

OPEN-SOURCE PRESS INTELLIGENCE

Iranian Press Monitor

Daily Front-Page Intelligence

Day 146 - Monday, 27 July 2026 · 5 Mordad 1405 · 12 Safar 1448

THE LEADER'S HAND AND HEZBOLLAH'S BAY'AH EDITION

Ten Persian front pages (nine kiosk scans plus two channel-read dailies) and one English print, with three agency wires read for corroboration; the office-of-the-Leader website and Tehran Times were unavailable at the time

Front pages published the morning of Monday 5 Mordad 1405 (27 July 2026), reflecting events through late Sunday 26 July local time

Defensive open-source press-intelligence. Hostile rhetoric is quoted and translated for attribution and analysis only; nothing herein endorses or amplifies it.



Front page: Seda-ye Iran

Executive Summary

Day 146 is a succession-consolidation edition, and its lead judgment is that the dominant move is the decisive front-page return of the Leader's direct voice: the office-aligned press makes Mojtaba Khamenei's reply to a letter from Hezbollah's Secretary-General and fighters the day's centrally-set line. Kayhan and Khorasan run the banner 'no path remains but jihad and resistance'; Seda-ye Iran gives the whole page to the Hezbollah emblem carved into a mountain under the headline 'beyond politics,' explicitly naming the reply as that of 'the third Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei,' and framing Lebanese Hezbollah's bay'ah (allegiance) to him as a trans-political act of fealty; Nobonyad, Sobh-e No and Vatan-e Emrooz carry the same message with its two conditions attached. The mechanism is centrally-guided message discipline binding the succession to the war doctrine, and the significance is direct: this is the most prominent direct Leader presence in several editions and reverses the negative-evidence finding the prior edition filed on the Leader's front-page absence.

The second organising theme is a qualitative escalation of the standing Hormuz thread, from a threat to close the strait to a claim of governance over it. Jomhuri Eslami leads on a mediators' proposal that Iran formally control the Strait of Hormuz and levy 'security-provision tolls,' naming India among the interlocutors; the English Iran Daily leads with the foreign-ministry spokesman reporting 'progress in Oman talks on Strait of Hormuz governance'; the state's own wires (Nour News, Fars News, Kayhan's channel) report Iran redirecting six vessels attempting 'unauthorised' passage through the southern strait and asserting that 'the transit route is designated by Iran'; and Sobh-e No cites an Israeli security institute conceding that 'Iran now controls the rules of engagement' there. Read together, these convert chokepoint leverage into a claimed institutional and revenue role, the sharpest new turn in the dual-chokepoint coercion thread since it began, though the 'governance' and 'toll' claims remain Iranian and mediator-sourced assertions, not demonstrated arrangements.

Beneath the narrative, the edition again separates loud claims from wire-corroborated events. The multi-country US-base strike claim persists and consolidates, Kayhan's centre-page 'list of Iran's heavy damages to America in 15 days' with satellite-style base imagery, and Vatan-e Emrooz's IRGC-spokesman 'Victory Report,' yet neither is echoed by the operational content of the state's own defence wires, which document only Yemeni (Ansarallah) operations against Saudi Arabia: three Saudi tankers targeted within 48 hours, sixteen vessels turned back, strikes on Aramco facilities at Jizan and Yanbu, and a claimed complete closure of Bab al-Mandab to Saudi shipping. The American-weakness narrative sharpens in parallel: Khorasan headlines 'the Americans' defeat, this time in air defence,' citing the New York Times, BBC, CNN, Axios and Reuters on depleted interceptor stocks, and Kayhan's channel amplifies US-politician criticism (Representative Thomas Massie, Senator Chris Murphy) and the New York Times 'quagmire' framing, against Trump's own reported denial that Washington has retreated.

The internal argument over war and settlement continues, now fought over how to read the fragile US memorandum. Sobh-e No uses the Leader's Hezbollah reply to recast the MoU as a resistance victory, making 'Lebanese territorial integrity and complete Israeli withdrawal the first clause' of the understanding and rebutting the charge that it was a capitulation, exactly the charge the rejectionist wing pressed in the prior edition. Nobonyad supplies the doctrinal escalation from the other direction: a marja', Grand Ayatollah Javadi-Amoli, certifies that 'we crushed the superpowers,' while a front-page column argues openly that 'war strengthens the advocates of atomic deterrence,' the most escalatory editorial signal of the day. The reformist press holds apart from both: Etemad leads on 'the domino of war,' warning that a broad conflict would drag in

the whole region and beyond, and reduces the Ghalibaf-Trump exchange to online theatre, while Sazandegi declines the war frame entirely, leading on a Generation Alpha consumer phenomenon.

The economic titles keep the war's home-front price on the page in a register the triumphalist fronts avoid. Ta'adol pairs a cautious 'slow return of production after the war' with a warning that 'the world is on the threshold of its heaviest energy shock,' converting the same Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab disruption into a global-price story that also constrains Iran's own growth; Chahar Sough runs an inflation-and-liquidity blame dispute personalised around Abdolnaser Hemmati, with exchange-rate and money-supply charts as evidence. The government's English-facing edition, meanwhile, is markedly more diplomatic than its Persian counterparts: Iran Daily foregrounds Hormuz 'governance' diplomacy, a UNESCO listing for Alamut Castle, President Pezeshkian's grievance over US strikes on civilian infrastructure, a Pakistani-restraint interview, and a rebuttal of Ukrainian accusations over Iran-Russia cooperation and the Caspian-vessel incident that Etemad also keeps alive.

Net assessment: this is a consolidation-and-governance edition. The verifiable developments are a decisive front-page return of the Leader's voice paired with Hezbollah's declared bay'ah, a diplomatic push to institutionalise Iran's Hormuz leverage, a corroborated Yemen-on-Saudi oil campaign, and a quantified economic strain; the unverifiable content is again the cluster of Iranian strikes on US bases, now consolidated into a 'Victory Report' but no better corroborated. The highest-significance finding is the succession consolidation itself: the new Leader's authority is being publicly underwritten by a foreign militia's allegiance and welded to the war doctrine, reversing the low-Leader-visibility pattern of recent editions. The sharpest new escalation is the move from threatening Hormuz to claiming to govern it, and the signal most worth watching is Nobonyad's open front-page advocacy of atomic deterrence, the first time in recent editions that a weapons option has been argued on a front page rather than implied.

