OPEN-SOURCE PRESS INTELLIGENCE

Iranian Press Monitor

Daily Front-Page Intelligence

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SECURITY-COUNCIL RESHUFFLE EDITION

12 daily front pages surveyed: 10 Persian print titles and Iran Daily (English) read from scan, with Kayhan and Sobh-e No from their own channels; Jam-e Jam and Iran also from scan; Defa Press, Fars and Nour News monitored for corroboration

Front pages published the morning of 10 August 2026, reflecting events through late 9 August local

Defensive open-source press-intelligence. Hostile rhetoric is quoted and translated for attribution and analysis only; nothing herein endorses or amplifies it.

Front page: No-Bonyad

Executive Summary

The lead development of the 10 August edition is a change at the apex of Iran's security architecture. By a decree issued in the name of Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei (printed in full on the No-Bonyad front page), Major General Mohsen Rezaei was named the Leader's representative to the Supreme National Security Council and, by a paired presidential decree, its Secretary; Mohammad-Baqer Zolqadr, who had held both posts for less than four months, was reassigned as the Leader's political advisor. The significance is sharpened by continuity: Zolqadr is the same official this monitor quoted on 9 August declaring that Iran 'will not yield, whether in war or negotiation' and that the strait stays closed 'until America corrects its behaviour.' The man who personified the yield-nothing pole of the system's central fracture has been moved, and No-Bonyad alone reads the swap plainly, as the surfacing of 'the leadership's deep dissatisfaction with this body's performance in recent months.'

The reshuffle did not, however, soften the line it might have been expected to. On the same morning, the fronts hardened Iran's Hormuz posture into a codified menu: Farhikhtegan announced 'Iran's six conditions for reopening the Strait of Hormuz on Iranian terms' under the banner 'the strait will not be opened'; Iran Daily rendered the same as 'six conditions' set by the 'top security chief'; Qods insisted 'negotiation will not begin from point zero,' demanding an end to threats and siege, compensation, and a mechanism to bar a repeat attack mid-talks; Kayhan set 'Iran's conditions... indifferent to Trump's empty boasts'; and Defa Press reported the Majlis National Security Commission passing a Hormuz-control bill. This is a real advance over the 9 August picture of an arrangement 'announced but not sealed': the preconditions bloc has consolidated a shared, itemized negotiating floor, and it now carries a legislative instrument behind it.

The diplomatic anchor firmed in parallel. Foreign Minister Araghchi, on the English front, ruled out talks 'as long as the US violates the Islamabad understanding,' naming the Pakistan-brokered arrangement as the tripwire. Against that, a genuine off-ramp signal circulated: Khorasan led with 'Trump's war bewilderment,' reporting a Wall Street Journal claim that Trump is 'ready to end the war with Iran without reaching a nuclear agreement.' The two lines are compatible in Tehran's telling - if Washington wants out more than it wants a comprehensive deal, the preconditions bloc's bet pays off - but the WSJ line is an attributed foreign-press item, and Iran Daily's own careful read of the Saudi-Turkey-Pakistan pact ('unlikely to affect Pakistan's stalled mediation role') concedes the mediation channel is stalled, not advancing.

The enemy-in-retreat register carried forward, now routed through the Mecca defence pact rather than fresh battlefield claims. Seda-ye Iran, the front most tightly keyed to the Leader's office, made the pact its lead as proof of 'the end of the illusion of the American security umbrella,' pairing it with unverified 'new images' of damage to US bases; Vatan-e Emrooz recast the same pact as evidence of Saudi weakness ('the Saudi: architect of misery') and spun US reporting into 'flight from Hormuz'; Farhikhtegan declared 'King Salman's alliance bubble burst.' Three hardline mastheads converging to deny the pact any deterrent value, on the morning after it dominated as an adverse realignment, again reads as centrally-congenial message discipline rather than independent judgement. The Yemen-Saudi front supplied the day's kinetic texture: strikes on Al-Mokha and Saudi oil and gas facilities, carried by Kayhan, Jam-e Jam, Farhikhtegan and the wires (Fars: '7 dead, 30 wounded' per Saudi-backed forces) as leverage against Riyadh.

Beneath the security drama the war economy again broke through, and from unusually establishment quarters. Jam-e Jam, the state broadcaster's paper, led with 'two branches warn over price rises,' reporting that judicial officials and MPs jointly insist 'wartime conditions must not be a pretext for irrational price increases'; Khorasan documented a government crackdown on old cars that 'resembles a livelihood dead-end for the lower deciles'; No-Bonyad ran 'inflation has raised even Baharestan's voice' and 'government tax

revenue under the blade of inflation' from the right. The cost-of-living complaint that was a reformist-and-economic register on 9 August has migrated to state and hardline-critical fronts, a broadening that matters more than any single figure.

Net assessment: this is a reshuffle-without-a-turn edition. The system changed the person at the security apex while holding the policy, printing both the removal of its yield-nothing secretary and a hardened, itemized Hormuz line on the same fronts - the clearest available evidence that the hard line is owned by the Leader's office, not the secretariat, and that Rezaei's arrival is being sold as corrective competence, not as a course change. The negotiate-now camp is quieter than on 9 August, its energy displaced by the personnel story and by the executive's defensive turn (Iran's 'don't be Netanyahu's plaything,' prosecuting insults to the President); the pragmatic case now speaks mainly through the economy, which even state and hardline titles can no longer keep off the front page. The signals to watch are whether Rezaei's SNSC narrows or widens the negotiate-now/yield-nothing gap, whether the 'six conditions' and the Majlis Hormuz bill produce any actual text or notice to mariners, and whether the WSJ 'US exit without a deal' line is echoed by Iranian officials or left to circulate as convenient foreign-press validation.

BOTTOM LINE Mojtaba Khamenei has replaced the security-council secretary who embodied 'we will not yield, in war or negotiation,' moving Zolqadr aside for the veteran commander Mohsen Rezaei; but the Hormuz line did not move with him, and the same fronts that carried the reshuffle also hardened Iran's terms into a published 'six conditions' for reopening the strait, indicating the hard line is set above the secretariat, not by it.

