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THE AVENGERS' ARBA'EEN AND THE DENIED CHANNEL EDITION

12 front pages read for 5 August: 9 as same-day scans (8 Persian dailies plus the English-language Iran Daily), with Etemad, the Persian Iran and Sobh-e No read via their outlet channels.

Front pages published the morning of 5 August 2026, reflecting events through late 4 August local.

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Front page: Hamshahri

Executive Summary

The lead judgment of Day 155 is that the edition fuses a peak of vengeance-mobilization rhetoric with a categorical denial of any US channel, while the substantive movement of the day sits underneath both in the maritime file. Across the scanned hardline and state fronts, Arba'een is not commemorated but operationalized: Kayhan's 'the tens-of-millions Arba'een march took on the color of blood-vengeance and revenge,' Hamshahri's 'Arba'een of blood-vengeance,' Vatan-e Emrooz's 'the Hussein blood-avengers,' Farhikhtegan's 'resurrection of political Islam,' and Javan's 'surge of the blood-avengers from Tehran to Karbala' under the explicit slogan 'Ya Latharat al-Khamenei' (O avengers of Khamenei). The pilgrimage is bound directly to avenging the Leader assassinated on 28 February 2026, continuing and intensifying the Arba'een-as-vengeance thread this monitor tracked on 3 August, now sharpened from a general mourning register into a named succession-vengeance slogan.

The day's genuinely new thread is a denial. The office of the Leader, Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei (named in print on Hamshahri and in Iran Daily), is reported across Kayhan, Jam-e Jam and Javan to have rejected as false a claim about the Leader's reaction to a letter from the US President; Javan hardens this into 'we have no letter for negotiation with Washington,' and the Foreign Ministry spokesman's line, that Iran is not currently in talks with the United States, carries the same message outward on the English Iran Daily. The underlying claim itself is not printed and is not reproduced here; only the denial is documented, and it functions to foreclose any narrative of Tehran-Washington correspondence during the Arba'een window.

Against that denial sits the edition's highest-significance finding: the maritime file appears to be advancing even as the front pages disown it. Hamshahri confirms an eighth round of Iran-Oman Hormuz negotiations at technical and political levels; Etemad reports that Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has given preliminary approval to a Gulf maritime accord covering mine-clearing and a corridor protocol, awaiting the Leader's and the Supreme National Security Council's sign-off; and regional wires (Nour News, and an Axios report amplified by Jam-e Jam) describe a temporary, roughly sixty-day arrangement to reopen the Strait via a merged central corridor in Omani and Iranian waters. The analytic caution is symmetrical: the hardline denial of any 'US channel' is technically compatible with an Oman-mediated arrangement, so the two need not be contradictory, but the distance between 'no letter, no talks, economic war' on the front pages and 'a drafted accord awaiting sign-off' in the reformist lane is the gap most worth watching.

The Hormuz doctrine has shifted register from sovereignty to economic siege. Where the 3 August edition hardened the 'never return to the pre-war state' line, today's fronts reframe the Strait as an economic-war instrument: Jam-e Jam's cartoon of 'Hormuz, the White House's grave-knot' and its 'oil prices forced Trump to plead' lead, Vatan-e Emrooz's 'the last barrels: it is an economic war,' and Kayhan's front-page note that the closure burns roughly one hundred million barrels a week (attributed to Aramco CEO Amin Nasser, whose real statement it is, carried as his claim). The coercion is being generalized beyond Hormuz: Vatan-e Emrooz's dual-strait 'new order' analysis and the government daily's and Sobh-e No's figures on Saudi shipping diverting from Bab el-Mandeb (transits down about 22 percent, tanker traffic down about 39 percent, vessels rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope) extend the chokepoint thread to the southern strait with concrete, if outlet-sourced, transit numbers.

Beneath the war register, a domestic contest over the presidency is now explicit. A coordinated hardline campaign delegitimizes calls for resignation, Kayhan's attack on 'surrenderism,' Qods's 'profiteers of resignation,' Vatan-e Emrooz's 'preserving the dignity of officials,' and Jam-e Jam's 'surrenderism in the name of peace is treason', while the reformist lane answers directly: Shargh prints President Pezeshkian's 'I will not resign, I will stand firm' and government spokeswoman Fatemeh Mohajerani dismisses mass-resignation

reports as recurrent false rumor. The reformist titles pair this with a diplomatic counter-doctrine, Shargh's 'negotiation is the winning card of Iran's oil' and its 'Hormuz trap' caution, positioning the Oman channel as leverage to be cashed rather than an end in itself.

Net assessment: this is a denial-and-mobilization edition whose loudest signals, the 'Ya Latharat al-Khamenei' vengeance crowds and the flat rejection of any US letter, are information-operation posture, while its most consequential signal is the quiet, cross-lane reporting that a temporary Hormuz corridor accord is drafted and awaiting the Leader's sign-off. No new US strike inside Iran, no confirmed Hezbollah or Houthi action, and no signed agreement or verified Strait reopening existed at the cut-off; the Israel and Lebanon items (Sobh-e No's espionage and cabinet-postponement claims, Qassem's 'we will not leave the field' and anti-negotiation quotes) are rhetoric and unverified morale claims, not confirmed events. The signals to watch are whether the Leader's office confirms or vetoes the drafted Oman accord, whether any Iranian front page names the Qatar-mediated channel as more than a foreign attribution, and whether the resignation fight produces named targets.

