

OPEN-SOURCE PRESS INTELLIGENCE

Iranian Press Monitor

Daily Front-Page Intelligence

Day 140 - Tuesday, 21 July 2026 · 30 Tir 1405 · 6 Safar 1448

THE MEDIATORS RETURN EDITION

Nine Persian front-page scans, one English print (Iran Daily), three outlet Telegram channels and three agency wires;
Tehran Times was unavailable at the time

Front pages published the morning of 21 July 2026, reflecting events through late 20 July local

Defensive open-source press-intelligence. Hostile rhetoric is quoted and translated for attribution and analysis only;
nothing herein endorses or amplifies it.

Iranian students collect 10 medals at global math, economics Olympiads

Iran Daily

Tu, 21 Jul 2026 · 30 Tir 1405 · 6 Safar 1448

Tehran confirms receiving de-escalation proposals from mediators

Pezeshkian: Iran's economy at center of 'full-scale war' with US

Iran's ground superiority leaves US operation little chance of success

Opinion

Find adverst... Integrit... in Shensha...

Front page: Iran Daily

Executive Summary

Day 140 is a mediators-return edition: the cross-cutting development is that the diplomatic track, which the prior cycle's hardline press worked to delegitimize, is back at the top of the front pages, and the significant move is the split over how to frame it. The government's English daily Iran Daily leads outright with 'Tehran confirms receiving de-escalation proposals from mediators'; the establishment Jomhuri-ye Eslami states on its own front page that there are 'new moves to halt the war and establish a ceasefire'; the reformist Etemad centers a feature titled 'The Return of the Mediators' on mounting Washington pressure channelled through third parties; and the government daily Iran carries a Guardian Council statement pegging council elections to 'two months after the Supreme National Security Council declares an end to the war,' an official body publicly presuming a coming close to the conflict. Four titles across three orientations thus converge on the same underlying fact: a mediation channel is live. This reverses the narrowing logged on Day 139, when the hardline press put negotiation itself on trial.

The hardline camp does not deny the opening; it re-scripts it. Kayhan, the Leader's-office flagship, leads with 'America took a hard slap, once again fled to the deception of negotiation,' using a New York Times citation ('Trump was forced to reach an understanding with Iran') as borrowed proof that any talks reflect American weakness rather than an Iranian concession, and it adds a legal-warfare line claiming Iranian courts may try and punish Trump. Javan keeps a naked deterrent threat ('we will teach the aggressors an unforgettable lesson') and an op-ed on 'American whitewashing behind a mask of peace-seeking' on the page; Vatan-e Emrooz runs 'a telling blow to Trump' and 'Trump: a weapon of mass destruction.' The centrist Hamshahri supplies the red line: it invokes the Leader's framing of the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf as 'beyond a body of water, part of our identity and civilization,' and explicitly analogizes any Hormuz diplomacy to a repeat of the JCPOA 'surrender.' Kayhan's Shariatmadari editorial gives that red line its ideological backbone, reviving a 'najes/impure' trope about Iranian oil to cast Western and reformist objections to the chokepoint leverage as manipulation. The result is a division of labor: the government wants the world to see an opening, the flagship wants Iranians to see a victory, and both agree that Hormuz cannot be seen to be traded away.

Two secondary fronts run beneath the diplomacy fight. First, a Yemen-Saudi escalation surfaces across the principlist and centrist titles: Javan's 'siege against siege,' Sobh-e No's 'naval siege of Saudi Arabia,' and Hamshahri's 'a Yemeni dagger at Saudi Arabia's throat' all promote a declared Yemeni maritime blockade of Saudi Arabia as a live second front in the resistance narrative. Second, the strike campaign against US regional bases continues as attacker-sourced claim, now branded 'Operation Nasr 2' on the agency wires (Defa Press, Fars News): claimed radar, Patriot, F-15, MQ-9 and HIMARS strikes across Jordan, Kuwait and Bahrain, plus tanker interdictions in the Strait of Hormuz. US casualty figures diverge inside the same edition, sixteen in Vatan-e Emrooz against roughly one hundred wounded in the Iran daily, and both remain single-side sourced. A Hamas-succession claim (Khalil al-Hayya named successor to Yahya Sinwar) is carried by both Kayhan and Javan and should be treated as an attributed claim pending confirmation.

Third, a Palestine-inflected reading of the 2026 World Cup final runs as an edition-wide soft-power motif. Spain's win over Argentina is read by the principlist and centrist press as a resistance victory: Sobh-e No titles its front 'the Cup of the Free,' Hamshahri declares 'Palestine, the champion of the World Cup in America,' and Javan captions its match photo 'football's revenge on politics' with a human figure blacked out of the frame. The reformist Sazandegi pointedly declines the allegory, playing the final as sport ('the kingdom of the matadors') and instead foregrounding a more consequential political item: a reported message from the Leader to former reformist president Mohammad Khatami, conveyed via Mohammad-Ali Abtahi, a possible leadership gesture toward the reformist camp at the moment the mediation track reopens.

The economic titles carry the government's own account of the war. President Pezeshkian's High Judicial Council remarks, that 'the most important arena of battle is the economy and people's livelihood,' are lifted across Ta'adol, Chaharsu, Etemad and the English Iran Daily ('Iran's economy at the center of a full-scale war with the US'), a coordinated presidential message that reframes the confrontation as primarily economic and lowers the military temperature. Ta'adol leads on chronic inflation as the biggest challenge to reconstruction and on housing unaffordability; Chaharsu stages a Hemmati-voiced defense of the government's record alongside blunt figures on halved per-capita income and an 'alarm bell' for the 49 million holders of Justice Shares. A coordinated home-front reassurance line also runs: 'no rise in rationed gasoline prices' (Etemad, Sobh-e No) and 'war-damaged southern desalination plants fully operational' (Jomhuri-ye Eslami, Iran Daily).

Net assessment: this is a framing-contest edition, not a fresh-escalation one. The verifiable development is that the mediation track has been publicly re-platformed at the state level after a cycle spent discrediting it, and the elite fight has correspondingly shifted from whether to negotiate to who is seen to be conceding, with Hormuz established cross-factionally as the line no negotiator can be shown to cross. The battlefield claims outrun corroboration and contradict each other on casualties; the Yemen-Saudi 'counter-siege' is a new front to watch; the World Cup soft-power motif and the economy-first presidential line both work to lower the temperature; and the reported Leader-to-Khatami message hints at an internal realignment that would fit a move toward an exit. The single highest-significance finding is the open, state-level confirmation of live de-escalation proposals, precisely because the flagship is expending so much effort to ensure it is not read as surrender.

