

OPEN-SOURCE PRESS INTELLIGENCE

Iranian Press Monitor

Daily Front-Page Intelligence

Day 141 - Wednesday, 22 July 2026 · 31 Tir 1405 · 7 Safar 1448

THE CEASEFIRE-WITHOUT-PEACE EDITION

Nine Persian front-page scans, one English print (Iran Daily) and the Kayhan channel, plus three agency wires; Tehran Times was unavailable at the time

Front pages published the morning of 22 July 2026, reflecting events through late 21 July local

Defensive open-source press-intelligence. Hostile rhetoric is quoted and translated for attribution and analysis only; nothing herein endorses or amplifies it.

Front page of Vatan-e Emrooz (وطن امروز) newspaper, dated Wednesday, 22 July 2026 (31 Tir 1405). The main headline reads: "خارج تدریجی" (Gradual Withdrawal), with a sub-headline: "فارس بالیسی: بحران تنگه هرمز می‌تواند آغاز فروپاشی نظم جهانی آمریکایی باشد" (Farsi Balisi: The Strait of Hormuz crisis could be the beginning of the collapse of the American world order). The page features a large grid of satellite images showing various locations, likely related to the Strait of Hormuz. Other headlines include "نفت نزولی سعودی" (Saudi oil prices falling), "شهر دار علیه جنایتکار" (City of the tyrant), "نسخه چهارم التهاب ارز" (Fourth version of currency inflation), and "بن بست ترامپ" (Trump's deadlock). The page also includes a section titled "نیایش اقتصاد اردن را هدف بگیرد" (Target Jordan's economy with prayer) and a small article about the "روزنامه‌نگاران" (Journalists).

Front page: Vatan-e Emrooz

Executive Summary

Day 141 is a ceasefire-without-peace edition: the single most consequential line is not a battle claim but a reported leadership boundary. Carried on the reformist Etemad and relayed by President Pezeshkian at an Industry-Day ceremony, the Leader (Mojtaba Khamenei) is said to have stressed that the objective is 'the end of the state of war, not peace.' The distinction is deliberate - a cessation of hostilities is permissible, reconciliation or normalization is not - and it functions as a ceiling on the very mediation track the government titles are promoting. It resolves the tension logged on Day 140, when mediators returned to the front pages: Tehran will pursue a truce, but the top has pre-defined it as something short of peace, insulating any deal from the 'surrender' charge at home while denying the West a normalization narrative.

Around that ceiling, the hardline press swings the frame back toward triumph and expulsion after a cycle spent recoding the diplomacy opening. Kayhan leads with 'after Iran's hard blow, America is fleeing the region to the occupied territories,' merging a claimed US drawdown from Arab host states with the Israel-as-final-redoubt motif; Vatan-e Emrooz runs 'Gradual Expulsion' over a before/after satellite grid asserting Trump's war of attrition has failed; Jam-e Jam claims precise missile-and-drone strikes that 'blinded' US radars and 'open the way for wider attacks'; and Javan theorizes a dual-chokepoint deterrent - Hormuz plus Bab al-Mandeb - under 'the exclusive power of the native straits.' The agency wires supply the operational branding: 'Operation Saaeqeh Phase 21' against a base in Kuwait and 'Operation Nasr 2, Wave 24' against a CENTCOM-linked data center in Bahrain. Every base-by-base target and casualty figure here is attacker-sourced, internally inconsistent (the Kuwait base is named 'Al-Doha' by Kayhan and 'Al-Dhafra' by Fars; casualty tallies diverge from a few confirmed deaths to a claimed 500-plus wounded), and is logged as claim, not fact.

The Strait of Hormuz, established cross-factionally as a red line on Day 140, hardens this cycle into an explicit operational demand. The economic title Chaharsu turns its front into a principlist manifesto: over a photograph of Mohammad-Javad Zarif it brands the 'Barjamiyoun' (JCPOA camp) prescription 'the surrender of Hormuz,' equates any Strait diplomacy with a repeat JCPOA capitulation ('what do we want Hormuz for = JCPOA 2'), and prints a standalone demand to 'keep the Strait closed for at least another 60 days.' This is the single most concrete escalation ask on any page and the sharpest naming of a domestic faction, rather than the foreign adversary, as the security risk. Sobh-e No and Javan extend the chokepoint logic outward, promoting the Yemeni Ansarullah naval blockade of Saudi shipping at Bab al-Mandeb to a second front billed as a 'winning card' capable of shaking the world economy.

The government and establishment bloc holds the off-ramp open but recasts it as pressure on America rather than Iranian concession. Jomhuri-ye Eslami leads on 'continuing global efforts to stop America's attacks and end the war' and files an Iranian complaint to the UN Security Council; the English Iran Daily shows Pakistan's prime minister (Shehbaz Sharif) calling for restraint and carries an interview sketching actual ceasefire mechanics - Persian Gulf coalition guarantees and a Qatar-linked temporary arrangement with a managed reopening of the Strait. The gap between that English-facing 'guaranteed, phased reopening' and Chaharsu's Persian-facing 'keep it closed 60 more days' is the negotiating space itself, addressed to two different audiences. A coordinated presidential message runs beneath all of it - carried nearly verbatim on Iran Daily, Ta'adol and Jomhuri-ye Eslami - that 'diplomacy will never fall short of the nation's rights,' paired with Pezeshkian's public rebuke of 'non-expert commentary' on the talks, an open push-back against the Kayhan-Chaharsu campaign against the negotiators.

Two domestic threads and one soft-power motif run beneath the war. A censorship episode becomes a genuine cross-title story: the blocking of the Football-360 site after broadcaster Adel Ferdosipour criticized the

national team leads the reformist Sazandegi ('silencing a voice'), forces the judiciary into a public denial on Etemad, and draws a 'criticism is not a red line' line from Sobh-e No - the state policing sports commentary while it manages a war narrative. The Minab school casualties from an earlier US strike on Iranian soil reopen on Jam-e Jam and the wires (further remains identified), anchoring the outbound strike claims to a domestic grievance and the revenge (خونخواهی) motif for the assassinated predecessor, which persists even on the reformist page via Elias Hazrati. And the 2026 World Cup continues as an anti-Israel symbol (Kayhan: Spanish fans trampling the Zionist flag) that Sazandegi alone declines, reading it as censorship rather than resistance victory.

Net assessment: this is a reassertion-and-ceiling edition, not a fresh-escalation one. The verifiable shift is directional rather than kinetic - the hardline frame reclaimed the top of the page after a cycle of diplomacy-first coverage, and the leadership publicly bounded the mediation track at a truce-without-peace. The battlefield claims outrun corroboration and contradict each other on both base names and casualties; the Yemen-Saudi blockade is kept visibly active as an escalation hedge; Hormuz has moved from red line to a concrete closure demand pitched against the government's own quiet talk of a guaranteed reopening; and Israel and Lebanon remain absent as active fronts, surfacing only as symbol and as the 'occupied territories' the US is said to be retreating into. The highest-significance finding is the ceiling itself: that the diplomatic opening is real enough to require the top to define, in advance, how far it may go.