BOTTOM LINE Day 155 turns on a contradiction the fronts are built to hold apart: the Arba'een crowds are coded as blood-avengers of the assassinated Leader under the slogan 'Ya Latharat al-Khamenei' and every hint of a US letter or channel is branded a fabrication, even as reformist titles and regional wires report an Araghchi-approved temporary Hormuz corridor accord awaiting the Leader's and the security council's sign-off, so the loudest signal is denial and the most consequential one is a maritime arrangement quietly being drafted.

CRITICAL SOURCING NOTE Compiled from nine same-day front-page scans read directly (eight Persian dailies plus the English Iran Daily) and three further dailies (Etemad, the Persian Iran, Sobh-e No) read via their Telegram channels, with agency wires (Nour News, Fars News, Defa Press) used only for corroboration and threat context. This is a smaller batch than the 3 August edition; the reformist economic dailies and Tehran Times were not available today, so the economic-strain read leans on the government daily's gold and Bab el-Mandeb figures. The current Leader is Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei, confirmed by printed name; Ali Khamenei (assassinated 28 February 2026) appears only as the martyred Leader. All Iranian battle-damage, espionage, emigration, poll, barrel and missile figures, including the Aramco 100-million-barrel and CNN/CBS missile-depletion claims (the latter denied by US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth per the government daily), are carried strictly as the originating outlets' claims and are not verified fact.

Macro Trend Analysis

① Arba'een sharpened into a named succession-vengeance slogan

The mourning-into-vengeance framing tracked on 3 August is intensified today into the explicit crowd slogan 'Ya Latharat al-Khamenei' (O avengers of Khamenei), carried on Javan and Farhikhtegan and echoed as 'blood-vengeance' across Kayhan, Hamshahri and Vatan-e Emrooz. The pilgrimage is bound directly to avenging the assassinated Leader, and Farhikhtegan elevates it to a claimed civilizational revival ('resurrection of political Islam'); the near-identical vengeance wording across otherwise competitive titles indicates centrally-guided message discipline, documented for defensive assessment only.

② A categorical denial of any US letter or channel

A new standing thread: the Leader's office is reported to reject as false any claim of the Leader's reaction to the US President's letter (Kayhan, Jam-e Jam, Javan), Javan flattens it to 'we have no letter for negotiation with Washington,' and the Foreign Ministry's 'no current US talks' line carries it outward on Iran Daily. The

denial forecloses any Tehran-Washington-correspondence narrative during the Arba'een window and should be read as an information-operation move, not a neutral clarification.

3 The Hormuz file: economic-siege rhetoric over a quietly drafted corridor accord

The 'never-return' sovereignty line of 3 August is reframed as deliberate economic warfare, Jam-e Jam's 'Hormuz, the White House's grave-knot' cartoon and 'oil prices forced Trump to plead,' Vatan-e Emrooz's 'the last barrels: it is an economic war,' Kayhan's Aramco-sourced hundred-million-barrels note, even as Hamshahri confirms an eighth-round Iran-Oman talk and Etemad and regional wires report an Araghchi-approved temporary corridor accord awaiting Leader/SNSC sign-off. The tracking cues remain shipping, insurance and transit data, and the sign-off decision, rather than the front-page declarations.

4 Chokepoint coercion generalized to Bab el-Mandeb

Vatan-e Emrooz's dual-strait 'new order' analysis, and concrete figures on the government daily and Sobh-e No, Saudi vessel transits down about 22 percent and tanker traffic down about 39 percent at Bab el-Mandeb, with rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope, extend the chokepoint-as-coercion doctrine from Hormuz to the southern strait. The transit numbers are the verifiable core beneath the coercion rhetoric and are carried as the outlets' claims pending independent shipping data.

5 The presidency as the domestic battleground

A coordinated hardline effort to delegitimize resignation demands, Kayhan's 'surrenderism,' Qods's 'profiteers of resignation,' Vatan-e Emrooz's 'dignity of officials,' Jam-e Jam's 'surrenderism is treason,' meets a direct reformist answer: Shargh's front-page Pezeshkian 'I will not resign, I will stand firm' and Mohajerani's dismissal of mass-resignation reports. The reformist lane couples this with a diplomatic counter-doctrine (negotiation as the winning card, the 'Hormuz trap' caution), making the presidency the arena where the war's political meaning is contested.

Key Judgments

KJ-1 [HIGH] Arba'een has been operationalized as a named succession-vengeance mobilization for the assassinated Leader. The explicit crowd slogan 'Ya Latharat al-Khamenei' on Javan and Farhikhtegan, and the 'blood-vengeance' framing across Kayhan, Hamshahri and Vatan-e Emrooz, bind the pilgrimage directly to avenging Ali Khamenei and to the legitimacy of Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei's succession. Significance: the commemoration is being used as an escalation-signaling and cohesion instrument, and the fusion should be expected to continue through the mourning period; the calibration is bidirectional, since the crowds are real even where the vengeance framing is imposed.

KJ-2 [HIGH] The front-page consensus flatly denies any US letter or channel, and that denial is itself the day's principal information operation. The Leader's office rejection of a 'false claim' about a reaction to the President's letter, Javan's 'no letter for negotiation with Washington,' and the Foreign Ministry's 'no current US talks' are coordinated to foreclose a correspondence narrative during Arba'een. Significance: the denial is a posture, not necessarily a fact about the maritime channel, and it is technically compatible with an Oman-mediated arrangement, so it should not be read as ruling out an interim deal.

KJ-3 [MODERATE-HIGH] The most consequential movement of the day is a reported temporary Hormuz corridor accord advancing beneath the denial. Hamshahri confirms an eighth-round Iran-Oman talk at technical and political levels; Etemad reports an Araghchi-approved draft awaiting the Leader's and the Supreme National Security Council's sign-off; Nour News and an Axios report amplified by Jam-e Jam

describe a roughly sixty-day arrangement. Significance: the maritime file, not the nuclear file, remains the near-term point of an ambiguous compromise, and the Leader's sign-off decision is the single highest-value cue; the judgment is held at moderate-high because the accord is reported, not confirmed, and the hardline titles are positioned to disown it.

