

OPEN-SOURCE PRESS INTELLIGENCE

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Daily Front-Page Intelligence

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THE HORMUZ ACCORD, CONTESTED IN THE OPEN EDITION

Eleven front pages read for 6 August: nine as same-day scans (eight Persian dailies plus the English-language Iran Daily), with Kayhan and Sobh-e No read via their outlet channels.

Front pages published the morning of 6 August 2026, reflecting events through late 5 August local.

Defensive open-source press-intelligence. Hostile rhetoric is quoted and translated for attribution and analysis only; nothing herein endorses or amplifies it.



Front page: Sazandegi

Executive Summary

The lead judgment of Day 156 is that the maritime file this monitor tracked on 5 August as a quietly drafted accord awaiting the Leader's sign-off has broken into the open as a near-consensus front-page lead. Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baqaei is quoted on the record, on Sazandegi's banner 'The Strait of Hormuz on the verge of reopening' and in the English Iran Daily's masthead 'Baqaei: Iran, Oman agree on shipping route coordinates in Hormuz,' that Iran and Oman have agreed on the geographic coordinates of a shipping route and that a joint statement covering the main technical, legal, security and environmental points is in final drafting. Western wire reporting (Euronews, Bloomberg, Reuters, 5-6 August) corroborates the announcement, while noting Baqaei's own caution that the bilateral understanding alone does not guarantee safe navigation. The accord is therefore real as an announcement, but its operative security guarantees remain unsettled.

The day's genuinely new movement is that yesterday's unified denial of any US letter or channel has fractured into an open argument over whether Washington is a party to the deal. Farhikhtegan's over-photo banner insists 'the agreement with Oman has nothing to do with America'; Jomhuri Eslami, alone among the fronts, frames it as speculation about an 'Iran, Oman and America' agreement, naming the United States; Nour News reports a Deputy Foreign Minister acknowledging 'messages from Washington' alongside the Tehran-Muscat understanding; and Kayhan refuses the premise entirely. This is a shift from the 5 August posture, when the denial was uniform and functioned as the day's principal information operation: the denial has now given way to a visible internal contest, and the contest itself is the tell that a US-linked channel is in play behind the Omani mediation.

The sign-off is contested inside the system, and the contest is now waged in public by the flagship hardline voice and an organized economic-nationalist bloc. Kayhan's 'Yadasht-e Rooz' by managing editor Hossein Shariatmadari declares the Strait of Hormuz 'not negotiable,' invokes the Leadership's directive to keep it closed as a deterrent, and warns that reopening would benefit the United States without reciprocal commitment. The economic daily read as Charsoo devotes its entire front to a montage of some forty named experts warning that reopening the strait without full sanctions removal, an end to maritime seizures, and the meeting of all Iran's conditions 'is only to America's benefit.' Against this, the reformist and business lanes (Sazandegi, Ta'adol, Etemad) and the state broadcaster's daily (Jam-e Jam, filing Hormuz as 'the initiative in Iran's hands') treat the accord as leverage to be cashed. The deal is announced but not sealed, and the preserve-the-leverage camp is mobilizing to condition it.

Beneath the maritime story, the fronts pivot hard from the vengeance-mobilization register that peaked on 5 August to domestic accountability, organized around President Pezeshkian's televised dialogue with the public on the eve of his third presidential year. The Arba'een 'blood-vengeance' and 'Ya Latharat al-Khamenei' framing that dominated Day 155 is largely absent today. In its place: Farhikhtegan's 'Halfway' audit of the government, Ta'adol's 'In the presence of the people' report, and, most sensitively, Etemad's pull-out of Pezeshkian's Q&A lines. There the president reveres the martyred predecessor Leader ('stood behind us like a mountain') but says material published in the present Leadership's name 'does not match the character I have seen in him,' and that a message held the Leader was 'in principle not in agreement' before ultimately permitting a process to take shape. The referent is unstated on the page and the reading is held carefully, but placed against the maritime sign-off it is the highest-value leadership-level cue of the day.

Net assessment: this is a deal-announced-but-not-sealed edition whose surface is diplomacy and whose substance is an unresolved internal contest over the terms and ownership of that diplomacy. The threat register stays live but low beneath it: a reported Strait of Hormuz tanker-explosion incident (UKMTO-

corroborated, crew safe), a Yemeni claim of a ballistic-missile strike on the Saudi tanker 'Daisy' in the Gulf of Aden (Defa Press, per spokesman Yahya Saree), Reuters-sourced Iranian warnings to Gulf Arab states over their energy infrastructure, and continued Israeli strikes on south Lebanon with a claimed two Israeli soldiers killed. No new kinetic escalation was attributed to Iranian territory, and the economy is being staged as a front-page contest between a resilience narrative (Jam-e Jam's bourse record) and a cost ledger (Ta'adol's 2.6 billion barrels off market). The signals to watch are whether the Leadership's office confirms or vetoes the announced accord, whether any front page names the US role as more than speculation, and whether the vengeance register returns if the sign-off stalls.

BOTTOM LINE Day 156 turns on a deal announced but not sealed: the Foreign Ministry confirms on the record that Iran and Oman have agreed on Hormuz shipping-route coordinates, corroborated by Western wires, but the front pages split openly over whether America is a party and whether to reopen at all, with the hardline flagship and an economic-nationalist expert bloc mobilizing to condition or block the sign-off, so the loudest movement of the day is not the accord itself but the contest over it breaking into public view.