CRITICAL SOURCING NOTE Eleven front pages were read directly from scan and two dailies (Kayhan, Sobh-e No) from their Telegram channels; Defa Press, Fars and Nour News were used only for corroboration under the attribution firewall. The Rezaei appointment is verified against the Mehr, Mashregh, Fars and Defa Press wires (dated 18 Mordad 1405); the quoted decree wording in Appendix A is a reconstruction to the customary template, not a verbatim text, as khamenei.ir was not retrievable. Battle-damage and 'greatest power defeated' claims (Kayhan, Seda-ye Iran), the 'half the Saudi fleet' figure (Farhikhtegan), and the second-hand CNN 'hardened demands' rendering (Sobh-e No) are outlet claims, not confirmed events. The Wall Street Journal 'end the war without a nuclear deal' line reaches us via Khorasan's rendering and is not independently confirmed. Tehran Times was unavailable at compile time and is not cited.

Macro Trend Analysis

1 The secretary changes, the line holds

The load-bearing story is the SNSC reshuffle: Mojtaba Khamenei's decree installs Mohsen Rezaei as his representative and the Council's secretary and moves Mohammad-Baqer Zolqadr, the 'we will not yield' voice of 9 August, to a political-advisor role. No-Bonyad reads it as a rebuke ('deep dissatisfaction with this body's performance'); Sobh-e No and Jam-e Jam absorb it as orderly succession with Qalibaf's and Aref's endorsements. Crucially, the hard Hormuz line did not move with Zolqadr - it hardened - which continues, and partly resolves, the negotiate-now-versus-yield-nothing thread this monitor has tracked since 6 August: the yield-nothing pole is being owned by the Leader's office directly, not by the outgoing secretariat.

2 From slogan to menu: the 'six conditions' for Hormuz

The Hormuz file advanced from assertion to itemized policy. Farhikhtegan ('six conditions... the strait will not be opened'), Iran Daily ('six conditions' set by the top security chief), Qods ('not from point zero': end threats and siege, compensation, an anti-repeat-attack mechanism), Kayhan ('conditions... indifferent to Trump's boasts') and Araghchi's 'no talks while the US violates the Islamabad understanding' converge on one

published negotiating floor, now backed by a Majlis National Security Commission Hormuz-control bill (Defa Press). This sharpens the 9 August 'announced but not sealed' finding: the preconditions bloc has a shared text and a legislative instrument, even as no joint Iran-Oman notice to mariners has surfaced.

3 The Mecca pact, denied any deterrent value

The Saudi-Turkey-Pakistan defence pact, dominant on 8 August as an adverse realignment, is now uniformly drained of threat by the hardline fronts: 'the end of the illusion of the American security umbrella' (Seda-ye Iran), 'the Saudi: architect of misery' and Saudi 'acute security predicament' (Vatan-e Emrooz), 'King Salman's alliance bubble burst' (Farhikhtegan). Iran Daily, for foreign readers, is the outlier, treating it as eroding trust in the US role but 'unlikely to affect Pakistan's stalled mediation.' The convergence of three mastheads on 'Saudi weakness / American decline' is the standing enemy-in-retreat construction, its function to keep any Hormuz settlement resembling the pre-war normal domestically unaffordable.

4 The war economy breaks the establishment fronts

Cost-of-living pressure, a reformist-and-economic register on 9 August, has migrated to state and hardline-critical titles: Jam-e Jam's 'two branches warn over price rises' (judiciary and MPs: wartime is no pretext for gouging), Khorasan's clunker-car crackdown that 'resembles a livelihood dead-end for the lower deciles,' and No-Bonyad's 'inflation has raised even Baharestan's voice' and 'tax revenue under the blade of inflation.' With the negotiate-now camp muted this cycle, the economy is now the main channel through which the pragmatic case that the war must end is being made, and it can no longer be kept off establishment front pages.

5 The executive turns defensive; the Caspian frame stays contested

The government daily Iran met the war-guilt and surrender attacks (Asr-e Iranian's 'war-bringing government,' No-Bonyad's 'distorting Ashura in the name of negotiation') by reframing critics as unwitting instruments ('do not become Netanyahu's plaything') and by demanding prosecution of those who insult the President, while staking legitimacy on 'the continuation of unity and empathy' from the Pezeshkian-Leader meeting. On the sovereignty-right's second front, Shargh answered the 9 August 'Caspian JCPOA' surrender-frame with a call for 'expert review of the Caspian bill' on the merits, keeping that thread contested across the aisle rather than spreading unopposed.

Key Judgments

KJ-1 **[HIGH]** The reshuffle at the security apex is a change of personnel, not of policy. Mojtaba Khamenei's decree replaced Zolqadr - the 'we will not yield, in war or negotiation' secretary of 9 August - with Mohsen Rezaei, yet the same fronts hardened the Hormuz line into a published 'six conditions' rather than softening it. Significance: the yield-nothing posture is owned above the secretariat, by the Leader's office, so the swap should be read as a bid for corrective competence (No-Bonyad: 'deep dissatisfaction with this body's performance') and not as a signal of flexibility on the war's terms.

KJ-2 **[HIGH]** The Hormuz file advanced this cycle from slogan to itemized policy with a legislative instrument behind it. A shared 'six conditions' menu ran across Farhikhtegan, Iran Daily, Qods and Kayhan, Araghchi anchored it to 'the Islamabad understanding,' and the Majlis National Security Commission passed a Hormuz-control bill (Defa Press). Significance: unlike the 9 August 'announced but not sealed' picture, the preconditions bloc now has a common text and a law, raising the domestic cost of any compromise, though still with no joint Iran-Oman notice to mariners or map to show the strait has actually reopened.

KJ-3 [MODERATE-HIGH] The hardline press has drained the Mecca defence pact of deterrent value in a coordinated fashion. Three mastheads converged on the same morning - Seda-ye Iran ('collapse of the American security umbrella'), Vatan-e Emrooz ('the Saudi: architect of misery,' Saudi 'acute security predicament') and Farhikhtegan ('King Salman's alliance bubble burst') - the day after the pact dominated as an adverse realignment. Significance: the uniformity indicates centrally-congenial message discipline aimed at denying an adversary coalition any signaling power, and Iran Daily's more measured English read ('unlikely to affect Pakistan's stalled mediation') is the tell that the Persian framing is domestic messaging, not assessment.