BOTTOM LINE The single verifiable shift this cycle is that the diplomatic track is back on the front pages: the state's English daily, an establishment title and the government daily all confirm that de-escalation and ceasefire proposals from mediators have reached Tehran, reversing the prior edition's move to put negotiation on trial, but the hardline flagship immediately recodes the opening as an American defeat and 'deception,' the centrist and hardline titles wall off the Strait of Hormuz as a non-negotiable matter of 'identity and civilization,' and the strike-triumph claims, a Yemeni counter-siege of Saudi Arabia and a Palestine-inflected reading of the World Cup keep the momentum narrative running, so the fight on the page is no longer over whether to talk but over who is seen to be conceding.

CRITICAL SOURCING NOTE Compiled from nine Persian front-page scans (30 Tir 1405), one English print scan (Iran Daily), outlet Telegram channels (Kayhan, Vatan-e Emrooz, Iran) and three agency wires (Defa Press, Fars News, Nour News). The Iran and Vatan-e Emrooz entries are text-channel sourced rather than drawn from today's scan kiosk and are labelled as such. Tehran Times was unavailable at the time and is represented by the Iran Daily print scan; no primary transcript of the Leader's Hormuz statement was captured, so Appendix A is reconstructed from the Hamshahri front page and flagged partial. All Iranian military, battle-damage and casualty claims (Operation Nasr 2 strikes; F-15/MQ-9/HIMARS/Patriot kills; tanker interdictions; the Yemeni naval blockade; the '16' versus '~100 wounded' US casualty figures) are recorded as attributed claims and, where they conflict, noted as unreconciled. Second-hand Western-press renderings (New York Times, Wall Street Journal, the Guardian, Alastair Crooke) are flagged as the Iranian outlet's rendering and are not independently verified. 'The Leader' denotes Mojtaba Khamenei per standing context; the Khalil al-Hayya Hamas-succession claim and the reported Leader-to-Khatami message are attributed and unverified.

Macro Trend Analysis

1 The mediation track is re-platformed at the state level

After a cycle in which the hardline press put negotiation itself on trial, the diplomatic track is back at the top of the front pages: Iran Daily leads on 'de-escalation proposals from mediators,' Jomhuri-ye Eslami on 'new moves to halt the war and establish a ceasefire,' Etemad on 'the return of the mediators,' and the government daily Iran carries an official statement pegging council elections to 'two months after the war's declared end.' Four titles across three orientations confirm a live channel; the argument has moved from whether to talk to how the talks are framed.

2 The hardline camp pre-claims victory rather than blocking the talks

Unable to deny the opening, the flagship recodes it: Kayhan's 'America took a hard slap, once again fled to the deception of negotiation' uses a New York Times citation as proof of American weakness, and Javan ('American whitewashing behind a mask of peace-seeking') and Vatan-e Emrooz ('a telling blow to Trump') keep the strike-triumph and US-decline lines running. The purpose is inoculation: to ensure no subsequent deal can be read at home as an Iranian concession.

3 Hormuz established cross-factionally as the non-negotiable red line

The centrist Hamshahri invokes the Leader's framing of the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf as 'part of our identity and civilization' and analogizes any Hormuz diplomacy to a repeat of the JCPOA 'surrender'; Kayhan's Shariatmadari editorial supplies the ideological backbone with a 'najes/impure' oil trope. That a municipal centrist title carries this line shows the sovereignty-over-Hormuz frame has broad buy-in and functions as the boundary the negotiators cannot be seen to cross - even as Vatan-e Emrooz quietly concedes, while rebutting it, that alternative pipelines could erode the chokepoint's leverage.

4 A Yemen-Saudi counter-siege promoted as a new front

Javan's 'siege against siege,' Sobh-e No's 'naval siege of Saudi Arabia' and Hamshahri's 'a Yemeni dagger at Saudi Arabia's throat' converge to promote a declared Yemeni maritime blockade of Saudi Arabia, folding a Yemen-Saudi escalation into the axis-of-resistance narrative at the same moment the US-Iran track leans toward de-escalation. Treat the blockade and its effects as attributed claims and watch whether the thread persists or fades.

5 The World Cup as soft-power, read against the elite split

Spain's win over Argentina in the 2026 final is turned into a resistance-solidarity victory by the principlist and centrist press ('the Cup of the Free,' 'Palestine, the champion of the World Cup in America,' 'football's revenge on politics' with a blacked-out figure), while the reformist Sazandegi declines the allegory and plays it as sport. The same event thus refracts the same factional divide as the diplomacy fight, and its prominence lowers the edition's overall temperature.

6 The economy foregrounded as the government's account of the war

President Pezeshkian's 'the economy and people's livelihood are the most important arena of battle' is carried across Ta'adol, Chaharsu, Etemad and Iran Daily, a coordinated presidential message that reframes the confrontation as economic and implicitly supports an off-ramp. The economic titles keep the domestic cost visible - chronic inflation, halved per-capita income, housing unaffordability, an 'alarm bell' for Justice Shares holders - while a reassurance line ('no gasoline-price rise,' 'southern desalination restored') manages home-front morale.

Key Judgments

KJ-1 [HIGH] The diplomatic track has been publicly re-platformed at the state level, reversing the prior cycle's move to put negotiation on trial. Iran Daily leads with 'Tehran confirms receiving de-escalation

proposals from mediators,' Jomhuri-ye Eslami with 'new moves to halt the war and establish a ceasefire,' Etemad with 'the return of the mediators,' and the government daily Iran carries a Guardian Council statement pegging council elections to 'two months after the war's declared end' - four titles across three orientations converging on a live mediation channel. Significance: after Day 139's hardline campaign to delegitimize negotiation as such, the government and establishment have moved the off-ramp back to the front page, and an official body now publicly presumes the war is heading to a formal close; this is the edition's single most consequential shift and the anchor for everything else on the page.

KJ-2 [HIGH] The hardline flagship is pre-framing the opening as an American defeat rather than trying to block it, indicating a shift from obstruction to narrative-control. Kayhan leads with 'America took a hard slap, once again fled to the deception of negotiation,' using a New York Times citation ('Trump was forced to reach an understanding with Iran') as borrowed proof of US weakness and adding a claim that Iranian courts may try and punish Trump; Javan ('American whitewashing') and Vatan-e Emrooz ('a telling blow to Trump') reinforce the line. Significance: the flagship's investment in a victory narrative is itself evidence that a deal is anticipated - the message-discipline work is aimed at ensuring any subsequent agreement is read domestically as American capitulation, not Iranian concession.