CRITICAL SOURCING NOTE Compiled from nine same-day front-page scans read by vision (eight Persian titles: Farhikhtegan, Vatan-e Emrooz, Jam-e Jam, Sazandegi, Charsoo, Ta'adol, Etemad, Jomhouri Eslami; plus the English-language Iran Daily), with Kayhan read via its outlet channel (same-day posts including the Shariatmadari editorial) and Sobh-e No read via channel as continuity corroboration. The Iran newspaper channel did not surface a confirmed 15 Mordad front page at compile time and is filed as an absence, not analyzed as a front page. Three wire agencies (Defa Press, Fars News, Nour News) were read for threat-register context and their material is labeled as claims, not front pages. Tehran Times was unavailable at compile time, so English coverage rests on the Iran Daily scan. The day's spine, the Iran-Oman coordinate agreement and the reported Hormuz maritime incident, was cross-checked against Western wire reporting (Euronews, Bloomberg, Reuters, CNN, and UKMTO advisories); those external sources are cited for verification only. All Iranian and adversary battle-damage, casualty, and shipping figures are the originating outlets' claims and are not adopted as fact; second-hand renderings of Western reporting are flagged. The economic daily carrying the '40 experts' front is read from its masthead as Charsoo (moderate identification confidence). 'The Leader' in current coverage denotes Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei; the martyred predecessor is Ali Khamenei (assassinated 28 February 2026). Prepared for analysis and early warning; hostile content documented for defensive assessment only.

Macro Trend Analysis

① The Hormuz accord breaks into the open

The arrangement tracked on 5 August as a quietly drafted corridor accord awaiting sign-off is today announced on the record: Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baqaei confirms Iran-Oman agreement on shipping-route coordinates and a joint statement in final drafting (Sazandegi's 'on the verge of reopening,' Iran Daily's masthead), corroborated by Euronews, Bloomberg and Reuters. The story has moved from the reformist lane into a near-consensus front-page lead, and the tracking cue shifts from 'is there a draft' to 'will the Leadership seal it.'

② The US-as-party question fractures the denial

The uniform denial of any US channel that defined 5 August has splintered into a visible argument. Farhikhtegan insists the deal has 'nothing to do with America,' Jomhouri Eslami frames it as an 'Iran, Oman and America' arrangement and names Washington, Nour News reports a Deputy Foreign Minister acknowledging 'messages from Washington,' and Kayhan refuses the premise. The fracture, printed the same

morning across competing titles, is the clearest indication that a US-linked channel sits behind the Omani mediation, whatever the official line.

3 The hardline veto goes public

The preserve-the-leverage position, previously a caution in the reformist lane (Shargh's 'Hormuz trap' on 5 August), is now an organized front-page veto. Kayhan's Shariatmadari editorial declares the strait 'not negotiable' and invokes the Leadership's closure directive; the economic daily Charsoo mobilizes 'forty experts' warning that reopening without full sanctions relief 'only benefits America.' The camp that wants the Hormuz card hoarded rather than cashed is naming its condition set and pressing it on the sign-off.

4 The vengeance register recedes; diplomacy and domestic accountability return

The Arba'een 'blood-vengeance' and 'Ya Latharat al-Khamenei' mobilization that saturated the 5 August fronts is largely absent today. The fronts pivot to the Hormuz deal and to President Pezeshkian's televised third-year Q&A (Farhikhtegan's 'Halfway,' Ta'adol's 'In the presence of the people,' Etemad, Jomhuri Eslami). The de-escalation of the mobilization posture is consistent with an active diplomatic track being protected, not with demobilization; the cue is whether the vengeance framing returns if the accord stalls.

5 Kinetic friction persists beneath the diplomacy, and the economy becomes a front-page contest

The threat register stays live but low: a reported Strait of Hormuz tanker-explosion incident (UKMTO, crew safe), a Yemeni claim of a strike on the Saudi tanker 'Daisy' in the Gulf of Aden (Defa Press, per Yahya Saree), Reuters-sourced Iranian warnings to Gulf Arab states over their energy infrastructure, and continued Israeli strikes on south Lebanon. In parallel, the economy is staged as a contest between a resilience narrative (Jam-e Jam's 'historic' Tehran bourse record) and a cost ledger (Ta'adol's 2.6 billion barrels kept off market by the war), with the reformist and economic lanes using the cost side to argue for cashing the Hormuz lever.

Key Judgments

KJ-1 [HIGH] The Oman-Hormuz accord has moved from a quietly drafted arrangement to an on-record, front-page announcement, and it is externally corroborated. Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baqaei is quoted (Sazandegi, Iran Daily) confirming agreement on shipping-route coordinates and a joint statement in final drafting, and Western wires (Euronews, Bloomberg, Reuters, 5-6 August) report the same.

Significance: the maritime file, not the nuclear file, remains the axis of any near-term compromise; the announcement is real, but Baqaei's own caveat, that the bilateral understanding alone does not guarantee safe navigation, and the absence of a signed statement mean the accord is announced, not operative.

KJ-2 [HIGH] Whether the United States is a party to the accord is now openly contested on the front pages, and that contestation, not a unified denial, is the day's principal information signal. Farhikhtegan insists the deal has 'nothing to do with America,' Jomhuri Eslami names an 'Iran, Oman and America' arrangement, Nour News reports a Deputy Foreign Minister acknowledging 'messages from Washington,' and Kayhan refuses the premise. Significance: the 5 August unified denial has fractured into a visible internal argument; the fracture is the tell that a US-linked channel is in play, and it should not be read either as confirmation of a direct US deal or as its exclusion.