Prepared for analysis and early warning. Hostile content documented for defensive assessment only.

BOTTOM LINE The Iranian front pages converge on a succession-consolidation story: the new Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, replies to a letter from Hezbollah with 'no path but jihad and resistance,' and Lebanese Hezbollah's declared bay'ah to him as 'the third Leader' is treated as a strategic milestone, restoring the direct Leader presence the prior edition found absent; alongside it the war frame moves from unverified base-strike claims to a claimed Iranian governance-and-toll role over the Strait of Hormuz, while the only kinetic reality the state's own wires corroborate remains the Yemen-on-Saudi oil campaign at Bab al-Mandab.

CRITICAL SOURCING NOTE Built from nine Persian kiosk scans (Kayhan, Khorasan, Seda-ye Iran, Nobonyad, Jomhuri Eslami, Sazandegi, Chahar Sough, Ta'adol, Etemad) and one English print (Iran Daily), all dated 5 Mordad 1405, plus two channel-read dailies (Vatan-e Emrooz, Sobh-e No) with no kiosk scan this cycle, and three agency wires (Defa Press, Fars News, Nour News) read for corroboration only and treated as claims. The office-of-the-Leader website and Tehran Times were unavailable at compile time, so the Leader's message (Appendix A) is reconstructed from multiple front-page reproductions rather than a primary text, and Kayhan's full front-page editorial (Appendix B) is reconstructed from its headline, deck and companion line. Iranian base-strike claims and the CNN-attributed Pentagon-casualty and US-politician material are attacker- or second-hand-sourced and remain unverified here; the Israeli-institute assessment of Iranian Hormuz control is an adversary-sourced claim used as corroboration and flagged as such. The Leader's identity as Mojtaba Khamenei rests on the printed text of the day's pages, consistent with the standing record of Ali Khamenei's assassination on 28 February 2026.

Macro Trend Analysis

① The succession is publicly consolidated through allegiance, not just office

The office-aligned press does not merely report the Leader; it stages his authority. Seda-ye Iran names Mojtaba Khamenei 'the third Leader of the Islamic Revolution' and treats Lebanese Hezbollah's bay'ah to him as a trans-political act ('beyond politics'); Kayhan, Khorasan, Nobonyad, Sobh-e No and Vatan-e Emrooz all carry his reply to Hezbollah as the day's line. The mechanism is a foreign militia's declared fealty being used to underwrite a domestic succession, and the near-identical carriage across ideological titles indicates central guidance rather than organic convergence. This reverses the prior edition's finding that the Leader's direct voice was absent from the fronts.

② Hormuz leverage is recast from closure-threat to a governance-and-toll claim

The chokepoint thread takes a qualitative step: Jomhuri Eslami reports a mediators' proposal that Iran formally control Hormuz and collect 'security-provision tolls' (with India named among interlocutors), Iran Daily leads on 'progress in Oman talks on Hormuz governance,' the wires report Iran redirecting six vessels and 'designating' the transit route, and Sobh-e No cites an Israeli institute conceding Iranian control of the rules of engagement. The move is from denial-of-passage to a claimed institutional and revenue role, the sharpest turn in the dual-chokepoint coercion thread to date; the claims remain Iranian and mediator-sourced assertions, not demonstrated arrangements.

③ American restraint is sharpened into an air-defence 'defeat'

The standing 'America blinked' thread hardens onto a specific claim: depleted air defences. Khorasan headlines 'the Americans' defeat, this time in air defence,' naming five Western outlets (NYT, BBC, CNN, Axios, Reuters) as reporting a shortage of interceptor munitions; Kayhan's channel amplifies Representative Massie's and Senator Murphy's criticism of the war and the NYT 'quagmire' framing, with Trump's denial that the US retreated as the lone dissonant note. The convergence is centrally-guided amplification of Western reporting of caution into a claim of demonstrated US weakness, asserted rhetorically rather than shown on the battlefield.

④ The corroborated kinetic reality remains Yemen-on-Saudi at Bab al-Mandab

As in recent editions, the one wire-supported kinetic activity is Ansarallah's campaign against Saudi shipping and oil: Defa Press reports three Saudi tankers targeted within 48 hours, sixteen vessels turned back, and a claimed complete closure of Bab al-Mandab, alongside strikes on Aramco facilities at Jizan and Yanbu. The Iranian press packages this as an energy shock on the West (Ta'adol's 'heaviest energy shock,' Vatan-e Emrooz's Saudi-export-choke analysis), but the operational base is Yemeni operations, not a demonstrated Iranian closure of Hormuz or the claimed strikes on US bases.

⑤ The war-versus-settlement argument moves onto the meaning of the MoU, and a nuclear option reaches a front page

The intra-regime split now runs through how to read the fragile US understanding. Sobh-e No uses the Leader's Hezbollah reply to reframe the MoU as a resistance-commitment document ('first clause: Lebanon and Israeli withdrawal'), pre-empting the 'capitulation' charge; Nobonyad escalates from the other side, with a marja' certifying 'we crushed the superpowers' and a front-page column arguing that 'war strengthens the advocates of atomic deterrence.' The reformist titles hold apart: Etemad warns of an escalation 'domino,' and Sazandegi declines the war frame altogether. The front-page nuclear-deterrence advocacy is the most escalatory single editorial signal of the cycle.

Key Judgments

KJ-1 [HIGH] The succession-era Leader has returned decisively to the front page, his authority publicly underwritten by Hezbollah's declared allegiance. Seda-ye Iran names Mojtaba Khamenei 'the third Leader of the Islamic Revolution' and elevates Lebanese Hezbollah's bay'ah to him to a strategic milestone ('beyond politics'); Kayhan, Khorasan, Nobonyad, Sobh-e No and Vatan-e Emrooz all run his reply to Hezbollah ('no path but jihad and resistance') as the day's centrally-set line. Significance: this is the most prominent direct Leader presence in several editions and directly reverses the prior edition's negative-evidence finding on his front-page absence; the use of a foreign militia's fealty to consolidate a domestic succession is the cycle's highest-significance development, and the barometer to watch is whether less office-aligned titles reproduce the 'third Leader' formulation or hedge it.