KJ-4 [MODERATE-HIGH] A genuine US off-ramp signal is circulating, but only as attributed foreign-press material. Khorasan led with a Wall Street Journal claim that Trump is 'ready to end the war with Iran without reaching a nuclear agreement,' which - if real - would validate the preconditions bloc's bet that Washington wants exit more than a comprehensive deal. Significance: the line is second-hand and unconfirmed, no Iranian official is yet quoted endorsing it, and Iran Daily concedes Pakistan's mediation is 'stalled'; the item is being used as convenient validation rather than reported as a negotiating breakthrough.

KJ-5 [MODERATE] War-economy strain has broken onto establishment and hardline-critical front pages, broadening a signal that was reformist on 9 August. Jam-e Jam (state broadcaster) led with judiciary-and-MP warnings against wartime price gouging; Khorasan tied a government car-policy crackdown to a 'livelihood dead-end for the lower deciles'; No-Bonyad ran inflation eroding tax revenue and 'raising Baharestan's voice.' Significance: with the negotiate-now camp muted this cycle, the economy is now the principal vehicle for the pragmatic case that the war must end, and its spread across factional lines makes it harder for the triumphalist fronts to suppress.

KJ-6 [MODERATE] The executive answered the surrender-and-war-guilt campaign by reframing its critics as instruments of the enemy rather than by defending the negotiating track on the merits. The government daily Iran ran 'do not become Netanyahu's plaything' and demanded prosecution of those insulting the President, staking legitimacy on 'unity' from the Pezeshkian-Leader meeting; the hardline lane pressed 'war-bringing government' (Asr-e Iranian) and 'distorting Ashura in the name of negotiation' (No-Bonyad). Significance: the pro-settlement case is now being defended defensively and by loyalty framing, not by the confident 'best time for an agreement' argument that dominated 9 August, a retreat in the framing contest even if not in the underlying policy.

KJ-7 [MODERATE] Negative finding: no verified Leader's-office text beyond the personnel decree, and no confirmation of the day's loudest external claims, surfaced in the window. khamenei.ir was not retrievable (Appendix A is reconstructed to template); Kayhan's 'greatest power defeated' and 'Saudi facilities ablaze,' Seda-ye Iran's 'new US-base damage images,' Farhikhtegan's 'half the Saudi fleet' and the WSJ 'US exit' line are all uncorroborated or second-hand, and Tehran Times was unavailable. Significance: the edition's certainty about American decline and Iranian ascendancy again runs well ahead of its documentation, and the reshuffle - the one hard, verified event - is precisely the item the fronts frame least, and most divergently.

Named-Figure Tracker

Figure	Role / relevance	Today's framing	Flag
Mohsen Rezaei	Newly appointed Leader's representative to, and Secretary of, the Supreme National Security Council; Major General, former IRGC commander	Installed by decree as corrective competence at the security apex; celebrated ('Agha Mohsen') on Farhikhtegan	NEW NAMED FIGURE
Mohammad-Baqer Zolqadr	Outgoing SNSC secretary, reassigned as the Leader's political advisor	Removed less than four months in; No-Bonyad reads it as a leadership rebuke of the Council's performance	WATCH
Mojtaba Khamenei	Supreme Leader	Issued the appointment decree; full name printed only on No-Bonyad; met the President on economic and military affairs	WATCH
Masoud Pezeshkian	President	Met the Leader entering his third year ('unity'); warned enemies target scientists; his office warns against being 'Netanyahu's plaything'	WATCH
Abbas Araghchi	Foreign Minister	'No talks as long as the US violates the Islamabad understanding'; anchors the preconditions line	COERCION SPOKESMAN
Donald Trump	US President	'Empty boasts' (Kayhan), 'war bewilderment' (Khorasan), reportedly 'ready to end the war without a nuclear deal' (WSJ via Khorasan)	TARGET FRAMING
Benjamin Netanyahu	Israeli Prime Minister	Invoked as the enemy whose 'plaything' internal critics risk becoming (Iran daily)	TARGET FRAMING
Mohammad bin Salman / King Salman	Saudi leadership	'The Saudi: architect of misery' (Vatan-e Emrooz); the Mecca pact framed as Saudi	TARGET FRAMING

Figure	Role / relevance	Today's framing	Flag
		weakness and a 'burst bubble'	
Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf and Mohammad-Reza Aref	Speaker of Parliament; First Vice President	Both publicly congratulated Rezaei, framing the reshuffle as orderly and unifying	WATCH

Headline Summary Table

Outlet	Lead Headline (English)	Orientation	Theme	Threat signal
No-Bonyad	Change, on principle	Hardline-critical conservative	SNSC reshuffle read as a leadership rebuke	MODERATE: institutional-discontent signal
Farhikhtegan	Iran's united voice: the strait will not be opened	Principlist (Azad University)	Six conditions for reopening Hormuz	HIGH: codified closure preconditions
Kayhan	Iran's conditions for reopening Hormuz, indifferent to Trump's empty boasts	Ultra-hardline flagship (channel)	Hormuz conditions; 'greatest power defeated'	HIGH: victory-and-conditions register
Qods	Negotiation will not begin from point zero	Conservative (Astan Quds)	Talks only with guarantees	MODERATE: hardened negotiating floor
Iran Daily	Araghchi: No talks as long as US violates Islamabad understanding	State English-language	Preconditions diplomacy; six Hormuz conditions	MODERATE: codified preconditions
Seda-ye Iran	The end of the illusion of the American security umbrella	Hardline, pro-Leader's-office	Mecca pact as US-umbrella collapse	MODERATE-HIGH: American-decline thesis
Vatan-e Emrooz	The Saudi: architect of misery	Hardline principlist	Mecca pact as Saudi weakness; 'flight from Hormuz'	MODERATE-HIGH: Hormuz maximalism
Jam-e Jam	Two branches warn over price rises	State broadcaster (IRIB)	War-economy strain; leadership meeting; reshuffle	MODERATE: cost-of-living warning
Khorasan	Trump's war bewilderment	Conservative, Mashhad	US 'ready to end war without a deal'; car policy hits the poor	MODERATE: US-exit framing; livelihood strain
Iran	The continuation of unity and empathy	Official government daily	Leadership meeting as unity; executive pushes back on critics	LOW-MODERATE: state-cohesion messaging
Sobh-e No	Pezeshkian's second meeting with the Leader	Principlist (channel)	Leadership continuity; Hormuz demands hardened; Lebanon flashpoint	MODERATE-HIGH: Hormuz + Lebanon reports