KJ-3 [MODERATE-HIGH] The sign-off is contested inside the system, and the preserve-the-leverage camp is mobilizing in public to condition or block it. Kayhan's Shariatmadari editorial declares Hormuz 'not

negotiable' and invokes the Leadership's closure directive; the economic daily Charsoo musters 'forty experts' warning that reopening without full sanctions relief 'is only to America's benefit.' Significance: the deal is announced but not sealed, and the Leadership's posture is the decisive variable; the judgment is held at moderate-high because the veto is loud but its purchase on the actual decision is unmeasured.

KJ-4 [MODERATE-HIGH] President Pezeshkian's televised third-year Q&A produced a rare on-record hint of friction with the Leader's office. On Etemad, he says material published in the Leadership's name 'does not match the character I have seen in him,' and that a message held the Leader was 'in principle not in agreement' before ultimately permitting a process to proceed; the referent is unstated on the page. Significance: read against the maritime sign-off, this is the highest-value leadership-level cue of the day, but the calibration is bidirectional, overstating it would invent a rift the page does not assert, while understating it would miss a genuine on-record signal from the president himself about the Leadership's posture.

KJ-5 [MODERATE] The vengeance-mobilization register that peaked on 5 August has receded from the fronts, replaced by diplomacy and domestic accountability. The Arba'een 'blood-vengeance' and 'Ya Latharat al-Khamenei' framing that dominated Day 155 is largely absent; the fronts pivot to the Hormuz deal and Pezeshkian's third-year audit. Significance: this de-escalation of the mobilization posture is consistent with protection of an active diplomatic track rather than demobilization, and the cue is whether the vengeance framing returns if the accord stalls or is vetoed.

KJ-6 [MODERATE] Negative evidence: no new kinetic escalation was attributed to Iranian territory, and the live maritime friction is incident-level, not campaign-level. The reported Strait of Hormuz tanker explosions (UKMTO, crew and vessel safe) and the Yemeni claim of a strike on the Saudi tanker 'Daisy' in the Gulf of Aden (Defa Press, per Yahya Saree) are attributed incidents, not Iranian operations; the Israeli strikes on south Lebanon and a claimed two Israeli soldiers killed are the outlets' claims. Significance: the pattern is diplomacy on the front pages over low-level kinetic friction underneath, consistent with a negotiating window being kept open; the cue is any incident attributed directly to Iran while the accord is unsealed.

KJ-7 [MODERATE] An economic-confidence counter-narrative is being staged against the war's cost accounting. Jam-e Jam leads with a 'historic' Tehran bourse record, while Ta'adol quantifies 2.6 billion barrels kept off market by the war. Significance: the economy is now a front-page contest between a resilience narrative and a cost-of-siege ledger, and the reformist and economic lanes are using the cost side to build the case for cashing the Hormuz lever through the Oman channel rather than hoarding it.

Named-Figure Tracker

Figure	Role / relevance	Today's framing	Flag
Esmail Baqaei	Iran Foreign Ministry spokesman	The day's key on-record voice: confirms Iran-Oman agreement on Hormuz shipping-route coordinates and a joint statement in final drafting, while cautioning the bilateral understanding alone does not guarantee safe navigation.	NEW NAMED FIGURE

Figure	Role / relevance	Today's framing	Flag
Masoud Pezeshkian	President of Iran	Televised third-year dialogue with the public; hints of friction with the Leadership ('material published in his name does not match the character I have seen'); says Iran 'supports any Palestinian decision' to end the Gaza war.	WATCH
Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei	The Leader (successor to Ali Khamenei, assassinated 28 February 2026)	Appears only indirectly: via Pezeshkian's account that he was 'in principle not in agreement' before permitting a process, and via the closure directive Kayhan invokes against reopening. No standalone Leadership message anchored the fronts.	absence noted
Hossein Shariatmadari	Kayhan managing editor	Authors the flagship hardline veto: 'The Strait of Hormuz is not negotiable,' arguing reopening would benefit the United States without reciprocal commitment.	WATCH
Donald Trump	US President	Framed as failing militarily and taking refuge in diplomacy (Kayhan, Vatan-e Emrooz's 'Trump's failed path'); reportedly said a Hormuz reopening would come 'soon' (Western wires).	TARGET FRAMING
J.D. Vance	US Vice President	Quoted via Fox News that 'Iranians are tough negotiators' and that Washington is pursuing a resolution through military, economic and diplomatic tools (Fars, Nour News); carried as an adversary statement.	COERCION SPOKESMAN
Yahya Saree	Spokesman, Yemeni (Ansarallah) armed forces	Claims a ballistic-missile strike on the Saudi tanker 'Daisy' in the Gulf of Aden; carried as the Yemeni forces' own claim, extending the southern-chokepoint thread.	COERCION SPOKESMAN

Headline Summary Table

Outlet	Lead Headline (English)	Orientation	Theme	Threat signal
Sazandegi	The Strait of Hormuz on the verge of reopening	Reformist / Kargozaran	Oman-Hormuz accord as a strategic lever; near-reopening	LOW-MODERATE: diplomacy-forward
Iran Daily	Baqaei: Iran, Oman agree on shipping route coordinates in Hormuz	English-language government daily	On-record outward confirmation; Gaza deference	LOW-MODERATE: diplomacy secured
Kayhan	The Strait of Hormuz is not negotiable	Ultra-hardline flagship (editor Hossein Shariatmadari)	Editorial veto; preserve the closure as deterrent	HIGH: flagship refusal to negotiate
Charsoo	Forty experts warn on the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz	Economic daily	Preserve-the-leverage expert consensus	MODERATE: organized economic-nationalist pushback
Vatan-e Emrooz	Trump's failed path	Hardline / principlist	Deal reframed as a US defeat; US-depletion claims	HIGH: chokepoint triumphalism