KJ-4 [MODERATE-HIGH] The Hormuz argument has shifted from a sovereignty claim to an economic-siege weapon, and the coercion is being generalized to Bab el-Mandeb. Jam-e Jam's 'oil prices forced Trump to plead,' Vatan-e Emrooz's 'economic war,' and Kayhan's Aramco-sourced hundred-million-barrels note reframe the closure as leverage rather than cost, while transit figures at Bab el-Mandeb extend the doctrine south. Significance: this is doctrinal consistency with the standing chokepoint thread, but it raises Iran's exposure to the same economic pain it is inflicting, a tension the reformist and business-tilted items are beginning to surface.

KJ-5 [MODERATE] A coordinated hardline campaign is delegitimizing resignation demands while the reformist lane defends the president and diplomacy. The 'surrenderism/profiteers-of-resignation/dignity-of-officials' cluster on Kayhan, Qods, Vatan-e Emrooz and Jam-e Jam meets Shargh's Pezeshkian 'I will not resign' and Mohajerani's denial of mass resignations. Significance: the war's political meaning is now being fought domestically over the presidency, and the reformist coupling of cabinet stability with the Oman channel positions diplomacy as the responsible exit; the cue is whether the hardline campaign names specific targets.

KJ-6 [MODERATE] Negative evidence: no new confirmed kinetic event, on Israel, Lebanon or the Axis, was identified inside the reporting window. The Israel items (Sobh-e No's settler-espionage arrest and a postponed security-cabinet meeting, tank shelling of northern Gaza) are unverified or reported claims, and the Lebanon signal is rhetorical (Qassem's 'we will not leave the field' and his anti-negotiation line), with no confirmed Hezbollah or Houthi action. Significance: the pause across the Axis during Arba'een is best read as tactical restraint that preserves negotiating space around the maritime file, not demobilization; the cue is whether attacks resume if the Oman accord stalls.

Named-Figure Tracker

Figure	Role / relevance	Today's framing	Flag
Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei	Leader of the Revolution (succeeded his assassinated father Ali Khamenei, 28 Feb 2026)	Named in print on Hamshahri as the 'groundwork for greater victories'; his office denies a false claim about a reaction to the US President's letter; not seen publicly since being wounded in the February strike	WATCH
Donald Trump	US President	Cast as pleading, bogged down and strategically pinned (Jam-e Jam, Farhikhtegan); the alleged sender of a letter whose Iranian 'reaction' is denied	TARGET FRAMING
Masoud Pezeshkian	President of Iran	Front-page 'I will not resign, I will stand firm' (Shargh, Iran Daily); target of the hardline resignation-pressure campaign	WATCH
Abbas Araghchi	Foreign Minister	Reported to have given preliminary approval to a Gulf maritime accord awaiting Leader/SNSC	NEW NAMED FIGURE

Figure	Role / relevance	Today's framing	Flag
sign-off (Etemad)			
Esmail Baghaei	Foreign Ministry spokesman	The 'no current US talks; negotiations only with Oman' line, independently reported	COERCION SPOKESMAN
Fatemeh Mohajerani	Government spokeswoman	Dismisses mass-cabinet-resignation reports as recurrent false rumor (Etemad)	NEW NAMED FIGURE
Sheikh Naim Qassem	Secretary-General of Hezbollah	'We will not leave the field' (Hamshahri); negotiating like Tel Aviv means only loss and humiliation for Lebanon (Javan)	WATCH
Amin H. Nasser	President and CEO of Saudi Aramco	His 'about 100 million barrels a week' Hormuz-closure warning is repurposed by Kayhan and others as evidence of Iranian economic leverage	COERCION SPOKESMAN
Pete Hegseth	US Secretary of Defense	Denies the CNN/CBS claim that US forces expended ~80 percent of THAAD interceptors; the rebuttal is aired only on the government daily	absence noted

Headline Summary Table

Outlet	Lead Headline (English)	Orientation	Theme	Threat signal
Kayhan	The tens-of-millions Arba'een march took on the color of blood-vengeance and revenge	Ultra-hardline flagship, managing editor Hossein Shariatmadari	Arba'een as blood-vengeance; denial of any US channel	HIGH: vengeance-mobilization plus Hormuz economic-siege framing
Javan	The surge of the blood-avengers, from Tehran to Karbala	Hardline, IRGC-affiliated	Ya Latharat al-Khamenei vengeance slogan; no US letter	HIGH: succession-vengeance slogan plus Lebanon rejectionism
Hamshahri	Arba'een of blood-vengeance	Conservative, Tehran municipality	Vengeance red flags over a confirmed 8th-round Oman Hormuz talk	MODERATE-HIGH: vengeance framing over an admitted negotiating track
Vatan-e Emrooz	The Hussein blood-avengers	Hardline principlist	Sacralized vengeance; anti-negotiation; two-straits economic war	HIGH: sacralized-vengeance and dual-chokepoint economic warfare
Farhikhtegan	The resurrection of political Islam	Principlist (Azad University)	Arba'een as political-Islam revival; blood-vengeance for Khamenei	MODERATE-HIGH: ideological framing of vengeance mobilization
Jam-e Jam	The oil price forced Trump to plead	State broadcaster (IRIB) daily	Hormuz as economic siege; surrenderism-is-treason; letter denial	HIGH: economic-siege triumphalism with anti-compromise discipline
Iran Daily	Iran not currently engaged in talks with US,	English-language government daily	Outward-facing denial with a Qatar-attributed	LOW-MODERATE: hedged denial; Pakistan