BOTTOM LINE After a cycle in which mediators returned to the front pages, the hardline press swings back to a strike-triumph and 'gradual expulsion of America' frame and hardens the Strait of Hormuz into an explicit demand to keep it closed 60 more days, while the government keeps a ceasefire channel visibly alive (Pakistan as mediator, Gulf-coalition guarantees) under a leadership ceiling reported through Pezeshkian that defines the goal as ending the state of war but not peace, so the contest on the page has moved from whether to talk to how far a truce may go, with normalization ruled out from the top.

CRITICAL SOURCING NOTE Compiled from ten front-page scans (nine Persian titles from the NewspaperTasnim kiosk album for 31 Tir 1405 and one English print, Iran Daily, from Newspapers_Iran), each read by vision, plus the Kayhan channel (no scan this cycle) and cross-checks against the Defa Press, Fars News and Nour News wires. The stale-batch guard confirmed the album's printed date matches the target date. Tehran Times was unavailable at the time and is not cited. All strike, blockade and casualty claims are attacker-sourced and attributed as claims; they are internally inconsistent on base identity (Al-Doha vs Al-Dhafra for the Kuwait target) and on casualties (a claimed 500-plus wounded against smaller confirmed-death counts), so no single figure is reproduced as fact. The Vatan-e Emrooz before/after satellite grid is outlet-curated and logged as claim-with-illustration. The Hamas-succession item (Khalil al-Hayya) and the Yemeni interdiction figures are single-side claims pending confirmation. The Kayhan 'Yadasht-e Rooz' editorial by Hossein Shariatmadari did not surface in retrievable channel content this cycle, so no signed Kayhan editorial is asserted; the day's flagged editorial is the unsigned Chaharsu front. 'The Leader' denotes Mojtaba Khamenei; the assassinated Ali Khamenei is referenced only in the revenge motif. Named individuals were checked against the printed pages; the Pakistani premier is inferred from the Iran Daily photograph and caption.

Macro Trend Analysis

① The hardline frame reasserts triumph-and-expulsion over the diplomacy track

After a cycle in which the mediation track led the front pages, the hardline titles swing the frame back: Kayhan's 'America is fleeing the region to the occupied territories,' Vatan-e Emrooz's 'Gradual Expulsion' over a before/after strike grid, Jam-e Jam's radar-blinding missile claim, and Javan's 'native chokepoints' doctrine

together reclaim the top of the page for a strike-triumph and US-in-retreat narrative. The argument is no longer that talks reflect US weakness but that America is being physically expelled and driven back into Israel; treat every base-strike and expulsion claim as attacker-sourced.

② A leadership ceiling: end the war, but not peace

The cycle's defining new signal is a reported leadership boundary, relayed by Pezeshkian on Etemad: the goal is 'the end of the state of war, not peace.' It permits a ceasefire while withholding normalization, capping the mediation track from the top. The line resolves the elite tension over negotiation by pre-defining any deal as a truce short of reconciliation - insulating it from the 'surrender' charge at home and denying the West a normalization reading.

③ Hormuz hardens from red line to a closure demand

The cross-factional Hormuz red line of Day 140 sharpens into an operational demand. Chaharsu, over a photo of Zarif, brands Strait diplomacy 'the surrender of Hormuz,' equates it with a repeat JCPOA capitulation, and prints an explicit call to 'keep the Strait closed for at least another 60 days.' That Persian-facing demand sits directly against the English Iran Daily's talk of a guaranteed, phased reopening under Gulf-coalition guarantees - the gap between the two is the negotiating space, pitched to two different audiences.

④ The Yemen-Saudi blockade elevated to a second chokepoint front

The Ansarullah naval campaign against Saudi shipping at Bab al-Mandeb, a sidebar in the prior cycle, is promoted to a lead: Sobh-e No's 'Ansarullah's winning card' and Javan's dual-strait map fold Yemen into a two-lock grip on global energy passage. The resistance axis is kept visibly active precisely as the US-Iran track leans toward de-escalation, an escalation hedge; treat the blockade and its interdiction figures as attributed claims and watch whether the thread hardens or fades.

⑤ A coordinated presidential message disciplines the hardline critics

A near-verbatim line - 'the diplomatic apparatus will never fall short of the nation's rights,' paired with Pezeshkian's rebuke of 'non-expert commentary' on the talks - runs across Iran Daily, Ta'adol and Jomhuri-ye Eslami, indicating a centrally-set message rather than organic convergence. It marks an open intra-elite front: the presidency publicly pushing back on the Kayhan-Chaharsu campaign against the negotiators, at the same moment Chaharsu names Zarif and the JCPOA camp as the internal risk.

⑥ Domestic control surfaces as a cross-title censorship story

The blocking of the Football-360 site after Adel Ferdosipour criticized the national team becomes a multi-title thread: Sazandegi leads on it as 'silencing a voice,' the judiciary is forced to disown it on Etemad, and Sobh-e No insists 'criticism is not a red line.' The state policing sports commentary while it manages a war narrative is a genuine domestic-control signal; paired with the World Cup's use as an anti-Israel symbol, it shows the information space being actively curated on both the sports and the war fronts.

Key Judgments

KJ-1 [HIGH] A leadership ceiling has been set on the mediation track: end the state of war, but not peace. Relayed by President Pezeshkian at an Industry-Day ceremony and carried on Etemad, the Leader (Mojtaba Khamenei) is reported to have drawn the line between halting the fighting and 'peace,' i.e. reconciliation or normalization. Significance: this is the cycle's most consequential development because it pre-defines how far any deal may go - a truce is sanctioned from the top, a settled peace is not - which simultaneously protects the government from the domestic 'surrender' charge and forecloses a Western normalization narrative; that the boundary needed to be set publicly is itself evidence the diplomatic

opening is real. It is a relayed paraphrase, not a retrieved verbatim text, and is judged on the consistency of the front-page renderings rather than a primary source.

KJ-2 [HIGH] The hardline press has reasserted a strike-triumph and expulsion frame over the diplomacy-first coverage of the prior cycle. Kayhan ('America is fleeing to the occupied territories'), Vatan-e Emrooz ('Gradual Expulsion' with a before/after satellite grid), Jam-e Jam (radar-blinding missile strikes) and Javan (dual-chokepoint doctrine) together reclaim the top of the page. Significance: the swing is directional evidence of an ongoing message contest, not of new battlefield facts - the frame moved, the war did not visibly escalate - and the specific 'US driven back into Israel' construction keeps the axis-victory narrative alive as cover for a negotiation the same camp distrusts; read the reassertion as narrative management timed against the ceasefire track, and every base-strike claim as attacker-sourced.

