'Iran's conditions' framing and evidence the negotiate-now camp reads Hormuz as leverage that is working.
- Sub-item: An interview with analyst Rahman Qahremanpour on the strategic picture.
- Sub-item: 'Will the construction industry's financing lock be opened?' (آیا صنعت ساختمانی باز می‌شود؟): a war-economy and housing-finance angle that rhymes with Ta'adol's housing lead.
- Sub-item: 'Not every ban is about art' (دلیل همه ممنوعیت‌ها هنری نیست) and a cultural-policy panel on music and the Ershad ministry.

ANALYST NOTE Etemad routes the reformist case through civil liberties (ending 'arbitrary' internet filtering, with the President named as guarantor) and through a striking inversion on the war: it is America, not Iran, that 'seeks a way out of the Hormuz impasse'. That inversion is analytically important, it shows the negotiate-now camp is not conceding the strait but claiming it as successful leverage, aligning the reformist read with the hardline preconditions bloc on outcome even as they differ on register. The filtering push is the domestic dividend the reformists want to bank from the unity moment.

«مسکن در دوراهی تورم و رکود» "Housing at the crossroads of inflation and recession"



- Main: 'Housing at the crossroads of inflation and recession' (مسکن در دوراهی تورم و رکود), subhead 'why do prices rise while the market does not come to life?': the war-economy strain rendered as a stagflation trap in the housing market, prices climbing without transactions.
- Center: 'Changing the pattern of trade in the post-war [period]' (تغییر الگوی تجارت), over a container-ship image: the economic press explicitly adopts a 'post-war' (پساجنگ) frame, treating the fighting as effectively over and the task as reconstruction and trade reorientation.
- Top strip: 'Tehran bourse rises against the caution of world exchanges' (صعود بورس تهران در برابر احتیاط بورس‌های جهانی), beside inflation figures cited at 266 percent: a claim of domestic-market resilience amid extreme price growth.
- Sub-item: 'A current from the President's meeting with the Leader' (جریانی از دیدار رئیس‌جمهوری با رهبر انقلاب): the economic paper reads the Pezeshkian-Leader meeting for its bearing on policy direction.
- Sub-item: 'It is the goods, not purchasing power' and a panel on why headline economic data understates the squeeze.

ANALYST NOTE Ta'adol is the clearest instance of a broader signal: the economic and business press has moved to an explicit 'post-war' (پساجنگ) framing, discussing trade reorientation and reconstruction rather than active fighting, even as it concedes stagflation (a housing market frozen amid 266 percent inflation). This matters two ways: it corroborates, from a non-political quarter, that Iranian elites increasingly treat the kinetic phase as closed (consistent with the Hormuz-arrangement and Trump-exit threads), and it keeps the war economy on the front page as the durable pressure the triumphal fronts cannot dispel.

Kayhan

Ultra-hardline flagship close to the Leader's office; managing editor Hossein Shariatmadari (read via the outlet's own Telegram channel, no scan in this batch)

"Six commanders appointed

MODERATE-HIGH: mocking US-vulnerability claims plus energy-shock messaging

on the Leader's directive; 'Trump's escape by food truck'" «انتصاب ۶ فرمانده در ستاد کل نیروهای مسلح»

- Main: 'Six commanders appointed in the General Staff of the Armed Forces' (انتصاب ۶ فرمانده در ستاد کل نیروهای مسلح): Kayhan records the Leader's military-command decrees as the lead institutional event, in line with the batch.
- Op-ed (Yadasht-e Rooz): 'If the Messenger of God had not existed, what good is being?' (اگر رسول (خدا نبود، بودن را چه سود؟) by Hossein Shariatmadari: a Safar-season devotional editorial on the Prophet and, by extension, on legitimate leadership and continuity, rather than an overt war polemic.
- Claim: 'Trump's escape by food truck' (فرار ترامپ با کامیون حمل غذا): a mocking, uncorroborated item alleging Trump was moved covertly via an airport catering truck after a purported Iranian threat, presented as ridicule of US vulnerability. To be treated strictly as Kayhan's propaganda claim, not as fact.
- Attributed analysis: a piece rendering a University of Chicago political scientist's warning that the global energy market is heading 'toward an iceberg' as tensions endanger Hormuz stability, quoted second-hand and to be flagged as an outlet rendering rather than a verified primary quotation.
- Sub-item: 'Libya's national oil facility hit by drone' (a second drone strike on the al-Zawiya refinery compound): a foreign-instability item folded into the energy-crisis frame.

ANALYST NOTE Kayhan's front is quieter on the war than in recent cycles: its lead is the reshuffle and its day-note is a Safar devotional by Shariatmadari, not a battlefield boast, which itself signals the batch-wide shift from active-war triumphalism to consolidation and endurance. The remaining war content is carried in the mocking ('Trump food-truck escape') and the second-hand-attributed ('energy market iceberg') registers, both of which the attribution firewall requires be labelled as Kayhan claims; the paper's real argument today is legitimacy and continuity, not conquest.