KJ-2 [MODERATE-HIGH] Iran's Hormuz posture has escalated in kind, from threatening closure to claiming a governance-and-toll role. Jomhouri Eslami reports a mediators' proposal for Iran to control the strait and levy 'security-provision tolls' (India named among interlocutors), Iran Daily leads on 'progress in Oman talks on Hormuz governance,' the wires report Iran redirecting six vessels and 'designating' the transit route, and Sobh-e No cites an Israeli institute conceding Iranian control of the rules of engagement. Significance: converting chokepoint leverage into a claimed institutional and revenue arrangement is the sharpest new turn in the standing dual-chokepoint thread; the claims are Iranian and mediator-sourced assertions, not demonstrated arrangements, and the tracking cue is whether any external party confirms a toll or governance mechanism or whether it stays a one-sided narrative.

KJ-3 [HIGH] The one kinetic reality corroborated on the state's own wires remains the Yemen-on-Saudi oil campaign, not any Iranian strike on US bases. Defa Press reports three Saudi tankers targeted within 48 hours, sixteen vessels turned back, a claimed complete closure of Bab al-Mandab, and Ansarallah strikes on Aramco facilities at Jizan and Yanbu; the press repackages this as a global energy shock. Significance: the corroborated Saudi disruptions should be tracked separately from the uncorroborated Iranian base-strike and Hormuz-closure claims that ride on them; the evidentiary base of the coercion narrative is Yemeni operations, not a demonstrated Iranian capability.

KJ-4 [MODERATE-HIGH] The multi-country US-base strike claims persist and consolidate but remain uncorroborated. Kayhan's centre-page 'list of Iran's heavy damages to America in 15 days,' with satellite-style base imagery, and Vatan-e Emrooz's IRGC-spokesman 'Victory Report' present a consolidated tally, yet neither is supported by the operational content of the state's own defence wires, which report only Yemeni operations against Saudi Arabia. Significance: consolidation into a single 'Victory Report' adds presentation, not corroboration; every base-strike claim should be treated as attacker-sourced messaging to be confirmed outside this monitor, and the negative evidence (the wires' silence on Iranian base strikes) is itself the finding.

KJ-5 [HIGH] The American-weakness narrative has sharpened onto a specific, testable claim of air-defence depletion. Khorasan headlines 'the Americans' defeat, this time in air defence,' naming five Western outlets as reporting depleted interceptor stocks, and Kayhan's channel amplifies US-politician criticism (Massie, Murphy) and the NYT 'quagmire' framing against Trump's denial of any retreat. Significance: the discipline is real (near-identical carriage indicates central guidance) but the underlying event is Western reporting of caution, not a demonstrated Iranian gain; the item to watch is whether any operational fact is ever offered to substantiate the air-defence-collapse claim or whether it remains a rhetorical posture built on amplified foreign reporting.

KJ-6 [MODERATE] Open advocacy of a nuclear-deterrence option has reached a front page. Nobonyad runs a marja's certification that 'we crushed the superpowers' alongside a front-page column arguing that 'war strengthens the advocates of atomic deterrence.' Significance: prior editions carried the weapons question only by implication; a front-page column making the affirmative case is a discrete escalation in the domestic discourse and warrants tracking for any migration from fringe op-ed to mainstream demand, especially if it recurs or is echoed by the office-aligned press.

KJ-7 [MODERATE] The intra-regime settlement-versus-rejection split continues, now fought over the meaning of the US memorandum, while the reformist press holds apart from the war frame. Sobh-e No reframes the MoU as a resistance-commitment document ('first clause: Lebanon and Israeli withdrawal'), rebutting the 'capitulation' charge that the rejectionist wing (Nobonyad) presses; Etemad warns of an escalation 'domino' and treats the Ghalibaf-Trump exchange as theatre, and Sazandegi declines the war frame entirely for a Generation Alpha social lead. Significance: the fracture documented across recent editions persists, now mapped onto how the settlement is read; the sustained reformist distance from the mobilisation narrative is logged as its own finding, a proxy for elite reservations about the centrally-set line.

Named-Figure Tracker

Figure	Role / relevance	Today's framing	Flag
Mojtaba Khamenei	Leader of the Islamic Republic (succeeded the assassinated Ali Khamenei, 28 Feb 2026)	Named on the pages as 'the third Leader of the Islamic Revolution'; his reply to Hezbollah is the day's centrally-set line and his authority is underwritten by the militia's declared bay'ah	NEW NAMED FIGURE (direct front-page presence restored after absence)
Ali Khamenei	Assassinated predecessor (28 Feb 2026)	Invoked as 'the martyred Ali Khamenei'; a memorial for 'the martyred Leader' was reported on Kayhan	absence noted (present only as martyred predecessor)
Hezbollah Secretary-General and fighters	Lebanese resistance leadership	Authors of the letter of allegiance (bay'ah) to the new Leader; their defence framed as 'the strategic policy of the Islamic Republic'	COERCION SPOKESMAN (ally elevated to succession-legitimising role)
Donald Trump	US president	Cast as trapped and weakened (NYT 'quagmire,' depleted air defences); his denial that the US retreated is the lone counter-note; trades online barbs with Ghalibaf	TARGET FRAMING
Abdollah Javadi-Amoli	Grand Ayatollah (senior Qom marja')	Quoted by Nobonyad certifying that 'we crushed the superpowers' in the two Ramadan-era wars,	WATCH (clerical validation of the war frame)

Figure	Role / relevance	Today's framing	Flag
		lending clerical authority to the triumph narrative	
Mohammad-Baqer Ghalibaf	Speaker of the Iranian parliament	Etemad reports his 'Twitter duels' with Trump, treated as spectacle rather than statecraft	WATCH
Masoud Pezeshkian	President of Iran	Iran Daily reports him urging international action against US strikes on civilian infrastructure and welcoming the UNESCO Alamut listing; a grievance-and-legitimacy register	WATCH (diplomatic/grievance track)
Thomas Massie and Chris Murphy	US legislators (Representative; Senator)	Amplified on Kayhan's channel as US critics of the war ('no objectives achieved,' 'depleted defences for Israel'); second-hand renderings used to corroborate the American-weakness theme	WATCH (adversary-source amplification)
Abdolnaser Hemmati	Iranian economic figure (former Central Bank governor)	Chahar Sough centres an inflation-and-liquidity blame dispute on him ('is it everyone's business except Hemmati's?')	WATCH (domestic economic blame)
Netanyahu / Israel	Adversary state	Present mainly at one remove: Kayhan's swipe that 'Israel is bombing Lebanon while Beirut's FM attacks Hezbollah,' and Sobh-e No's citation of an Israeli institute on Hormuz; no direct Israel-front lead this cycle	absence noted (Israel front recedes relative to prior edition)