KJ-3 [MODERATE-HIGH] The Strait of Hormuz has been established cross-factionally as the non-negotiable red line of any talks. The centrist Hamshahri invokes the Leader's 'identity and civilization' framing and explicitly analogizes Hormuz diplomacy to a repeat of the JCPOA 'surrender'; Kayhan's Shariatmadari editorial supplies the ideological backbone via a 'najes/impure' oil trope. Significance: that a municipal centrist title, not only the hardline press, carries this line means the sovereignty-over-Hormuz frame is a broadly held boundary rather than a factional talking point, constraining what the negotiators can be seen to trade; the quiet Vatan-e Emrooz concession that alternative pipelines could erode the chokepoint's leverage is the one crack in that wall worth tracking.

KJ-4 [MODERATE] A Yemen-Saudi 'counter-siege' has been promoted to a live second front across the principlist and centrist titles. Javan's 'siege against siege,' Sobh-e No's 'naval siege of Saudi Arabia' and Hamshahri's 'a Yemeni dagger at Saudi Arabia's throat' converge on a declared Yemeni maritime blockade of Saudi Arabia, and the Fars wire carries a Yemeni warning of 'consequences of a continued blockade.' Significance: the resistance axis is being kept visibly active precisely as the US-Iran track leans toward de-escalation, a hedge that preserves escalation capacity elsewhere; treat the blockade and its effects as attributed claims and watch whether the thread hardens into sustained coverage or fades within a cycle.

KJ-5 [MODERATE-HIGH] The strike campaign against US regional bases continues but remains attacker-sourced and internally inconsistent on its own numbers. The agency wires (Defa Press, Fars News) brand it 'Operation Nasr 2' and claim radar, Patriot, F-15, MQ-9 and HIMARS strikes across Jordan, Kuwait and Bahrain plus Hormuz tanker interdictions, while US casualty figures diverge inside the same edition - sixteen in Vatan-e Emrooz against roughly one hundred wounded in the Iran daily. Significance: treat the continuing exchange as probable but every base-by-base target and casualty tally as messaging to be confirmed outside this monitor; the unreconciled casualty figures are themselves a caution against reproducing any single number as fact.

KJ-6 [MODERATE] A reported leadership gesture toward the reformist camp coincides with the diplomatic opening. The reformist Sazandegi carries, via Mohammad-Ali Abtahi's account, a reported message from the Leader (Mojtaba Khamenei) to former reformist president Mohammad Khatami, while Etemad and the

establishment titles push a 'collective responsibility' and 'everyone must support the government' line. Significance: if accurate, an outreach to the reformist establishment at the moment mediators return would fit an internal realignment toward an exit and a broadening of the coalition that would own it; the message's content is unverified and attributed to Abtahi, and should be tracked rather than asserted.

KJ-7 [MODERATE] Negative-evidence judgment: Israel and the Lebanese front are again largely absent from the front pages, and the resistance-axis energy has migrated to the Yemen-Saudi arena and to Palestine-as-symbol rather than Palestine-as-battlefield. No monitored front page leads on an Israeli or Lebanese military development; Gaza surfaces mainly through the attributed Hamas-succession claim and the World Cup solidarity motif. Significance: the confrontation on the page has consolidated around the US-Iran diplomatic contest, the Strait of Hormuz and the new Yemen-Saudi front; the continued Israel-Lebanon quiet should be logged as a finding in its own right, since a return to either would be a signal, and read against the de-escalation lead rather than as evidence of it.

Named-Figure Tracker

Figure	Role / relevance	Today's framing	Flag
Mojtaba Khamenei	The Leader (رهبر انقلاب)	Voiced as the authority behind the Hormuz 'identity and civilization' red line (Hamshahri); reported to have sent a message to Khatami via Abtahi (Sazandegi); pictured embracing a resistance-bloc figure (Kayhan)	WATCH
Masoud Pezeshkian	President of Iran	Reframes the confrontation as primarily economic ('the economy and livelihood are the most important arena of battle'); 'collective responsibility' at the High Judicial Council	WATCH
Donald Trump	US President	Cast as forced to negotiate from weakness (Kayhan via NYT), a legal target for Iranian courts (Kayhan), 'a weapon of mass destruction' and 'strategically adrift' (Vatan-e Emrooz via the Guardian)	TARGET FRAMING
Hossein Shariatmadari	Kayhan managing editor	Author of the flagged 'Yadasht-e Rooz' editorial casting Hormuz leverage as a nuclear-equivalent deterrent and negotiation as a snare	COERCION SPOKESMAN
Khalil al-Hayya	Reported successor to Yahya Sinwar as Hamas leader	'Bad news for the Zionists' (Kayhan); a Hamas leadership 'restructuring' (Javan)	NEW NAMED FIGURE
Mohammad Khatami	Former reformist president	Reported recipient of a message from the Leader, conveyed via Abtahi (Sazandegi) - a possible reformist-outreach signal	NEW NAMED FIGURE
Abdolnaser Hemmati	Economy minister / former central-bank governor	Voices a defense of the government's economic record (Chaharsu)	WATCH
Chuck Schumer	US Senate minority leader	Quoted demanding an end to the operations; enlisted as evidence of US domestic pressure to de-escalate (Iran)	WATCH

Figure	Role / relevance	Today's framing	Flag
Israel / the Lebanese front	Regional flashpoints	Largely absent from the front pages this cycle; resistance-axis energy migrated to Yemen-Saudi and to Palestine-as-symbol	absence noted

Headline Summary Table

Outlet	Lead Headline (English)	Orientation	Theme	Threat signal
Iran Daily (English)	Tehran Confirms Receiving De-escalation Proposals from Mediators	State English daily	State-level confirmation of a live mediation track; economy as the main front	MODERATE: de-escalation-leaning confirmation
Jomhuri-ye Eslami	New Moves to Halt the War and Establish a Ceasefire	Traditional / establishment	Establishment endorsement of ceasefire diplomacy; unity behind the government	LOW-MODERATE: pro-ceasefire
Etemad	The Responsibility for a Collective Decision Rests with Everyone	Reformist	'Return of the mediators' centered; collective responsibility; gasoline-price reassurance	MODERATE: reformist normalization of talks
Iran	Council Elections Two Months After the War's Declared End	Official government daily	Official framing presuming a coming end to the war; US-pressure signalling	MODERATE: presumes formal close of the war
Kayhan	America Took a Hard Slap, Once Again Fled to the Deception of Negotiation	Hardline flagship (Leader's office / IRGC)	Mediation recoded as US defeat and deception; legal-warfare escalation against Trump	SEVERE: victory-narrative pre-framing
Hamshahri	Again, 'Should We Just Hand It Over?!'	Centrist (Tehran municipality)	Hormuz cast as a non-negotiable identity red line against any deal	MODERATE-HIGH: Hormuz red line
Vatan-e Emrooz	A Telling Blow to Trump	Hardline / principlist	Strike-triumph and US-decline messaging; a rare Hormuz-bypass concession	HIGH: anti-diplomacy strike-triumph line
Javan	Yemen Arrives with 'Siege Against Siege'	Hardline (IRGC-affiliated)	Yemen-Saudi counter-siege front; Hamas succession; deterrent threats	HIGH: promotes a new escalation front
Sobh-e No	The Cup of the Free	Principlist	World Cup as Palestine-solidarity victory; Yemen siege; attacker-sourced base-strike claims	HIGH: strike claims within a momentum narrative
Sazandegi	The Kingdom of the Matadors	Reformist (Kargozaran)	World Cup as sport; reported Leader-to-Khatami message; escalation questioned	LOW-MODERATE: de-escalation-leaning
Chaharsu	Pezeshkian's Record, in Hemmati's Words	Economic / business	Economy as the decisive battlefield; halved incomes; livelihood pressure	LOW: domestic economic anxiety