KJ-3 [MODERATE-HIGH] The Strait of Hormuz has hardened from a cross-factional red line into an explicit operational demand to keep it closed. Chaharsu, an economic title, prints 'keep the Strait closed for at least another 60 days' and brands any Strait diplomacy 'the surrender of Hormuz,' naming Zarif and the 'Barjamiyoun.' Significance: this is the most concrete escalation ask on any front page and the sharpest identification of a domestic faction as the security risk, and it stands in direct tension with the government's own English-facing talk (Iran Daily) of a guaranteed, phased reopening under Gulf-coalition guarantees; the '60 more days' demand is the barometer to track for hardline pressure on the ceasefire, and the government-hardline gap over Hormuz is the clearest fault line in the elite.

KJ-4 [MODERATE] The Yemen-Saudi naval blockade has been promoted from sidebar to a second chokepoint front. Sobh-e No leads with 'Ansarullah's winning card' theorized as a world-economy lever, and Javan's map fuses Bab al-Mandeb with Hormuz into a single 'native straits' deterrent. Significance: the resistance axis is being kept visibly active precisely as the US-Iran track leans toward de-escalation, preserving escalation capacity on a front Tehran does not directly own; treat the blockade, the reported turning-back of Saudi vessels and any economic effects as attributed claims, and watch whether the thread sustains across cycles or fades as the Hormuz-and-diplomacy contest absorbs the coverage.

KJ-5 [MODERATE-HIGH] The strike campaign against US regional bases continues as attacker-sourced claim and is internally inconsistent on its own facts. The wires brand 'Operation Saaeqeh Phase 21' (a base in Kuwait) and 'Operation Nasr 2, Wave 24' (a CENTCOM-linked data center in Bahrain), while the Kuwait target is named 'Al-Doha' by Kayhan and 'Al-Dhafra' by Fars, and US casualty figures range from a few confirmed deaths to a claimed 500-plus wounded on Nour News. Significance: treat the continuing exchange as probable but every base identity and casualty tally as messaging to be confirmed outside this monitor; the unreconciled base names and casualty counts are themselves the caution against reproducing any single claim as fact, and the Vatan-e Emrooz before/after imagery is outlet-curated illustration, not confirmation.

KJ-6 [MODERATE] A coordinated presidential message is disciplining the hardline campaign against the negotiators. The near-verbatim line 'diplomacy will never fall short of the nation's rights,' with Pezeshkian's rebuke of 'non-expert commentary,' runs across Iran Daily, Ta'adol and Jomhuri-ye Eslami, while Chaharsu names Zarif and the JCPOA camp as the internal risk. Significance: this is an open intra-elite front over who controls the diplomacy narrative - the presidency publicly pushing back on the flagship's line at the same moment the flagship's allies escalate against the negotiators - and the coordination of the presidential

wording across three titles indicates a deliberate message rather than convergence; track whether the pushback holds or the hardline framing prevails as the mediation track develops.

KJ-7 [MODERATE] Negative-evidence judgment: Israel and Lebanon remain absent as active military fronts and surface only as symbol and as the 'occupied territories' the US is said to be retreating into. No monitored front page leads on an Israeli or Lebanese military development; Israel appears via the World Cup flag-trampling motif and via Kayhan's 'fleeing to the occupied territories' construction, and Gaza only through the attributed Hamas-succession item. Significance: the confrontation on the page has consolidated around the US-Iran contest, the Hormuz-and-Yemen chokepoints and the internal diplomacy fight; the continued Israel-Lebanon quiet should be logged as a finding in its own right, since a return to either would be a signal, and read against the ceasefire-ceiling lead rather than as evidence that either front has closed.

Named-Figure Tracker

Figure	Role / relevance	Today's framing	Flag
Mojtaba Khamenei	The Leader (successor to the assassinated Ali Khamenei)	Reported, via Pezeshkian, to have set the ceiling on the diplomatic track: 'end the state of war, not peace' - a truce without normalization.	WATCH
Masoud Pezeshkian	President	Relays the leadership ceiling, rebukes 'non-expert commentary' on the talks, and carries the coordinated line that diplomacy will never surrender the nation's rights.	COERCION SPOKESMAN
Donald Trump	US President	Cast as defeated and out of leverage: 'Trump's empty gun' (Vatan-e Emrooz), a failed war of attrition, and (per Sobh-e No) reduced to asking Iraq's premier to bring Iran to talks.	TARGET FRAMING
Mohammad-Javad Zarif	Former foreign minister; figurehead of the 'Barjamiyoun' (JCPOA camp)	Named and pictured on Chaharsu as author of a 'surrender of Hormuz' prescription; the cycle's designated internal-adversary.	TARGET FRAMING
Shehbaz Sharif	Prime Minister of Pakistan	Shown on Iran Daily calling for restraint from the warring sides and expanding trade with Tehran; positioned approvingly as a mediator.	NEW NAMED FIGURE
Adel Ferdosipour	Sports broadcaster	His criticism of the national team is tied to the blocking of the Football-360 site; Sazandegi frames it as 'silencing a voice,' the judiciary disowns it on Etemad.	NEW NAMED FIGURE
Elias Hazrati	Official cited on Etemad	Voices the revenge motif - 'we await [the revenge for] the blood of our martyred leader' - keeping the assassination grievance alive on the reformist page.	WATCH
Khalil al-Hayya	Reported Hamas figure	Carried on Javan as a reported successor development within Hamas; an attributed claim pending confirmation.	WATCH

Figure	Role / relevance	Today's framing	Flag
Hossein Shariatmadari	Kayhan managing editor	His 'Yadasht-e Rooz' editorial did not surface in retrievable Kayhan content this cycle; no signed Kayhan editorial is asserted.	absence noted
Ali Khamenei	Assassinated predecessor (28 Feb 2026)	Referenced only through the blood-revenge (خونخواهی) motif; his succession by Mojtaba remains a single-source-flagged standing fact.	absence noted