Outlet	Lead Headline (English)	Orientation	Theme	Threat signal
Shargh	Is an agreement on the way?	Reformist	Deal as open question; Caspian bill on the merits	LOW-MODERATE: pro-settlement questioning
Asr-e Iranian	The war-bringing government	Independent/centrist, here anti-executive	Executive blamed for projecting weakness	MODERATE: inward war-guilt framing

Per-Paper Front-Page Analysis

Iran Daily

State-run English-language daily (for foreign/diplomatic readers)

“Araghchi: No talks as long as US violates Islamabad understanding”

MODERATE: codified preconditions; Pakistan channel preserved

- Main: Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi rules out negotiations 'as long as the US violates the Islamabad understanding,' the Pakistan-brokered arrangement, the English front's authoritative statement of the preconditions line.
- Deck: 'Top security chief sets six conditions for reopening Strait of Hormuz,' the English rendering of the six-conditions package that Farhikhtegan and the Majlis commission also carry.
- Center: 'Pezeshkian says enemies target scientists to hinder country's progress,' pairing the assassination-of-scientists frame with the development narrative (matches Iran's 'don't be Netanyahu's plaything').
- Sub-item: 'Iran-Turkey trade jumps 73% in June as maritime routes affected by US blockade,' presenting sanctions-era trade resilience for foreign readers.
- Interview: 'Trilateral defense pact unlikely to affect Pakistan's stalled mediation role,' an analyst reading of the Saudi-Turkey-Pakistan pact that preserves Islamabad's channel between Tehran and Washington.
- Banner: 'President meets Leader as he begins his third year in office.'

> **ANALYST NOTE** The English state daily is the cleanest statement of the day's diplomatic line: preconditions, not point-zero talks, anchored to a named 'Islamabad understanding' and 'six conditions.' Its careful treatment of the trilateral pact (a threat to trust in the US role, but not to Pakistan's mediation) is calibrated for foreign audiences and is more measured than the Persian fronts' 'Saudi weakness' and 'collapsed umbrella' framings.

Asr-e Iranian

Independent/centrist Tehran daily, here running a hardline-flavored critique of the executive's foreign-policy posture

“The war-bringing government” «دولت جنگ‌آور»

MODERATE: inward war-guilt framing pressures the negotiating track

- Main: The lead thesis blames the executive for the war itself: a full-width feature argues that the fourteenth government's projection of a 'weak Iran' («تصویر ایران ضعیف») shaped enemy calculations and its effect on the occurrence of three wars (تأثیر آن بر وقوع سه جنگ), an unusually direct front-page assignment of war-guilt to Pezeshkian's cabinet rather than to Washington or Tel Aviv.
- Op-ed: 'Diplomatic recess' (تعطیلات دیپلماسی), bylined Ayoub Najafnejad (ایوب نجف‌نژاد), charges the Foreign Ministry with passivity (انفعال) and being preoccupied with 'the sidelines of Oman' (حاشیه‌های عمان) while the diplomatic track stalls.
- Sub-item: 'The If-Then rule between Iran and America' («قاعده «اگر - آنگاه» بین ایران و آمریکا) frames the standoff as a conditional-deterrence game rather than open negotiation.
- Sub-item: A citation of Foreign Affairs, 'Why does the United States keep failing at its wars?' (چرا ایالات متحده به شکست در جنگ‌ها ادامه می‌دهد؟), imported as external validation of the enemy-in-decline register.
- Right rail: The Mohsen Rezaei appointment as the Leader's representative and Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, carried as the day's institutional news.

> **ANALYST NOTE** Notable as a rare front-page critique from the principlist-adjacent lane that turns the war's causation inward, blaming the executive's 'weakness' rather than the adversary. It converges with No-Bonyad and Vatan-e Emrooz in weaponizing the negotiate-now camp's posture as a national-security liability, sharpening the achievement-versus-surrender thread this monitor has tracked since 6 August.

Farhikhtegan

Principlist daily (Azad University), analytically ambitious hardline

“Iran's united voice: the strait will not be opened” «صدای واحد ایران: تنگه باز نمی‌شود»

HIGH: codified Hormuz-closure preconditions and Saudi-fleet targeting

- Banner: 'Iran's six conditions for reopening the Strait of Hormuz on Iranian terms have been announced' (شرط ایران برای بازگشایی تنگه هرمز ۶ به‌ترتیبات ایرانی اعلام شد), presenting the closure as a policy with published preconditions rather than a bluff, and claiming a single national line across factions.
- Main: A full-page fireball over a burning tanker anchors the maximalist read, paired with the analytic teaser 'When will Trump be defeated? Oil, or...?' (ترامپ چه زمانی شکست می‌خورد؟ نفت یا...؟), an in-house study of the war's effect on American governance.
- Sub-item: 'Half of Saudi Arabia's fleet under Yemen's strike' (نصف ناوگان عربستان زیر ضرب یمن), amplifying the Yemen-Saudi front as leverage against Riyadh.
- Sub-item: 'The bubble of King Salman's alliance has burst' (حباب اتحاد ملک سلمان ترکید), casting the Mecca/Saudi defense pact as a failed construct.
- Op-ed: 'Agha Mohsen in Sha'am' (آقامحسن در شعام), a tribute keyed to the Rezaei appointment.
- Right rail: 'The man who wanted knowledge for Iran' (مردی که علم را برای ایران خواست), a martyr/science tribute banner.

> **ANALYST NOTE** The 'six conditions' formulation is the day's most concrete Hormuz artifact: it converts the slogan into a claimed negotiating menu and matches Iran Daily's English 'six conditions' subhead and the Majlis commission's Hormuz-control bill (Defa Press). Farhikhtegan's insistence on a 'united voice' is itself a tell, published on the same morning the SNSC secretary is being replaced, suggesting message-discipline over demonstrated consensus.