Outlet	Lead Headline (English)	Orientation	Theme	Threat signal
Ta'adol	Mirdamad's Gaze on the Future of the Economy	Economic	Chronic inflation as top challenge; 'economy is the main front'	LOW: economy-first, de-escalation-supportive

Per-Paper Front-Page Analysis

Iran Daily

English-language state daily (published by the government's IRNA/Iran newspaper group)

"Tehran

MODERATE: state-level confirmation of a live mediation track; de-escalation-leaning for foreign audiences

Confirms Receiving De-escalation Proposals from Mediators"



- Main: The banner 'Tehran confirms receiving de-escalation proposals from mediators' is the edition's single most consequential line: the state's English-facing daily openly acknowledges that third-party de-escalation proposals have reached Tehran, packaging the diplomatic track for foreign readers even as the Persian hardline flagship recodes the same development as an American climb-down.
- Sub-item: «Pezeshkian: Iran's economy at center of 'full-scale war' with US» - the President reframes the confrontation as primarily economic, elevating sanctions and economic pressure to the status of the main battlefield; this is the English rendering of the same High Judicial Council remarks carried by Etemad, Ta'adol and Chaharsu.
- Right rail: 'Minister: War-damaged desalination plants in the south fully operational' - a home-front-recovery reassurance item aimed at foreign audiences, matching the Persian titles' southern-stability line.
- Op-ed: 'They pressured Carter to invade Kharg Island but he didn't' - a historical-analogy opinion piece invoking the 1980s to argue against a US ground option today; pairs with the front-page interview.
- Interview: 'Iran's ground superiority leaves US operation little chance of success' - an exclusive with a retired officer arguing a US ground assault would face prohibitive costs; presented as analysis, not as a claim of imminent invasion.
- Kicker: 'Iranian students collect 10 medals at global math, economics Olympiads' - a soft-power normalcy item signalling business-as-usual on the civilian front.

ANALYST NOTE As the government's English shopfront, Iran Daily is where the state chooses what foreign readers should take away, and today it leads outright on de-escalation proposals from mediators - the most authoritative confirmation in the edition that a diplomatic channel is live. The pairing with Pezeshkian's 'economy is the real full-scale war' line is deliberate: it lowers the military temperature for external audiences while keeping the sanctions grievance central. Read alongside Kayhan, the split is not about whether talks exist but about how to frame them: the government wants the world to see an opening; the flagship wants Iranians to see a US defeat.

“Again, ‘Should We Just Hand It Over?’” «باز هم «بدیم بره؟!»

MODERATE-HIGH: Hormuz cast as a non-negotiable identity red line against any deal



- Main: «باز هم بدیم بره؟!» ('again, should we just give it away?!') is a rhetorical defense of Iranian sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf, with the subhead attributing to the Leader (رهبر انقلاب) that the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf, 'beyond being a body of water, are part of our identity and civilization' («جزئی از هویت و تمدن ماست»). The framing casts any negotiated concession on the chokepoint as a betrayal of national identity.
- Kicker: «نسخه برجام را غربگراها این بار برای تنگه هرمز پیچیده‌اند» ('the Westernizers have this time written a JCPOA-style prescription for the Strait of Hormuz') - an argument that a diplomatic 'deal' over Hormuz would repeat the perceived surrender of the nuclear accord, a pointed shot at the pro-negotiation camp.
- Cover image: A large photograph of the Sassanid rock relief at Naqsh-e Rostam (the ancient investiture/triumph carving), pairing the Hormuz-sovereignty argument with a civilizational-continuity visual.
- Sub-item: «فلسطین قهرمان جام جهانی در آمریکا» ('Palestine, the champion of the World Cup in America'), reading global fan solidarity with Palestine at the tournament as the real victory, with a photo of a supporter holding the Palestinian flag.
- Sub-item: «خنجر یمنی روی گلوئ عربستان» ('a Yemeni dagger at Saudi Arabia's throat'), reporting the Yemeni naval-blockade escalation against Saudi Arabia - the same Yemen-Saudi thread as Javan and Sobh-e No.
- Right rail: «دانش ایرانی علیه مرگبارترین تومور مغزی» ('Iranian science against the deadliest brain tumor'), a domestic scientific-achievement item signalling civilian normalcy.

ANALYST NOTE Hamshahri, a municipal centrist title, lands squarely on the hardline side of the Hormuz argument today: it invokes the Leader's 'identity and civilization' language and explicitly analogizes any Hormuz diplomacy to a repeat of the JCPOA 'surrender,' framing the chokepoint as non-negotiable exactly as mediators return. That a centrist paper carries this line indicates the sovereignty-over-Hormuz frame has broad cross-factional buy-in and functions as a red line the negotiators cannot be seen to cross. It also joins the Palestine-World Cup and Yemen-Saudi threads, confirming both as edition-wide.



- Main: «جام آزادگان» ('the Cup of the Free/Freemen') recasts the World Cup final as a Palestine-solidarity victory, with the subhead crediting Spain and European supporters who 'stood on the right side of history' and made the Palestine flag the symbol of the tournament; the front page is dominated by a mural photograph of youths holding the Palestinian flag.
- Banner (top): «برنامه‌ای برای افزایش قیمت بنزین نداریم» ('we have no plan to raise gasoline prices'), attributed to the government spokesman - the same fuel-price reassurance line as Etemad, confirming a coordinated denial.
- Right column: «محاصره دریایی عربستان» ('a naval siege of Saudi Arabia'), reporting the Yemeni armed forces' declared maritime blockade of Saudi Arabia in retaliation for its own blockade of Yemen - matching Javan's 'siege against siege.'
- Sub-item: «منشورترین جنگ تاریخ» ('the most hated war in history'), citing polling that over 70 percent of Americans oppose the war on Iran - an attributed claim used to argue US domestic isolation.
- Sub-item: «همکاری اطلاعاتی مردم اردن با ایران» ('intelligence cooperation by the people of Jordan with Iran') tied to a claim that the IRGC successfully targeted large C-17 transport and P-8 patrol aircraft; carried with «شلیک به» «قلب ابلیس» ('a shot to the heart of the Devil') on a claimed strike at the US base nearest Israel. Treat all base-strike and aircraft-kill specifics as attacker-sourced claims.
- Kicker: The Palestine-solidarity framing is explicitly threaded to the Yemen and war content, presenting sport, the resistance axis and the strike campaign as one continuous narrative of momentum.