Headline Summary Table

Outlet	Lead Headline (English)	Orientation	Theme	Threat signal
Seda-ye Iran	Beyond politics	Hardline / revolutionary (Leader's-office-aligned)	Hezbollah's bay'ah to Mojtaba Khamenei as the 'third Leader'	MODERATE-HIGH: succession-consolidation messaging
Kayhan	No path remains before us but jihad and resistance	Hardline flagship (Leader's office / IRGC)	Leader's Hezbollah message fused with a 'break the naval blockade' editorial and base-damage list	HIGH: Leader-endorsed maximalist war frame

Outlet	Lead Headline (English)	Orientation	Theme	Threat signal
Khorasan	The Americans' defeat, this time in air defence	Conservative (Mashhad)	American air-defence-depletion narrative plus the Leader's resistance message	HIGH: American-weakness amplification
Nobonyad	We crushed the superpowers	Conservative / principlist	Marja'-certified triumph and open nuclear-deterrence advocacy	HIGH: front-page atomic-deterrence advocacy
Sobh-e No	Emphasis on the MoU's first clause as a document of commitment to Hezbollah	Principlist (channel read)	Reframing the US understanding as a resistance-commitment document	MODERATE-HIGH: settlement recast as victory
Vatan-e Emrooz	Victory Report	Hardline / principlist (channel read)	Consolidated IRGC 'Victory Report' base-strike tally and energy coercion	HIGH: uncorroborated base-strike consolidation
Jomhuri Eslami	Mediators propose Iran control the Strait of Hormuz for security tolls	Traditional / establishment	Hormuz recast as a control-and-toll governance claim	MODERATE-HIGH: chokepoint-governance claim
Iran Daily (English)	FM spox: Progress made in Oman talks on Strait of Hormuz governance	State English daily (government)	Hormuz-governance diplomacy and international legitimacy messaging	MODERATE: governance diplomacy for the foreign audience
Ta'adol	The slow return of production after the war	Economic	Cautious recovery signal against a 'heaviest energy shock' warning	MODERATE: energy-shock coercion in an economic key
Chahar Sough	Don't take the blame	Economic / business	Inflation and liquidity blame dispute (Hemmati)	LOW-MODERATE: war's economic cost as domestic blame
Etemad	The domino of war	Reformist	Escalation-risk caution and the Ghalibaf-Trump spat	MODERATE: reformist counter-framing
Sazandegi	And now, Generation Alpha	Reformist (Kargozaran)	Youth-consumer social lead; war frame absent	LOW: war frame declined

Per-Paper Front-Page Analysis

Iran Daily (English)

State English-language daily (government), for an international readership

“FM MODERATE: Hormuz 'governance' diplomacy and civilian-infrastructure grievance for the international audience

spox: Progress made in Oman talks on Strait of Hormuz governance”



- Main: The lead, 'FM spox: Progress made in Oman talks on Strait of Hormuz governance,' presents Muscat-hosted talks on a 'governance' arrangement for the strait as advancing - the diplomatic face of the same Hormuz-control claim Jomhuri Eslami frames as a toll regime.
- Banner: A photo feature, 'UNESCO lists Alamut Castle as Iran's 30th World Heritage Site,' quotes the President that the recognition is 'indicative of the country's diverse history' - a soft-power counter-message for the foreign audience.
- Sub-item: 'Pezeshkian urges international action against US strikes on civilian infrastructure' - the government pressing a law-of-war grievance abroad rather than a battlefield-victory claim.
- Right rail: An 'Interview Exclusive' headlined 'Islamabad's policy: to de-escalate, not to enter the fray' presents Pakistan as a restraining regional actor, and a sports note on Iran's Asian Games squad.
- Op-ed: A featured analysis, 'Iran's possible military cooperation with Russia does not make it party to the Ukraine war,' rebuts Ukrainian accusations - the English-facing framing of the Caspian-vessel and Russia-cooperation thread.

ANALYST NOTE The state's English shop-window is markedly more diplomatic than the Persian hardline fronts: it leads on Hormuz 'governance' talks in Oman and a civilian-infrastructure grievance rather than base-strike victories, and uses the UNESCO listing and the Pakistan-restraint interview to project a lawful, statecraft-minded Iran to foreign readers. The Russia/Ukraine rebuttal shows the government managing a reputational liability the Persian fronts ignore. Significance: the audience-tuned gap between the English (governance, grievance, legitimacy) and Persian (jihad, victory, blockade) editions is itself a finding about who each register is meant to persuade.

"The

HIGH: American air-defence-collapse narrative plus Leader-endorsed resistance line in a mass-circulation title

Americans' defeat, this time in air defence» «شکست آمریکایی‌ها، این بار پدافند»



- Main: The lead converts a cluster of Western reports into an American air-defence-collapse story: it names 'the NYT, BBC, CNN, Axios, Reuters' as 'expressing concern about the war's expansion and the depletion of munitions stocks for intercepting Iranian missiles (کاهش ذخایر مهمات برای (رهگیری موشک‌های ایرانی), folding depleted Patriot interceptors into a claimed US defeat on defence.
- Sub-item: A second lead, 'jihad and resistance: the only way to confront America and the Zionist regime (جهاد و مقاومت؛ تنها راه مقابله با آمریکا و رژیم صهیونیستی)', reprints the Leader's (Mojtaba Khamenei) reply to Lebanese Hezbollah's fighters, subtitled 'defence of the oppressed and mighty mujahideen of Hezbollah Lebanon: the strategic policy of the Islamic Republic.'
- Banner: A held portrait dominates the crowd photo of a night-time resistance rally with Hezbollah and Iranian flags and raised victory signs.
- Kicker: Top-left culture strip, 'the camera should come back!' (دوربین برگرده), and a note on Alamut ('الموت، دیر که جهان رسید'), echoing the UNESCO listing carried elsewhere.
- Right rail: Page pointers to interior features (pp. 3, 6, 8) on missile-transfer/transformation and 'the power of choice.'

ANALYST NOTE Khorasan, a mass-market conservative title outside the hardline core, adopts both centrally-set lines at once: the American-weakness/air-defence narrative and the Leader-to-Hezbollah message. Its citation-by-name of five Western outlets is the amplification mechanism in the clear - a single reported hesitation over interceptor stocks rendered as a demonstrated US 'defeat.' That a Mashhad general-interest daily runs the identical Hezbollah-letter framing as Kayhan indicates the message discipline reached well beyond the ideological press. Continuity: extends the standing 'America blinked' thread from the prior edition, now sharpened to air defence specifically.