Sobh-e No

Principlist daily (read via the outlet's Telegram channel; no scan in this batch)

"The US energy squeeze around a

MODERATE: energy-leverage messaging tied to Hormuz uncertainty

Hormuz still not fully reopened" «بازگشایی و امنیت تردد در تنگه هرمز»

- Main thread: Sobh-e No keys its front to the strait as an open question, 'the reopening and transit security of the Strait of Hormuz' (بازگشایی و امنیت تردد در تنگه هرمز), the same file Jomhourī Eslami reports as an Iran-Oman understanding, here still framed as unresolved.
- Claim: 'An 8 percent jump in European gas prices' (جهش ۸ درصدی قیمت گاز در اروپا) attributed to uncertainty over Hormuz transit, the energy-leverage argument that Iranian pressure is priced into world markets (outlet claim).
- Claim: 'Trump: I too want Iran to compensate our damages' (ترامپ: من هم از ایران می‌خواهم خسارات ما) (را جبران کند): a rendered US-side demand, presented as evidence Washington is now bargaining rather than dictating (second-hand, flagged).
- Claim: US Strategic Petroleum Reserve reported at 298.7 million barrels, described as the lowest since 1983, with a Jones Act waiver extension, marshalled as proof of American energy vulnerability (outlet figure, to be verified before reuse).
- Sub-item: Reports of reduced US aerial-tanker activity at Ben Gurion airport and explosions at Libya's al-Zawiya refinery, foreign-instability items folded into the energy-crisis frame.
- Sub-item: 'Appointment of six senior commanders on the Leader's directive': the reshuffle logged in brief.

ANALYST NOTE Sobh-e No builds the batch's most sustained 'America is being squeezed on energy' case, European gas up, US reserves at a multi-decade low, Trump reduced to demanding compensation, all pinned to Hormuz uncertainty. Read against Jomhourī Eslami's 'final Iran-Oman understanding', the two are complementary: the reshuffle-and-Hormuz cycle is being sold domestically as leverage that is already moving world energy markets. The specific figures (SPR at 298.7 million barrels; 8 percent European gas move) are outlet claims that should be corroborated before any analytic weight is placed on them.

*"Flight from Hormuz: Trump***MODERATE-HIGH: US-defeat framing of Hormuz; Yemeni-strike leverage claims***wanted to declare the strait's reopening a victory, an outcome that did not materialize" «فرار از هرمز؛**ترامپ می‌خواست بازگشایی تنگه هرمز را یک پیروزی اعلام کند»*

- Main: 'Flight from Hormuz: Trump wanted to declare the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz a victory, an outcome that did not materialize' (فرار از هرمز؛ ترامپ می‌خواست بازگشایی تنگه هرمز را یک پیروزی اعلام کند): Vatan frames the US as having failed to force a reopening on its terms, citing Wall Street Journal and CNN coverage; the foreign-press citations are second-hand and to be flagged as renderings.
- Analysis: 'Oil for security! A political-economy analysis of the Mecca pact' (نفت در ازای امنیت! تحلیل) (اقتصاد سیاسی پیمان مکه): the 7 August Saudi-Turkey-Pakistan accord recast as a transaction born of Saudi weakness rather than a durable realignment, draining it of deterrent value, exactly the 10 August pattern.
- Sub-item: 'From Aramco to al-Mokha: a report on the Yemeni army's new strikes' (آرامکو تا المخا): claims of fresh Ansarallah strikes on Saudi oil facilities, with Jizan-refinery fires said to be confirmed despite official denials, kinetic leverage against Riyadh (Iranian-aligned battle claims, labelled as such).
- Sub-item: 'Appointment of six high-ranking commanders in the General Staff, IRGC and Basij': the reshuffle recorded in the hardline register.
- Sub-item: 'Joy upon blood' (شادی بر خون): coverage of the killing of the eulogist Hamidreza Rajabzadeh, with alleged monarchist-opposition links abroad.

ANALYST NOTE Vatan-e Emrooz supplies the sharpest hardline counter-narrative to any Hormuz settlement: 'flight from Hormuz' inverts the strait story into a US defeat and, crucially, keeps the reopening framed as something Washington wants and cannot get, the mirror image of Etemad's 'America seeks a way out'. Its 'oil for security' demolition of the Mecca pact continues the coordinated drain-the-pact line. The convergence of hardline and reformist fronts on 'the US is the demandeur at Hormuz', from opposite motives, is the cycle's most notable cross-factional agreement and raises confidence that Tehran genuinely reads itself as holding the leverage.

Appendix A - The Leader's lead message of the day: the military-command decrees

Reconstructed from the front-page renderings on Seda-ye Iran, Chaharsoo, Khorasan, Qods and Jomhuri Eslami (20 Mordad 1405). khamenei.ir was not retrieved in the monitoring window; this is a reconstruction of the printed framing, not a verbatim decree text.

The Leader's principal act of the day was not a written homily but a set of command decrees. As printed in full on Chaharsoo, 'His Excellency Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, by issuing separate decrees conveyed the responsibilities and missions of six commanders and senior managers of the armed forces.' Seda-ye Iran devoted its entire front to the single caption 'Commander-in-Chief' (فرمانده کل قوا) over the Leader's portrait, presenting the decrees as the personal exercise of supreme command.