ANALYST NOTE Sobh-e No is the sharpest example of the edition's soft-power turn: it converts the World Cup final into an axis-of-resistance triumph ('the Cup of the Free'), using the Palestine flag's prominence at a tournament hosted in the United States as evidence of American moral isolation. Beneath the sport, it keeps the Yemen-Saudi counter-siege and the attacker-sourced base-strike claims (C-17s, P-8s, 'the base nearest Israel') on the page, and it carries the same 'no gasoline-price rise' reassurance as Etemad. The through-line is momentum-management: every front, sporting and military, is scripted as Iran ascendant.

“Yemen Arrives with ‘Siege Against Siege” **HIGH: deterrent threats plus promotion of a Yemen-Saudi counter-siege front**

«یمن با «محاصره در برابر محاصره» آمد»



- Main: «یمن با محاصره در برابر محاصره آمد» ('Yemen came with siege-against-siege') foregrounds the Yemeni armed forces' declared naval blockade of Saudi Arabia as a retaliatory counter-siege, elevating the Yemen-Saudi front to the top of a hardline front page and knitting it into the axis-of-resistance narrative.
- Sub-item: «بازآرایی رهبری حماس پس از جنگ با انتخاب خلیل الحیه» ('a restructuring of Hamas's leadership after the war, with the selection of Khalil al-Hayya'), the same Hamas-succession claim Kayhan runs; treat the al-Hayya elevation as an attributed claim pending independent confirmation.
- Banner: «درس فراموش نشدنی به متجاوزان خواهیم آموخت» ('we will teach the aggressors an unforgettable lesson'), attributed to the IRGC central command - a deterrent-threat line kept prominent even as mediation reappears elsewhere in the edition.
- Main photo: A staged image of the victorious Spain squad with a human silhouette blacked out in the foreground under the caption «انتقام فوتبال از سیاست» ('football's revenge on politics') - a visual editorializing the World Cup final as a rebuke to Western/Israeli politics; the blacked-out figure is a deliberate erasure device, not a documentary element.
- Op-ed: «تطهیر آمریکایی با نقاب صلح طلبی» ('American whitewashing behind a mask of peace-seeking') - a signed column arguing that US de-escalation signalling is cosmetic, the hardline echo of Kayhan's 'deception of negotiation' framing.
- Right rail: «همه در یک کشتی هستیم و وحدت شرط پیروزی است» ('we are all in one boat and unity is the condition of victory'), an internal-cohesion appeal consistent with the message-discipline drive.

ANALYST NOTE Javan is the IRGC-affiliated voice hardening the same lines the flagship sets: it keeps a naked deterrent threat ('unforgettable lesson') and an anti-diplomacy op-ed ('American whitewashing') on the page precisely as the mediation track resurfaces, and it promotes the Yemen-Saudi 'counter-siege' as a live second front. The al-Hayya succession claim, shared with Kayhan, is worth flagging as a coordinated resistance-bloc message. The blacked-out figure in the World Cup photo is an editorial erasure worth noting as visual-propaganda technique.

Spain World Cup squad photo with a human silhouette blacked out in the foreground, captioned 'football's revenge on politics' - an editorial erasure device

Kayhan

Hardline flagship, close to the Supreme Leader's office and the IRGC; managing editor Hossein Shariatmadari

“America Took SEVERE: victory-narrative pre-framing of a re-opened diplomatic track plus legal-warfare escalation

a Hard Slap, Once Again Fled to the Deception of Negotiation” «آمریکا سلی سخت خورد، بار دیگر به نیرنگ مذاکره پناه برد»



- Main: The banner headline («شکست در میدان و التماس در فضای مجازی» / defeat on the field and pleading in the virtual space) frames the reported return of mediators and de-escalation feelers not as an Iranian opening but as an American retreat, arguing Washington 'took a hard slap' and 'once again fled to the deception (نیرنگ) of negotiation.' The paper pre-labels any talks as a US tactic to be distrusted, inoculating the base against reading a diplomatic move as an Iranian concession.
- Kicker: A New York Times citation is used as the load-bearing evidence: 'Trump is now suffering the same economic and political dangers, and a few months ago was forced, because of them, to reach an understanding with Iran.' This is a second-hand Western-press rendering enlisted to prove US weakness; per the attribution firewall it is Kayhan's reading of the NYT, not an independent fact.
- Banner (top): دادگاه‌های ایران صلاحیت محاکمه و مجازات دولت آمریکا و ترامپ: «را دارند» - a claim that Iranian courts have jurisdiction to try and punish the US government and Trump personally, escalating the legal-warfare track alongside the military one.
- Sub-item: «خبر بد برای صهیونیست‌ها - خلیل الحیه جانشین یحیی سنوار شد» ('Bad news for the Zionists - Khalil al-Hayya has become the successor to Yahya Sinwar'), announcing a Hamas leadership succession; carried with a photograph of the Leader (Mojtaba Khamenei) embracing a resistance-bloc figure. Attribute the succession claim to Kayhan pending confirmation.
- Right rail: جبهه گشوده جنگ از اردن تا دریای عمان - ایران به نظامیان آمریکا: «امی‌گوید بفرمایید» ('An open war front from Jordan to the Sea of Oman - Iran tells the American military: step right up!'), packaged with a 'Report from 144 days of war' - Kayhan runs its own war-day counter that differs from this monitor's calendar count.
- Op-ed: The 'Yadasht-e Rooz' daily note (Shariatmadari), a two-part column on oil and the Strait, recalling a historical British intelligence trope that Iranian oil was 'najes' (impure) to discourage its exploitation, and casting Western and domestic 'reformist' objections to Iran's Hormuz leverage as an updated version of that manipulation; it frames chokepoint control as a deterrent equivalent to a nuclear weapon.