Headline Summary Table

Outlet	Lead Headline (English)	Orientation	Theme	Threat signal
Kayhan	After Iran's Hard Blow, America Is Fleeing the Region to the Occupied Territories	Hardline flagship (Leader's office / IRGC)	US expelled from the region and driven back into Israel; strike-triumph and legal subordination of the ceasefire	SEVERE: expulsion-and-victory framing, US-driven-into-Israel motif, attacker-sourced base claims
Vatan-e Emrooz	Gradual Expulsion	Hardline / principlist	Trump's attrition strategy 'failed'; before/after strike imagery; Hormuz as system-breaker	HIGH: expulsion thesis with before/after strike imagery, US-order-collapse framing
Jam-e Jam	The Devil's Eye Blinded	State broadcaster daily (IRIB)	Radar-blinding missile/drone claim 'opening the way for wider attacks'; distrust of any US withdrawal	HIGH: forward-looking strike-triumph claim, anti-negotiation inoculation, revenge framing
Javan	The Exclusive Power of the Native Chokepoints	Hardline (IRGC-affiliated)	Hormuz-plus-Bab-al-Mandeb deterrent doctrine; Arab bases 'evacuated under Iran's fire'	HIGH: dual-chokepoint deterrent doctrine, expulsion and radar claims
Chaharsu	The Barjamiyoun Prescription: Surrender of Hormuz	Economic, running a principlist front	Anti-JCPOA internal front; explicit demand to keep the Strait closed 60 more days	HIGH: names the negotiation camp as a security risk, demands 60 more days of Hormuz closure
Sobh-e No	Ansarullah's Winning Card	Principlist	Yemen naval blockade as a world-economy lever; mediation framed as US supplication; Bulgaria friction	HIGH: Yemen blockade elevated to lead, chokepoint doctrine, US-supplication framing
Iran Daily (English)	Pezeshkian Reaffirms Support for Production, Urges National Unity	State English daily (government)	Ceasefire needs Gulf-coalition guarantees; Pakistan as mediator; legal deterrence; 'diplomacy won't concede rights'	MODERATE: outward-facing ceasefire mechanics, mediator-friendly framing

Outlet	Lead Headline (English)	Orientation	Theme	Threat signal
Jomhuri-ye Eslami	Continuing Global Efforts to Halt America's Attacks and End the War	Traditional / establishment	International effort to end the war; UN complaint; presidential discipline of hardline critics	LOW-MODERATE: establishment pro-diplomacy line, presidential pushback, UN legal track
Etemad	Licenses Ready for Women Motorcyclists	Reformist	Leader's 'end the war, not peace' ceiling (top banner); domestic normalization; war's industrial cost; censorship	MODERATE-HIGH: Leader's ceasefire-not-peace ceiling on talks; censorship thread; revenge motif
Sazandegi	Silencing a Voice	Reformist (Kargozaran)	Football-360/Ferdosipour censorship; war's costs; skepticism of the triumph frame	LOW-MODERATE: domestic censorship signal, dissent from the triumph narrative
Ta'adol	Mistaken Readings of Industry	Economic	Industrial-policy critique; world-market liquidity; coordinated 'diplomacy won't surrender rights' line	LOW: economy-first framing, coordinated presidential message, livelihood stress

Per-Paper Front-Page Analysis

Iran Daily

State-run English-language daily (government)

"Pezeshkian

MODERATE: outward-facing ceasefire mechanics, mediator-friendly framing, legal-deterrence track

Reaffirms Support for Production, Urges National Unity" Iran's diplomacy will never compromise on»
«nation's rights



- Main (top): 'Pezeshkian reaffirms support for production, urges national unity,' strapline 'Iran's diplomacy will never compromise on nation's rights' - the English-facing government line pairs an economy-and-unity message with a firm-but-open diplomatic posture aimed at foreign readers.
- Lead photo/story: 'Pakistan PM calls for restraint from warring sides in region,' captioned 'Tehran focused on expanding cross-border trade with Islamabad' - Pakistan's prime minister (Shehbaz Sharif) shown meeting Iranian officials, positioning Islamabad as a restraining mediator and a trade partner, the government's preferred image of regional diplomacy.
- Interview (exclusive): 'Iran-US ceasefire deal to need Persian Gulf coalition guarantees' - an analyst interview argues any ceasefire would require a Persian Gulf coalition of guarantors and discusses a Qatar-linked proposal for a temporary arrangement and the reopening of the Strait, the most concrete English-language sketch of ceasefire mechanics this cycle.
- Sub-item: 'Iran to establish legal deterrence on global stage' - the government's stated drive to prosecute US and Israeli 'war crimes,' the legal-warfare track that appears in Persian on Jomhuri-ye Eslami and Jam-e Jam.
- Sub-item: 'Government incentives spur new wave of tourism investment in Iran' and a Kowkhaban tourism-potential item - normalization-and-continuity signaling for an international audience, business-as-usual beneath the war.
- Right rail: conference and business briefs, including a 2026 Chambers Review Europe note - the English daily maintaining an investment-and-institutions face outward.

ANALYST NOTE Iran Daily is the government's outward-facing instrument, and this cycle it does two things the Persian hardline pages will not: it names a mediator approvingly (Pakistan's Shehbaz Sharif as a voice for restraint) and it sketches actual ceasefire architecture (Persian Gulf coalition guarantees, a Qatar-linked temporary arrangement, a managed reopening of Hormuz). That last point is the analytically important divergence: while Chaharsu demands Hormuz stay closed 60 more days, the English state daily is floating a guaranteed, phased reopening - the two are addressing different audiences with incompatible asks, and the gap between them is the negotiating space. The 'legal deterrence' and tourism items keep the government's dual message intact: firm on rights, open to an exit, functioning at home.



- Main: A strike-triumph banner - 'Iran's precise missile and drone operations against American radars open the way for wider attacks on enemy positions in the region.' The 'blinded eye' (چشم ... کور) trope casts US surveillance and radar assets as the target and frames their destruction as clearing the path for further escalation, an attacker-sourced claim presented as accomplished fact.
- Sub-item: 'Gasoline options on the government's table' (گزینه‌های بنزینی روی میز دولت) - the rationing-and-price question kept in play as a home-front economic pressure point, continuing the prior cycle's fuel-reassurance thread.
- Sub-item: 'The Minab wound reopened' (داغ میناب تازه شد) - a return to the Minab school casualties from an earlier US strike on Iranian soil, the mirror-image of the outbound strike claims and a grievance-and-revenge anchor.
- Op-ed: 'Project to whitewash America' (پروژه تطهیر آمریکا) - warns against domestic voices said to be 'cleansing' the US image, the flagship's inoculation line against the negotiation track.
- Sub-item: 'Theatrical withdrawal' (عقب‌نشینی نمایشی, top strip) and 'We know the bloodthirsty opposition well' (اپوزیسیون خونخوار را به خوبی می‌شناسیم) - twin warnings against reading any US pullback as genuine and against exile-opposition exploitation.
- Right rail: soft items - a 60-episode 'Salman Farsi' TV serial 'ready to air,' 'women's motorcycle license closer to issuance,' and 'Spain showed football belongs to the young,' the state broadcaster's normalization-and-morale register running beneath the war banner.

ANALYST NOTE Jam-e Jam, as the broadcaster's paper, delivers the official strike-triumph line in its purest form: the missile-and-drone claim is stated as fact and explicitly forward-looking ('opens the way for wider attacks'), which is the escalation signal to log. Its 'whitewashing America' and 'theatrical withdrawal' items show the state media hedging the same ceasefire opening the government titles promote: keep the victory frame, distrust the pullback. The Minab callback ties the outbound claims to a domestic-casualty grievance, sustaining the revenge (خونخواهی) logic across editions.