Shargh

Leading reformist daily

LOW-MODERATE: pro-settlement questioning; de-escalatory register

“Is an agreement on the way?” «توافقی در راه است؟»

- Main: An interview-anchored lead poses the deal as an open question, weighing 'technical negotiations' against a 'strategic opening' (مذاکرات فنی با گشایش راهبردی), the reformist counter to the hardline 'the enemy is in retreat' certainty.
- Sub-item: 'One covenant and a thousand meanings' (یک پیمان و هزار معنا), reading the contested Hormuz/Oman arrangement as deliberately ambiguous text that each faction fills with its own meaning.
- Sub-item: 'Nilufar Square; 163 days later' (میدان نیلوفر؛ ۱۶۳ روز بعد), a war-anniversary reckoning marking 163 days since the late-February rupture.
- Op-ed: 'The calculative logic of war and peace' (منطق محاسباتی جنگ و صلح), arguing for cost-benefit reasoning over the vengeance register.
- Op-ed: 'The necessity of expert review of the Caspian bill' (ضرورت بررسی کارشناسی لایحه کاسپین), engaging the Caspian Sea legal-convention dossier on the merits rather than as the 'Caspian JCPOA' surrender-frame No-Bonyad ran on 9 August.

ANALYST NOTE Shargh answers the triumphalist fronts with interrogation, not assertion, keeping the pragmatic 'is a deal possible and on what terms' lane alive. Its call for expert (not political) review of the Caspian bill is the reformist rebuttal to the sovereignty-right's new surrender-frame, showing that thread now contested across the aisle rather than spreading unopposed.

Vatan-e Emrooz

Hardline principlist daily

“The Saudi: architect of misery” «سعودی معمار بدبختی»

MODERATE-HIGH: Hormuz maximalism, Saudi-as-weak framing, diaspora-security thread

- Main: A cover image of a Saudi figure contemplating a framed portrait of Donald Trump anchors the thesis, with the strap 'Why the Mecca pact, more than signaling a new regional alignment, expresses Saudi Arabia's acute security predicament' (چرا پیمان مکه بیش از آنکه نشان از آرایش جدید در منطقه باشد بیانگر وضعیت حاد امنیتی عربستان است), reframing the Saudi-Turkey-Pakistan pact as evidence of Riyadh's weakness.
- Banner: The masthead strip carries the leadership shuffle: 'Mohsen Rezaei became Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council' and, by the Leader's decree, 'Mohammad-Baqer Zolqadr became the Leader's political advisor' (محمدباقر ذوالقدر، مشاور سیاسی رهبری شد).
- Kicker: 'Flight from Hormuz' (فرار از هرمز), over 'Wall Street Journal: nothing happened!' (وال‌استریت ژورنال: اتفاقی رخ نداد!), spinning US reporting as an admission of American impotence at the strait.
- Sub-item: 'Blood trail: from Tehran to Canada' (رد خون: از تهران تا کانادا), an assassination/diaspora-security thread.
- Sub-item: 'From Aramco to Mokha' (آرامکو تا المخا), tying the Yemen-Saudi strikes into the pressure map.

ANALYST NOTE Vatan-e Emrooz recasts the Mecca pact (dominant on 8 August as an anti-Iran realignment) into a symptom of Saudi desperation, the standing move to deny adversary coordination any deterrent value. Placing Zolqadr's removal on the masthead alongside 'the strait will not open' messaging shows the hardline press absorbing the SNSC reshuffle without conceding any softening of the Hormuz line.

Jam-e Jam

State broadcaster (IRIB) daily

“Two branches warn over price rises” «هشدار ۲ قوه درباره گرانی‌ها»

MODERATE: war-economy strain acknowledged; hard-bargaining conditions

- Main: Judicial officials and members of parliament jointly warn that 'wartime conditions must not be a pretext for irrational price increases' (شرایط جنگی نباید بهانه‌ای برای افزایش غیرمنطقی قیمت باشد), an unusually pointed cost-of-living intervention from a state outlet.
- Banner: 'The President's meeting and talks with the Leader of the Revolution on the country's economic and military issues' (دیدار و گفت‌وگوی رئیس‌جمهور با رهبر معظم انقلاب درباره مسائل اقتصادی و نظامی کشور), the day's shared top event across the fronts.
- Right rail: The full appointment package - by the Leader's decree Mohsen Rezaei named the Leader's representative to the SNSC; by the President's decree named its Secretary; and Zolqadr made the Leader's political advisor (ذوالقدر، مشاور سیاسی رهبر انقلاب شد).
- Sub-item: 'Two long strides by Iranian scientists' (۲ گام بلند دانشمندان ایرانی), a domestic science/biotech achievement banner keyed to the 'enemies target our scientists' frame.
- Sub-item: 'Aramco under the Yemeni dagger' (آرامکو زیر ضرب خنجر یمنی), corroborating the Yemen-Saudi strikes.
- Sub-item: 'Iran's negotiating conditions' (شروط مذاکراتی ایران), presenting the preconditions bloc in state framing.

ANALYST NOTE As the state broadcaster's paper, Jam-e Jam's price-gouging warning signals official anxiety that the war economy is politically corrosive, and its 'two branches' framing lends the cost-of-living complaint institutional weight rather than reformist coloring. It carries the Rezaei reshuffle straight and pairs the Pezeshkian-Leader meeting with 'negotiating conditions,' the establishment's attempt to hold economic grievance and hard bargaining in one frame.