Outlet	Lead Headline (English)	Orientation	Theme	Threat signal
	FM spox says		diplomatic softener	trade hedge
Etemad	Hormuz accord takes shape as officials tamp down resignation talk	Reformist	Drafted Oman-Hormuz accord awaiting sign-off; resignation denial	LOW-MODERATE: reformist disclosure of a drafted maritime accord
Shargh	Negotiation: the winning card of Iran's oil	Reformist	Diplomacy-as-leverage; Pezeshkian refuses resignation	LOW-MODERATE: reformist diplomatic counter-framing
Qods	Bluntly, on the profiteers of resignation	Conservative, Astan Quds Razavi (Mashhad)	Resignation-profiteer attack; Arba'een unity; anti-Israel morale item	MODERATE: domestic cohesion enforcement; unverified morale claims
Iran	Arba'een services scaled up; US denies missile-depletion claim	Official government daily (Persian)	Arba'een services; US missile-depletion denial aired; Bab el-Mandeb data	LOW-MODERATE: administrative framing; adversary rebuttal aired
Sobh-e No	Israeli distress on the front page over the Hormuz standoff	Principlist	Israeli-distress morale claims; Western corroboration; Oman talks	MODERATE: unverified morale items over an admitted Oman channel

Per-Paper Front-Page Analysis

Iran Daily

English-language government daily (Iran newspaper group)

"Iran not currently engaged in talks with US, FM spox says"

LOW-MODERATE: outward-facing denial with a hedged diplomatic opening



- Main: The Foreign Ministry spokesman states Iran is not currently engaged in talks with the United States; the strap adds that, per Qatar, efforts are underway toward a Tehran-Washington diplomatic solution, the outward-facing version of the domestic 'no US channel' line.
- Sub-item: 'Iran, Pakistan advance toward \$10b trade target at economic talks', the tenth meeting of the Pakistan-Iran Joint Trade Committee in Islamabad works toward finalizing a free-trade arrangement, signaling economic hedging toward the east.
- Sub-item: 'Pezeshkian denies resignation rumors, says he will stand firm', with a caption that the Leader's office rejects a false statement attributed to Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei, the English-language confirmation of both the resignation and letter denials.
- Right rail: An opinion piece, 'India walks tightrope between Iran ties, US strategic interests', and a report that 'Saudi Arabia's entry into conflict is a watershed moment' (illustrated with Mohammed bin Salman) foreground the Gulf and South-Asian dimensions.
- Sub-item: A cultural exclusive frames Ta'ziyeh (Iranian passion-play) as the mother of Iran's performing arts, keeping the Arba'een-season sacral register on the English page.

ANALYST NOTE Iran Daily is the day's authoritative English rendering of the two denials, no current US talks and a false statement attributed to the Leader, and it is careful to attribute the 'efforts underway' softener to Qatar rather than to Tehran, preserving deniability while leaving a diplomatic door ajar. The Pakistan \$10b trade item and the Saudi 'watershed' framing show the government daily building an economic-and-regional hedge beneath the maritime standoff; the cue is whether the Qatar-mediated channel is ever named on an Iranian front page as more than a foreign attribution.

"The tens-of-millions Arba'een march took

HIGH: vengeance-mobilization plus Hormuz economic-siege framing

on the color of blood-vengeance and revenge" «راهپیمایی ده‌ها میلیونی اربعین رنگ خونخواهی و انتقام گرفت»



- Main: The mass Arba'een procession is coded as an act of blood-vengeance (خونخواهی/khoonkhahi) and revenge (انتقام/enteqam); the subhead states that Arba'een stragglers (جاماندگان/jamandegan) across the country raised the blood-vengeance flags of the martyred Imam, fusing the pilgrimage directly to the assassinated Leader's cult.
- Banner: A separate top item, echoed on other fronts, denies a claim about the Leader's reaction to the [US] President's letter (تکذیب یک ادعا درباره), presenting the alleged correspondence-and-response story as fabricated.
- Kicker: 'Trump's trick failed this time because it struck a strong dam called Iran' (شگرد ترامپ این بار شکست خورد چون با سد محکمی به نام ایران برخورد کرد), preserving the prior edition's structural-weakness read of Washington.
- Op-ed: A 'Yadasht-e Rooz'-style economic-war item, 'Every week 100 million barrels of oil burn in the fire of Hormuz' (attributing to the Aramco CEO), reframes the Strait closure as an economic siege weapon rather than a shipping problem.
- Sub-item: Wire-sourced claims are stacked outward, that the United States has expended nearly all its long-range precision missiles in the Iran war (attributed to CBS reporting, ~80% of THAAD reserves), that Iranian transit-fee collection in Hormuz could be lawful (attributed to the Financial Times, citing Danish, Swedish and Turkish precedent), and that large smoke columns rose over Dubai's Jebel Ali port; all carried as the outlets' own claims.

ANALYST NOTE Kayhan sets the day's dominant frame: Arba'een is not commemorated but operationalized as a vengeance mobilization for the martyred Leader, and any hint of a US channel is pre-emptively branded a fabrication. The paper simultaneously runs the economic-war Hormuz line and denies any correspondence, a message-discipline pairing that lets it claim both leverage and defiance; track whether the transit-fee legality argument migrates from Kayhan's page into official Foreign Ministry language.