Outlet	Lead Headline (English)	Orientation	Theme	Threat signal
Farhikhtegan	Halfway	Principlist (Azad University)	Third-year government audit; 'deal not about America'	LOW-MODERATE: domestic-audit lead
Jam-e Jam	A historic record on the bourse	State broadcaster (IRIB) daily	Economic confidence; 'Hormuz initiative in Iran's hands'	MODERATE-HIGH: Hormuz-as-strength framing
Ta'adol	In the presence of the people	Economic daily	Pezeshkian third-year report; oil-off-market cost	LOW-MODERATE: economic-cost framing
Etemad	Authoritative administration of the country	Reformist	Pezeshkian Q&A; hint of leadership-office friction	LOW-MODERATE: leadership-friction signal
Jomhuri Eslami	The president's frank dialogue with the people	Establishment-critical principlist	'Iran-Oman-America' Hormuz framing; Iran-Pakistan MOU	LOW-MODERATE: names a US role
Sobh-e No	Iran-Oman Hormuz talks continue	Principlist (channel-read continuity)	Sovereignty-framed talks; Bab el-Mandeb transit data	MODERATE: continuity corroboration

Per-Paper Front-Page Analysis

Iran Daily

English-language government daily

"Baqaei: Iran, Oman agree on shipping route coordinates in Hormuz"

LOW-MODERATE: outward-facing diplomacy-secured messaging



- Main: The masthead lead, 'Baqaei: Iran, Oman agree on shipping route coordinates in Hormuz,' is the outward-facing, on-record confirmation of the accord, attributed to Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baqaei.
- Main: A center photo box carries 'Iran supports any Palestinian decision in talks to end Gaza war: Pezeshkian,' pairing the maritime opening with a deferential, negotiation-forward posture on Gaza aimed at foreign readers.
- Op-ed: An 'Interview Exclusive,' 'Iran at forefront of resistance to US low-intensity warfare doctrine,' recasting the confrontation as resistance to a US 'low-intensity conflict' strategy rather than open war.
- Sub-item: 'Tehran, Islamabad sign trade cooperation MoU,' the English rendering of the 10-billion-dollar Iran-Pakistan committee outcome carried on the Persian fronts.
- Right rail: Softer items, a Japanese envoy performing Iranian TV-drama themes for a diplomatic centenary, a 'decolonize data' AI-sovereignty interview, and a national volleyball fixture, rounding out a deliberately non-escalatory English front.

ANALYST NOTE The English government daily puts the Oman coordinate-agreement in the masthead and frames Pezeshkian as deferring to 'any Palestinian decision' on Gaza: a moderate, diplomacy-secured message calibrated for foreign readers and the polar opposite of Kayhan's editorial refusal. Where the hardline Persian fronts manage the deal's optics or reject it outright, the outward-facing channel presents escalation as disowned and the maritime file as settled.



- Main: 'Halfway' (نیمه راه) over a portrait of President Pezeshkian, asking where the Pezeshkian government stands at the start of its third year (دولت), turning the presidential-anniversary mark into a domestic-performance audit rather than a war story.
- Banner: A yellow over-photo headline insists 'The agreement with Oman has nothing to do with America' (توافق با عمان ربطی به آمریکا ندارد), pre-empting any reading of the Hormuz accord as a US channel.
- Sub-item: A media-studies feature, 'How large is the audience for television entertainment?' (مخاطب سرگرمی های تلویزیونی چقدر است؟), built on a Farhikhtegan report about a 'missing number' in state-television's published viewership surveys.
- Right rail: 'The key to resilience' (کلید تاب آوری), an economic-endurance essay, and a housing package, 'Statistics far from home' (آمارهای دور از خانه), on the gap between monthly housing-inflation data and lived rents.
- Kicker: 'We are in Time 2027 but with 15 fewer universities' (در تایم ۲۰۲۷ اما با ۱۵ دانشگاه کمتر) and 'The city is not shut down' (شهر تعطیل نیست), local governance and higher-education items.

ANALYST NOTE Farhikhtegan's principlist framing does the day's optics management for the hardline camp: rather than deny the Oman deal, it insulates it from any US-channel narrative ('nothing to do with America'), while its lead turns the third-year mark into a domestic-accountability audit. The contrast with Jomhuri Eslami's 'Iran, Oman AND America' framing is the sharpest expression of the day's unsettled question over whether Washington is a party to the arrangement.