No-Bonyad

Hardline-critical conservative daily

“Change, on principle” تغییر «علی‌الاصول»

MODERATE: institutional-discontent signal; leadership rebuke of the SNSC

- Main: The headline puns on 'principlist' (اصول) to read the SNSC reshuffle as overdue: 'By the decree of Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei, the Leader's representative to the Supreme National Security Council was changed' (با حکم آیت‌الله سید مجتبی حسینی خامنه‌ای، نماینده رهبر انقلاب در شورای عالی امنیت ملی تغییر کرد).
- Main: The body frames the swap as a rebuke: 'less than four months after Mohammad-Baqer Zolqadr's appointment... Mohsen Rezaei replaced him, so that the leadership's deep dissatisfaction with this body's performance in recent months... now becomes fully evident' (نارضایتی عمیق رهبری از عملکرد این نهاد... حالا پیش از پیش عیان می‌شود).
- Op-ed: 'The transparency show' (شوی شفافیت), mocking the executive's transparency claims as performance.
- Sub-item: 'Distorting Ashura in the name of negotiation' (تحریف عاشورا به نام مذاکره), tying the pro-deal camp to religious-legitimacy transgression.
- Sub-item: 'Inflation has raised even Baharestan's voice' (گرانی؛ صدای بهارستان را هم درآورد) and 'Government tax revenue under the blade of inflation' (درآمد مالیاتی دولت زیر تیغ تورم), the cost-of-living pressure from the right.
- Right rail: 'From Yazid to Pahlavi; Zionism's petty successors' (از «یزید» تا «پهلوی»؛ نوگران حقیر صهیونیسم), the religio-nationalist delegitimation register.

> **ANALYST NOTE** No-Bonyad is the only front to read the Rezaei appointment as a public verdict on failure rather than a routine personnel move, explicitly printing the Leader's full name (Mojtaba) and attributing 'deep dissatisfaction' with the SNSC's recent performance. This is the sharpest available signal that the reshuffle is corrective, and it lets the hardline-critical lane fold institutional discontent into its standing surrender-narrative against the negotiate-now camp.

Seda-ye Iran

Hardline daily aligned with the Leader's office (front page carries a KHAMENEI.IR banner)

“The end of the illusion of the American security umbrella” «پایان توهّم چتر آمریکایی امنیت»

MODERATE-HIGH: American-decline thesis; unverified US-base strike-damage claims

- Main: Over a Mecca-summit image of Arab leaders (Erdogan and the Saudi crown prince among them), the lead argues 'the Arab states' insecurity about the efficacy of relying militarily on America' (ناامنی کشورهای عربی از کارآمدی اتکای نظامی به آمریکا), casting the pact as proof the US guarantee has failed.
- Op-ed: 'The illusion that collapsed' (توهمی که فروپاشید), the paired editorial (سرمقاله) generalizing the argument into a thesis of American strategic decline.
- Sub-item: 'Newly released images of the damage from Iran's missile strikes on US bases' (تصاویر تازه منتشر شده از خسارت حملات موشکی ایران به پایگاه‌های آمریکا), presented as fresh battle-damage evidence.
- Right rail: The Mohsen Rezaei appointment as the Leader's representative and SNSC secretary, and a martyr tribute banner ('survivor of martyr Ehsanolhaq').

ANALYST NOTE As the front most tightly keyed to the Leader's office, Seda-ye Iran converts the Mecca pact from an adverse realignment into evidence for the office's core thesis of American decline, the same enemy-in-retreat construction Kayhan and Vatan-e Emrooz run. Its unverified 'new battle-damage images' from US bases should be treated as claim, not documentation, and read as message reinforcement timed to the pact coverage.

Iran

Official government daily

“The continuation of unity and empathy” «استمرار وحدت و همدلی»

LOW-MODERATE: state-cohesion messaging; executive counter-pressure on critics

- Main: 'Coinciding with the start of the government's third year, the President and the Leader of the Revolution met' (همزمان با آغاز سومین سال فعالیت دولت، رئیس‌جمهور و رهبر انقلاب دیدار کردند), the meeting framed by the executive's own paper as continuity, unity and empathy - the state-cohesion register.
- Sub-item: 'Do not become Netanyahu's plaything' (بازیچه نتانیاهو نشوید), a warning from the President's legal deputy to internal 'dividers and double-players,' folding domestic dissent into the external-threat frame.
- Right rail: The Mohsen Rezaei appointment as the Leader's representative and SNSC secretary, carried straight.
- Sub-item: 'The necessity of lawful action against those who insult the President' (ضرورت برخورد قانونی با اهانت‌کنندگان به رئیس‌جمهور), signaling executive pushback against the hardline delegitimation campaign.
- Sub-item: An approval 'to facilitate goods clearance' (برای تسهیل ترخیص کالا), a supply-side economic-relief measure.

ANALYST NOTE The government daily reads the same Pezeshkian-Leader meeting the hardline fronts minimize as validation, staking the executive's legitimacy on 'unity' and continuity as it enters year three. The twin items on 'don't be Netanyahu's plaything' and prosecuting insults to the President show the executive answering the war-guilt and surrender attacks (Asr-e Iranian, No-Bonyad) by reframing its critics as unwitting instruments of the adversary.

Qods

Conservative daily (Astan Quds Razavi, Mashhad)

“Negotiation will not begin from point zero” «مذاکره از نقطه صفر آغاز نمی‌شود»

MODERATE: guarantees-first preconditions harden the negotiating floor

- Main: The lead lays out Tehran's preconditions for any return to talks: an end to threats and to the 'siege' (پایان تهدید و محاصره), compensation for war damage (جبران خسارت), and a mechanism 'that makes repeating an attack in the middle of the talks difficult' (کاری که تکرار حمله در میانه گفت‌وگو را دشوار کند) - talks resumed only with guarantees, not from scratch.
- Right rail: 'By a decree from Ayatollah Khamenei: the appointment of Mohsen Rezaei as the Leader's representative in the Supreme National Security Council' (انتصاب محسن رضایی به عنوان نماینده رهبر انقلاب در شورای عالی امنیت ملی).
- Sub-item: 'The troubled dream of the abandoned city' (خواب آشفته شهر متروکه), a reported feature on Persian Gulf sheikhdoms struggling to revive tourism, a soft-power jab at the Gulf monarchies.
- Sub-item: 'Yemen's prescription against the rented coalitions' (نسخه یمن در برابر ائتلاف‌های استیجاری), casting the Yemen front as the model for resisting US-backed alliances.
- Op-ed: 'Sacred Defense literature has moved past exaggerated narratives' (ادبیات دفاع مقدس از روایت‌های اغراق‌آمیز عبور کرده است), a war-memory culture piece.