ANALYST NOTE As the Leader's-office flagship, Kayhan is doing the pre-emptive framing work for the edition's central development: with mediators and de-escalation proposals back on the front pages, Kayhan re-scripts diplomacy as American surrender ('slap,' 'pleading,' 'deception') so that any subsequent deal cannot be read domestically as an Iranian retreat. This is the mirror-image sequel to the prior editions' 'diplomacy on trial' line: rather than delegitimizing negotiation outright, the flagship now pre-claims victory to control how a re-opened

track is understood. Track the al-Hayya succession claim and the Trump-jurisdiction legal line as new headline threads.

Chaharsu Economic/business daily

"Pezeshkian's Record, in Hemmati's Words"

LOW: domestic economic anxiety foregrounded; economy framed as the decisive front

«عملکرد پزشکیان از زبان همتی»



- Main: «عملکرد پزشکیان از زبان همتی» ('Pezeshkian's record in the words of Hemmati') frames a defense of the government's economic performance voiced by Abdolnaser Hemmati (economy minister and former central-bank governor), pictured in conversation with President Pezeshkian; the paper turns the economy into the government's central account of itself amid the war.
- Header items: A cluster of contested claims - investment growth 'sharply negative' under the government, economic growth positive but per-capita income roughly halved, real per-capita income of the population down by about half over four years, and a comparison of the Pezeshkian and (Ahmadinejad-era) records - laying out the economic scorecard as the day's battleground.
- Sub-item: «رنگ خطر برای ۴۹ میلیون دارنده سهام عدالت» ('an alarm bell for the 49 million holders of Justice Shares'), warning on the Saham-e Edalat equity scheme that touches tens of millions of households - a livelihood-anxiety signal.
- Analysis: The page argues the economy, not the battlefield, is where the government's fate will be decided, echoing Pezeshkian's own 'the most important arena of battle is the economy and people's livelihood' line carried across the economic titles.
- Right rail: Market and monetary items keeping the domestic cost of the confrontation (inflation, incomes, the bourse) in view.

ANALYST NOTE Chaharsu supplies the economic-press half of the edition's central government message: Pezeshkian's insistence that the economy is the 'real full-scale war.' By staging a Hemmati-voiced defense of the record alongside blunt figures on halved per-capita income, it keeps the war's domestic cost visible even as it defends the government - the economic titles continue to be the venue where the confrontation's self-inflicted price is stated plainly, unlike the strike-triumph framing on the hardline pages. The Saham-e Edalat 'alarm bell' is a livelihood-pressure marker worth tracking.

"The Kingdom of the

LOW-MODERATE: reformist de-escalation framing; leadership-to-reformist outreach signal

Matadors» «پادشاهی ماتادورها»



- Main: «پادشاهی ماتادورها» ('the kingdom of the matadors') leads on Spain's victory over Argentina in the 2026 World Cup final, treating the result as the end of an era of superstar-driven football; the page is dominated by a photograph of a young Spanish player lifting the trophy. The reformist paper plays the tournament as sport and spectacle rather than as resistance allegory.
- Banner (top): «پیام رهبری به خاتمی» ('a message from the Leader to Khatami'), presented as an account by the reformist figure Mohammad-Ali Abtahi of a meeting to convey a message from the Leader (Mojtaba Khamenei) to former reformist president Mohammad Khatami - a notable signal of leadership outreach toward the reformist camp.
- Op-ed: «راهبرد ناپایدار» ('an unstable strategy'), a signed column questioning the sustainability of the current confrontation posture - the reformist critique of open-ended escalation.
- Sub-item: Domestic and economic items («خداحافظی السالر», livestock/agriculture, «از تبریز تا بوشهر», keep the reformist front tilted toward internal governance and economy rather than the war front.
- Right rail: Analysis threading the World Cup and Palestine-solidarity motif more soberly than the principlist titles, without the 'Cup of the Free' resistance framing.

ANALYST NOTE The single most politically significant item on this reformist front is the banner claim that the Leader sent a message to Khatami via Abtahi: if accurate, it is a leadership gesture toward reconciliation with the reformist establishment at the exact moment the mediation track reopens, and it dovetails with the reformist/government push to legitimize a diplomatic exit. Treat the message's content as unverified and attributed to Abtahi's account. Sazandegi otherwise pointedly declines the resistance-allegory reading of the World Cup, keeping the reformist frame on economy, governance and de-escalation ('an unstable strategy').

Jomhuri-ye Eslami

Traditional establishment/conservative daily (historically tied to the founding generation)

"New

LOW-MODERATE: establishment endorsement of ceasefire diplomacy and unity behind the government

Moves to Halt the War and Establish a Ceasefire" «تحرکات تازه برای توقف جنگ و برقراری آتش‌بس»



- Main: «تحرکات تازه برای توقف جنگ و برقراری آتش‌بس» ('new moves to halt the war and establish a ceasefire') is the plainest front-page endorsement in the edition of the diplomatic track: an establishment title states outright that fresh ceasefire diplomacy is under way, corroborating Iran Daily's 'de-escalation proposals from mediators.'
- Banner (top): «وزیر نیرو از بازگشت آب شیرین کن‌های آسیب‌دیده جنوب به مدار» ('the Energy Minister reports the return to service of the war-damaged desalination plants in the south'), the same southern-recovery reassurance line carried in English by Iran Daily.
- Left: «همه مکلف به حمایت از دولت در شرایط کنونی هستیم» ('everyone is obliged to support the government in the current conditions'), attributed to the head of the judiciary - an establishment call for unity behind the Pezeshkian government that aligns with Etemad's 'collective responsibility' framing.
- Right column: «تاریخی‌ترین شکست برای آمریکا» ('the most historic defeat for America') and a New York Times-attributed claim that the Pentagon has concealed dozens of US military losses in the Iran war - the same NYT-as-evidence device Kayhan uses, and to be read as an attributed second-hand rendering.
- Sub-item: «ثبت اعلام آمادگی حج ۱۴۰۶ برای اولین بار آغاز شد» (Hajj-1406 registration opening) and an Ayatollah Beheshti commemoration quote box - establishment religious-calendar content signalling institutional continuity.
- Bottom: A framed quotation attributed to 'the oppressed martyr Ayatollah Beheshti' on guiding society toward growth rather than compromise and flattery.

ANALYST NOTE Jomhuri-ye Eslami is the establishment title that most cleanly confirms the edition's lead: it says on its own front page that new ceasefire diplomacy is moving, and it pairs that with a judiciary-voiced demand for unity behind the government - the establishment counterweight to Kayhan's 'deception' framing. Its simultaneous 'most historic US defeat' and NYT-Pentagon-concealment items show the shared face-saving architecture: even the pro-ceasefire wing sells de-escalation as arriving from a position of Iranian strength. Continues the home-front-recovery thread (desalination) tracked across recent editions.