«راه نافر جام ترامپ»

HIGH: chokepoint-as-victory triumphalism and US-depletion messaging

ترامپ»



- Main: The lead 'Trump's failed path' (راه نافر جام ترامپ) runs over a satellite image of the Persian Gulf dotted with vessels, with the kicker that Iran and Oman are on the verge of an agreement for new transit arrangements in the Strait of Hormuz (ایران و عمان در آستانه توافق برای ترتیبات جدید تردد در تنگه), and a claim that American media have conceded the failure of the 'White House project' to wrest control of the strait's transits from Iran's hands.
- Banner: A right-rail cluster of anti-US military items: 'The Pentagon without missiles' (پنتاگون بی موشک) over a photo of a missile launcher, and 'The missile is stronger than the trigger' (موشک از ماشه قوی تر است), amplifying claims of US precision-munition depletion in the Iran war.
- Sub-item: 'Aftershocks of war in the Persian Gulf' (پس لرزه های جنگ در خلیج) and an analysis asking 'Can the Strait of Hormuz really be bypassed?' (واقعا می توان تنگه هرمز را دور زد?), advancing the argument that alternative routes cannot substitute for the chokepoint.
- Right rail: 'The tip of the iceberg of America's crisis-hit economy' (نوک کوه یخ), tying the maritime disruption to claimed US economic strain; a top-corner legal-framing item, 'An indictment against a criminal' (کیفرخواستی علیه جانی), used as anti-Israel/anti-US moral framing.
- Op-ed: A culture item, 'Melodic historiography' (تاریخ نگاری ملودیک), fills the top-left, the only non-war register on an otherwise war-saturated front.

ANALYST NOTE Vatan-e Emrooz reads the same Oman-Hormuz accord the reformist fronts celebrate as a US defeat rather than a compromise: the deal is folded into a triumphalist 'Trump failed' frame, preserving the chokepoint-as-victory narrative while implicitly accepting that transit arrangements are being negotiated. The 'Pentagon without missiles' and 'missile stronger than the trigger' cluster continues the standing US-military-depletion thread; carried as the outlet's claims, they are morale content, not verified capability assessments.



- Main: The visual lead is a domestic-confidence signal, 'A historic record on the bourse' (رکوردشکنی تاریخی بورس), reporting that the Tehran Stock Exchange all-index broke through a new multi-million-unit high, foregrounding economic resilience over the war register.
- Main: The political top-rail declares 'Hormuz: the initiative is in Iran's hands' (هرمز؛ ابتکار عمل در دست ایران), reporting that Iran-Oman negotiations to stabilize transit in the strait are in their final stages, framing the maritime deal as a position of strength rather than concession.
- Sub-item: 'Deal-making by order of Ansarallah' (معامله سازی با فرمان), on Yemen's armed forces revealing the targeting of Saudi tankers in the Red Sea, extending the chokepoint-coercion thread to the southern maritime theater.
- Op-ed: A commemorative feature, 'The secret of the enduring flight of a hero' (راز ماندگاری پرواز یک قهرمان), marking the martyrdom anniversary of Iran-Iraq War fighter pilot Major General Abbas Babaei, alongside an interview with a novelist.
- Right rail: A dense column of domestic items, including 'A jihadi plan for Iran' (نقشه جهادی برای ایران) and human-interest pieces on a nurse's rescue and an Instagram-filmed assault case.

ANALYST NOTE The state broadcaster's daily leads with a market-record confidence signal while filing Hormuz as 'the initiative in Iran's hands,' a message-discipline pairing that presents the maritime accord as leverage secured, not ground ceded. The Ansarallah/Red Sea item keeps the Bab el-Mandeb dimension of the chokepoint doctrine alive; carried as the Yemeni forces' own claim, it is threat-signaling, not a confirmed operation from Iranian territory.

"The Strait of Hormuz on the Verge of Reopening"

LOW-MODERATE: diplomacy-forward; deal framed as leverage to be cashed

«تنگه هرمز در آستانه بازگشایی»



- Main: The full-width banner 'The Strait of Hormuz on the verge of reopening' (تنگه هرمز در آستانه بازگشایی) states that Iran and Oman have come close to an agreement to administer the strait (ایران و عمان به توافق برای اداره تنگه), quoting Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei that the two countries' joint statement, covering the main agreed considerations and points, is in the review and final-drafting stage.
- Main: The body frames the accord as a strategic lever Iran did not previously hold ('این توافق برای ایران یک اهرم استراتژیک خواهد بود'), arguing the arrangement lets Iran exercise growing control over transits and demonstrate its stewardship of an international waterway.
- Op-ed: A signed column, 'The new Hormuz deal' (معامله جدید هرمز), reads the arrangement as 'special for Iran, an exit for Oman,' positioning Muscat's mediation as leverage to be cashed rather than a concession.
- Sub-item: 'The dream of law and modernity' (سودای قانون و تجدد), a reformist historical-constitutional essay, and a top-left quote condemning continued aggression as 'absolute evil' (ادامه تجاوز شر مطلق است).
- Right rail: 'Astronomical cages' (قفس‌های نجومی) on a reported 30-percent rise in rents, and a 'policy of instability' economic critique, keeping cost-of-living pressure on the front page.

ANALYST NOTE Sazandegi makes the Oman-Hormuz accord its outright banner and translates 'reopening' into strategic leverage, the mirror image of Kayhan's editorial refusal to negotiate the strait. The openness with which the reformist lane and the English Iran Daily print the deal, against the hardline veto voices, marks the day's central intra-regime fault line: whether the Hormuz card is cashed now as a lever or hoarded as a siege weapon.

"Forty Experts Warn on the

MODERATE: organized economic-nationalist pushback against reopening

Reopening of the Strait of Hormuz" «هشدار ۴۰ کارشناس درباره باز شدن تنگه هرمز»



- Main: The entire front is a montage of some forty named expert headshots under the banner 'Forty experts warn on the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz' (هشدار ۴۰ کارشناس درباره باز شدن تنگه هرمز), presenting an assembled expert consensus against a premature deal.
- Main: The subhead states the terms of that consensus, that reopening the strait without full removal of sanctions, an end to maritime seizures, and the fulfilment of all of Iran's conditions 'is only to America's benefit' (بازگشایی (تنگه هرمز بدون لغو کامل تحریم‌ها ... فقط به سود آمریکاست), naming the tripwires the experts want attached to any accord.
- Sub-item: An aerial image of the Strait of Hormuz coastline anchors the montage, keeping the argument on the geography of the chokepoint rather than the diplomacy of the deal.