"The Exclusive Power

HIGH: dual-chokepoint deterrent doctrine, expulsion claims, base-strike and radar claims

of the Native Chokepoints" «قدرت انحصاری تنگه‌های بومی»



- Main: A full-page regional map with two pinned chokepoints frames a dual-strait doctrine - 'the exclusive/monopoly power of the native straits' (قدرت انحصاری تنگه‌های بومی): the Strait of Hormuz to the east and Bab al-Mandeb to the southwest are presented as instruments of leverage that only the resistance axis controls, casting geography itself as a deterrent asset.
- Sub-item (Hormuz pin): a slogan to the effect that 'if we take the mouth of Hormuz, America does not go along' - closure of Hormuz posited as the move Washington cannot counter.
- Sub-item (Bab al-Mandeb pin): a Yemeni turning-back of Saudi vessels at Bab al-Mandeb 'with a warning,' linking the Ansarullah maritime campaign to the same chokepoint-sovereignty logic.
- Banner (lower): 'Evacuation of Arab bases under Iran's fire' (تخلیه پایگاه‌های عربی زیر آتش ایران) - the expulsion-from-the-region theme rendered as Arab host states clearing US installations, an attacker-sourced claim.
- Sub-item: 'Shooting at America's eye and shield' (تسلیم به چشم و سپر آمریکا) - claimed strikes on US radar (the 'eye') and missile-defense (the 'shield'), converging with Jam-e Jam's radar-blinding motif.
- Op-ed / right column: 'The resistance world welcomes Hamas's [reported] naming of Khalil al-Hayya' and a Pezeshkian line on steering the country through current conditions; a deterrent register runs throughout.

ANALYST NOTE Javan is the clearest articulation of the day's chokepoint-sovereignty doctrine: it fuses Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb into a single 'native straits' deterrent and pairs it with the 'Arab bases evacuated under fire' expulsion claim. Analytically this is the IRGC-aligned paper doing the theoretical work the others assert in slogans: geography plus the Yemeni front equals a two-lock grip on global energy passage. The Hamas-succession item (Khalil al-Hayya) recurs from the prior cycle and remains an attributed claim pending confirmation. Read Javan as the escalation-doctrine anchor of the edition against Iran Daily's ceasefire-guarantees track.

«Gradual Expulsion» «اخراج تدريجي»

HIGH: expulsion thesis with before/after strike imagery, US-order-collapse framing

تدریجی»



- Main: 'Gradual Expulsion' (اخراج تدريجي) over a grid of before/after (قبل/بعد) satellite images of struck installations - 'experts say Iran's attacks on US bases and the widespread destruction of America's military facilities in the region show that Trump's strategy of a war of attrition against Iran has failed.' The before/after imagery is offered as documentary proof of the strike claims; treat the satellite pairs as outlet-presented, not independently verified.
- Banner: 'Trump's empty gun' (تفنگ خالی ترامپ, top left) - the personalized decline motif, casting Trump as out of leverage.
- Sub-item: quoting Foreign Policy - 'the Strait of Hormuz crisis could be the beginning of the collapse of the American-led world order.' A second-hand Western-source citation used as borrowed authority; the attribution firewall applies (quoting a rendering does not verify the original framing).
- Right rail: 'Saudi oil declining' (نفت نزولی سعودی) and 'a prescription to contain currency turmoil' (نسخه مهار التهاب ارز) - pairing an adversary's oil weakness with Iran's own currency-management problem.
- Sub-item: 'Mayor against the criminal' (شهردار علیه جنایتکار) and 'Twenty Trumpian' (بیست ترامپی) - local and satirical items sustaining the anti-Trump register.
- Kicker: 'Let the pulse of the economy be taken from within' (bottom analysis) - a home-front economic-resilience line beneath the strike-triumph banner.

ANALYST NOTE Vatan-e Emrooz gives the edition its dominant verb - 'expulsion' - and its evidentiary centerpiece, the before/after satellite grid, which is the day's most aggressive attempt to move the base-strike claims from assertion toward documentation. The analytic caution is precisely that: the imagery is outlet-curated and uncaptioned as to provenance, so it should be logged as claim-with-illustration, not confirmation. The Foreign Policy citation is the recurring hardline technique of importing a Western byline to authorize the 'collapsing US order' thesis. Its Hormuz framing dovetails with Javan and Chaharsu into the cross-title chokepoint wall.



- Main: 'Ansarullah's winning card' (برگ برنده انصارالله) over 'How can Yemen shake the world economy?' (جگونه یمن می تواند اقتصاد جهان را به لرزه درآورد؟), with a photo of an armed Yemeni fighter beside a cargo ship - the Yemeni maritime campaign presented as a global-economic lever complementary to Hormuz.
- Sub-item: the body claims Yemen's naval forces blocked the passage of Saudi vessels through Bab al-Mandeb (reported as six ships turned back 'with a warning'), promoting a declared Yemeni blockade of Saudi Arabia to a live second front; treat the interdiction figures as attributed claims.
- Banner (top): 'Iran's warning to Bulgaria' (هشدار ایران به بلغارستان) - the Foreign Ministry is said to have summoned Bulgaria's charge d'affaires over Sofia's handling of a US request touching Iran, a rare European-bilateral friction item.
- Sub-item: 'Trump asked Iraq's prime minister to persuade Iran to negotiate' (ترامپ از نخست وزیر عراق خواسته ایران را به مذاکره راضی کند) and 'Al-Zaidi's mission in Tehran?' (ماموریت الزیدی در تهران؟) - the mediation track surfaced as an American initiative routed through Baghdad, framed as US supplication rather than Iranian interest.
- Op-ed: 'The understanding was opportunity-creating, not a sign of trust' (تفاهم فرصت ساز بود نه نشانه اعتماد), attributed to a statement of the Isargaran (Devotees) Society - a principlist gloss policing how the ceasefire understanding may be read at home.
- Sub-item: 'Criticizing the national team is not a red line' (انتقاد از تیم ملی خط قرمز نیست) - a nod to the Football-360/Ferdosipour censorship controversy running elsewhere in the edition.

ANALYST NOTE Sobh-e No is the day's Yemen-front anchor: it elevates the Ansarullah blockade of Saudi shipping from sidebar (its status in the prior cycle) to lead, explicitly theorized as a world-economy lever that pairs with Hormuz. That is the trend to watch - the resistance axis keeping a second chokepoint visibly active precisely as the US-Iran track leans toward de-escalation. Its own diplomacy items (Trump via Baghdad, the Isargaran statement) frame any opening as American-initiated and trust-free, the principlist counterpart to the government titles' 'mediators return.' The Bulgaria summons is a genuinely new bilateral thread; note and track.