"Bluntly, on the profiteers of resignation"

MODERATE: domestic cohesion enforcement; unverified morale claims

«بدون تعارف با کاسبان استعفا»



- Main: The lead attacks 'the profiteers of resignation' (کاسبان استعفا), those it frames as making a political business of demanding the government's or president's resignation, tying the resignation controversy to accusations of opportunism at a sensitive diplomatic moment.
- Banner: 'Arba'een and the jewel of unity' (اربعین و گوهر وحدت), with a sub-item on how Arba'een can strengthen cultural, social and civilizational bonds among Muslim nations, and 'the mawkibs: bastions supporting the uprising for God.'
- Sub-item: An item frames the martyred Leader's thought as the source of Arba'een's unifying power, carried via the Vali-e Faqih's representative in Iraq; 'Arba'een: beyond borders, beyond differences.'
- Left rail: 'A tsunami of fleeing from Israel' (سونامی فرار از اسرائیل) claims mass emigration from Israel, carried as the paper's own assertion; a parallel item states 'America pulled back from Hormuz' (هرمز آمریکا پای کشیدند).
- Sub-item: Economic and social items, 'a billion-dollar trust without transparency' and a report on noise pollution in residential buildings, fill the lower page.

ANALYST NOTE Qods is the day's clearest window on the domestic resignation fight: its 'profiteers of resignation' lead mirrors Kayhan's 'surrenderism' and Vatan's 'dignity of officials' banner, indicating a coordinated hardline effort to delegitimize resignation demands as opportunism rather than to defend any particular official. The 'tsunami of fleeing Israel' claim is an unverified morale item and should be flagged as the outlet's assertion, not evidence; the cue is whether the resignation-profiteer framing hardens into named targets.

«The resurrection of political Islam» بعثت

MODERATE-HIGH: ideological framing of vengeance mobilization

اسلام سیاسی»



- Main: A large red vengeance banner ('Ya Latharat') over the crowd anchors a lead reading Arba'een 1405 as 'the resurrection of political Islam'; the strapline calls it a different Arba'een in which 'Iranians and Iraqis are the blood-avengers of the martyr Khamenei' (ایرانیان و عراقی‌ها خونخواه شهید) (خامنه‌ای).
- Op-ed: 'How Trump got bogged down' (ترامپ چطور زمین گیر شد) frames Washington as strategically pinned rather than merely deterred, continuing the structural-impasse read.
- Sub-item: An analytical report argues 'the Jolani economy is worse than the Assad economy' (اقتصاد جولانی بدتر از اقتصاد اسد), a Syria-focused item disparaging the post-Assad, HTS-led government's economic record.
- Right rail: A domestic item, 'when it reaches the scale of resignation' (وقتی), engages the cabinet-resignation controversy from a principlist angle.
- Kicker: 'Smoke of deliberate fires in the eyes of Miankaleh' and 'the blood-vengeance of students in Karbala' extend the vengeance motif to environmental and campus registers.

ANALYST NOTE Farhikhtegan supplies the ideological gloss for the day: it elevates the vengeance-Arba'een from ritual to a claimed civilizational revival ('resurrection of political Islam') and names the martyr Khamenei as the object of vengeance in as many words. Its Syria item is a factional signal, disparaging the Jolani government's economy positions Tehran's information space against the post-Assad order; the tracking cue is whether the anti-Jolani economic line recurs as the Syria file re-enters coverage.

«مذاکره؛ برگ برنده نفت ایران» «Negotiation: the winning card of Iran's oil»



- Main: The lead argues that negotiation, not confrontation, is the instrument that would let Iranian oil regain its market position, an explicit reformist counter to the hardline economic-war framing of Hormuz.
- Sub-item: President Masoud Pezeshkian is quoted, 'I will not resign, I will stand firm' (استعفا نخواهم داد، خواهم ایستاد), alongside 'an accurate account of the fuss made over the president's resignation,' contesting the hardline resignation narrative.
- Left rail: 'The Hormuz trap for a deal with Iran?' (تله هرمز برای توافق با ایران؟) reads the maritime standoff as a possible bargaining snare rather than a pure victory.
- Sub-item: 'Rereading the Arba'een message: from historic reform to today's responsibility' recasts the commemoration in a reformist, responsibility-centred register rather than a vengeance one.
- Op-ed: A foreign-affairs item, 'Who fears the East?', and a Spain migration story ('the refugee crisis between Madrid and Brussels') round out the international page.

ANALYST NOTE Shargh anchors the reformist counter-lane this monitor has tracked, and today it sharpens into a direct contest over the president: Pezeshkian's on-the-record refusal to resign is the reformist answer to the coordinated 'resignation-profiteer/surrenderism' campaign on the hardline fronts. Its 'negotiation as the winning card' lead and 'Hormuz trap' caution reframe the maritime file as leverage to be cashed in diplomacy rather than an end in itself; the cue is whether Pezeshkian's camp converts the Oman channel into an explicit case for talks.

"The Hussein blood-avengers"

HIGH: sacralized-vengeance and dual-chokepoint economic warfare

«خون خواهان حسینی»



- Main: Millions of Shiites and 'the free of the world' at the Arba'een ceremony are said to have declared loyalty to the cause of Sayyid al-Shohada and to have emphasized the struggle against 'the Yazid of the time' (یزید زمانه), a religious analogy that casts the present adversary in the role of Karbala's oppressor.
- Banner: 'Preserving the sacred unity and the dignity of officials' (حفظ اتحاد), a domestic-cohesion message aimed at the resignation controversy.
- Kicker: 'Eternal shame: the outcome of negotiating with Tel Aviv' (نگ ابدی), an explicit anti-negotiation warning tied to the Israel track.
- Right rail: 'The last barrels: it is an economic war' (آخرین بشکه‌ها، جنگ) frames the Hormuz standoff as deliberate economic warfare; an analytic item weighs 'the simultaneous consequences of developments at the two straits, Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb' (نظم جدید).
- Sub-item: On the second anniversary of Ismail Haniyeh's assassination, the paper carries the Palestinian resistance's line that disarmament is impossible (خلع سلاح ناممکن); a separate item frames Trump's cancelled strike as a media 'weekend show' (نمایش آخر هفته).