ANALYST NOTE This front operationalizes the 'preserve the leverage' position as a technocratic expert consensus, giving Shariatmadari's Kayhan editorial an economic-nationalist echo from outside the flagship hardline titles. Published the same morning the reformist and state fronts announce the Oman accord, the '40 experts' package is the organized pushback that names the condition set, no reopening before full sanctions relief, and signals that the sign-off is being contested on economic-leverage grounds, not only ideological ones.

«در محضر مردم» "In the Presence of the People"



- Main: 'In the presence of the people' (در محضر مردم) over a photo of President Pezeshkian seated before a row of national flags, presenting his televised report to the nation on the eve of the third year of his presidency as an accountability moment.
- Main: The economic top-lead, 'War and wandering oil in the Persian Gulf' (جنگ و نفت سرگردان در خلیج فارس), carries a Ta'adol report that 2.6 billion barrels of oil did not reach market because of the war against Iran, quantifying the cost side of the maritime standoff.
- Sub-item: A markets column, 'The market between fear and greed' (بازار بین ترس و طمع), and 'Roads to the private car' (راه‌های اقتناء خودرو) on vehicle-purchase policy, keeping consumer economics on the page.
- Right rail: A housing package, 'From a 150-million mindset to 680-billion-toman in the capital,' on the spread of Tehran property prices; and 'Pars Khodro: a record drop in production' on the auto sector.

ANALYST NOTE The business daily reads the war through its balance sheet: 2.6 billion barrels stranded, positioning Pezeshkian's third-year address as an economic-accountability moment. Pairing the president's report with the oil-off-market figure surfaces the cost side of the chokepoint doctrine that the hardline triumphalist fronts suppress, and aligns the economic press with the reformist case for cashing the Hormuz lever through the Oman channel.

«اداره مقتدرانه کشور» "Authoritative Administration of the Country"



- Main: 'Authoritative administration of the country' (اداره مقتدرانه کشور), the banner over Pezeshkian's televised dialogue with the public, with the sub-line 'I have not yet forgotten the events of Dey' (حوادث دی ماه را هنوز فراموش نکرده‌ام) and a photo of the president walking.
- Main: A right-column pull-out of Pezeshkian's Q&A lines, including that 'the martyred Leader stood behind us like a mountain' (رهبر شهید مانند کوه پشتمان ایستاده بودند), referring to the predecessor Leader assassinated on 28 February.
- Main: A more sensitive line, that 'material sometimes published in the name of the Leadership does not match the character I have seen in him' (مطالبی که گاهی از قول رهبری منتشر می‌شود با شخصیتی که من از ایشان دیده‌ام تطابق ندارد), and that a message attributed to the Leadership held he was 'in principle not in agreement' before ultimately permitting a process to take shape.
- Op-ed: 'Masoud's legacy' (میراث مسعود), a signed address to the president arguing 'your main capital is the people's trust' (سرمایه اصلی شما اعتماد مردم است), a pointed play on the paper's own name.
- Sub-item: An economic package, 'Sanctions-lifting for the country' (لغو تحریم), tying the diplomatic opening to the reformist economic case; closing line, 'When we are with the people, no power can bring us down.'

ANALYST NOTE Etemad foregrounds Pezeshkian's most delicate lines: a public suggestion that messages circulated in the current Leadership's name do not match the man he knows, and that the Leader was 'in principle not in agreement' before permitting a process to proceed. The front page does not specify the referent, so the reading is held carefully, but placed against the maritime-file sign-off tracked since 5 August, it is a rare on-record hint of friction between the presidency and the Leader's office and a high-value cue to watch.

"The President's Frank Dialogue

LOW-MODERATE: names a US role in the Hormuz accord; diplomacy-forward

«گفتگوی صریح

رئیس‌جمهور با مردم درباره دستاوردهای دولت، جنگ تحمیلی و مذاکرات»



- Main: The lead reports Pezeshkian's 'frank dialogue with the people' (گفتگوی صریح رئیس‌جمهور با مردم) covering the government's achievements, the 'imposed war,' and negotiations, with a large photo from the same televised Q&A.
- Main: A boxed item airs 'speculation about an Iran, Oman and America agreement to reopen the Strait of Hormuz' (گمانه‌زنی‌ها درباره توافق ایران، عمان و آمریکا), naming the United States as a party, in direct contrast to Farhikhtegan's insistence the deal has nothing to do with America.
- Sub-item: 'Signing of a 10-billion-dollar Iran-Pakistan trade memorandum' (امضای یادداشت تفاهم تجاری ۱۰ میلیارد دلاری ایران و پاکستان) at the 10th Pakistan-Iran Joint Trade Committee dated 5 August, a concrete economic-diplomacy datapoint.
- Op-ed: A Pezeshkian line that 'the Palestine question is among the fixed principles of the Islamic Republic's foreign policy' (مسئله فلسطین از اصول ثابت سیاست خارجی جمهوری اسلامی ایران است).
- Right rail: The Science Minister warning that distancing from international bodies would cost Iran scientific and academic opportunities; a commemorative item on 'the oppressed martyr Ayatollah Beheshti.'