"The Barjamiyoun

HIGH: names the negotiation camp as a security risk, demands 60 more days of Hormuz closure

Prescription: Surrender of Hormuz" «نسخه برجامیون: تسلیم هرمز»



- Main: A photo of Mohammad-Javad Zarif anchors an attack on the 'Barjamiyoun' (برجامیون, the JCPOA camp): their 'prescription' is cast as 'surrender of Hormuz' (تسلیم هرمز), the argument being that the reformist current would trade away the Strait's leverage as it once traded away enrichment - the day's sharpest naming of a domestic faction as a security risk.
- Banner (top): a paired formula - 'What do we want enrichment for? = JCPOA 1 / What do we want the Strait of Hormuz for? = JCPOA 2' (غنی سازی می خواهیم چه کار = برجام ۱ / تنگه هرمز را می خواهیم چه کار = برجام ۲) - equating any Hormuz diplomacy with a repeat capitulation.
- Sub-item: economic bullets marshalled as leverage - 'Trump's war raised the cost of shipping oil through Hormuz,' 'closing Hormuz threw the global aluminium market into trouble,' 'rising Hormuz tension lifts the world energy index,' and 'vessels do not dare transit the strait' - the chokepoint's disruptive power presented as proof of Iranian control.
- Sub-item: 'Resistance and market pressure force America to accept an Iranian order in the strait' (مقاومت و فشار بازار آمریکا را به پذیرش نظم ایرانی) - the economic-coercion thesis stated outright.
- Kicker (bottom): 'Keep the strait closed for at least another 60 days' (حداقل ۶۰ روز دیگر تنگه را بسته نگه دارید) - an explicit call for sustained closure, the most operational demand on any front page today.
- Right rail: Zarif addressed directly ('Mr. Zarif, a repeat of pure loss...'), personalizing the anti-negotiation argument.

ANALYST NOTE Chaharsu is the analytic surprise of the edition: an economic title turning its front into a principlist manifesto that (a) names Zarif and the JCPOA camp as the internal adversary and (b) makes the boldest operational demand on any page - keep Hormuz closed 60 more days. This is the internal-front counterpart to Kayhan's external one, and it sharpens Day 140's cross-factional Hormuz red line into an explicit intra-elite accusation: negotiators who touch Hormuz are surrendering. The '60 more days' call is the single most concrete escalation ask in the cycle and should be tracked as a barometer of hardline pressure on the ceasefire track.



- Main: 'Silencing a voice!' (حذف یک صدا) over a portrait of sports broadcaster Adel Ferdosipour - 'Ferdosipour's criticism of Iran's national football team led to the blocking of the Football-360 site; Sazandegi examines the matter.' The reformist paper turns a sports-media shutdown into a press-freedom and censorship story, the mirror-opposite of the principlist titles' World-Cup triumphalism.
- Banner (top): 'China's and Russia's benefit from the Iran-US war' (بهره چین (و روسیه از جنگ ایران و آمریکا) - a great-power-cost reading absent from the hardline pages, implying the war serves Beijing and Moscow rather than Tehran.
- Sub-item: 'Why did the negotiations fall apart?' (چرا مذاکرات کنار آمد؟) - the reformist paper alone asking the failure question directly rather than celebrating or recoding the diplomatic track.
- Sub-item: 'The grudge of a generation' (بغض یک نسل, left column) - a domestic-mood essay reading public frustration, a register the war-triumph pages exclude.
- Right rail: 'The big loser of the World Cup' and a 'complex of war's end' item - deflating the resistance-victory allegory the principlist titles built around the final.
- Sub-item: the Ferdosipour/Football-360 episode is cross-referenced by Etemad (judiciary denial) and Sobh-e No ('criticism is not a red line'), making media censorship a genuine cross-title thread this cycle.

ANALYST NOTE Sazandegi is again the edition's dissenting voice, and this cycle it declines two dominant frames at once: it reads the World Cup as censorship-and-control rather than resistance victory, and it foregrounds the war's costs (great-power free-riding, a frustrated generation, collapsed talks) where the hardline pages see only triumph. The Ferdosipour/Football-360 shutdown becoming a multi-title story - even the judiciary is forced to deny involvement in Etemad - is a real domestic-control signal worth logging: the state is policing sports commentary at the same moment it manages a war narrative. Read Sazandegi as the barometer of reformist skepticism toward both the strike-triumph and the mediation-supplication frames.

«تلاش‌های ادامه‌دار جهانی "Continuing Global Efforts to Halt America's Attacks on Iran and End the War" برای توقف حملات آمریکا علیه ایران و پایان جنگ»



- Main: The establishment lead keeps the diplomacy track at the top - 'continuing global efforts to stop America's attacks on Iran and end the war' - framing the mediation not as an Iranian concession but as an international movement to halt US aggression, the establishment counterweight to the hardline expulsion banners.
- Sub-item: 'Iran's letter to the Security Council over the American aggression against a nuclear power plant' (به نامه ایران به شورای امنیت در مورد تجاوز ... به) - the legal-diplomatic track, complaining of US strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure to the UN, aligning with Iran Daily's 'legal deterrence' theme.
- Sub-item: 'Dr. Pezeshkian criticizes improper and non-expert commentary about the negotiations' (انتقاد دکتر پزشکیان از اظهارنظرهای ناروا و) - the president publicly rebuking (unnamed) hardline sniping at the diplomatic track, an intra-elite discipline signal.
- Sub-item: 'A human chain on the Persian Gulf coast in defense of Iran' (تشکیل زنجیره انسانی در ساحل خلیج فارس به دفاع از ایران) - a staged mobilization image tying Gulf-sovereignty sentiment to national unity.
- Sub-item (economy): '203 trillion tomans of tax collected this spring' and a housing-project opening in Borazjan - the government's continuity-and-competence register.
- Kicker: a commemorative panel for 'the oppressed martyr Ayatollah Beheshti,' the establishment's historical-legitimacy motif.

ANALYST NOTE Jomhuri-ye Eslami is the clearest establishment endorsement of the off-ramp: it leads on ending the war and routes the effort through international pressure and the UN rather than bilateral talks, insulating the government from the 'surrender' charge the hardline titles level. The reported Pezeshkian rebuke of 'non-expert commentary' is the notable intra-elite signal - the presidency openly pushing back on the Kayhan/Chaharsu campaign against negotiators - and it recurs on Ta'adol and Etemad, indicating a coordinated presidential message this cycle. Read against Chaharsu's Zarif attack, the two mark the open front line inside the elite over who controls the diplomacy narrative.