HIGH: Leader-endorsed jihad/resistance line fused with blockade-breaking advocacy and unverified base-strike claims

«راهی جز جهاد و مقاومت پیش رو نمانده است» "No path remains before us but jihad and resistance"



- Main: The banner reproduces the Leader's (Mojtaba Khamenei) reply to a letter from Lebanese Hezbollah's Secretary-General and fighters, headlined 'no path remains but jihad and resistance (جهاد و مقاومت)'; the deck frames 'defence of Lebanon's mujahideen as the strategic policy of the Islamic Republic' and casts the reply as a pledge that endures 'until the appearance of the Mahdi (تا ظهور منجی آل محمد).'
- Op-ed (Yadasht-e Rooz): 'Be careful the dagger of Shemr does not go blunt' (مراقب باشید خنجر شمر کم نشود) - a Safar/Karbala-coded editorial warning against blunting the resistance edge; a companion editorial argues 'the enemy's arms stockpile has run dry, it is time to break the naval blockade (ذخیره تسلیحاتی دشمن ته کشیده، وقت شکست محاصره دریایی است).'
- Sub-item: A center-page feature, 'the list of Iran's heavy damages inflicted on America in 15 days (فهرست خسارت‌های سنگین ایران به آمریکا در ۱۵ روز)', carries satellite-style images captioned as 'new images of damage to a US base' - the recurring, attacker-sourced multi-base strike claim.
- Banner: Top strip: 'Israel is bombing Lebanon while Lebanon's foreign minister is busy attacking Hezbollah! (اسرائیل در حال بمباران لبنان، وزیر اسراییل در حال حمله به حزب الله)' - a swipe at the Beirut government's line.
- Right rail: Domestic governance notes: the judiciary chief says he is 'aware of the plight of the homeless (کارتن خواب‌ها)', and 3,000 holders of 'rented' commercial trading cards were identified; a memorial was held for 'the martyred Leader of the Revolution (رهبر شهید انقلاب)' - the assassinated Ali Khamenei - with media managers present.

ANALYST NOTE Kayhan makes the Leader's Hezbollah letter the day's centrally-set line, and its own channel confirms the front page (Mordad 5, 1405) and carries the Massie/Murphy/NYT 'quagmire' material as second-hand Western corroboration of the American-weakness theme. The pairing of the succession-era Leader's direct voice with a 'break the naval blockade' editorial and the unverified 15-day base-damage list is the flagship's signature move: bind the new Leader's authority to the maximalist war frame. Tracking cue: whether the 'break the blockade' language migrates from editorial to attributed operational claim.

MODERATE-HIGH: succession-consolidation messaging; a foreign militia's bay'ah to the new Leader elevated to strategic doctrine

«فراتر از سیاست» *"Beyond politics"*



- Main: A full-page painted illustration of the Hezbollah emblem (the raised rifle over the party name) carved into a mountain under a blood-red sky, headlined 'beyond politics (فراتر از سیاست)'. The deck is the day's most explicit succession statement: 'a look at Lebanese Hezbollah's bay'ah (بیعت) to the third Leader of the Islamic Revolution and the reply of His Excellency Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei.'
- Op-ed: The lead editorial (سرمقاله) reads the bay'ah as a trans-political act of religious allegiance rather than a state-to-proxy transaction, hence the 'beyond politics' framing - Hezbollah's fealty presented as owed to the office of the Leader, now held by Mojtaba Khamenei.
- Banner: The masthead carries the khamenei.ir wordmark, marking the page as Leader's-office-aligned messaging rather than independent editorial.
- Sub-item: A martyr portrait (Shahid Mohammad-Mahdi ...) is boxed top-right, the standard revolutionary-press honorific frame.
- Kicker: The imagery is emblem-and-landscape, not caricature; no cartoon this issue.

ANALYST NOTE This is the single most significant page of the edition for succession-watch: it names Mojtaba Khamenei as 'the third Leader' and treats a foreign militia's bay'ah to him as a strategic milestone, precisely the direct Leader presence whose absence the prior edition logged as negative evidence. The 'beyond politics' gloss is doing ideological work: it launders a proxy relationship into sacralised allegiance and pre-empts the reading that Hezbollah is being instrumentalised. Tracking cue: whether other, less office-aligned titles reproduce the 'third Leader' formulation or hedge it - a read on how consolidated the succession narrative actually is.

"We crushed the

superpowers" «ابر قدرت‌ها را مجاله کردیم»

HIGH: front-page nuclear-deterrence advocacy plus marja'-certified triumph narrative



- Main: A large quotation lead, 'we crushed the superpowers (ابر قدرت‌ها را مجاله کردیم)', attributed to Grand Ayatollah Abdollah Javadi-Amoli's reading of 'the conquests of Islamic Iran in the two wars, the 12-day and the 40-day, of Ramadan' - clerical validation of the triumph narrative from a senior Qom marja'.
- Banner: Top strip reprints the Leader's line, 'defence of Hezbollah's mighty mujahideen: the strategic policy of the Islamic Republic,' naming 'His Excellency Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei' and invoking 'the martyred Ali Khamenei (شهید علی خامنه‌ای)', and setting 'Lebanon's territorial integrity and full Israeli withdrawal as the first condition of any ceasefire with the US.'
- Op-ed: 'War strengthens the advocates of atomic deterrence (جنگ، تقویت‌کننده حامیان بازدارندگی اتمی)' - an explicit nuclear-deterrence advocacy piece, arguing the conflict has vindicated those calling for a weapons option.
- Sub-item: Two clerical/veteran quotes flank the page - 'a popular slogan has no right to take charge of running the war (شعار مردم حق ندارد اداره جنگ را)' and 'the people's steadfastness changed every equation' (بر عهده بگیرد) - a call to keep war-management with the establishment.
- Right rail: 'America's oil reserves have reached the brink of catastrophe (ذخایر نفت آمریکا به مرز فاجعه رسید)' extending the US-weakness frame to strategic petroleum stocks.