ANALYST NOTE Alone among the fronts, Jomhouri Eslami frames the Hormuz understanding as involving 'Iran, Oman AND America,' contradicting the hardline insistence that Washington is not a party. That divergence, printed the same morning, is itself the most telling signal of the day: the system has not settled whether the accord is a bilateral Muscat arrangement or a de facto US channel, and this establishment-critical paper is again the outlet willing to name the American role.

Kayhan

Ultra-hardline flagship, managing editor Hossein Shariatmadari (read via outlet channel; no same-day scan in the batch)

"The Strait of Hormuz Is Not

HIGH: flagship editorial veto against reopening; Leadership directive invoked

Negotiable" «تنگه هرمز مذاکره‌بردار نیست»

- Op-ed: The 'Yadasht-e Rooz' (Note of the Day) by Hossein Shariatmadari argues the Strait of Hormuz 'is not negotiable': Iran should not relinquish its control, reopening would benefit the United States without reciprocal commitment, and the closure should be preserved as a deterrent per the Leadership's directive (reconstructed from the outlet channel; not a verbatim transcript).
- Main: 'Trump, failing to win over Iran, takes refuge in diplomacy' (ترامپ ناکام از پیروزی بر ایران به (دیپلماسی پناه می‌برد), casting the reported US pivot to talks as a confession of military failure.
- Sub-item: 'US Senator: the Strait of Hormuz was open before the war' (سناتور آمریکایی: تنگه هرمز قبل (از جنگ باز بود), aired to rebut the notion that reopening is a US achievement.
- Sub-item: 'Trump's anger at the US war secretary's dream-selling over Iran' (عصبانیت ترامپ از (رؤیافروشی وزیر جنگ آمریکا در قبال ایران), amplifying reported White House discord over the Iran file.
- Banner: 'The countdown to the death of the pro-Ukraine coalition has begun' (آغاز شمارش معکوس برای (مرگ ائتلاف حامی اوکراین فرار غول‌های فناوری از (Technology giants flee the Middle East' (خاورمیانه), extending the claimed-Western-decline register.

ANALYST NOTE Kayhan is the day's dissenting veto: while the state and reformist fronts announce the Oman accord, Shariatmadari's editorial flatly declares Hormuz 'not negotiable,' invokes the Leadership's closure directive, and warns that reopening serves Washington alone. Read against the announced coordinate-agreement and Charsoo's '40 experts,' this is the clearest sign the sign-off is contested inside the system rather than settled, and it aligns the flagship hardline voice with the economic-nationalist pushback.

Sobh-e No

Principlist (read via outlet channel; no same-day scan, freshest items may lag the print date)

"Iran-Oman Hormuz Talks Continue"

MODERATE: continuity corroboration; chokepoint and US-depletion claims

«ادامه مذاکرات ایران و عمان درباره تنگه هرمز»

- Main: 'Ongoing Iran-Oman talks on the Strait of Hormuz' (ادامه مذاکرات ایران و عمان درباره تنگه هرمز), reporting the Foreign Ministry spokesman's confirmation of discussions to establish safe shipping corridors while 'balancing sovereignty and national security.'
- Sub-item: 'Ceasefire violations and Zionist-regime attacks on southern Lebanon' (نقض آتش‌بس و حملات رژیم صهیونیستی به جنوب لبنان), reporting artillery and gunfire on the Jabal Sadaneh border zone.
- Sub-item: 'The US has used nearly all its long-range missiles in the Iran war' (آمریکا تقریباً تمامی موشک‌های دوربرد خود را در جنگ ایران استفاده کرده است), attributed to CBS News and Reuters, the standing US-depletion claim.
- Right rail: 'Unprecedented flight of Saudi vessels from Bab al-Mandeb' (فرار بی‌سابقه کشتی‌های سعودی از باب‌المندب), citing a 22-percent drop in transits and a 39-percent decline in tanker traffic.

ANALYST NOTE Sobh-e No's channel content is read as continuity rather than a confirmed same-day front page (its freshest items track the 4-5 August cycle). Its value today is corroborative: it keeps the Bab el-Mandeb transit figures and the US-missile-depletion claim in the principlist register, both carried as the outlets' claims pending independent shipping and munitions data, and it frames the Oman talks in the sovereignty-and-security idiom the hardline camp prefers over the reformist 'reopening.'

Appendix A: The Leadership Signal of the Day (Indirect)

Etemad front page (Pezeshkian televised Q&A); Kayhan 'Yadasht-e Rooz' (via outlet channel)

No standalone message from the Leader (Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei, who succeeded his father Ali Khamenei after the latter's assassination on 28 February 2026) anchored the front pages of 15 Mordad 1405. The Leadership appears indirectly, through two second-hand channels that are documented here as reported references, not as a verified primary text.

First, on Etemad, President Pezeshkian is quoted from his televised dialogue with the public describing the predecessor Leadership in reverent terms ('the martyred Leader stood behind us like a mountain'), while making a markedly more sensitive observation about the present Leadership: that material sometimes published in the Leadership's name 'does not match the character I have seen in him,' and that a message attributed to the Leadership had held he was 'in principle not in agreement' before ultimately permitting a process to take shape. The referent of that process is not specified on the page. This is a second-hand account by the president of the Leader's position and is flagged as such; it is not a statement issued by the Leader's office.

Second, Kayhan's editorial invokes 'the Leadership's directive' to keep the Strait of Hormuz closed as a deterrent, using it to argue against any reopening. This too is the outlet's characterization of a directive rather than a published Leadership text retrieved for this edition.