ANALYST NOTE Vatan-e Emrooz supplies the sacral-analogy engine of the vengeance frame ('the Yazid of the time') and pairs it with the day's clearest anti-negotiation red line on the Israel track. Its dual-strait 'new order' analysis extends the chokepoint-coercion doctrine this monitor has tracked from Hormuz to Bab el-Mandeb, matching the wire-service reporting of Saudi shipping diverting from the southern strait; the significance is doctrinal consistency, the coercion thread is being generalized beyond a single waterway.

"The oil price forced Trump to plead"

HIGH: economic-siege triumphalism with anti-compromise discipline

«قیمت نفت ترامپ را به التماس انداخت»



- Main: A front-page cartoon shows an Iran-cuffed hand pushing back a US-flagged oil-pump machine, captioned 'Hormuz: the White House's grave-knot' (هرمز گره گور کاخ سفید); the text claims Trump, having failed to reopen Hormuz and lower prices, 'pleadingly turned to the oil companies.'
- Op-ed: 'Surrenderism in the name of peace is treason' (تسلیم طلبی به اسم صلح خیانت است), a message-discipline line against any faction reading the standoff as an opening for compromise.
- Sub-item: 'Decisive rejection of compromise in Lebanon' (رد قاطع سازش در لبنان), hardening the Lebanon track in parallel with Qassem's front-page quotes elsewhere.
- Right rail: 'The Leader of the Revolution's office reacts to a false claim' (واکنش دفتر رهبر انقلاب به یک ادعای کذب), the state-broadcaster version of the denial carried across Kayhan and Javan.
- Sub-item: Off the front the channel amplifies wire claims of an Axios-reported temporary 60-day Hormuz arrangement and CNN figures on depleted US THAAD and Patriot stocks, and reports Netanyahu rejecting a US Gaza proposal, all carried as the originating outlets' claims.

ANALYST NOTE As the IRIB daily, Jam-e Jam is the clearest read on centrally-preferred framing: it fuses the economic-siege Hormuz line, the anti-compromise discipline ('surrenderism is treason'), the Lebanon-rejection line and the letter denial into a single page. The tension worth flagging is internal to the state ecosystem, the same channel that denies any US channel also amplifies an Axios-sourced 60-day Hormuz arrangement, indicating the maritime file may be moving in a direction the front-page rhetoric is built to disown.

“Arba'een of blood-vengeance”

MODERATE-HIGH: vengeance framing over an admitted negotiating track

«اربعین خونخواهی»



- Main: Arba'een pilgrims, by raising red flags, declared that the blood of the martyred Leader and other martyrs will not be forgotten (خون رهبر شهید و دیگر شهدا فراموش نمی شود), the vengeance frame stated plainly under a photograph of the red-flag processions.
- Sub-item: The Foreign Ministry spokesman announced an eighth round of Hormuz negotiations conducted at two levels, technical and political, and confirmed that the Iran-Oman talks continue (مذاکره ایران و عمان ادامه دارد), the clearest front-page acknowledgment of an active maritime channel.
- Right rail: Hezbollah Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem is quoted, 'We will not leave the field' (میدان را ترک نمی کنیم), carried as his statement of continued Lebanese-front resolve.
- Sub-item: The masthead panel states that 'the leadership of Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei is the groundwork for greater victories' (رهبری (آیت الله سیدمجتبی خامنه ای زمینه ساز پیروزی های بزرگ تر است), naming the current Leader in print.
- Kicker: 'Arba'een message: the criminals will never live in peace' (جنايتكاران هرگز آسوده نخواهند زیست) and 'Uprising of the red flags in Tehran' extend the vengeance register to the domestic processions.

ANALYST NOTE Hamshahri is analytically the most useful front of the day because it prints both halves of the contradiction the hardline titles keep apart: the red-flag vengeance frame and an on-the-record confirmation that Iran-Oman Hormuz talks have reached an eighth round at technical and political levels. Its explicit naming of Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei as Leader is a clean identification anchor. The confirmed negotiating track sitting beneath the vengeance banner is the edition's central tension and the primary cue to watch.

"The surge of the blood-avengers, from Tehran to Karbala" «خروش خونخواهان از تهران تا کربلا»

HIGH: succession-vengeance slogan plus Lebanon-track rejectionism



- Main: This year's Arba'een is cast as categorically different, distinguished by the raising of the martyred Aqa's blood-vengeance flags bearing the slogan 'Ya Latharat al-Khamenei' (یا لثارات الخامنه‌ای, O avengers of Khamenei) by the mourners of Aba Abdullah al-Hussein; the pilgrimage is explicitly bound to avenging the assassinated Leader.
- Banner: 'The claim of the Supreme Leader of the Revolution's reaction to the President's letter is false' (ادعای واکنش رهبر معظم انقلاب به نامه (رئیس جمهور گداز است), the sharpest of the day's denials.
- Sub-item: 'Tehran: we have no letter for negotiation with Washington' (تهران: (هیچ نامه‌ای برای مذاکره با واشنگتن نداریم), converting the denial into a flat rejection of any correspondence channel.
- Op-ed: A cleric-bylined item on the martyred Leader's long devotions frames his sanctity, reinforcing the vengeance-cult register.
- Right rail: Hezbollah Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem is quoted that negotiating in the manner of Tel Aviv would bring Lebanon nothing but loss and humiliation, a Lebanon-track rejection of compromise carried as his statement.