"نگاه میرداماد به آینده اقتصاد" on the Future of the Economy



- Main: «نگاه میرداماد به آینده اقتصاد» ('Mirdamad's gaze on the future of the economy') presents chronic inflation as the single biggest challenge to an Iranian economy on a reconstruction path, foregrounding the structural-economic outlook over the war front.
- Banner (top): «با ۳۰۰ میلیون تومان در تهران کجا می‌توان خانه رهن کرد؟» ('with 300 million tomans, where in Tehran can you rent a home?'), a cost-of-living item translating macro inflation into a concrete housing-affordability question.
- Sub-item (photo): President Pezeshkian at the High Judicial Council, quoted «مهم‌ترین میدان نبرد عرصه اقتصاد و معیشت مردم است» ('the most important arena of battle is the economy and people's livelihood') - the same governmental line carried by Etemad, Chaharsu and Iran Daily, confirming a coordinated presidential message.
- Analysis: «رقص دلارهای نفتی روی گل تنش» ('the dance of oil dollars on the bloom of tension') and treasury-and-tax pieces («درمان میان چکش بیمه و» (Sندان مالیات) weigh the fiscal squeeze between insurance costs and taxation.
- Right rail: Bourse and market items («بورس در درمان ریسک و صعود») keeping capital-market risk in view.

ANALYST NOTE Ta'adol reinforces the edition's coordinated presidential message - the economy as 'the most important arena of battle' - and does the work the economic press keeps doing across editions: naming the domestic cost (chronic inflation, housing unaffordability, the fiscal squeeze) rather than the strike-triumph line. Its restraint framing implicitly supports the diplomatic off-ramp: a paper that leads on reconstruction and inflation has a structural interest in de-escalation, aligning the business press with the reformist/government wing on the underlying question of an exit.



- Main: Leads on President Masoud Pezeshkian at the High Judicial Council session, quoting his line that collective national decisions carry collective responsibility, paired with «ایستادگی در برابر دشمن هزینه دارد اما این هزینه را» ('standing against the enemy has a cost, but we must accept that cost') - a governmental framing that both defends resistance and, implicitly, spreads the blame for its costs across the whole establishment rather than the government alone.
- Sub-item: The center feature «بازگشت میانجی‌ها» ('The Return of the Mediators') reports mounting pressure from Washington channelled through third parties, accompanied by a photograph of a diplomatic handshake; this is the reformist front page putting the re-opened mediation track at the visual center rather than burying it - the opposite editorial choice from Kayhan.
- Banner (top): «افزایش قیمت بنزین سهمیه‌ای فعلاً منتفی است» ('a rise in the price of rationed gasoline is ruled out for now'), a home-front reassurance line that also appears in Sobh-e No, indicating a coordinated message-discipline denial of any near-term fuel-price shock.
- Op-ed/analysis: Notes that «ایستادگی» has costs the public is being asked to bear, edging toward the reformist accountability argument (who decides, who pays) without directly attacking the resistance line.
- Right rail: Foreign-affairs items on diplomacy versus Israel and the mediation posture; the reformist read foregrounds the off-ramp that the hardline titles are trying to discredit.

ANALYST NOTE Etemad is the clearest reformist counterpoint to Kayhan on the same underlying fact: both acknowledge that mediators and de-escalation proposals are back, but where the flagship codes them as US weakness to be exploited, Etemad centers 'the return of the mediators' as a genuine diplomatic opening and pairs it with Pezeshkian's 'collective responsibility' framing - a bid to legitimize an exit and distribute its political cost. Continues the standing elite-split thread: the diplomatic track that Day 139's hardline press put 'on trial' is being actively re-platformed by the government and reformist titles.

Two Months After the War's Declared End; US Talks Continue"

- Main (text channel): The Guardian Council spokesman states «انتخابات شوراها دو ماه پس از اعلام توقف» ('council elections will be held two months after the Supreme National Security Council declares an end to the war') - an official item that both presumes a coming end to the war and ties the electoral calendar to it, dovetailing with the edition's ceasefire-diplomacy lead.
- Sub-item (text channel): An American official is cited claiming ongoing talks with Tehran while the Trump administration intends to press Iran over alleged Strait-of-Hormuz activity - corroborating the mediation/negotiation thread from the US side, carried as an attributed claim.
- Sub-item (text channel): US Senate minority leader Chuck Schumer is quoted demanding an end to the military operations, warning that continued engagement keeps US troops in danger - enlisted as evidence of American domestic pressure to de-escalate.
- Sub-item (text channel): US officials are reported to have acknowledged roughly 100 personnel wounded in Iran's recent strikes on US bases - an attributed casualty figure, higher than the 16 cited by Vatan-e Emrooz; treat both as claims to be reconciled outside this monitor.
- Sub-item (text channel): The IRGC Aerospace Force reports destroying a radar/missile-defense system and an F-15 in a shelter at a Jordanian base under 'Operation Nasr 2' - the same attacker-sourced strike claim carried across the agency wires.

ANALYST NOTE As the government's own daily, Iran quietly does the most consequential framing work of all: by anchoring the council-election calendar to 'two months after the war's declared end,' an official body publicly presumes that the war is heading to a formal close - the institutional counterpart to the mediation lead. It stacks US-domestic-pressure signals (Schumer, ~100 wounded, an official's talks admission) to argue that Washington, not Tehran, needs the exit. This part is text-channel sourced (Iran was not among today's front-page scans), so headline placement is inferred from the channel rather than the printed page.

*"A Telling Blow to Trump"***HIGH: sustained strike-triumph and US-decline messaging; anti-diplomacy posture**

«ضربه کاری به ترامپ»

- Main (text channel): «ضربه کاری به ترامپ» ('a telling blow to Trump') builds on Western-press coverage (Wall Street Journal, New York Times) to claim Iranian missiles continue to penetrate US air defenses, citing 16 confirmed US military casualties from strikes on bases in Jordan; carried as an attributed claim, and note the casualty figure differs from the ~100-wounded figure in the Iran daily.
- Sub-item (text channel): «نقشه دور زدن هرمز» ('the map for bypassing Hormuz') engages the counter-argument to Iran's chokepoint leverage, citing Goldman Sachs projections that a large share of Hormuz oil transit could shift to alternative pipelines (Saudi East-West line, UAE Habshan-Fujairah) by 2027-2028 - a rare hardline acknowledgement of the limits of the Hormuz threat, framed to be rebutted.
- Sub-item (text channel): «شلیک به انبار تجزیه» ('firing on the separatists' arsenal') reports Iranian strikes on Kurdish separatist groups in northern Iraq, framed as pre-emption against a coordinated US-Israeli proxy strategy.
- Op-ed (text channel): «ترامپ؛ سلاح کشتار جمعی» ('Trump: a weapon of mass destruction'), citing a Guardian assessment that Trump is strategically adrift in the renewed Iran conflict with no viable exit - a second-hand Western-press rendering used to argue American incoherence.