Analyst flag: the two references point in opposite directions, one implying the Leadership permitted a diplomatic process the president is defending, the other asserting a Leadership directive against reopening the strait. Whether these describe the same underlying decision on the maritime file cannot be resolved from the front pages, and the apparent contradiction is itself the day's most significant leadership-level cue. Source line: Etemad and Kayhan, 15 Mordad 1405; both references second-hand and unverified against any Leadership primary source.

Appendix B: The Flagged Editorial - Kayhan, 'The Strait of Hormuz Is Not Negotiable'

Kayhan, 'Yadasht-e Rooz' (Note of the Day), Hossein Shariatmadari, 15 Mordad 1405 (via t.me/s/kayhan_online)

Author verification: the column is Kayhan's standing 'Yadasht-e Rooz,' authored by managing editor Hossein Shariatmadari, whose editorial voice speaks for the paper's ultra-hardline line and is widely read as close to the Leadership's office. The attribution is consistent with the outlet's fixed byline for this slot.

Argument (reconstructed from the outlet channel's post summaries; this is a faithful paraphrase, not a verbatim transcript): the Strait of Hormuz is not a bargaining chip to be traded away. The leverage Iran now holds over the waterway was produced by the war and should be preserved, not surrendered in exchange for promises.

The column contends that reopening the strait would deliver a one-sided benefit to the United States without any reciprocal commitment, no lifting of sanctions, no end to maritime seizures, no fulfilment of Iran's stated conditions, and that a concession offered in advance of those guarantees would forfeit the deterrent for nothing.

It closes by invoking the Leadership's directive to maintain the closure as a deterrent, casting any move to normalize transit through an Oman-brokered arrangement as premature and strategically self-defeating.

Analyst flag: this editorial is the sharpest institutional counter to the Oman-Hormuz accord announced the same morning by the reformist and state fronts and the English Iran Daily; it should be read as the flagship hardline veto in an unsettled internal debate, not as a settled regime position. Verification note: the full printed text was not retrieved in clean form at compile time; no sentence here should be reproduced as a direct Shariatmadari quotation without confirmation against the printed column. Source line: Kayhan, 'Yadasht-e Rooz,' 15 Mordad 1405.

Appendix C: Methodology and Sourcing Notes

iran-press-digest v2 pipeline

Coverage: nine same-day front-page scans were read by vision, eight Persian titles from the NewspaperTasnim album (Farhikhtegan, Vatan-e Emrooz, Jam-e Jam, Sazandegi, Charsoo, Ta'adol, Etemad, Jomhuri Eslami) and the English-language Iran Daily. Kayhan was read via its outlet channel (same-day posts, 02:00-04:00 local, including the Shariatmadari editorial). Sobh-e No was read via its outlet channel and is treated as continuity corroboration rather than a confirmed same-day front page, as its freshest items track the 4-5 August cycle. The Iran newspaper channel did not surface a confirmed 15 Mordad front page at compile time and is not analyzed as a front page today, an absence noted rather than filled.

Wire corroboration: three agency channels were read for threat-register context and are labeled as claims, not front pages: Defa Press (IRGC-aligned defense agency), Fars News, and Nour News (linked to the Supreme National Security Council). Nour News and Fars reported a maritime incident in the Strait of Hormuz (a tanker reporting two explosions), and Defa Press carried the Yemeni forces' claim, via spokesman Yahya Saree, of a ballistic-missile strike on the Saudi tanker 'Daisy' in the Gulf of Aden. Tehran Times was unavailable at the time of compilation, so English-language coverage rests on the Iran Daily scan.

Independent verification: the day's spine was checked against Western wire reporting. The Iran-Oman shipping-route agreement is corroborated by Euronews, Bloomberg, Gulf News, and Reuters (5-6 August), which report Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baqaei announcing agreement on the geographic coordinates of a Hormuz route and a joint statement in preparation, with Tehran stating the US was not a party and Baqaei cautioning that the bilateral understanding alone does not guarantee safe navigation. The reported maritime incident is corroborated by UKMTO advisories (a tanker reporting two explosions roughly nine nautical miles southeast of Kumzar, Oman, crew and vessel safe) and by CNN's 5 August coverage noting Houthi tanker claims and Trump stating a Hormuz reopening would come 'soon.' These external sources are cited for verification only; the report documents the Iranian outlets' own framing.

Attribution firewall: all Iranian battle-damage, US-depletion, and casualty figures (US long-range-missile exhaustion; approximately 9,000 wounded Israeli soldiers per Yedioth; the 2.6-billion-barrels-off-market figure; Bab el-Mandeb transit percentages) are the originating outlets' claims and are not adopted as fact. Second-hand renderings of Western reporting inside Iranian outlets are flagged; quoting a rendering does not verify it.

Identification caveats: the economic daily carrying the '40 experts' Hormuz warning is read from its masthead as Charsoo (چارسوق) and is held at moderate identification confidence. Two front-page portraits were not identified with confidence, a Vatan-e Emrooz corner item ('an indictment against a criminal') and a Sazandegi top-left quote condemning 'continued aggression as absolute evil,' and no specific individual is asserted for either. Standing succession fact: 'the Leader' in current coverage denotes Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei; the martyred predecessor is Ali Khamenei (assassinated 28 February 2026). This edition documents hostile foreign-press rhetoric for defensive assessment only; nothing herein endorses, amplifies, or operationalizes it.

Open-source material only. All translations from Persian/Arabic originals. Iranian claims are labelled as claims. Prepared for analysis and early warning; hostile content is documented for defensive assessment only, not endorsed.