ANALYST NOTE Javan is the day's most explicit fusion of the pilgrimage with the succession-vengeance program: 'Ya Latharat al-Khamenei' makes the avenging of the assassinated Ali Khamenei the organizing slogan of the crowd, while the paper simultaneously forecloses any US channel and imports Qassem to harden the Lebanon file. As an IRGC-aligned title its denial of a letter is a threat-signaling posture, not a neutral clarification; the tracking cue is whether the 'no letter' line survives if the Oman corridor talks produce a written arrangement.

Etemad

Reformist daily (front page read via the outlet's channel; no scan in today's batch)

*"Hormuz accord takes shape as officials
tamp down resignation talk"*

LOW-MODERATE: reformist disclosure of a drafted maritime accord

- Main: The channel reports that Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has given preliminary approval to a Gulf maritime accord, requiring the Supreme Leader's and Supreme National Security Council's sign-off, covering mine-clearing and a maritime-corridor protocol between Iran and Oman, the reformist read that a Hormuz arrangement is being drafted rather than merely denied.
- Sub-item: Government spokeswoman Fatemeh Mohajerani dismissed reports of mass cabinet resignations, likening the narrative to recurring false death rumors; conservative-critical commentary accuses hardliners of undermining national cohesion during a sensitive diplomatic phase.
- Sub-item: A weather-emergency item notes five Sistan municipalities closed government offices under orange-level dust-storm alerts.
- Sub-item: Domestic-economy coverage flags the thirteenth phase of non-cash subsidy (kaalabarg) payments beginning by national-ID batches.
- Right rail: Commentary presses the case that the Oman channel, not confrontation, is the realistic path out of the maritime standoff.

ANALYST NOTE Etemad is the most concrete counter to the hardline denial: where Kayhan and Javan insist there is no channel and no letter, Etemad reports an Araghchi-approved draft accord awaiting Leader and SNSC sign-off, converging with the wire-service (Nour News, Axios) reporting of a temporary corridor. Read together with Mohajerani's resignation denial, the reformist lane is arguing that the machinery of both a deal and a stable cabinet already exists; the cue is whether the Leader's office confirms or vetoes the drafted accord.

Iran

Official government daily (Persian; front page read via the outlet's channel, no scan in today's batch)

"Government daily foregrounds Arba'een services and a US denial of missile depletion"

LOW-MODERATE: administrative framing; adversary rebuttal aired

- Main: In a governance-tilted register the daily leads on Arba'een logistics, more than 1.7 million services delivered across some 4,000 medical stations at the border crossings, with 150 buses moving returning pilgrims from the Mehran border to Tehran.
- Sub-item: Notably, the government daily carries the US denial, reporting that Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth rejected CNN's claim that American forces expended roughly 80 percent of THAAD interceptors against Iran, a rare front-page airing of the adversary's rebuttal alongside the Iranian claim.
- Sub-item: 'Saudi-affiliated vessel transits down 22% and tanker traffic down 39% at Bab el-Mandeb,' with ships rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope, extending the chokepoint story to the southern strait.
- Sub-item: Economic coverage notes the world gold market's worst quarter in thirteen years (a 14.1% decline).
- Right rail: Service-and-weather items (Tehran air quality, pilgrimage-route traffic, Mazandaran rain) keep the government daily's administrative tone.

ANALYST NOTE The government daily runs the quietest, most administrative version of the day, and it is the one front that prints the US rebuttal (Hegseth denying the THAAD-depletion figure) next to the Iranian claim, a small but real marker of the government lane's greater tolerance for adversary sourcing than the hardline titles. Its Bab el-Mandeb shipping figures corroborate Vatan's dual-strait 'new order' analysis with concrete transit numbers, useful as the verifiable core beneath the coercion rhetoric.

Sobh-e No

Principlist daily (front page read via the outlet's channel; no scan in today's batch)

"Principlist front stacks Israeli-distress items over the Hormuz standoff"

MODERATE: Israel-distress morale items over an admitted Oman channel

- Main: The front leads on Israel-distress claims: an Israeli settler reportedly arrested on charges of spying for Iran, a sudden postponement of the Israeli security cabinet meeting, and Israeli tank shelling of northern Gaza, carried as reported items.
- Sub-item: On the US track it aggregates Western sourcing, 'Hezbollah: Trump forced to admit Iran is an important actor', 'Washington Post: Iran unafraid of Trump's threats', and 'Financial Times on Trump's Iran-policy confusion', marshaling external outlets for the structural-weakness verdict.
- Sub-item: On Hormuz it runs the Aramco CEO's '100 million barrels a week' warning and confirms that 'Iran-Oman negotiations continue on managing the Strait.'
- Sub-item: Arba'een coverage cites 22 million pilgrims and 'a wave of crowds' at the stragglers' processions across Iran.
- Right rail: 'Unprecedented diversion of Saudi vessels from the Bab el-Mandeb strait' extends the maritime-pressure narrative to the southern chokepoint.

ANALYST NOTE Sobh-e No is representative of the principlist middle: it accepts the active Iran-Oman Hormuz channel on the record while packing the front with Israel-distress and Western-corroboration items that source the American-and-Israeli-weakness verdict outward. Its espionage and cabinet-postponement claims are unverified morale items and should be flagged as such; the value here is confirmation that even principlist titles now print the Oman negotiating track rather than denying it.