> **ANALYST NOTE** Qods supplies the clearest editorial statement of the preconditions bloc: the same guarantees-first logic Araghchi frames in Iran Daily ('no talks while the US violates the understanding') and Farhikhtegan's 'six conditions,' rendered as a demand that any resumption carry anti-attack safeguards. From an Astan Quds title this reads as the Mashhad clerical establishment endorsing hard preconditions rather than the negotiate-now timing.

Khorasan

Conservative daily, Mashhad-based, large circulation

“Trump's war bewilderment” «گیجی جنگی ترامپ»

MODERATE: US-exit-without-deal framing; domestic livelihood strain

- Main: The lead reports that 'the Wall Street Journal has reported Trump's readiness to end the war with Iran without reaching a nuclear agreement' (وال‌استریت ژورنال از آمادگی ترامپ برای پایان جنگ با ایران بدون دستیابی به توافق هسته‌ای خبر داد), read as American confusion and retreat rather than de-escalation.
- Main image: 'A strict prescription for worn-out cars' (نسخه سخت‌گیرانه برای خودروهای فرسوده) over a scrapyard of old Iranian vehicles: the report argues the government's traffic-and-fuel crackdown on old cars, absent effective support packages, 'resembles a livelihood dead-end for the lower deciles' (بن‌بست معیشتی برای دهک‌های پایین).
- Sub-item: 'The President's meeting with the Leader of the Revolution' (دیدار رئیس‌جمهور با رهبر انقلاب), carried on the top rail.
- Sub-item: 'The army of comedians on its way to air' (لشکر کمدین‌ها در راه آنتن), a television-season culture item.
- Op-ed: 'Note of the day' (یادداشت روز), the paper's signed daily column.

ANALYST NOTE Khorasan pairs an externally-sourced de-escalation signal (WSJ: Trump ready to end the war without a nuclear deal) with domestic cost-of-living reporting that quietly indicts government policy, the conservative-provincial version of the war-economy candor Jam-e Jam and No-Bonyad also run. The WSJ 'no-nuclear-deal exit' line, if it holds, would validate the preconditions bloc's bet that Washington wants out more than it wants a comprehensive agreement.

Kayhan

Ultra-hardline flagship, close to the Leader's office; managing editor Hossein Shariatmadari (read from the paper's Telegram channel; no print scan in today's batch)

HIGH: Hormuz conditions, victory-and-retreat register, Yemen-Saudi escalation claims

“Iran's conditions for reopening the Strait of Hormuz, indifferent to Trump's empty boasts” «شروط ایران برای بازگشایی تنگه هرمز بی‌اعتنا به لاف‌های گزاف ترامپ»

- Main: Iran sets the terms for any Hormuz reopening while dismissing Trump's 'empty boasts' (لاف‌های گزاف) - the flagship version of the six-conditions line, framing US pressure as bluster.
- Banner: 'Iranians defeated the world's greatest military power' (ایرانی‌ها بزرگ‌ترین قدرت نظامی جهان را شکست دادند), the maximal enemy-in-retreat claim.
- Sub-item: 'Yemen set Saudi Arabia's gas and oil facilities ablaze' (یمن تأسیسات گازی و نفتی عربستان را به آتش کشید), corroborating the Yemen-Saudi strikes carried across the fronts.
- Sub-item: 'The President's meeting with the Leader on the country's economic and military matters,' carried straight.
- Right rail: The Mohsen Rezaei appointment as the Leader's representative to the SNSC.

> **ANALYST NOTE** Kayhan holds the hard Hormuz line ('conditions, not concessions') and the 'we defeated the greatest military power' register even as the SNSC secretary it aligns with is replaced, evidence the flagship line is set by the Leader's office, not the outgoing secretariat. Its Saudi-facilities-ablaze and 'greatest power defeated' claims are outlet assertions to be treated as claims, not confirmed events. No 'Yadasht-e Rooz' editorial was posted to the channel in the compile window.

Sobh-e No

Principlist daily (read from the paper's Telegram channel; no print scan in today's batch)

MODERATE-HIGH: Hormuz hardening claim; Lebanon-Israel flashpoint reports

“Pezeshkian's second meeting with the Leader of the Revolution” «دومین دیدار پزشکیان با رهبر انقلاب»

- Main: The lead marks a 'second meeting' (دومین دیدار) between the President and the Leader, foregrounding the leadership-consultation cadence as the government enters its third year.
- Sub-item: 'CNN's jibe at Trump's illusion of forcing Iran's surrender' (طعنه سی‌ان‌ان به توهم ترامپ برای تسلیم ایران), reporting that Iran 'hardened its demands over the Strait of Hormuz' rather than yielding - a second-hand CNN rendering used as external validation.
- Sub-item: The Mohsen Rezaei appointment (Leader's representative and SNSC secretary) with Speaker Qalibaf's congratulations, citing Rezaei's Iran-Iraq War command record.
- Sub-item: Reports of Israeli territorial claims toward southern Lebanon and explosions reported near Haifa, keeping the Lebanon-Israel flashpoint on the front.

> **ANALYST NOTE** Sobh-e No brackets the reshuffle with continuity signaling (a 'second' leadership meeting, Qalibaf's endorsement of Rezaei) rather than the rebuke framing No-Bonyad uses, the principlist establishment absorbing the change as orderly succession. Its CNN 'hardened demands' item is a second-hand rendering that quoting does not verify; the south-Lebanon and Haifa lines are the day's live-flashpoint markers and should be treated as unconfirmed reports.

Appendix A - The Leader's lead message of the day: the decree replacing the Supreme National Security Council secretary

Reconstructed from the front-page renderings (No-Bonyad, Jam-e Jam, Qods, Vatan-e Emrooz, Seda-ye Iran, Iran) and corroborated by the Mehr, Mashregh and Fars news wires; the full text on khamenei.ir was not retrievable at compile time, so the wording below is a faithful reconstruction and is flagged as partial.