"Mistaken Readings of Industry"

LOW: economy-first framing, coordinated presidential message, livelihood-stress items

«برداشت‌های نادرست از صنعت»



- Main: 'Mistaken readings of industry' (برداشت‌های نادرست از صنعت) - 'industry activists say the producers pay the cost of policy-making errors,' a domestic industrial-policy critique that keeps the war off the lead and the economy at the center.
- Sub-item: over a photo of the New York Stock Exchange, 'the rotation of liquidity in the world's stock markets' (چرخش نقدینگی در بورس‌های دنیا) - a global-markets read that, unusually, looks outward at capital flows rather than at strike claims.
- Banner (top): the presidential line carried across the economic titles - 'the president criticizes non-expert commentary in the negotiations' and 'the diplomatic apparatus will never fall short of the Iranian nation's rights' (دستگاه دیپلماسی هرگز از حقوق ملت ایران کوتاه نخواهد آمد), echoing Iran Daily's English rendering almost verbatim.
- Sub-item: 'The sun caught in the twists of currency allocation' (خورشید در پیچ) - a foreign-exchange-allocation bottleneck story, the recurring hard-currency-scarcity thread.
- Sub-item: '90,000 kilometers of Iran's poultry [supply] at risk' (هزار کیلومتر ۹۰) (مرغ ایران در معرض خطر) - a food-supply-chain warning, keeping livelihood stress visible.
- Kicker: an SMS reader-line promotion, the paper's routine engagement footer.

ANALYST NOTE Ta'adol continues the economic titles' role as the vehicle for the government's economy-first framing of the war, and it carries the same coordinated presidential message - diplomacy will never surrender the nation's rights - that appears on Jomhuri-ye Eslami, Etemad and Iran Daily, confirming a centrally-set line rather than organic convergence. Its outward look at world stock-market liquidity is a subtle counter to the hardline 'collapsing US order' thesis: the economic press reads global capital as functioning, not fracturing. The poultry and currency-allocation items keep the domestic cost of the confrontation on the page, the quiet ballast beneath the triumph banners elsewhere.

Ready for Women Motorcyclists" «گواهینامه‌های آماده برای زنان موتورسوار»



- Banner (top, the edition's key nuance): 'The Leadership's emphasis: ending the state of war, not peace' (نه صلح، نه وضعیت جنگ، تاکید رهبری بر پایان وضعیت جنگ)، relayed by President Pezeshkian at an Industry-Day ceremony - the Leader (Mojtaba Khamenei) is reported to draw a sharp line between halting the fighting and 'peace,' i.e. a ceasefire without normalization or reconciliation with the adversary.
- Main: 'Licenses ready for women motorcyclists' (گواهینامه‌های آماده برای زنان) - 'finally realized with the government's follow-up,' a domestic social-liberalization lead the reformist paper foregrounds over the war banners, signaling normalization and government deliverables.
- Sub-item: 'The day of firing at the heart of Khuzestan Steel' (روز شلیک به قلب فولاد خوزستان) - an Etemad reporter's dispatch from the Ahvaz steelworks on a US strike's industrial toll, the reformist paper documenting the war's cost to the production base rather than trading in battle-damage claims.
- Sub-item: 'Judiciary: the blocking of Adel's site has nothing to do with us' (قوه قضایه: مسدود شدن سایت عادل ربطی به ما ندارد) - the judiciary forced to publicly disown the Football-360/Ferdosipour shutdown, corroborating the censorship thread Sazandegi leads on.
- Sub-item: 'The challenges of negotiation' (چالش‌های مذاکره) and 'the last winning card of the doves/managers' - the reformist read that treats the diplomatic track as difficult and contested, not a triumphal recoding.
- Right rail: 'We await [the revenge for] the blood of our martyred leader' (منتظر خون رهبر شهیدمان هستیم), attributed to Elias Hazrati - the revenge (خونخواهی) motif for the assassinated predecessor persisting even on the reformist page.

ANALYST NOTE Etemad carries the edition's single most consequential diplomatic nuance: the Leader's reported ending-the-war-but-not-peace formula, which sets the ceiling on the mediation track - Tehran may accept a cessation of hostilities but is being told from the top that this is not reconciliation, foreclosing the 'surrender/normalization' reading the hardliners fear and the West might hope for. That the reformist paper both platforms this line and leads on women's motorcycle licenses shows the government-reformist bloc pairing a strategic red line with domestic-deliverable normalization. The judiciary's public disavowal of the Ferdosipour shutdown confirms the censorship episode as a real intra-state embarrassment. The Hazrati revenge line is the reminder that the assassination grievance still frames even reformist coverage.

Kayhan

Hardline flagship, close to the Supreme Leader's office and the IRGC; managing editor Hossein Shariatmadari

"After

SEVERE: expulsion-and-victory framing, US-driven-into-Israel motif, attacker-sourced base-strike claims

Iran's Hard Blow, America Is Fleeing the Region to the Occupied Territories، «پس از سیلی سخت ایران، آمریکا در حال فرار از منطقه به سرزمین‌های اشغالی است»

- Main: The lead recodes the war as an American rout: after Iran's 'hard blow' (سیلی سخت), the United States is said to be withdrawing its forces out of Arab host states and consolidating into the 'occupied territories' (سرزمین‌های اشغالی), i.e. Israel, folding a claimed US retreat into the axis framing that Washington and Tel Aviv are one target set.
- Sub-item: 'Jordanian political and national figures demand the withdrawal of all foreign forces and cancellation of security and military agreements with the US' - the expulsion narrative extended to a host government's domestic politics, presented as evidence the regional basing structure is unraveling.
- Sub-item: 'Operation Saaqeh, 21st phase': the Army (Artesh) claims a drone strike on the Al-Doha base in western Kuwait, described as a US ground-forces ammunition-and-logistics command center - an attacker-sourced battle-damage claim carried without independent confirmation.
- Sub-item: US Senate hearing framed as an admission of failure: senators are quoted telling Trump's defense secretary 'you have failed' on Iran, imported as borrowed proof of American strategic collapse.
- Right rail: World Cup as anti-Israel symbol - 'Spanish fans trampled the Zionist flag' during the championship celebrations, with 'Zionist entities' said to be angered; Brent crude reported at \$92.50 as evidence the confrontation is pricing into oil.
- Kicker: Orange-level flood warnings for northern and central provinces (domestic weather), the one non-war item on an otherwise war-saturated page.

ANALYST NOTE Kayhan supplies the edition's most maximalist frame: not merely that talks reflect US weakness (yesterday's 'deception of negotiation' line) but that America is being physically expelled from the region and driven back into Israel. The 'fleeing to the occupied territories' construction is the analytically notable move: it merges a claimed US drawdown with the Israel-as-final-redoubt narrative, keeping the war's momentum framing alive even as other titles foreground a ceasefire track. The Al-Doha/Kuwait strike claim is attacker-sourced and, notably, names a different base than the Fars rendering (Al-Dhafra), a single-side inconsistency to flag, not adopt.

Appendix A - The Leader's lead message: 'Ending the state of war, not peace'

Reported via President Masoud Pezeshkian at an Industry-Day ceremony; carried on the Etemad front page (31 Tir 1405) and echoed across Ta'adol and Jomhuri-ye Eslami

The most-cited leadership line of the cycle is not a published text but a relayed emphasis: the Leader (Mojtaba Khamenei) is reported, through remarks President Pezeshkian delivered at an Industry-Day ceremony, to have stressed that the objective is 'the end of the state of war, not peace' (پایان وضعیت جنگ، نه صلح). The distinction is deliberate and load-bearing: it accepts, in principle, a cessation of hostilities while withholding 'peace' in the sense of reconciliation, normalization, or a settled accommodation with the United States and Israel.