ANALYST NOTE Nobonyad supplies the clerical and doctrinal scaffolding for the edition's themes: a marja' certifies the 'we crushed the superpowers' victory claim, while a front-page column openly argues the war has strengthened the case for atomic deterrence - the most escalatory editorial signal of the day and one worth flagging on its own. Coupled with 'a slogan has no right to run the war,' the page reads as an establishment effort to lock war-management authority against populist pressure. The nuclear-deterrence advocacy is a standing thread to track across editions for any shift from fringe op-ed to mainstream demand.

"Mediators propose Iran

MODERATE-HIGH: Hormuz leverage recast as a formal control-and-toll governance claim

control the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for security-provision tolls" «پیشنهاد میانجیگران برای کنترل تنگه هرمز توسط ایران با دریافت عوارض تأمین امنیت»



- Main: The lead reports a mediators' proposal that Iran formally 'control' the Strait of Hormuz and levy 'security-provision tolls (عوارض تأمین امنیت)' on transiting traffic - a move from denial/threat to a claimed governance-and-revenue role over the chokepoint.
- Sub-item: 'What were the Iran-India talks on the Strait of Hormuz?' - identifying India as a specific interlocutor on safe-passage arrangements.
- Op-ed: A senior clerical message, 'weakening unity or tearing down the system's servants is helping the enemy (تضعیف وحدت یا تخریب خدمتگزاران)' a discipline-and-unity appeal against internal criticism.
- Banner: Business/energy lead: 'gas output rises with the start of the South Pars pressure-boosting project,' and 'thermal power-plant capacity passes 79,000 MW' - a resilience counter-message on the energy front.
- Sub-item: Culture/heritage note that 'Alamut has been registered globally (UNESCO), plus a retrospective on Operation Mersad and a boxed remembrance of the martyred Ayatollah Beheshti.

ANALYST NOTE Jomhouri Eslami advances the day's most consequential diplomatic-coercive claim: a mediator proposal to convert Iran's chokepoint leverage into a formal control-and-toll regime over Hormuz, naming India among the interlocutors and dovetailing with Iran Daily's 'Oman talks progress' line. Read against the outlet's establishment position, the page argues Iran can institutionalise its Hormuz gains diplomatically rather than only through interdiction, while its unity editorial polices dissent. Continuity: escalates the standing Hormuz-as-coercion thread from closure-threat to governance claim - the sharpest new turn in that thread since it began.

«و اینک نسل آلفا» "And now, Generation Alpha"



- Main: A social-phenomenon lead, 'and now, Generation Alpha (و اینک نسل آلفا)', reports tens of thousands of teenagers converging on a single retail-outlet opening (an 'Irancotton' store) after a simple online invitation, asking 'how the new generation has bypassed institutions and reached the social networks (از نهادها عبور کرده و به شبکه‌های اجتماعی رسیده).'
- Banner: The dominant image is a vast youth crowd inside the store - a deliberately non-war front page on a day of resistance and war leads elsewhere.
- Op-ed: The day's column, 'a bloated culture (فریه‌شده فرهنگ)', reflects on consumer spectacle and generational drift.
- Right rail: Culture/lifestyle pointers (memoir-reading, obituary-style notes) rather than security content.
- Kicker: No war headline on the front; the political and military story is entirely displaced by a social-generational one.

ANALYST NOTE Sazandegi's choice to lead on a youth-consumer phenomenon rather than the Leader's Hezbollah message is itself the signal: on a day when the office-aligned press consolidates a war-and-succession narrative, a Kargozaran reformist title pointedly turns to society and generational change. The absence of the war frame is an editorial statement about audience and priorities, not a lapse - a marker of how far the reformist press will hold apart from the centrally-set line. Tracking cue: sustained war-avoidance on reformist fronts as a proxy for elite distance from the mobilisation narrative.

“Don't take the blame” «گردن نگیر»

LOW-MODERATE: war's economic cost as an inflation/liquidity blame dispute



- Main: A polemical lead, 'don't take the blame (گردن نگیر)', built around a full-page portrait of a shrugging official and the question 'is it everyone's business except Hemmati's?' (آیا به همه مربوط است به جز همتی؟), referencing Abdolnaser Hemmati and a dispute over who owns responsibility for inflation and the liquidity overhang.
- Sub-item: 'A defence of liquidity stagnation (دفاع از رکود نقدینگی)' - an argument that slowing money-supply growth, whatever its costs, is being unfairly blamed.
- Banner: A row of charts tracks the exchange rate, liquidity growth and price indices - the war's macro-economic footprint rendered as data rather than rhetoric.
- Sub-item: 'Inflation is not everyone's business (تورم بدن مربوط نیست)' - style framing over the charts, disputing diffuse blame for price rises.
- Right rail: A central-bank/monetary-authority angle on whether policymakers or structural factors drive the currency slide.

ANALYST NOTE Chahar Sough keeps the war's economic cost on the page in the technocratic register the triumphalist fronts avoid: a blame-attribution fight over inflation and liquidity, personalised around Hemmati, with exchange-rate and money-supply charts as evidence. Read against the day's dominant resistance narrative, the economic press functions as the standing counterweight - the war's toll priced in tomans and rials rather than declared in victories. Continuity: extends the recurring inflation/currency-pressure thread from the prior edition's economic titles.

"The slow return of production

MODERATE: energy-shock coercion framing alongside a cautious recovery signal

after the war" «بازگشت آرام تولید پس از جنگ»



- Main: 'The slow return of production after the war (بازگشت آرام تولید پس از جنگ)', subtitled 'the PMI shows autos moving against the direction of recession (شماره تولید ایران به سطح جهانی نزدیک می‌گردد)' - a cautious recovery signal from manufacturing indices.
- Banner: A stacked-oil-barrel graphic with a rising red arrow headlines 'the world on the threshold of its heaviest energy shock (جهان در آستانه سنگین‌ترین شوک انرژی)', with 'Ta'adol reports on the war's consequences for world energy' - Iran's chokepoint leverage read as a global price event.
- Op-ed: 'How is inflation to be reined in? (تورم چگونه مهار می‌شود?)' recurs as the standing macro question.
- Sub-item: 'The importance of developing relations with Africa (اهمیت توسعه روابط با آفریقا)' and a bourse note on markets 'at the political-and-currency crossroads' - the eastward/southern diversification theme in an economic key.
- Right rail: 'Naval blockade and the demand for growth (محاصره دریایی و مطالبه رشد)' ties the Bab al-Mandab/Hormuz disruption directly to Iran's own growth calculus.