Appendix A - The Leader's office and the disputed 'letter' (reconstructed from the front pages; not a verbatim text)

Carried on the front pages of Kayhan, Javan and Jam-e Jam, and in the English Iran Daily, 14 Mordad 1405

The most prominent Leader-linked item of the day is not a sermon or message but a denial. Across several fronts the office of the Leader of the Revolution is reported to have rejected as false (کذب) a claim concerning the Leader's reaction to a letter from the [US] President. Kayhan's banner reads 'Refutation of a claim regarding the Leader of the Revolution's reaction to the President's letter'; Jam-e Jam frames it as 'The Leader of the Revolution's office reacts to a false claim'; Javan states most sharply that 'the claim of the Supreme Leader of the Revolution's reaction to the President's letter is false,' and pairs it with the flat assertion, attributed to Tehran, that 'we have no letter for negotiation with Washington.'

The English-language Iran Daily renders the same denial as the Leader's office rejecting 'a false statement attributed to Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei,' which both confirms the identification of the current Leader by printed name and locates the denial at the office level rather than as a personal statement. No first-person text from the Leader appeared on the scanned fronts; Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei has not been seen in public since he was wounded in the 28 February 2026 strike that killed his father and predecessor, Ali Khamenei.

Analyst flag: the substance of the underlying 'claim' is not printed on the fronts and is not reproduced here; only the denial is documented. The denial should be read as an information-operation move to foreclose any narrative of Tehran-Washington correspondence during the Arba'een window, consistent with the parallel Foreign Ministry line that there are no current US talks. Verification note: reconstructed from the front-page banners named above, not from a primary khamenei.ir text; treat as partial.

Appendix B - The day's flagged editorial: Hormuz as economic siege (Kayhan; theme reconstructed from the scan)

Kayhan front-page note, 14 Mordad 1405; managing editor Hossein Shariatmadari

Kayhan's flagged front-page note runs under the line that every week the closure of Hormuz burns roughly one hundred million barrels of oil, a figure it attributes to the chief executive of Saudi Aramco. The argument reframes the Strait standoff away from a shipping or freedom-of-navigation dispute and toward deliberate economic warfare: the closure is presented not as a cost Iran bears but as a pressure instrument Iran wields, with the burden falling on Gulf producers and the global refining system.

The note is consistent with the day's cross-title economic-war register, Vatan-e Emrooz's 'the last barrels: it is an economic war' and Jam-e Jam's cartoon of 'Hormuz, the White House's grave-knot', and it stacks Western sourcing (a Financial Times argument that transit-fee collection could be lawful, CBS-attributed claims of depleted US missile stocks) to source the leverage claim outward.

Analyst flag: the '100 million barrels a week' figure is a real and independently reported statement by Aramco president and CEO Amin H. Nasser (who has described the closure as the largest oil-supply shock in history); it is nonetheless the Aramco chief's assessment, carried here as his claim, not an Iranian measurement. The specific columnist is not individually bylined on the scan and is not asserted; the note is attributed to Kayhan under its managing editor. Verification note: editorial theme reconstructed from the front-page scan, not a verbatim translation of the full column.

Appendix C - Methodology and Sourcing Notes

iran-press-digest v2 pipeline

Coverage basis: nine front-page scans were read directly by vision, eight Persian (Kayhan, Qods, Farhikhtegan, Shargh, Vatan-e Emrooz, Jam-e Jam, Hamshahri, Javan) from the NewspaperTasnim batch for Wednesday 14 Mordad 1405, and one English (Iran Daily) from the Newspapers_Iran batch. The batch guard confirmed the Persian album's printed Jalali date (14 Mordad 1405) matched the target date, so the edition is same-day and not stale. Three further dailies (Etemad, the Persian Iran, Sobh-e No) were read via their Telegram channels because no scan was in today's batch; those entries are labelled as channel-sourced.

This is a smaller batch than recent editions (the 3 August edition drew on some twenty fronts). Several titles carried in prior editions (Sazandegi, Donya-e Eqtesad, Taadol, Jomhuri-ye Eslami, No-Bonyad, Kayhan International, Tehran Times) were not in today's scan set. Tehran Times was unavailable at compile time and is not represented. The absence of the reformist economic dailies means today's economic-strain signal rests mainly on the government daily's gold and Bab el-Mandeb figures rather than a dedicated business-press read.

Agency wires (Nour News, Fars News, Defa Press) were used only for corroboration and threat-signaling context, not as front pages, and their material is labelled as claims: the Axios-reported temporary 60-day Hormuz arrangement, the CNN/CBS figures on depleted US THAAD and Patriot stocks (which the government daily notes Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has denied), the Jebel Ali/Dubai port explosion reports (local sources cited 'technical problems'), Saudi airstrikes on Sana'a, and the Saudi-shipping diversion figures at Bab el-Mandeb. None is adopted as fact.

Attribution and identification: the current Leader is Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei, confirmed by printed name on the Hamshahri front and in Iran Daily; Ali Khamenei was assassinated on 28 February 2026 and appears only as 'the martyred Leader/Imam.' Named figures verified against the pages and, where needed, the open web include President Masoud Pezeshkian, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei (whose 'no US talks, negotiations only with Oman' line is independently reported), government spokeswoman Fatemeh Mohajerani, Hezbollah Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem, and Aramco CEO Amin H. Nasser. Iranian battle-damage, casualty, espionage, emigration and poll claims, and all cited barrel and missile figures, are carried strictly as the originating outlets' claims and are not to be reproduced as verified fact without primary-source confirmation.

Open-source material only. All translations from Persian/Arabic originals. Iranian claims are labelled as claims. Prepared for analysis and early warning; hostile content is documented for defensive assessment only, not endorsed.