Read against the front pages, the formula functions as a ceiling on the mediation track that the government and establishment titles are promoting. It lets Tehran pursue a ceasefire without conceding the ideological posture the hardline press polices: a truce is permissible, a peace is not. This forecloses both the 'surrender' reading the hardliners fear (Chaharsu's 'surrender of Hormuz' attack on the negotiators) and the normalization reading a Western audience might infer from Iran Daily's ceasefire-mechanics interview.

Alongside this, President Pezeshkian is reported on the same pages to have criticized 'improper and non-expert commentary' about the negotiations and to have insisted that 'the diplomatic apparatus will never fall short of the Iranian nation's rights.' Taken together, the leadership ceiling and the presidential floor define the cycle's official diplomatic posture: negotiate to end the fighting, do not call it peace, and do not concede the nation's rights.

Analyst flag: this is a relayed and paraphrased message, not a verbatim published statement retrieved from khamenei.ir this cycle; the wording above reconstructs the printed front-page renderings (chiefly Etemad) and should be treated as an attributed paraphrase, not a primary-source quotation. 'The Leader' in current coverage denotes Mojtaba Khamenei; the martyred predecessor Ali Khamenei (assassinated 28 February 2026) is referenced separately in the revenge (خونخواهی) motif that recurs on the same pages.

Appendix B - The day's flagged editorial: Chaharsu, 'The Barjamiyoun Prescription: Surrender of Hormuz'

Chaharsu front page (31 Tir 1405), unsigned front-page editorial; presented over a photograph of Mohammad-Javad Zarif

The most editorially charged front page of the cycle is Chaharsu's, an economic title that turned its lead into a political polemic. Its argument, compressed into a paired formula across the top of the page, runs: 'What do we want enrichment for? = JCPOA 1. What do we want the Strait of Hormuz for? = JCPOA 2.' The rhetorical move equates any diplomacy over the Strait with the nuclear deal, and the nuclear deal with capitulation, so that to negotiate over Hormuz is by definition to repeat a surrender.

The editorial names its domestic target directly. The 'prescription of the Barjamiyoun' (the JCPOA camp, برجامیون) is, it says, 'the surrender of Hormuz' (تسلیم هرمز), and it addresses Mohammad-Javad Zarif by name, casting the reformist current's diplomacy as 'the internal translation of America's strategy' and as 'a repeat of pure loss.' This is the cycle's sharpest identification of a domestic faction, rather than the foreign adversary, as the security threat.

The economic case is marshalled as proof of leverage rather than as caution: that Trump's war raised the cost of shipping oil through Hormuz; that closing the Strait unsettled the global aluminium market; that rising tension lifts the world energy index; and that vessels 'do not dare' transit. From these the editorial draws its thesis - 'resistance and market pressure force America to accept an Iranian order in the Strait' - and its operational demand, printed as a standalone kicker: 'Keep the Strait closed for at least another 60 days.'

Analyst flag: this is an unsigned front-page editorial attributed to the paper, not to a named columnist; no individual author is asserted. It is documented here for defensive assessment only. Notably, the Kayhan 'Yadasht-e Rooz' column by managing editor Hossein Shariatmadari, ordinarily the cycle's flagged editorial, did not surface in the retrievable Kayhan channel content this cycle, so no signed Kayhan editorial is reproduced; the Chaharsu front stands as the day's most fully argued editorial statement. Its '60 more days of closure' demand is the single most concrete escalation ask on any front page and is tracked as a barometer of hardline pressure on the ceasefire track.

Appendix C - Methodology and sourcing notes

iran-press-digest pipeline (v2), 22 July 2026

Coverage and provenance: this edition rests on ten front-page scans - nine Persian titles from the NewspaperTasnim kiosk album for 31 Tir 1405 (Jam-e Jam, Javan, Vatan-e Emrooz, Sobh-e No, Chaharsu, Sazandegi, Jomhuri-ye Eslami, Ta'adol, Etemad) and one English print (Iran Daily) from the Newspapers_Iran album - each read directly by vision. Kayhan carries no scan this cycle and was analyzed from its public Telegram channel. The stale-batch guard confirmed the album's own printed Jalali date (31 Tir 1405) matches the target date, so the batch is fresh, not a holiday or Friday carry-over.

Text and wire corroboration: outlet and agency Telegram channels were consulted for cross-checking - Kayhan for its front line and item list; Defa Press and Fars News (IRGC-aligned wires) and Nour News (Supreme National Security Council-linked) for the strike claims and casualty figures, folded in as claims per the attribution firewall, not as front-page material. Tehran Times was unavailable at the time of compilation and is not cited.

Attribution firewall: all battle-damage and casualty claims here are attacker-sourced and are reproduced as attributed claims only. The base-strike claims are internally inconsistent across sources - the Kuwait strike is named against the 'Al-Doha' base by Kayhan and the 'Al-Dhafra' base by Fars, and US casualty figures diverge across outlets (a 'more than 500 wounded' figure on Nour News against smaller confirmed-death counts elsewhere) - and no single figure should be reproduced as fact. The 'Operation Saaeqeh Phase 21' (Kuwait) and 'Operation Nasr 2, Wave 24' (a claimed strike on a CENTCOM-linked data center in Bahrain) labels are the wires' own branding. The before/after satellite grid on Vatan-e Emrooz is outlet-curated and uncaptioned as to provenance; it is logged as claim-with-illustration, not confirmation.

Named-figure and translation caveats: Persian headlines are retained in original script beside editorial English translations; loaded register terms are glossed inline (اخراج تدریجی/gradual expulsion, تسلیم هرمز/surrender of Hormuz, برج‌امیون/the JCPOA camp, خونخواهی/blood-revenge). 'The Leader' denotes Mojtaba Khamenei; the assassinated Ali Khamenei is referenced only in the revenge motif. The Hamas-succession item (Khalil al-Hayya) and the Yemeni blockade interdiction figures are single-side attributed claims pending confirmation. Named individuals (Pezeshkian, Zarif, Ferdosipour, Shehbaz Sharif, Elias Hazrati, Shariatmadari) were checked against the printed pages; where a figure is inferred from a photograph rather than a caption, this is stated in the relevant entry.

Handling: this product documents and analyzes hostile foreign-press rhetoric for defensive assessment only; nothing herein endorses, amplifies, or operationalizes it.

Open-source material only. All translations from Persian/Arabic originals. Iranian claims are labelled as claims. Prepared for analysis and early warning; hostile content is documented for defensive assessment only, not endorsed.