ANALYST NOTE Ta'adol threads the needle the hardline fronts cannot: it acknowledges a tentative post-war production recovery while pricing the same chokepoint disruption the war fronts celebrate as a looming global energy shock that also constrains Iran's growth. The 'heaviest energy shock' framing converts the Yemen/Hormuz interdiction into a market-leverage story aimed at Western economies, but the recession and blockade sub-items keep the domestic cost in view. Continuity: sustains the economic press's dual role - amplifier of the energy-coercion narrative and ledger of its home-front price.

"The domino of war"

«دومینوی جنگ»

MODERATE: escalation-risk warning; reformist counter-framing to the triumph narrative



- Main: An analytic lead, 'the domino of war (دومینوی جنگ)', developed with analyst Afshin Zargar, warns that 'a broad conflict with Iran would drag in not only the region's Arab states but the whole Middle East and even beyond' - a cautionary, escalation-averse frame distinct from the hardline triumphalism.
- Sub-item: 'The Twitter duels of Ghalibaf and Trump (دوئل‌های توییتری قالیباف و ترامپ)' - the parliament speaker Mohammad-Baqer Ghalibaf and the US president trading barbs online, treated as spectacle rather than statecraft.
- Sub-item: 'The shifting of the conflict's frontiers (جابه‌جایی مرزهای درگیری)' analyses the incident involving an Iranian vessel in the Caspian Sea - continuity with the Caspian ship thread from the prior edition.
- Op-ed: 'Iran's development requires collaborative governance, not legal rent-seeking (توسعه ایران، حکمرانی همکار نه رانت حقوقی)' - a reformist governance critique.
- Right rail: Domestic strands: the housing market 'locked by price-setting,' and 'the challenges of Generation Z' between freedom and virtual space - the reformist social register.

ANALYST NOTE Etemad is the clearest counter-pole to the day's triumph narrative: where the hardline press reads the war as a series of Iranian victories, its lead warns of uncontrolled regional escalation and reduces the Ghalibaf-Trump exchange to online theatre. That a reformist title keeps the Caspian-vessel incident on the front page, when the hardline fronts ignore it, marks the intra-press divergence over which facts matter. Continuity: sustains the reformist-vs-hardline split documented across recent editions, here on the axis of escalation-risk versus victory.

MODERATE-HIGH: MoU reframed as a resistance-commitment document; adversary-sourced Hormuz-control claim

«تأکید بر بند اول "Emphasis on the MoU's first clause as a document of commitment to Hezbollah" تفاهم نامه به عنوان سند تعهد به حزب الله»

- Main: The lead reads the Leader's reply to Hezbollah's bay'ah as making 'preserving Lebanese territorial integrity and the complete removal of Israeli occupation the first clause (بند اول) of the [ceasefire] understanding with the US' - recasting the MoU as proof of continued commitment to the resistance rather than a concession.
- Op-ed: The paper counters domestic critics who called the understanding a capitulation, arguing it embedded resistance commitments into the text rather than trading them away.
- Sub-item: It cites an Israeli security institute's assessment that 'Iran now controls the rules of engagement in the Strait of Hormuz,' leaving the US to choose between protracted conflict and accepting Iranian dominance of the waterway - an adversary-sourced concession used to bolster the Hormuz-control claim.
- Sub-item: Lebanon is foregrounded as the test case of Iran integrating a partner's sovereignty into its own international agreements.
- Banner: The framing binds the succession event (bay'ah to the new Leader) to the live diplomacy (the MoU) and the chokepoint leverage (Hormuz) in one argument.

ANALYST NOTE Sobh-e No performs the edition's key act of narrative integration: it uses the Leader's Hezbollah reply to reinterpret the fragile US MoU as a resistance victory ('first clause = Lebanon and Israeli withdrawal') and pre-empts the 'capitulation' charge that hardliners like Nobonyad level at any settlement. Its citation of an Israeli institute to certify Iranian Hormuz dominance is a classic use of an adversary source as corroboration - to be flagged, not adopted. Continuity: directly engages the intra-regime diplomacy-versus-rejection split from the prior edition, arguing the settlement track and the resistance line are compatible. Read via channel; no kiosk scan this cycle.

"Victory

HIGH: consolidated but uncorroborated 'Victory Report' base-strike tally fused with the resistance line

Report" «گزارش نصر»

- Main: The channel's front-page lead, 'Victory Report (گزارش نصر),' compiles an IRGC-spokesman accounting of damage claimed from Iranian missile and drone strikes on US bases across the region - the recurring, attacker-sourced multi-base strike claim, presented as a consolidated tally.
- Sub-item: A Leader-to-Hezbollah item confirms 'defence of the Lebanese resistance as strategic policy' and sets 'Lebanese territorial integrity and full Israeli withdrawal as conditions for any ceasefire with the US.'
- Sub-item: An energy-coercion analysis argues threats to the Bab al-Mandab strait are choking Saudi oil exports and rippling into global prices, inflation and Western economies.
- Op-ed: Analytical pieces assert that after '150 days of conflict' US military operations have failed to achieve strategic objectives and that military superiority alone cannot decide the region.
- Banner: A Yemen item reports Ansarallah strikes on Aramco facilities at Jizan and Yanbu 'in response to Saudi airstrikes on al-Hudaydah.'

ANALYST NOTE Vatan-e Emrooz is the maximalist end of the day's spectrum: it packages the unverified base-strike claims into a single 'Victory Report' and fuses them with the Leader's Hezbollah line and the Bab al-Mandab energy-coercion story. The '150 days, no US objectives achieved' framing is the mirror image of the American-weakness thread carried elsewhere. Attribution firewall: the base-damage tally is an IRGC-spokesman claim uncorroborated on the state's own operational wires (which document only Yemeni operations) and must be treated as messaging. Read via channel; no kiosk scan this cycle.

Appendix A: The Leader's message to Lebanese Hezbollah (reconstructed from front-page reproductions)

Reply of the Leader (Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei) to a letter from Hezbollah's Secretary-General and fighters, as reproduced on the front pages of Kayhan, Khorasan, Nobonyad, Seda-ye Iran, Sobh-e No and Vatan-e Emrooz, Mon 5 Mordad 1405 / 12 Safar 1448 / 27 Jul 2026

Framing note: the following renders the message as reproduced across the day's front pages. The office-of-the-Leader website (khamenei.ir) could not be retrieved at compile time, so this is an editorial reconstruction from multiple secondary reproductions, not a verbatim primary-source translation; wording is consolidated where titles agree and no phrase is presented as a direct quotation unless it is carried identically across sources.