The dominant act of the Leader's office on this edition is not a speech but a personnel decree. By an order issued in the name of Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei (printed in full on the No-Bonyad front page), Major General Mohsen Rezaei was appointed as the Leader's representative to the Supreme National Security Council, and in a paired decree by the President was appointed Secretary of that Council. Mohammad-Baqer Zolqadr, who had held both roles for less than four months, was reassigned as the Leader's political advisor.

Reconstructed decree language, in the standard form these appointments take: 'In the name of God. Esteemed Major General Dr. Mohsen Rezaei - Given your record of management and command and your long experience in the country's security and defense affairs, I appoint you as my representative to the Supreme National Security Council. I expect the Council, in coordination with the branches of government, to pursue the country's higher security interests with vigilance, unity and strategic wisdom in these sensitive conditions. Success is from God.'

The accompanying reassignment, as rendered across the fronts: by a further decree Mr. Mohammad-Baqer Zolqadr was appointed political advisor to the Leader, with thanks for his services as the Council's representative and secretary. The First Vice President, Mohammad-Reza Aref, publicly congratulated Rezaei, stressing that 'national cohesion and strategic intelligence are the country's principal need in the current sensitive conditions' (Nour News); Speaker Qalibaf congratulated the appointment citing Rezaei's Iran-Iraq War command record (Sobh-e No, Defa Press).

Analyst flag: the substance is verified (the appointment, the dual decrees, Zolqadr's reassignment, the 18 Mordad 1405 date); the quoted decree wording is reconstructed to the customary template and must not be reproduced as the verbatim text. Only No-Bonyad printed the Leader's full name (Mojtaba); the other fronts wrote 'the Leader of the Revolution' or 'Ayatollah Khamenei,' consistent with the standing succession. Source line: front pages of 19 Mordad 1405; Mehr News item 6912156; Fars and Mashregh News, 18-19 Mordad 1405.

Appendix B - Flagged editorial: 'Diplomatic recess,' Asr-e Iranian front-page column

Asr-e Iranian, front-page editorial (سرمقاله), 19 Mordad 1405; author printed as Ayoub Sahabnejad (ایوب سحاب‌نژاد). Rendered from the printed column; the text runs past the page fold and the closing lines were not fully legible in the scan.

Title: 'Diplomatic recess' (تعطیلات دیپلماسی). Standfirst: 'The Foreign Ministry is passive and still preoccupied with the sidelines of Oman' (وزارت خارجه در انفعال و همچنان مشغول به حاشیه‌های عمان).

'The recent rapid and unprecedented developments have moved the equation of power in the region and the world into a new phase. With the collapse of the achievements of the aggressor front in the recent confrontation among Iran, the Zionist regime and the United States, international relations have been struck by structural shocks.'

'Amid this, one of the most decisive markers of the former order - America's role as reference point and stabilizer - has entirely lost its credibility. Washington is no longer seen as a point of reliance for security and stability, but as the principal agent of disorder, insecurity and instability.'

'This very change to the architecture of regional security has led even America's longtime allies to conclude that Washington's protective umbrella is more full of holes than [the text continues past the fold]...'

Analyst flag: the column reads as an argument that a strategic opening has appeared (the 'collapse of the US security umbrella,' the same thesis Seda-ye Iran runs on its cover) yet Iran's diplomacy is 'on holiday' - a critique of executive passivity from a lane willing, on the same front page, to brand the government 'war-bringing.' Loaded terms retained: 'aggressor front' (جبهه متجاوز), 'the Zionist regime' (رژیم صهیونیستی). This is documented for analysis of hostile-press framing, not endorsed. Source line: Asr-e Iranian, front-page سرمقاله, 19 Mordad 1405, by Ayoub Sahabnejad.

Appendix C - Methodology and sourcing notes

iran-press-digest v2 pipeline

Coverage: eleven front-page scans were read directly (ten Persian print titles from the NewspaperTasnim kiosk album for 19 Mordad 1405 - Asr-e Iranian, Farhikhtegan, Shargh, Vatan-e Emrooz, Jam-e Jam, No-Bonyad, Seda-ye Iran, Iran, Qods, Khorasan - plus Iran Daily in English), and two further dailies (Kayhan and Sobh-e No) were read from their own Telegram channels, which carried no print scan in today's batch. The stale-batch guard passed: the album's printed Jalali date (19 Mordad 1405) matched the target date, so this is a fresh, same-day edition.

Wire corroboration (not treated as front pages): Defa Press, Fars News and Nour News were monitored for official and semi-official claims. Their material - the Majlis National Security Commission's Hormuz-control bill, the Yemen strikes on Al-Mokha ('7 dead, 30 wounded' per Saudi-backed forces, via Fars), reported Israeli strikes on south Lebanon and Gaza, and a 'former Trump war secretary: Iran's upper hand is reality' item - is folded into the trends and threat register under the attribution firewall, not into the per-paper sections.

Identification: two similarly-scripted mastheads were disambiguated by crop - fa-01 is Asr-e Iranian (عصر ایرانیان) and fa-07 is Seda-ye Iran (صدای ایران, carrying a KHAMENEI.IR banner). The Mohsen Rezaei appointment was verified against the Mehr, Mashregh, Fars and Defa Press wires and dated 18 Mordad 1405. 'The Leader' in current coverage is Mojtaba Khamenei; No-Bonyad printed the full name (سید مجتبی حسینی خامنه‌ای) on its front page this edition.

Single-source and verification flags: Kayhan's 'Iranians defeated the world's greatest military power' and 'Yemen set Saudi oil and gas facilities ablaze,' Seda-ye Iran's 'new images of damage to US bases,' Sobh-e No's second-hand CNN 'hardened demands' rendering, and Farhikhtegan's 'half of Saudi Arabia's fleet' are outlet claims, not confirmed events, and are labeled as such. Tehran Times was unavailable at the time of compilation and is not cited. No 'Yadasht-e Rooz' editorial was posted to the Kayhan channel in the compile window. Translations are editorial; loaded regime vocabulary is glossed in place. This product documents hostile foreign-press rhetoric for defensive assessment only; nothing herein endorses or amplifies it.

Open-source material only. All translations from Persian/Arabic originals. Iranian claims are labelled as claims. Prepared for analysis and early warning; hostile content is documented for defensive assessment only, not endorsed.