ANALYST NOTE Vatan-e Emrooz keeps the hardline strike-triumph and US-decline lines running as the mediation track resurfaces, using Western outlets (WSJ, NYT, Guardian) as borrowed authority for US weakness. Notably, its 'map for bypassing Hormuz' piece concedes - even while trying to rebut it - that alternative pipelines could erode the chokepoint's leverage, a quiet admission that the Hormuz doctrine has a shelf life. This part is text-channel sourced (Vatan was not among today's front-page scans); base-strike and casualty specifics are attacker-sourced claims.

Appendix A - The Leader's lead message: the Strait of Hormuz as 'identity and civilization'

Hamshahri front page (30 Tir 1405), attributing the statement to the Leader (رهبر انقلاب, Mojtaba Khamenei); wording reconstructed from the printed front-page rendering, flagged as partial

The day's lead leadership message, as carried on the Hamshahri front page, addresses sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf. The printed rendering attributes to the Leader the assertion that the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf are, «بخشی از هویت و تمدن ماست» - 'beyond being a mere body of water, a part of our identity and our civilization.'

The framing recasts the chokepoint from a bargaining asset into a constitutive element of national identity, and by extension casts any negotiated concession over it as a surrender of that identity rather than a diplomatic trade-off. Hamshahri sharpens the point with its own kicker, that 'the Westernizers have this time written a JCPOA-style prescription for the Strait of Hormuz' - explicitly analogizing any Hormuz diplomacy to the perceived surrender of the nuclear accord.

Verification note: This monitor did not obtain a full primary-source transcript of the statement (khamenei.ir was not captured verbatim at compile time); the text above is reconstructed from the Hamshahri front-page rendering and should be read as an attributed paraphrase, not a verbatim quotation. Per standing context, 'the Leader / رهبر انقلاب' in current Iranian coverage denotes Mojtaba Khamenei; «شهید سیدعلی» denotes the martyred predecessor. Honorifics as printed.

Appendix B - The flagged editorial: Kayhan's 'Yadasht-e Rooz' on oil and the Strait

Kayhan 'Yadasht-e Rooz' daily note, 30 Tir 1405, by Hossein Shariatmadari (Kayhan managing editor); retrieved via the kayhan_online channel, full printed text not captured verbatim - reconstructed summary, flagged as partial

Author verification: the 'Yadasht-e Rooz' is Kayhan's signed daily note, written by managing editor Hossein Shariatmadari; today's installment takes oil and the Strait of Hormuz as its subject.

Argument, in summary: the column revives a historical trope - which it attributes to British intelligence influence - that Iranian oil was once branded 'najes' (impure) in order to discourage Iranians from exploiting their own resource. It then casts present-day Western objections, and those of domestic 'reformists,' to Iran's use of Hormuz leverage as a modern continuation of that same manipulation. It concludes that control of the Strait operates as a strategic deterrent comparable in weight to a nuclear weapon, and that giving up that leverage under the cover of negotiation would repeat a historic error.

Analyst flag: the editorial supplies the ideological backbone for the edition's 'Hormuz is non-negotiable' line and is the flagship's contribution to pre-framing the re-opened mediation track as a snare. The 'najes/impure' motif is echoed by a quotation fragment on the Kayhan front page. Verification note: the full printed column was not captured word-for-word at compile time; the above is a reconstructed summary and must not be reproduced as a verbatim quotation. Source line: Kayhan, 'Yadasht-e Rooz,' 30 Tir 1405.

Appendix C - Methodology and sourcing notes

iran-press-digest v2 pipeline

Coverage: nine Persian front-page scans from the NewspaperTasnim kiosk album for 30 Tir 1405 (Hamshahri, Sobh-e No, Javan, Kayhan, Chaharsu, Sazandegi, Jomhuri-ye Eslami, Ta'adol, Etemad), one English print scan (Iran Daily), plus outlet Telegram channels (Kayhan, Vatan-e Emrooz, Iran) and three agency wires (Defa Press, Fars News, Nour News). Two per-paper entries (Iran and Vatan-e Emrooz) are text-channel sourced rather than drawn from today's scan kiosk, and are labelled as such; headline placement for those two is inferred from the channel, not a printed page.

Availability: Tehran Times was unavailable at the time of compilation and could not be read directly; its usual English-daily coverage is represented here by the Iran Daily print scan. khamenei.ir was not captured for a verbatim Leader transcript; Appendix A is reconstructed from the Hamshahri front page and flagged as partial.

Attribution firewall: all Iranian military and battle-damage claims (Operation Nasr 2 strikes on US bases in Jordan, Kuwait and Bahrain; F-15 and MQ-9/aircraft kills; tanker interdictions in Hormuz; the Yemeni naval blockade of Saudi Arabia; US casualty figures of '16' per Vatan-e Emrooz and '~100 wounded' per the Iran daily) are recorded as attributed claims, not established facts, and the two casualty figures are noted as unreconciled. Second-hand Western-press renderings (New York Times on Trump and on concealed Pentagon losses; Wall Street Journal on penetrated air defenses; the Guardian on Trump; Alastair Crooke on Netanyahu) are flagged as the Iranian outlet's rendering and are not verified here; quoting a rendering does not authenticate it.

Named-figure verification: 'the Leader' denotes Mojtaba Khamenei per standing context (Ali Khamenei was assassinated 28 February 2026). The Hamas-succession claim (Khalil al-Hayya named successor to Yahya Sinwar) is carried by Kayhan and Javan and is recorded as an attributed claim pending independent confirmation. The 'message from the Leader to Khatami' is attributed to Mohammad-Ali Abtahi's account (via Sazandegi) and its content is unverified. Abdolnaser Hemmati is identified as economy minister / former central-bank governor per his role in the Pezeshkian government. World Cup 2026 result (Spain over Argentina) is attributed to the Iranian papers' sports coverage.

House rules: em dashes are avoided throughout; loaded regime vocabulary (najes/impure, siege-against-siege, 'the Cup of the Free') is glossed and kept in quotation as analytic evidence, not adopted as the monitor's own voice. Prepared for analysis and early warning; hostile content is documented for defensive assessment only.

Open-source material only. All translations from Persian/Arabic originals. Iranian claims are labelled as claims. Prepared for analysis and early warning; hostile content is documented for defensive assessment only, not endorsed.