The reply, addressed to 'the Secretary-General and the fighters of Hezbollah of Lebanon,' opens by receiving their letter of allegiance and characterising the relationship as one of religious commitment rather than political convenience: the defence of 'the oppressed and mighty mujahideen' of the Lebanese resistance is presented as 'the strategic policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran,' not a contingent or negotiable one.

The message's central line, run as the banner on Kayhan and Khorasan, is that 'no path remains but jihad and resistance' in confronting the United States and 'the Zionist regime.' Resistance is framed as a standing obligation rather than a tactic of the moment, and, in the formulation carried by Kayhan, one that endures 'until the appearance of the Mahdi.'

On terms, the reproductions in Nobonyad, Sobh-e No and Vatan-e Emrooz attach two conditions to any ceasefire understanding with the United States: the preservation of Lebanon's territorial integrity and the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces. Sobh-e No renders these as 'the first clause' of the understanding, using the Leader's letter to argue that the fragile US memorandum embeds the resistance's demands rather than trading them away.

Analyst flag: this is the succession-era Leader's most prominent direct front-page presence in several editions and the first to be paired with a foreign militia's stated bay'ah (allegiance) to him as 'the third Leader.' Treat the conditions ('first clause,' full Israeli withdrawal) as the Iranian press's rendering of the message, to be confirmed against the office-of-the-Leader text when it becomes available; the honorifics ('His Excellency,' the invocation of 'the martyred Ali Khamenei') are reproduced as printed and are not endorsements.

Appendix B: Kayhan front-page editorial (Yadasht-e Rooz) - 'Be careful the dagger of Shemr does not go blunt'

Kayhan, front-page 'Yadasht-e Rooz' (institutional daily note; customarily unsigned; managing editor Hossein Shariatmadari), Mon 5 Mordad 1405 / 27 Jul 2026

Author-verification note: Kayhan's daily 'Yadasht-e Rooz' carries no personal byline on the scan and is treated as an institutional editorial; the paper's managing editor is Hossein Shariatmadari. The full body text was not legible at kiosk-scan resolution and the outlet's channel did not carry the complete note this cycle, so the following renders the note's argument from its printed headline and deck and from the companion front-page editorial line, and is a reconstruction rather than a verbatim translation.

The note's title invokes the Karbala imagery proper to the month of Safar: 'be careful the dagger of Shemr does not go blunt' casts vigilance against the enemy as a devotional duty, warning the domestic audience against any dulling of the resistance's edge, whether through war-weariness or talk of settlement.

Its companion front-page line makes the operational claim explicit: 'the enemy's arms stockpile has run dry; it is time to break the naval blockade.' The editorial reads the reported depletion of US and allied munitions (the same Western reporting Khorasan headlines as an American air-defence defeat) as an opening, and urges converting that claimed weakness into action against the maritime interdiction of regional shipping.

Analyst flag: the note is agitational, not evidentiary; its premise (that adversary stockpiles are exhausted) rests on Iranian amplification of Western press reports of caution, not on demonstrated fact, and its call to 'break the naval blockade' is advocacy rather than a report of any operation. It is documented here as a marker of hardline pressure to escalate at sea, to be tracked for any migration from editorial exhortation to attributed action.

Appendix C: Methodology and sourcing notes

iran-press-digest v2 pipeline

Sources: nine Persian front-page scans from the NewspaperTasnim kiosk album (Kayhan, Khorasan, Seda-ye Iran, Nobonyad, Jomhouri Eslami, Sazandegi, Chahar Sough, Ta'adol, Etemad) and one English print (Iran Daily), all carrying the printed date Monday 5 Mordad 1405; two further dailies (Vatan-e Emrooz, Sobh-e No) were read from their Telegram channels as no kiosk scan was available this cycle and are labelled channel-reads. Agency wires (Defa Press, Fars News, Nour News) were read for corroboration only and their content is treated as claims, not as front pages.

Freshness: the gather step's stale-batch guard confirmed the newest Persian kiosk album's own printed Jalali date (5 Mordad 1405) matched the target day, so the edition reflects genuinely current front pages rather than a carried-over batch.

Coverage gaps: the office-of-the-Leader website (khamenei.ir) and Tehran Times were unavailable at compile time, so the Leader's message in Appendix A is reconstructed from multiple front-page reproductions rather than from a primary text, and Tehran Times contributed nothing to this edition. Kayhan's full Yadasht-e Rooz body was not machine-readable at scan resolution; Appendix B is reconstructed from the headline, deck and companion line.

Attribution firewall: Iranian claims of strikes on US bases (Kayhan's '15-day damage list,' Vatan-e Emrooz's IRGC 'Victory Report') are attacker-sourced and remain uncorroborated on the state's own operational wires, which document only Yemeni (Ansarallah) operations against Saudi targets and Bab al-Mandab; the Pentagon-casualty figures attributed to CNN on Nour News, and the Massie/Murphy/NYT material on Kayhan's channel, are second-hand renderings and are not verified here. The Israeli-institute assessment of Iranian Hormuz control cited by Sobh-e No is an adversary-sourced claim used as corroboration and is flagged as such.

Succession evidence: the identification of the Leader as Mojtaba Khamenei rests on the printed text of the day's pages (Seda-ye Iran names 'the third Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei'; Nobonyad names 'Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei' and invokes 'the martyred Ali Khamenei'), consistent with the standing record that Ali Khamenei was assassinated on 28 February 2026.

Named-figure verification: Grand Ayatollah Abdollah Javadi-Amoli (Nobonyad), Speaker Mohammad-Baqer Ghalibaf (Etemad), Abdolnaser Hemmati (Chahar Sough) and analyst Afshin Zargar (Etemad) are named as printed; identities and roles were checked against the pages and general knowledge, and no quotation is attributed to a figure beyond what the source page carries.

Translation caveats: English headlines are editorial renderings of the Persian originals, which are retained in original script beside them; loaded register terms (jihad, bay'ah/allegiance, the Safar/Shemr imagery) are glossed inline where they carry the framing. This product documents and analyses hostile foreign-press rhetoric for defensive assessment only; nothing herein endorses, amplifies or operationalises it.

Open-source material only. All translations from Persian/Arabic originals. Iranian claims are labelled as claims. Prepared for analysis and early warning; hostile content is documented for defensive assessment only, not endorsed.