Qods reproduced the institutional scope: the Leader, 'in separate decrees, while appointing senior commanders in the General Staff of the Armed Forces, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Basij, defined new duties for the country's military forces.' Khorasan and Jomhuri Eslami carried the same six-appointment framing, Jomhuri Eslami explicitly linking it to the 10 August designation of Mohsen Rezaei as the Leader's representative to the Supreme National Security Council.

The verifiable content is therefore the fact and scope of the reshuffle (six senior appointments spanning the General Staff, the IRGC and the Basij, issued personally by the Leader as Commander-in-Chief) and its explicit purpose, the assignment of 'new missions' and duties. The identities of the six appointees are shown on the fronts as uncaptioned portraits and were reported by name only in unverifiable channel previews; those names are withheld here pending primary confirmation.

Analyst flag: this is the one hard, cross-corroborated event of the edition. It should be read as the second stage of a command consolidation that began with the SNSC change on 10 August, the Leader's office taking direct, personal ownership of the military chain of command. Verification note: printed identity of the Leader confirmed on the page (Seyyed Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei); decree text not obtained in full; appointee names not confirmed.

Appendix B - The day's flagged editorial: Kayhan's 'Yadasht-e Rooz'

Kayhan, 'Yadasht-e Rooz' (Note of the Day), title and authorship read from the Kayhan Online Telegram channel, 20 Mordad 1405. Author verified: Hossein Shariatmadari, Kayhan managing editor. Full body text was not retrieved in the window; the following is a faithful summary of the verified title and register, not a verbatim translation.

Title as published: 'If the Messenger of God had not existed, what good is being?' (اگر رسول خدا نبود، بودن را چه سود؟). The piece sits in the Safar mourning season (the front pages this day are saturated with Prophet-and-Imam-Reza devotional content), and its register is theological and legitimist rather than an overt war polemic.

The argument, as signalled by the title and Kayhan's standing editorial line, subordinates all temporal purpose to prophetic guidance and, by the paper's habitual extension, to the legitimate leadership that claims that mantle, an apt frame on the very day the Leader personally re-issued the military command. The devotional editorial and the command decrees are complementary: one sacralises the authority the other exercises.

Analyst flag: the choice of a Prophet-centred day-note over a battlefield boast is itself a signal, consistent with the batch-wide move from active-war triumphalism to consolidation and legitimacy. Verification note: title and author (Hossein Shariatmadari) confirmed from the outlet's own channel; the full text was not obtained, so no sentence above should be quoted as Shariatmadari's verbatim wording.

Appendix C - Methodology and sourcing notes

iran-press-digest v2 pipeline; front-page scans plus outlet Telegram channels and the English state press.

Coverage: ten front pages were read directly from scan (nine Persian titles from the NewspaperTasnim daily album, dated 20 Mordad 1405, plus Iran Daily in English from the Newspapers_Iran album). Three further titles (Kayhan, Vatan-e Emrooz, Sobh-e No) were read from their own Telegram channels. Wire agencies (Fars News, Nour News, Defa Press) were monitored for corroboration only and are treated as claims, not as front pages.

Papers identified from scan: Seda-ye Iran, Iran, Qods, Khorasan, Sazandegi, Chaharsoo, Jomhuri Eslami, Etemad, Ta'adol (Persian) and Iran Daily (English). Mastheads were confirmed against the recognition reference; the Leader's printed identity (Seyyed Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei) was confirmed on Chaharsoo.

Attribution firewall: Iranian battle-damage and pressure claims (Vatan-e Emrooz's Aramco and al-Mokha strikes; Fars's Persian Gulf oil-spill and Gaza casualty figures; Sobh-e No's US petroleum-reserve figure and European gas-price move; Kayhan's 'Trump food-truck escape' and its second-hand 'energy iceberg' quotation) are recorded as outlet claims and are not adopted as fact. Second-hand foreign-press citations (WSJ, CNN, a University of Chicago analyst) are flagged as renderings, not verified primary quotations.

Single-source and negative-evidence flags: the 'final Iran-Oman understanding on the Strait of Hormuz transit map' is carried on one front page (Jomhuri Eslami) with no reproduced joint text, map or notice to mariners, and is logged as an unconfirmed outlet claim, thematically but not independently supported by Sobh-e No and Etemad. The identities of the six military appointees could not be confirmed from the scans and are withheld. Tehran Times was unavailable in the window. khamenei.ir was not retrieved, so Appendix A is a reconstruction of printed framing rather than a decree text.

Succession basis: current coverage's 'the Leader / Commander-in-Chief' is Seyyed Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei, printed by name on the fronts; the predecessor Ali Khamenei is referenced in the martyred register. Translations are editorial; loaded terms (khunkhah/blood-avenger, janfeda/self-sacrificing, dolat-e vefaq/consensus government, pasajang/post-war, ensedad-e saliqe'i/arbitrary blocking) are glossed inline where they carry the framing.

Open-source material only. All translations from Persian/Arabic originals. Iranian claims are labelled as claims. Prepared for analysis and early warning; hostile content is documented for defensive assessment only, not endorsed.